People vs. Quilaton

Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proven positively; it cannot be appreciated in the absence of evidence of the mode of attack. Where the attack was preceded by a heated argument and the sole eyewitness did not witness the actual stabbing, the attack cannot be fairly regarded as sudden and unexpected, and the victim should have been aware that he was inviting trouble.

The appellant was a laborer at the Bureau of Forest Development assigned at the PROFEM Nursery in San Agustin, San Simon, Pampanga until his services were terminated on 3 June 1983. The victim, Rolando Manahan, was the officer-in-charge of the PROFEM. The appellant had been spending the night in one of the rooms of the PROFEM office, sometimes bringing women from the town, which became the subject of the confrontation that led to the killing.

On 16 August 1983, between 6:00 and 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Rolando Manahan, officer-in-charge of the PROFEM, called for appellant Gumercindo Quilaton to see him at his office. The appellant, who was around the PROFEM office at that time, refused. Manahan came out and admonished the appellant to discontinue his practice of sleeping inside the office, sometimes with women brought from the town. A heated exchange of words ensued. The appellant later requested Lamberto Abugan, an employee of the PROFEM, to give him his bag of clothes, and with the bag, he left the office.

Manahan decided to follow the appellant, apparently to make certain that he would leave the premises. Abugan also went out to look after them and caught up with the two at the provincial road, where he saw Manahan kick the appellant's shoes which were lying on the road; the heated altercation continued. Moments later, the appellant pulled a fan knife (balisong) from his right hip and told Manahan: "this time I am going to kill you, I shall not forgive you." Manahan started to run away; the appellant chased him. Abugan ran from the scene to seek help and proceeded to the police headquarters, returning with Pfc. Nicolas Yambao. They saw Manahan lying on the road, already dead. The appellant was found in Sampaloc, Apalit, Pampanga, where he was arrested and searched; a fan knife and a bloodstained shirt were recovered from his possession. A post mortem examination conducted by Dra. Maria Theresa Santos indicated that Manahan sustained seven wounds, two of which, located in the chest, were fatal.

The appellant submitted a different version of the facts. He alleged that when he left the PROFEM office, he became alarmed upon noting that Manahan was following him. He quickened his steps but fell on the ground, and his shoes spilled onto the road. Manahan kicked his shoes away and continued walking. As Manahan came nearer, the appellant ran away only to be stopped in a fenced area, where Manahan attacked him with a bladed weapon. The appellant was able to wrest possession of the bladed weapon and instinctively stabbed Manahan until the latter died. The appellant claims that after the incident, he walked towards Apalit, Pampanga to surrender, and was on his way when the police arrested him.

The prosecution marked in evidence a letter from the INP Station Commander in Dalaguete, Cebu, informing the INP Station Commander in San Simon, Pampanga that the appellant had two pending cases in Dalaguete, Cebu — one for murder and another for double murder — with certified true copies of alias warrants for his arrest. The appellant denied the pendency of these cases on cross-examination, as well as any knowledge of the mayor, station commander, or any pending cases in his town. The trial court rejected the appellant's testimony on self-defense because it was not supported by convincing corroborative evidence and because the trial court perceived the appellant to be a liar. The trial court instead gave credence to the testimony of Lamberto Abugan, who had seen the appellant initiate a deadly assault on the victim by drawing a fan knife from his right hip and announcing his intention to kill Manahan.

• Self-Defense: The appellant contended that he had acted in self-defense when he stabbed Rolando Manahan to death, imputing unlawful aggression to Manahan, who deeply resented him as a cumulative result of antecedent events: (1) Manahan had been reprimanded for his inaction on the report that had reached the Central Office that the appellant was bringing girls during the night inside the PROFEM office; and (2) Manahan was humiliated by the appellant's lack of respect in refusing to see him at his office.
• Victim as Aggressor: The appellant argued that the trial court gravely erred in not finding that the victim was armed with a bladed weapon and was the aggressor.
• Treachery: The appellant argued that the trial court gravely erred in finding that the killing of the victim was qualified by treachery.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The prosecution relied on the testimony of Lamberto Abugan, who had seen the appellant initiate a deadly assault on the victim by drawing a fan knife from his right hip and announcing his intention to kill Manahan.
• Conviction for Homicide: The Solicitor General agreed that the appellant should be convicted of homicide only, not murder, because treachery was not adequately established.

• Self-Defense: Whether the appellant acted in self-defense when he stabbed Rolando Manahan to death.
• Treachery: Whether the killing of the victim was qualified by treachery.
• Damages: Whether the trial court's awards of indemnity for death, actual damages, and moral damages were proper.

• Self-Defense: No. The appellant's claim of self-defense was rejected, as his uncorroborated testimony was disbelieved by the trial court, which perceived him to be a liar.
• Treachery: No. Treachery cannot be appreciated in the absence of evidence of the mode of attack; it cannot be presumed but must be proven positively. The sole eyewitness did not witness the actual stabbing, and the attack was preceded by a heated argument.
• Damages: Partially. The indemnity for death was reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 conformably with prevailing jurisprudence. The award of P250,000.00 as "moral damages" was set aside, and separate amounts were awarded for lost earnings (P114,000.00), educational assistance to the victim's sisters (P10,000.00), and moral damages (P20,000.00).

• Self-Defense: By invoking self-defense as a justifying circumstance, the appellant in effect admitted that he had indeed killed Rolando Manahan. To be relieved of criminal liability, he was obliged to establish the presence of the following requisites: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The appellant must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the prosecution's evidence were weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the appellant has admitted the killing. The evidence of the appellant on his claim of self-defense consisted solely of his own testimony, which the trial court rejected because it was not supported by convincing corroborative evidence and because the trial court had perceived the appellant to be a liar. The trial court instead gave credence to the testimony of Lamberto Abugan. The ordinary rule is that findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect, and the Court did not see any compelling reason to depart from the general rule.

• Treachery: The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the appellant should be convicted of homicide only. The information specified treachery and evident premeditation as qualifying circumstances. The trial court disregarded evident premeditation but considered the appellant's act of stabbing the unarmed Rolando Manahan as treachery. Treachery cannot be appreciated in the absence of evidence of the mode of attack; it cannot be presumed but must be proven positively. Treachery exists only "when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make." The sole eyewitness, Lamberto Abugan, did not witness the actual stabbing by the appellant of Rolando Manahan as he ran away to seek help. His testimony offers no sufficient basis for reasonably inferring that treachery attended the commission of the crime. On the contrary, considering that the attack was preceded by a heated argument, it cannot be fairly regarded as sudden and unexpected. The tense and hostile atmosphere should have sufficiently put Rolando Manahan on guard against physical violence; he should have been aware that he was in effect inviting trouble in following the appellant into the provincial road and kicking the latter's shoes.

• Damages: The trial court had ordered the appellant to pay P26,445.00 as actual damages, representing interment and related expenses, which was not controverted by the appellant. The amount of P100,000.00 awarded as indemnity for death was reduced to P50,000.00 conformably with prevailing jurisprudence. The propriety of the award of P250,000.00 as moral damages needed analysis. Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the monetary liabilities of a person convicted of a crime include: (1) liability for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased; (2) support to recipients who are not heirs; and (3) moral damages for mental anguish to the spouses, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants. The trial court lumped these monetary obligations into what it called "moral damages." The more important variables in determining the compensable amount of lost earnings are the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived and the rate of loss sustained by the heirs. Considering that Rolando Manahan was 26 years of age at the time of death, he was expected to live for another 46 years, derived using the generally accepted formula based on the 1980 CSO table. This was reasonably reduced to 39 years, as a man does not normally continue working to earn money up to the final month or year of his life. As a government employee expected to retire at age 65, with 261 working days in a year and receiving P23.00 a day, his gross earnings would be approximately P234,000.00. A reasonable amount of P120,000.00 was deducted for necessary expenses, resulting in net compensable earnings of P114,000.00. The Court, in the exercise of its discretion, awarded P20,000.00 as moral damages, considering that the victim's mother suffered a mild stroke upon learning of the slaying, which eventually resulted in her semi-paralysis.

• Self-Defense Requisites — For self-defense to be a justifying circumstance, the accused must establish: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, the accused admits the killing and must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence.

• Treachery Must Be Proven Positively — Treachery cannot be appreciated in the absence of evidence of the mode of attack; it cannot be presumed but must be proven positively. Treachery exists only when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. Where the attack was preceded by a heated argument, it cannot be fairly regarded as sudden and unexpected.

• Credibility of Witnesses — Findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect, considering that the trial court was in a position to evaluate the deportment of witnesses while testifying.

• Computation of Lost Earnings — The compensable amount of lost earnings is determined by: (1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Life expectancy is computed using the generally accepted formula based on the 1980 Commissioner's Standard Ordinary Mortality Table, and gross earnings are reduced by a reasonable amount representing necessary living expenses.

• "Treachery cannot be appreciated in the absence of evidence of the mode of attack; it cannot be presumed but must be proven positively." — This states the controlling rule that treachery must be established by positive proof of the mode of attack, not merely inferred from the circumstances.

• "The testimony of Lamberto Abugan offers no sufficient basis for reasonably inferring that treachery attended the commission of the crime. On the contrary, considering that the attack was preceded by a heated argument, it cannot be fairly regarded as sudden and unexpected." — This explains the application of the treachery rule to the facts, where the prior altercation negated the element of surprise essential to treachery.

• "By invoking self-defense as a justifying circumstance, appellant in effect admitted that he had indeed killed Rolando Manahan. In order that he may be relieved of criminal liability, he is obliged to establish the presence of the following requisites: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself." — This articulates the burden on the accused who invokes self-defense, requiring him to prove all three requisites.

• People vs. Delgado, 182 SCRA 343 (1990) — Cited for the requisites of self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Abagon, 161 SCRA 255 (1988) — Cited for the requisites of self-defense.
• Araneta vs. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 123 (1990) — Cited for the rule that the accused invoking self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence.
• People vs. Dofilez, 130 SCRA 603 (1984) — Cited for the rule on the burden of proof in self-defense cases.
• People vs. Bachar, 170 SCRA 700 (1989) — Cited for the rule that findings of fact of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect, and for the rule that treachery cannot be appreciated in the absence of evidence of the mode of attack.
• People vs. Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649 (1989) — Cited for the rule that treachery must be proven positively.
• People vs. Diaz, 167 SCRA 239 (1988) — Cited for the rule that treachery must be proven positively.
• People vs. Bartulay, 192 SCRA 621 (1990) — Cited for the reduction of indemnity for death to P50,000.00.
• People vs. Yeban, 190 SCRA 409 (1990) — Cited for the reduction of indemnity for death to P50,000.00.
• People vs. Daniel, 136 SCRA 92 (1985) — Cited for the variables in determining compensable lost earnings and the formula for computing life expectancy.
• Villa Rey-Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 511 (1970) — Cited for the formula for computing life expectancy, later updated by the 1980 CSO table.
• Philippine Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 110 (1990) — Followed the formula for computing life expectancy from Villa Rey Transit.
• Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95582, 7 October 1991 — Followed the formula for computing life expectancy from Villa Rey Transit.

• Article 11, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Defines the justifying circumstance of self-defense, requiring unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery as employing means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from any defense which the offended party might make.
• Article 2206, Civil Code — Specifies the monetary liabilities of a person convicted of a crime causing death, including indemnity for death, liability for loss of earning capacity, support obligations, and moral damages for mental anguish to the spouses, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to sentence the appellant to an indeterminate period ranging from ten (10) years as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as maximum for homicide.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concurred.