People vs. Quirol

The testimony of a lone eyewitness, if found credible by the trial court, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder, and conspiracy may be proven by the coordinated acts of the accused showing a common purpose and design. The Court also held that treachery is present when the concerted acts of the accused were consciously and deliberately adopted to ensure that the victims could not defend themselves or retaliate.

The case involves the prosecution of Juanito Quirol and Mario Quirol, along with PO3 Jed Daloso (who remained at large), for the murder of Benjamin Silva and Roel Ngujo. The crimes were committed on December 5, 1993, prior to the effectivity of R.A. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law), which was approved on December 13, 1993. The applicable penalty for murder at the time of the commission of the crimes was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.

On December 4, 1993, a "benefit disco dance" was held at the UCMA Village in Apas, Lahug, Cebu City, in celebration of a fiesta. Appellants Juanito and Mario Quirol, the victims Benjamin Silva and Roel Ngujo, and PO3 Jed Daloso, a third accused who remains at large, all attended the event. During the dance, Juanito, Mario, and Jed drank together throughout the night. Jed was later seen in a drunken state chasing people, while Juanito was seen toying with a Batangas knife.

The dance ended just prior to 4 a.m. Prosecution principal witness Wilson Cruz testified that he was asked by Benjamin and Roel to accompany them in escorting some ladies home. Wilson told them to go ahead and that he would follow, remaining behind at a distance of 7 to 10 fathoms. As the group passed by Jed's house, Wilson saw Jed stop the two victims, frisk them, and bind them together with a pair of handcuffs. Jed then led them towards the control tower of the old airport of Lahug, where they were met by Juanito and Mario. Together, they proceeded to the airport runway. Wilson, hidden behind a bush, heard Benjamin plead for his life. Jed then took out his .38 caliber service revolver and shot Benjamin at point-blank range on the head. As Benjamin fell, Roel was dragged down to his knees since he was handcuffed to Benjamin. Mario held Roel while Juanito stabbed him with a Batangas knife, and Jed finished by shooting Roel.

At around 7 a.m. that same morning, Juanito went to collect his wages at the house of Galileo Banate, a construction foreman. Galileo observed Juanito to be in an inebriated state and allowed him to sleep on the floor. Juanito unconsciously dropped his Batangas knife, which Galileo picked up and kept. Four days later, Mario arrived with a policeman and picked up Juanito, who asked for his knife back. Galileo retrieved the knife and turned it over to the policeman. A subsequent examination revealed that the knife had human bloodstains on it.

Mario attempted to establish the defense of alibi, testifying that he arrived at the dance at 7 p.m. and never left the dance area, falling asleep drunk on the drinking table at around 2 a.m. He claimed he was awakened at 5 a.m. by Exequiel Aranas, who corroborated his testimony. Juanito, for his part, admitted being present at the scene but denied complicity, claiming that Jed had forced him to accompany the group and that he ran home upon hearing a gun burst.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Appellants argued that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly questioning the testimony of Wilson Cruz, the lone eyewitness upon which the convictions were heavily based.
• Misapprehension of Facts: Appellants claimed that Wilson could not have hidden behind a bush as the runways are always clear from obstruction, and that if a bush existed, it would be too far for Wilson to see the crime considering the darkness of the night.
• Unnatural Behavior of Witness: Appellants argued that it was contrary to common experience for Wilson not to offer assistance to his friends or report the matter to the police immediately, and for Mario to hold Roel while being stabbed and shot, as it would risk getting injured by a wayward thrust or bullet.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the arguments of the appellee (the People of the Philippines) beyond the prosecution's evidence presented at trial.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution's evidence, particularly the testimony of lone eyewitness Wilson Cruz, was sufficient to establish appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy among the appellants and their co-accused was sufficiently proven.
• Alibi: Whether Mario's defense of alibi, corroborated by Exequiel Aranas, should prevail over the positive identification by Wilson Cruz.
• Treachery: Whether treachery was correctly found to qualify the crimes as murder.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed given the crimes were committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. 7659.
• Damages: Whether the award of actual damages should be modified to temperate damages.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The prosecution's evidence was sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court's factual findings and credibility assessments being entitled to respect in the absence of glaring errors or gross misapprehension of facts.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was sufficiently proven by the coordinated acts of the appellants and Jed, who met at the old airport tower and walked together towards the runway where they performed acts in unison, unmistakably revealing a common purpose and design.
• Alibi: No. Mario's alibi, despite corroboration, is an inherently weak defense that cannot prevail over positive identification from a witness found credible by the trial court.
• Treachery: Yes. The concerted acts of the appellants and Jed were consciously and deliberately adopted so that the victims would not be in a position to defend themselves or to retaliate.
• Penalty: Yes. Since the crimes were committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. 7659, and there being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed.
• Damages: Modified. In lieu of actual damages, temperate damages of ₱15,000 were awarded to each set of heirs, since pecuniary loss was present but its amount could not be proven with certainty.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Court ruled that appellants' arguments pertained to alleged misapprehension of facts by the trial court, followed by the offering of unreasonable surmises and conjectures which cannot justifiably be used to overturn a conviction. The prevailing evidentiary tenet is that findings of the trial court which are factual in nature and which revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected in the absence of glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of facts. The Court also noted that not every witness to a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably to expectation, as different people react differently to a given situation, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when confronted with a strange or frightful experience. It was more reasonable to expect that Wilson would stay put and wait until after the perpetrators had left, which is exactly what he did.

• Conspiracy: The Court held that conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime, nor is it necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What has to be shown is that all the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design. In this case, the conspiracy was sufficiently proven by Jed meeting with appellants at the old airport tower and walking together with them towards the runway where they performed acts in unison.

• Alibi: The Court ruled that alibi, despite corroboration, is still an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over a positive identification from a witness found credible by the trial court. Assessments of credibility are generally left to the trial court whose proximate contact with those who take the witness stand places it in a more competent position to discriminate between true and false testimony. Moreover, the distance between the scene of the crimes and where Mario claims he passed out was not so far away as to prevent him from being physically present at the place of the crimes or its immediate vicinity at the time the crimes were committed.

• Treachery: The Court found that treachery was correctly present as the evidence shows that the concerted acts of appellants and Jed were consciously and deliberately adopted so that the victims would not be in a position to defend themselves or to retaliate. The crimes were therefore properly qualified to murder.

• Penalty: Since the crimes were committed on December 5, 1993, prior to the effectivity of R.A. 7659, the penalty for murder then was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed should be the medium range thereof, namely, reclusion perpetua.

• Damages: In accordance with the ruling in People vs. Mahilum, the Court awarded temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code in the amount of ₱15,000, since pecuniary loss is present but its amount cannot be proven with certainty. No modification was made on the award of civil indemnity and moral damages as these were in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.

• Credibility of Witnesses — Findings of the trial court which are factual in nature and which revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected in the absence of glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of facts, or where no speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gleaned from such findings. The trial court's proximate contact with those who take the witness stand places it in a more competent position to discriminate between true and false testimony.

• Conspiracy — Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime, nor is it necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What has to be shown is that all the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design.

• Alibi — Alibi is an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over a positive identification from a witness found credible by the trial court. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown that the accused was so far away from the scene of the crime that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the time of its commission.

• Treachery — Treachery is present when the concerted acts of the accused were consciously and deliberately adopted so that the victims would not be in a position to defend themselves or to retaliate.

• Temperate Damages — Under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be awarded in lieu of actual damages when pecuniary loss is present but its amount cannot be proven with certainty.

• "Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. Neither is its necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What has to be shown is that all the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on conspiracy, which the Court applied to sustain the finding of conspiracy in this case.

• "The fact of the matter is that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or frightful experience." — This statement addresses the appellants' attack on the credibility of the eyewitness, establishing that witnesses cannot be expected to act uniformly in frightening situations.

• "All things considered, it is more reasonable to expect that rather than leave his hiding place and risk being seen, the witness would stay put and wait until after the perpetrators of the crime had left, which is exactly what he did." — This passage explains the Court's reasoning in upholding the credibility of the lone eyewitness despite the appellants' arguments about his allegedly unnatural behavior.

• People vs. Mirafuentes, G.R. Nos. 135850-52, January 16, 2001, 349 SCRA 204 — Cited for the principle that findings of the trial court which are factual in nature and revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected in the absence of glaring errors.
• People vs. Martinez, G.R. No. 124892, January 30, 2001, 350 SCRA 537 — Cited for the proposition that not every witness to a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably to expectation.
• People vs. Tio, G.R. Nos. 132482-83, February 20, 2001, 352 SCRA 295 — Cited for the principle that there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or frightful experience.
• People vs. Balanag, G.R. No. 103225, September 15, 1994, 236 SCRA 474 — Cited for the doctrine that conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior agreement.
• People vs. Givera, G.R. No. 132159, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 513 — Cited for the rule that what must be shown for conspiracy is that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design.
• People vs. Olivo, Jr., G.R. No. 130335, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 499 — Cited for the principle that assessments of credibility are generally left to the trial court.
• People vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 128105, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 189 — Cited for the rule that alibi cannot prevail when the distance between the scene of the crime and the accused's location does not prevent physical presence at the time of the crime.
• People vs. Bacho, G.R. No. 66645, March 29, 1989, 171 SCRA 458 — Cited for the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua as the medium range where there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances.
• People vs. Mahilum, G.R. No. 137990, September 27, 2002, 390 SCRA 91 — Cited as controlling precedent for the award of temperate damages in lieu of actual damages when pecuniary loss is present but its amount cannot be proven with certainty.

• Art. 2224, Civil Code — The Court applied this provision to award temperate damages of ₱15,000 to each set of heirs in lieu of actual damages, since pecuniary loss was present but its amount could not be proven with certainty.
• R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) — The Court noted that the crimes were committed on December 5, 1993, prior to the effectivity of R.A. 7659 on December 13, 1993, and therefore the penalty for murder at the time was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, not the increased penalty under R.A. 7659.
• Section 13, Article VIII, Constitution — Referenced in the certification that the conclusions in the decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman)
• Quisumbing, J.
• Ynares-Santiago, J.
• Carpio, J.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the provided case text.