People vs. Rafanan

The defense of insanity under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code requires proof of complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the criminal act; mere impairment of mental faculties, including schizophrenia, does not constitute an exempting circumstance but may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) when it diminishes the exercise of will-power without depriving the offender of consciousness of his acts.

Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. resided with his mother, Ines Rafanan, his wife, and his two children in Barangay San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. The household operated a store situated approximately six meters in front of their residence. In February 1976, Ines Rafanan hired Estelita Ronaya, then fourteen years old, as a househelper at a monthly salary of ₱30.00. Estelita lived and worked in the Rafanan household, performing domestic chores and occasionally assisting in the store.

On February 27, 1976, Estelita Ronaya, then fourteen years old, was hired as a househelper by Ines Rafanan, the mother of appellant Policarpio Rafanan, Jr., at a monthly salary of ₱30.00. Policarpio lived with his mother, his wife, and his two children in the same household at Barangay San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. The family also operated a store located about six meters in front of their house.

On the evening of March 16, 1976, after dinner, Ines Rafanan sent Estelita to help in the store, where Policarpio was then attending to customers. At around 11:00 p.m., Policarpio called Estelita to help him close the store doors. As she approached, he suddenly pulled her inside and said, "Come, let us have sexual intercourse." Estelita refused, struggled, and cried. Policarpio then drew a bolo approximately one and a half feet long, pointed it at her throat, and threatened to kill her if she resisted. He forced her onto a bamboo bed, removed her pants and underwear, unfastened his own pants, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her despite her continued resistance. After the intercourse, Policarpio warned Estelita not to report the matter to her mother or anyone in the household, threatening to kill her if she did.

Out of fear, Estelita did not report the assault immediately and remained in the Rafanan household that night. The following morning, she performed her usual chores. It was only on the evening of March 17, 1976, after the Rafanan family learned of the incident and a quarrel ensued among them, that Estelita returned to her own home. When her mother, Alejandra Ronaya, asked why she had come home, Estelita could only cry. The following morning, March 18, 1976, Estelita told her mother she had been raped. Alejandra immediately took her to Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis Police Force, a cousin of Estelita's father. Mairina advised them to proceed to the municipal building while he fetched the accused. Policarpio was later brought to the police headquarters along with the bolo he had allegedly used.

At arraignment, Policarpio pleaded not guilty. During trial, at the urging of defense counsel, the court suspended proceedings and ordered the appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. He was admitted on December 29, 1976 and remained there until June 26, 1978. Four clinical reports were prepared during his confinement, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E. Nerit. The first report, dated January 27, 1977, found appellant suffering from schizophrenia and concluded he was psychotic and could not stand trial. The second report, dated June 21, 1977, similarly found him still psychotic. The third report, dated October 5, 1977, noted improvement but recommended further treatment. The final report, dated June 26, 1978, found appellant in a "much improved condition" and "in a mental condition to stand court trial."

Trial resumed thereafter. The defense presented Dr. Arturo Nerit, who suggested that appellant had been ill one or two years before his admission, implying he was already suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the rape. The defense also presented Dr. Raquel Jovellano, a psychiatrist in private practice who had examined and treated appellant. On cross-examination, Dr. Jovellano testified that appellant was not completely devoid of consciousness, that he was conscious of threatening the victim, of forcing her to lie down, and of removing her clothing, and that a schizophrenic person is capable of planning a rape and performing preparatory acts. Dr. Jovellano acknowledged that schizophrenics may know what is wrong but lack inhibition. Notably, the defense did not present Dr. Masikip, the physician who had actually observed and examined appellant during his confinement at the National Mental Hospital.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant assailed the credibility of the complainant and her mother, contending that their testimonies were contradictory. He pointed to the complainant's testimony on direct examination that she immediately went home after the rape, which he claimed was at variance with her cross-examination testimony that she stayed in appellant's house until the following day. He also alleged that the complainant's claim that she left the house by herself contradicted her mother's testimony that the mother went to the store on the evening of March 17 and brought Estelita home.
• Hearsay Evidence: Appellant argued that the lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the prosecution, Exhibits B and C.
• Expert Testimony: Appellant contended that the lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert witnesses regarding his mental condition at the time of the alleged commission of the crime.
• Insanity Defense: Appellant maintained that he was suffering from insanity — specifically schizophrenia — at the time of the alleged rape and should therefore be exempt from criminal liability.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether inconsistencies in the testimonies of the complainant and her mother impair their credibility and warrant reversal of the conviction.
• Insanity Defense: Whether the accused was exempt from criminal liability on the ground that he was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the commission of the rape.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Whether schizophrenia should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential details that did not touch upon the manner in which the crime was committed and therefore did not impair the complainant's credibility.
• Insanity Defense: No. The defense of insanity was rejected because appellant failed to prove complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the criminal act, the controlling test under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code and prevailing jurisprudence.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Yes. Schizophrenia, while not exempting, was appreciated as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, as an illness diminishing the exercise of will-power without depriving the offender of consciousness of his acts, though it did not affect the penalty of reclusion perpetua prescribed as a single indivisible penalty under Article 63.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The apparently inconsistent statements made by the complainant were clarified by her on cross-examination. In any case, the inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential details — specifically, whether she went home immediately or stayed until the following day, and whether she left by herself or was fetched by her mother. These details did not touch upon the manner in which the crime was committed and therefore did not impair her credibility. The Court relied on prior cases holding that minor inconsistencies in testimony do not affect credibility. The commission of the crime was not seriously disputed by appellant; the complainant's testimony was clear and convincing as to the elements of the rape, including the threat with a bolo, the use of force, and the carnal knowledge.

• Insanity Defense: The Court analyzed the standards of legal insanity as elaborated in People vs. Formigones, which established two distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition — "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act," and (b) the test of volition — "total deprivation of freedom of the will." Examination of Philippine caselaw revealed common reliance on the test of cognition rather than on a test relating to freedom of the will; no case was found where the Court exempted an accused on the sole ground of total deprivation of freedom of the will without accompanying complete deprivation of intelligence. This is consistent with the principle that a person's volition naturally reaches out only toward that which is presented as desirable by his intelligence. In cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumstance, the Court had mostly rejected it, finding that impairment of mental faculties was not so complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or consciousness of his acts. In the instant case, Dr. Jovellano's testimony in substance negated complete destruction of intelligence at the time of the act: she admitted appellant was conscious of threatening the victim, of forcing her to lie down, and of removing her clothing, and that a schizophrenic is capable of planning a rape. The fact that appellant threatened the complainant with death should she reveal the assault indicated he was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of his act. The law presumes every man sane, and the burden of proving insanity rests on the accused. Appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the assault; the physicians' testimonies consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of schizophrenics and did not specifically relate to circumstances occurring on or before the day of the rape. The defense also chose not to present Dr. Masikip, the physician who had actually observed and examined appellant during confinement.

• Mitigating Circumstance: Following People vs. Puno, the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting because it does not completely deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts, may be considered a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code — as an illness which diminishes the exercise of the offender's will-power without depriving him of consciousness of his acts. Appellant should have been credited with this mitigating circumstance. However, it would not have affected the penalty imposable under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua in this case), it shall be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

• Test of Cognition for Insanity Defense — Under Philippine jurisprudence, the defense of insanity requires proof of "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act," meaning the accused was deprived of reason, acting without the least discernment, with complete absence of the power to discern. This is the test of cognition, as distinguished from the test of volition ("total deprivation of freedom of the will"). Philippine courts have consistently relied on the test of cognition, and no case has exempted an accused on the sole ground of total deprivation of freedom of the will without accompanying complete deprivation of intelligence. Where the accused fails to show complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court recognizes at most a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, not an exempting one.

• Burden of Proving Insanity — The law presumes every man sane. A person accused of a crime bears the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. Inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed. Expert testimony consisting of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns, without specifically relating to the accused's mental condition at the critical time of the offense, is insufficient to discharge this burden.

• Schizophrenia as a Mitigating Circumstance — Schizophrenia, while not an exempting circumstance because it does not completely deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts, may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, as an illness which diminishes the exercise of the offender's will-power without depriving him of consciousness of his acts. However, where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty such as reclusion perpetua, the mitigating circumstance does not affect the penalty imposed, pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Minor Inconsistencies in Testimony — Inconsistencies relating to minor and inconsequential details that do not touch upon the manner in which the crime was committed do not impair the credibility of a witness.

• "A linguistic or grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable tests (a) the test of cognition — 'complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act,' and (b) the test of volition — 'or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.' But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on a test relating to 'freedom of the will;' examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of 'freedom of the will,' i.e., without an accompanying 'complete deprivation of intelligence.'" — This passage articulates the Court's analytical framework distinguishing the cognitive and volitional tests for legal insanity, establishing that Philippine jurisprudence has consistently relied on the cognitive test.

• "The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita." — This passage states the burden of proof for the insanity defense and its application to the facts, emphasizing that inquiry must relate to the mental state at the time of the offense.

• "The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault." — This passage illustrates how the Court inferred consciousness and awareness of moral quality from the accused's post-act conduct, negating complete deprivation of intelligence.

• "In People v. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting because it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, may be considered as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an illness which diminishes the exercise of the offender's will-power without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts." — This passage states the canonical formulation of schizophrenia as a mitigating rather than exempting circumstance under Philippine law.

• People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658 (1950) — Controlling precedent for the standards of legal insanity. The Court elaborated on the required standards, quoting from the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, establishing the tests of cognition and volition. These standards were commonly adopted in subsequent cases.
• People vs. Puno, 105 SCRA 151 (1981) — Followed. The Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, while not exempting, may be considered a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code. This ruling was applied in the instant case to credit appellant with the mitigating circumstance.
• People vs. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451 (1986) — Followed. Cited as a case where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumstance and rejected, and as authority for the proposition that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed.
• People vs. Dungo, G.R. No. 89420, July 31, 1991 — Followed. Cited for the proposition that the law presumes every man sane and that the burden of proving insanity rests on the accused.
• People vs. Veloso, 148 SCRA 60 (1987); People vs. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500 (1987); People vs. Polo, 147 SCRA 551 (1987) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that inconsistencies relating to minor and inconsequential details do not impair the credibility of a witness.

• Article 12, Revised Penal Code — Provides that an imbecile or an insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. The Court applied this provision in evaluating appellant's defense of insanity, requiring proof of complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the act.
• Article 13(9), Revised Penal Code — Defines as a mitigating circumstance "[s]uch illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts." The Court applied this provision to appreciate schizophrenia as a mitigating circumstance, following People vs. Puno.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The Court applied this provision to explain that the mitigating circumstance of schizophrenia would not affect the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed for rape.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concurred.