People vs. Rabanal

Self-defense cannot be sustained where unlawful aggression had already ceased at the time of the fatal attack, and treachery and cruelty must be proved as clearly as the killing itself. The successive close-range shots against an unarmed, intoxicated victim who had laid down his firearm demonstrated a determined intent to kill rather than self-preservation, while the absence of proof of conscious adoption of treacherous means and of deliberate prolongation of suffering reduced the crime to homicide without aggravation or mitigation.

Bonnie R. Rabanal was a security guard posted at the McDonald's restaurant inside the CSI building in Dagupan City, Pangasinan. Roberto Pascua, also called Rudy Pascua, was the security coordinator of the same building. The governing charge was Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, which qualifies unlawful killing by circumstances including treachery.

At about 2:00 a.m. on August 11, 1996, in front of the McDonald's restaurant inside the CSI building in Dagupan City, security guard Bonnie R. Rabanal fatally shot Roberto Pascua, the building's security coordinator. According to prosecution eyewitness Freddie Soriano, also a security guard of the CSI building, Rabanal repeatedly shot Pascua at close range, fired another shot after Pascua fell, then took the victim's gun and fled. Pascua was rushed to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City where he was declared dead on arrival, having sustained four gunshot wounds to the chest, all fatal.

Rabanal, for his part, testified that Pascua approached his usual post armed and reeking of alcohol, suddenly kicked the podium so that it fell on him, and demanded P100.00 per head monthly from the security guards. When Rabanal asked what was the matter, Pascua allegedly said, "You're hard-headed security guards, I told you to give me P100.00 per head monthly but you refused to give, are you going to give me or not?" Pascua then drew his firearm and said, "If that's the thing you want to happen, I better kill you." Rabanal pleaded for his life while Pascua demanded surrender of Rabanal's firearm.

While Pascua was reaching for Rabanal's holster, Rabanal pushed him and grabbed his gun, causing Pascua to lose balance and stagger backwards. At that instant, Rabanal drew his pistol and pulled the trigger four times, felling Pascua, then took the gun from Pascua's hand to bring to the security agency as proof that someone attempted to kill him. The record showed Pascua laid his handgun down on the nearby concrete porch or pavement shortly before being shot, and that Rabanal had shoved the intoxicated victim before firing. Pascua was a 46-year-old, 5'2" in height, armed with a 9mm Colt MK IV, while Rabanal was a 27-year-old, 5'5", sober guard armed with a .38 caliber pistol.

That same day Rabanal voluntarily surrendered himself and Pascua's firearm to Supt. Enrique Galang at Camp Crame, explaining he did not surrender in Dagupan because of Pascua's influence as bodyguard of Belen Fernandez, and he was brought to the Lingayen Police Station the following day. The Dagupan City Police Station was only a few meters away from the locus criminis, and Rabanal fled the scene taking the victim's gun with him.

• Self-Defense: Petitioner argued that all elements of self-defense were present and the trial court's contrary finding rested on conjectural, preposterous, and illogical reasons.
• Continuing Aggression: Petitioner maintained that the victim's unlawful aggression was continuing whether or not he momentarily tripped, lost balance, or lowered his guard, emphasizing the victim's predisposition to violence and intimidation and his possession of a more powerful 9mm Colt MK IV compared to petitioner's inferior .38 caliber pistol.
• Treachery: Petitioner argued that there was no treachery in a face-to-face encounter with a deceased whose firearm was within easy reach, and that he never employed means to ensure success without risk to himself.
• Cruelty: Petitioner argued that cruelty refers to the manner of execution and not the number of mortal wounds inflicted in self-defense, so the number of wounds alone could not support the finding.
• Voluntary Surrender: Petitioner argued that voluntary surrender should have been appreciated despite surrender at Camp Crame and not at Dagupan, characterizing the trial court's refusal as whimsical and unjustified.
• Damages: Petitioner argued that the trial court committed error by awarding an unconscionable amount of damages.

• Self-Defense: Whether accused-appellant acted in self-defense when he shot the victim four times.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing so as to qualify it as murder.
• Cruelty: Whether cruelty aggravated the killing based on the number of mortal wounds inflicted.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether voluntary surrender should mitigate criminal liability where accused-appellant surrendered at Camp Crame and not in Dagupan.
• Damages: Whether the awards for burial expenses, loss of earnings, civil indemnity, and moral damages were proper.

• Self-Defense: No. Self-defense was not established because unlawful aggression had ceased when the victim laid down his gun, and the successive close-range shots were not rationally necessary.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not proven, there being no showing of the two requisites and no description of a sudden, unexpected attack consciously adopted.
• Cruelty: No. Cruelty was not present, the four gunshots having been fired in quick succession without proof of deliberate, sadistic prolongation of suffering.
• Voluntary Surrender: No. Voluntary surrender was not appreciated, the surrender not being spontaneous after flight from a nearby police station.
• Damages: Partly yes. Civil indemnity and moral damages were affirmed, actual burial expenses were reduced to proven amounts, and loss of earning capacity was deleted for lack of unbiased proof.

• Self-Defense: Self-defense requires (1) unlawful aggression by the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation by the defender, with unlawful aggression as the primordial element presupposing an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger, not mere threatening attitude. Even accepting that the drunken victim initially brandished his handgun, the evidence showed he laid it down on the nearby concrete porch shortly before being shot, so peril was neither actual nor imminent when accused-appellant fired. Having shoved the intoxicated victim who staggered backwards, accused-appellant became the aggressor by firing several times; under the conditions — a youthful, sober 27-year-old, 5'5" guard versus a middle-aged, drunken 46-year-old, 5'2" victim with impaired reflexes — subduing the unarmed victim was feasible. The means were unreasonable because four close-range shots concentrated on the chest, each fatal, demonstrated determined intent to kill, with nature and number of wounds constituting important indicia negating self-defense.
• Treachery: Qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be proven with equal certainty as the criminal act itself. Treachery requires (1) the victim was not in a position to defend himself at the time of attack, and (2) conscious adoption of the particular means, method, or form of attack, with essence in a swift, unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without provocation, present and seen at the inception of the attack. No particulars were established on how the killing began — whether sudden, unexpected, or catching the victim unaware — nor that execution was consciously or deliberately adopted, and doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. Absent treachery, the crime was homicide, not murder, punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium period with no modifying circumstance, resulting in an indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of prision mayor to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
• Cruelty: Cruelty exists when the culprit enjoys and delights in making the victim suffer slowly and gradually, deliberately increasing suffering for pleasure and satisfaction, denoting sadism, malice, and perversity; the test is deliberate and sadistic augmentation of suffering, requiring proof the victim was made to agonize. Other than number and location of wounds from four gunshots fired in quick succession, no evidence showed cruelty or sadism, and successive wounds with no appreciable interval to prolong suffering do not suffice.
• Voluntary Surrender: Voluntary surrender requires (1) no actual arrest, (2) surrender to a person in authority, and (3) voluntary, spontaneous surrender unconditionally acknowledging guilt or saving authorities trouble and expense. Accused-appellant fled after the crime taking the victim's gun although the Dagupan City Police Station was meters away, with claimed fear of influence unsupported and indicative of guilt; flight implies admission of guilt and desire to evade responsibility. Later surrender without resistance does not constitute voluntary surrender, nor was it spontaneous.
• Damages: Civil indemnity of P50,000.00 requires no proof other than death and was affirmed under prevailing jurisprudence, as was P50,000.00 moral damages for the family's pain and anguish. Actual pecuniary loss must be established by credible evidence such as receipts; bare allegations by the widow without computation could not sustain P26,000.00 for the Eternal Garden plot, P60,000.00 for coffin, and P100,000.00 for wake expenses totaling P186,000.00, so the award was reduced to P66,000.00 borne out by evidence. Loss of earning capacity partakes of actual damages requiring unbiased proof of average, not gross, income; the widow's self-serving testimony was insufficient under People vs. Panabang and People vs. Cuenca, so the P5,440,800.00 award was deleted.

• Self-Defense; Elements and Primordial Unlawful Aggression — Self-defense requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of (1) unlawful aggression by the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the defender. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger to life and limb at the time of defensive action, not mere threatening attitude; without it, neither complete nor incomplete self-defense can prosper. Applied here, initial brandishing did not sustain the plea because aggression had ceased when the gun was laid down.
• (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
• (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it
• (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself
• Unlawful Aggression; Actual or Imminent Peril — There is unlawful aggression when peril to life, limb, or right is either actual, meaning presently in existence, or imminent, meaning on the point of happening. A victim already unarmed when shot, having laid his gun on the pavement, no longer presents such peril, enabling the defender to push him away rather than fire successively.
• Reasonable Necessity of Means — The means employed must be rationally necessary, judged by rational equivalence considering the emergency, imminent danger, instinct impelling defense, and the nature and quality of the aggressor's weapon, his physical condition, character, size, and other circumstances, as well as those of the defender and the place and occasion. The number and nature of wounds inflicted are important indicia disproving self-defense when they show determined effort to kill. Applied here, four fatal close-range chest wounds against an unarmed, intoxicated, smaller victim by a bigger, sober guard were unreasonable.
• Treachery or Alevosia; Elements and Proof — Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms tending directly and specially to insure execution without risk from defense the offended party might make. Its elements are (1) the victim was not in a position to defend himself at the time of attack, and (2) conscious adoption of the particular means of attack; its essence is swift, unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without provocation, present at the inception and proved as clearly as the killing, with doubt resolved for the accused. Absence of description of how the attack commenced precluded a finding of treachery.
• (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself
• (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed
• Cruelty; Test — Cruelty requires proof the accused for pleasure and satisfaction deliberately and sadistically augmented the victim's suffering, causing unnecessary physical and moral pain slowly and gradually before death. Mere successive wounds with no appreciable interval showing intent to prolong suffering is insufficient. Four gunshots in quick succession without evidence of agonizing did not establish cruelty.
• Voluntary Surrender; Elements and Flight — Voluntary surrender requires (1) the offender has not been actually arrested, (2) surrender to a person in authority, and (3) spontaneous, voluntary, unconditional surrender acknowledging guilt or saving authorities trouble and expense. Flight strongly indicates a guilty mind and betrays a guilty conscience, negating spontaneity, and mere non-resistance upon later apprehension is not voluntary surrender. Flight to Camp Crame despite a nearby station defeated the claim.
• (1) the offender has not been actually arrested
• (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority
• (3) the surrender was voluntary
• Damages; Civil Indemnity, Moral, Actual, and Loss of Earning Capacity — Civil indemnity of P50,000.00 requires no proof beyond death, and moral damages of P50,000.00 follow from the family's pain and anguish. Actual pecuniary loss must be established by credible evidence such as receipts, and loss of earning capacity, partaking of actual damages, requires unbiased proof of average income, not self-serving statements of gross income. Unsupported burial claims were reduced to P66,000.00 and the loss-of-earnings award deleted.

• "If no unlawful aggression has been proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete." — States the primordial requirement of unlawful aggression that defeats self-defense when the victim was already unarmed at the time of shooting.
• "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — Defines the canonical formulation of alevosia whose two elements were found absent, reducing murder to homicide.
• "There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act." — Articulates the test for cruelty requiring deliberate, sadistic prolongation of suffering, not satisfied by successive quick gunshots.
• "Flight strongly indicates a guilty mind and betrays the existence of a guilty conscience." — Explains why fleeing the nearby police station negated spontaneity and voluntary surrender.

• People vs. Herrera, G.R. Nos. 140557-58, 5 December 2001 — Cited as authority that flight implies admission of guilt and that a righteous individual claiming justification would report to police rather than escape.
• People vs. Encomienda, 46 SCRA 522, 534 [1972] — Cited for the rule that reasonable necessity depends on emergency, imminent danger, and instinct impelling defense, not merely harm done.
• People vs. Zeta, G.R. Nos. 140901-02, 9 May 2002 — Cited for the rule that nature and number of wounds are important indicia disproving self-defense as showing determined effort to kill.
• People vs. Panabang, G.R. Nos. 137514-15, January 16, 2002; People vs. Cuenca, G.R. No. 143819, January 29, 2002 — Followed for the rule that loss of earning capacity requires unbiased proof of average income and cannot rest on self-serving testimony.
• People vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 134762, 23 July 2002 — Cited for the definition of treachery and for the consequence that absence of treachery renders the crime homicide, not murder.
• People vs. Basao, 310 SCRA 743 [1999] — Cited for the rule that successive wounds without appreciable interval to prolong suffering do not prove cruelty.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 — Defines murder as unlawful killing qualified by circumstances including treachery; invoked in the information but held inapplicable for failure to prove treachery.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Punishes homicide with reclusion temporal; applied after treachery was rejected, with penalty imposed in medium period absent modifying circumstances.
• Article 64 (1), Revised Penal Code — Governs imposition of penalty in medium period when there is no modifying circumstance; applied to fix homicide penalty.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Requires a minimum term from the penalty next lower in degree, prision mayor; applied to impose eight years and one day of prision mayor to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal.

Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur. Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave. Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.