People vs. Rafael

Conspiracy may be inferred from the assailants' acts before, during, and after the crime, and a generic aggravating circumstance that would raise the penalty to death must be alleged in the information to be appreciated. Thus, the brothers' concerted attack established conspiracy, while dwelling, though proven, could not raise the murder penalty because it was not alleged.

The victims were Alejandra Rafael and her daughter-in-law Gloria Tuatis-Rafael. Accused-appellants Melchor and Mario Rafael are brothers, and their father Maximo Rafael is the brother of Alejandra's husband. Maximo was also charged in the same informations and was tried ahead of his sons.

On the evening of August 28, 1994, Alejandra Rafael and her daughter-in-law Gloria Tuatis-Rafael were in the kitchen on the ground floor of their residence on Rosal Street, Pingkian, Barangay Pasong Tamo, Quezon City. Alejandra was setting the table while Gloria was cooking dinner. Hearing a commotion outside, Alejandra opened the kitchen door and saw Melchor Rafael standing outside with his brother Mario Rafael and their father Maximo Rafael, who was slightly behind Mario. Without warning, Melchor attacked Alejandra with a bolo, severing her left hand. He then struck Gloria on the head with the bolo. Wounded, Gloria tried to run away, but Mario pursued her outside. Melchor continued attacking Alejandra and stopped only because he thought she was already dead. Before losing consciousness, Alejandra heard Maximo tell his two sons to kill the victims.

Alejandra was rushed to the East Avenue Medical Center. A medical certificate issued on August 13, 1998 described her injuries as traumatic amputation of the left wrist and hacking wounds on the right hand, with an open complete fracture of the distal part of the third portion of the fourth phalanx and the proximal part of the second portion of the third phalanx; she underwent emergency debridement, pinning of the third and fourth phalanges, and tenorrhaphy of the third flexor digitorum on August 29, 1994. Rogelio Rafael, Gloria's husband and Alejandra's son, testified that he was asleep in his bedroom on the second floor when noise awakened him. Looking through the window, he saw his wife being pursued outside their house by Mario and Melchor, both armed with bolos. The two caught up with Gloria near the pigpen and took turns stabbing and hitting her with their bolos. Rogelio cursed them and rushed downstairs, but by the time he got out of the house they had run away.

Leonilo Hamoy, whose house adjoined that of the victims, testified that he was holding his child when he heard a commotion outside. Looking out of the window, he saw Gloria coming out of her house pursued by the accused-appellants. He saw Gloria stumble and fall to the ground, after which she was struck by the accused-appellants with their bolos. Dr. Florante F. Baltazar identified the medico-legal certificate and the sketches of Gloria's head and body injuries. Medico-Legal Report No. M-1402-94 stated that the cause of death was hacking and stab wounds to the head, body, and extremity.

Mario Rafael's defense was alibi. He testified that on August 14, 1994, he left for Isabela after learning from the mother of his common-law spouse Myrna that one of their children was sick, and that for the next two years he never left Isabela. Myrna corroborated him, saying that on August 28, 1994, Mario was with her in Malanit, Isabela, more than 250 kilometers from Quezon City, and that he stayed for two years working as a cook at the "Mabuhay" restaurant, of which she was the manager, until he was arrested sometime in September 1996.

Melchor Rafael admitted the crimes but invoked passion and obfuscation on his part and provocation on the part of the victims. He claimed that in the afternoon of August 28, 1994, Rogelio Rafael, whom he called "Kuya Robert," invited him to a drinking session at Rogelio's house. He arrived alone at around 7 o'clock in the evening and found Rogelio drinking with two companions; he joined them and consumed four bottles of beer. Gloria arrived while they were drinking, and the couple quarreled shortly thereafter. The couple went outside, and Gloria eventually returned and told him, "Punyeta nandito ka na naman!" and "Putang ina, wala na ba kayong magawa kundi ayain n[an]g ayain ang Kuya Robert mong uminom?" Alejandra arrived shortly and said, "Nandito na naman ang patay-gutom." Melchor claimed he lost control of himself ("nagdilim ang paningin ko"), got hold of two sharp objects, and struck Alejandra with them. When he saw Gloria running toward the door, he pursued her outside; when Gloria tripped near the pigpen and fell on her back, he stabbed her with the knife he was holding. He then went into hiding. On cross-examination, he denied harboring a grudge against Gloria and Alejandra.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Accused-appellants argued that the RTC gravely erred in convicting them despite the incredible, inconsistent, if not contradictory testimonies of prosecution witnesses; Alejandra Rafael admitted she was in the kitchen and could not have seen them help each other in attacking Gloria, and Leonilo Hamoy did not shout or do anything except watch them take turns in hacking and stabbing Gloria.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Accused-appellants argued that their guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• Conspiracy: Accused-appellants argued that the prosecution failed to establish conspiracy; proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime is necessary; Melchor Rafael claimed sole responsibility for the crimes.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Melchor Rafael invoked passion and obfuscation on his part and provocation on the part of the victims.
• Alibi: Mario Rafael maintained that he was in Isabela on August 28, 1994, more than 250 kilometers from Quezon City.

• Credibility and Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution witnesses' testimonies were credible and sufficient to prove accused-appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite alleged inconsistencies and Mario Rafael's alibi.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy between Melchor and Mario Rafael was established.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Whether Melchor Rafael's claim of passion and obfuscation, based on alleged provocation by the victims, should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
• Treachery and Evident Premeditation: Whether the crimes were qualified by treachery and whether evident premeditation was established.
• Dwelling as Aggravating Circumstance: Whether dwelling may be appreciated to raise the penalty when not alleged in the information.
• Damages: Whether the awards of actual, moral, exemplary, civil indemnity, and nominal damages were proper.

• Credibility and Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The prosecution witnesses positively identified accused-appellants, and the trial court's credibility findings are respected absent plainly overlooked facts; Mario's alibi cannot prevail over positive identification.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established; direct proof is not required and may be inferred from acts before, during, and after the crime.
• Passion and Obfuscation: No. Passion and obfuscation were not appreciated; there was no evidence other than Melchor's self-serving testimony of provocation, and his conduct showed a deliberate attack.
• Treachery and Evident Premeditation: Yes as to treachery; no as to evident premeditation. Treachery qualified the crimes because the attacks were without warning by armed men against defenseless women; evident premeditation was not established.
• Dwelling as Aggravating Circumstance: No. Dwelling, though proven, could not be appreciated because it was not alleged in the information; under RA No. 7659 and Rule 110, a generic aggravating circumstance that would raise the penalty to death must be alleged.
• Damages: Modified. Actual damages were deleted for lack of receipts; civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and nominal damages were awarded as modified.

• Credibility and Sufficiency of Evidence: The alleged inconsistency in Alejandra Rafael's testimony does not exist. She testified that she heard a commotion, opened the kitchen door to verify it, saw the three accused, and was immediately hacked by Melchor; the fact that she had not yet set the table because she saw them after opening the door does not mean she saw them through a closed door. Leonilo Hamoy's failure to shout or intervene is not surprising: he was holding his child, the events unfolded quickly, and different people react differently. The trial court's credibility findings are not disturbed absent plainly overlooked facts of substance. Alejandra and Leonilo positively identified accused-appellants, and Rogelio Rafael's account supported them; Mario's denial and alibi cannot prevail over positive identification.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy does not require proof of a previous agreement; direct proof is rarely found because criminals do not write down their plans. Conspiracy may be inferred from acts before, during, and after the crime. Here, both brothers were armed when they went to Rogelio's residence; when Gloria fled after being wounded by Melchor, Mario pursued her; when they caught up with her, they took turns stabbing and hacking her; and both fled and went into hiding. Melchor's claim that he was the sole assailant appeared intended to shield Mario, while the prosecution eyewitnesses had no improper motive. The SC had found no conspiracy between Maximo and his sons in Maximo's appeal, but the conspiracy between the two brothers was sufficiently and convincingly established in these cases.

• Passion and Obfuscation: Passion and obfuscation require an unlawful act sufficient to produce the condition of mind, and the act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed from the crime by a considerable length of time during which the perpetrator might recover moral equanimity. There was no evidence other than Melchor's self-serving testimony that the victims berated him. His conduct—grabbing not one but two sharp objects, then noticing Gloria running and stopping his attack on Alejandra to pursue Gloria—did not show a man in the grip of passion and obfuscation but one deliberately set on committing mayhem.

• Treachery and Evident Premeditation: Treachery requires (1) that at the time of the attack the victim was not in a position to defend himself and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack. Both conditions were met: the attacks were made without warning by armed men against defenseless women. Treachery absorbed abuse of superior strength, so the latter need not be appreciated separately. As to Alejandra, the number and severity of her wounds would have caused death had she not been rushed to the hospital and given timely medical attention, so the crime was frustrated murder. Evident premeditation was not established because there was no proof of the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, an act manifestly indicating that they clung to that determination, and sufficient lapse of time to reflect on the consequences.

• Dwelling as Aggravating Circumstance: Dwelling was proven: the two women were attacked inside their house, and Gloria was killed outside only because she ran outside to avoid further attack; the aggression began in the house though it ended outside. But under RA No. 7659, where a generic aggravating circumstance would raise the penalty to death, it must be alleged in the information. Rule 110, Secs. 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure require qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be stated in the information, and those provisions were given retroactive effect. Because dwelling was not alleged, it could not be appreciated to raise the penalty.

• Damages: Actual damages for funeral and medical expenses in both cases were deleted for lack of receipts or any documents evidencing them, as required by Art. 2199 of the Civil Code; the receipts apparently were presented only in Maximo Rafael's trial. Nominal damages of P10,000 in each case may be awarded so that the victims' rights may be recognized or vindicated. Civil indemnity was fixed at P50,000 for the murder of Gloria and P30,000 for the frustrated murder of Alejandra; moral damages at P50,000 in each case; and exemplary damages at P25,000 in each case because treachery and dwelling were established, pursuant to Art. 2230 of the Civil Code.

• Conspiracy inferred from acts — Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found; conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the assailants before, during, and after the commission of the crime. The SC applied this to the brothers' armed approach, pursuit of Gloria, combined attack, and flight.
• Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification — Mario's alibi was corroborated by Myrna, but the positive identification by Alejandra and Leonilo, supported by Rogelio, prevailed.
• Treachery requisites — Treachery requires (1) that at the time of the attack the victim was not in a position to defend himself and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack. The SC found both conditions met and held that treachery absorbed abuse of superior strength.
• Passion and obfuscation requisites — Passion and obfuscation require an unlawful act sufficient to produce the condition of mind, and the act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed from the crime by a considerable length of time during which the perpetrator might recover moral equanimity. Self-serving testimony of provocation is insufficient.
• Aggravating circumstance must be alleged — Under RA No. 7659 and Rule 110, Secs. 8 and 9, a generic aggravating circumstance that would raise the penalty to death must be alleged in the information. Dwelling, though proven, was not appreciated for the penalty because it was not alleged.
• Frustrated murder — The crime is frustrated murder when the number and severity of wounds would have caused death had the victim not been rushed to the hospital and given timely medical attention. The SC applied this to Alejandra's injuries.
• Actual damages require proof; nominal damages may be awarded — Actual damages require receipts or documents under Art. 2199 of the Civil Code; absent such proof, actual damages were deleted, but nominal damages of P10,000 per case were awarded to recognize or vindicate the victims' rights.
• Exemplary damages from aggravating circumstances — Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The SC awarded P25,000 in each case because treachery and dwelling were established.

• "For direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, as criminals do not write down their lawless plans and plots." — The SC used this to explain why conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence rather than direct proof.
• "Certainly, conspiracy can be inferred from the acts of the assailants before, during, and after the commission of the crime." — The SC applied this to the brothers' armed approach, pursuit, combined attack, and flight.
• "The two conditions for treachery, i.e., (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him, have thus been met in this case." — The SC used this to qualify the attacks as treacherous.
• "The death sentence being irrevocable, we cannot allow the decision to take away life to hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of the accused in predicting what aggravating circumstance will be appreciated against him." — The SC quoted this in holding that dwelling must be alleged in the information before it can raise the penalty to death.

• People vs. Gallego, 338 SCRA 21 (2000) — Controlling precedent: a generic aggravating circumstance that would raise the penalty to death must be alleged in the information.
• People vs. Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, Aug. 23, 2001 — Cited to support the award of exemplary damages under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code.
• People vs. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 137494-95, Oct. 25, 2001 — Cited for the two conditions of treachery.
• People vs. Lobino, 317 SCRA 606 (1999) — Cited for the requisites of passion and obfuscation.
• People vs. Estepano, 307 SCRA 701 (1999) — Cited for the rule that proof of a previous agreement is not necessary to establish conspiracy.
• People vs. Pagpaguitan, 315 SCRA 226 (1999) — Cited for the rule that direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found.
• People vs. Templa, G.R. No. 121897, Aug. 16, 2001 — Cited for the rule that conspiracy may be inferred from acts before, during, and after the crime.
• People vs. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 121039-45, Oct. 18, 2001 — Cited to support the award of nominal damages.

• Revised Penal Code, Art. 245, in relation to Arts. 50 and 61(2) — The SC stated that the penalty for frustrated murder is reclusion temporal and applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law; the RTC sentence for frustrated murder was within the range and was affirmed.
• Revised Penal Code, Art. 14 — Evident premeditation was alleged but not established because there was no proof of the time of determination, an act manifesting determination, and sufficient lapse of time.
• RA No. 7659 — Under this law, a generic aggravating circumstance that would raise the penalty to death must be alleged in the information; dwelling was not alleged.
• Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Secs. 8 and 9 — These require the information to state qualifying and aggravating circumstances; the SC gave them retroactive effect.
• Civil Code, Art. 2230 — Exemplary damages may be awarded when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances; applied despite dwelling not being alleged for the penalty.
• Civil Code, Art. 2199 — Actual damages require proof; absent receipts or documents, the actual damages awarded by the RTC were deleted.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to the frustrated murder conviction; the minimum of the penalty was within prision mayor, and the RTC sentence was within the proper range.