People vs. Quijano

Where conspiracy is established from planning through execution to disposal of the effects of the crime, all conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of their individual participation in the final killing, and extrajudicial confessions obtained with competent and independent counsel assistance are admissible absent substantiated proof of coercion.

The four accused-appellants — Elanito Quijano, Edwin Layog, Danilo Lapinid, and Edgar Gonzales — were acquaintances who came together on the evening of September 16, 1986, during a town fiesta dance in Perilos, Carcar, Cebu. Quijano was the nephew of the victim, Abundio Baring, and resided in Carcar; Gonzales had been dismissed from his job at a rattan factory in Mandaue City earlier that day; Lapinid was a jeepney conductor; and Layog was a cigarette vendor who had traveled to Carcar to sell a speaker to Quijano. The killing occurred in the victim's home at Sitio Tal-ot, Barangay Valencia, Carcar, Cebu.

At about 11:00 in the evening of September 16, 1986, at Tal-ot, Valencia, Carcar, Cebu, Abundio Baring and his wife Quintina Baring were awakened by a call from Elanito Quijano, Abundio's nephew, asking for water. Abundio stood up to get the water, and Quintina followed. By then, Quijano and his three companions — Edwin Layog, Edgar Gonzales, and Danilo Lapinid — had all gone upstairs. According to the prosecution's evidence, Gonzales, armed with a knife, suddenly stabbed Abundio before the latter could hand a glass to Quijano. Quintina began shouting for help but was led by Lapinid to her room and warned not to shout, as many of the assailants' companions were downstairs. Held by Layog and Quijano, Abundio continued to receive multiple stabs from Gonzales, causing his instantaneous death. Gonzales then cut off Abundio's head, placed it inside a sack, and the four left for Mandaue.

At about 3:30 in the morning of September 17, 1986, the four accused, riding in a tricycle, were intercepted along the highway in Mandaue City by Pat. Joseph Togonon. Upon inspection of the plastic bag they were carrying, Togonon found Abundio Baring's head inside. Meanwhile, in Carcar, at about 7:00 in the evening of the same day, Platon Quijano reported to the police that his nephew Abundio had been killed. Patrolman Jonas Pananganan, sent to verify, found the headless body sprawled on the floor of the victim's house. Municipal Health Officer Dr. Linda Perez Rodiz examined the cadaver and found 13 stab wounds. The four accused were turned over to the Carcar Police Station, where Layog and Lapinid executed separate sworn affidavits confessing their participation — Layog's on September 22, 1986 with the assistance of Atty. Flavio Vargas, and Lapinid's on September 24, 1986 with the assistance of Atty. Avelino Escubido.

For the defense, the accused presented a different version. Gonzales had been fired from his rattan factory job that morning and met Lapinid, who invited him to a town fiesta dance in Perilos, Carcar. Layog had gone to Quijano's house to sell a speaker and was persuaded to stay and attend the dance. The four met at the dance hall, drank White Castle and beer at a nearby store, and later accompanied a young woman named Inday to her home in Tal-ot, Valencia. From Inday's house, the four walked together; Gonzales, claiming thirst, went alone up the stairs of a house to ask for water. The house turned out to be Abundio Baring's. According to Gonzales, the victim gave him an empty glass while armed with a bolo, and because Gonzales was drunk and "suspected that he had some evil motive," he stabbed the victim several times without his companions' knowledge. Layog and Lapinid entered only after the stabbing and were "speechless with fear," failing to prevent Gonzales from cutting off the head. Gonzales claimed he acted alone out of drunkenness and anger over losing his job, and that the three others accompanied him to Mandaue out of fear of Gonzales. The trial court, however, credited the prosecution's evidence, finding the widow's testimony credible and concluding that conspiracy existed among all four accused.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellants faulted the trial court for giving credence to the testimony of Quintina Vda. de Baring, arguing that her account was unworthy of belief.
• Credibility of Pat. Togonon: Appellants challenged the credibility of Pat. Joseph Togonon, who intercepted them and found the victim's head.
• Credibility of Other Prosecution Witnesses: Appellants questioned the testimonies of Pat. Jonas Pananganan and NBI Agent Benjamin Romero.
• Validity of Extrajudicial Confessions: Appellants argued that the extrajudicial confessions of Layog and Lapinid were legally defective, claiming the confessions were obtained through force and intimidation and should not have been admitted.
• Absence of Conspiracy: Appellants maintained that no conspiracy existed and that only Gonzales should be held responsible for the killing, the others having acted independently or out of fear.
• Credibility of Defense Testimonies: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in disregarding their testimonies, which presented a version of events exculpating three of the four accused.
• Erroneous Conviction: Appellants contended that the trial court erred in convicting all four accused beyond reasonable doubt.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly Quintina Vda. de Baring and Pat. Joseph Togonon.
• Validity of Extrajudicial Confessions: Whether the extrajudicial confessions of appellants Layog and Lapinid were validly obtained and properly admitted.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy existed among the four accused such that all should be held liable as co-principals for the murder of Abundio Baring.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Conviction: Whether the accused were properly convicted beyond reasonable doubt.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Yes. The trial court's findings on witness credibility were sustained, the widow having been present during the killing and having no motive to fabricate, and Pat. Togonon's testimony corroborated by the accused's own admission of culpability at the time of interception.
• Validity of Extrajudicial Confessions: Yes. The confessions were validly obtained, both having been executed with the assistance of competent counsel — Atty. Vargas for Layog and Atty. Escubido for Lapinid — and the allegation of force and intimidation remaining unsubstantiated.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established from the planning stage through the execution of the crime to the disposal of the victim's head, the four accused having thought and acted as one throughout.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Conviction: Yes. The positive identification by the widow, the extrajudicial confessions, and the concerted conduct of the accused established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The widow Quintina Baring was an eyewitness to the killing, present when her husband was stabbed and beheaded, and she identified each accused and the specific role each performed — Gonzales as the stabber, Layog and Quijano as those who held the victim, and Lapinid as the one who restrained her and warned her not to shout. No reason was advanced by the defense to explain why a widow seeking justice for a brutally killed husband would falsely implicate persons who had nothing to do with the crime. The bare self-serving denials of the accused, uncorroborated by any disinterested witness, could not prevail over her positive testimony. Pat. Togonon's testimony was likewise credited: when he intercepted the four accused and found the victim's head, they readily allowed inspection and assumed responsibility for the crime. Not one objected to the admission made before Togonon; their demeanor indicated awareness of guilt. The fact that Togonon was alone and the four did not resist further undermined the defense's claim of innocence.

• Validity of Extrajudicial Confessions: The challenge to the extrajudicial confessions was characterized as a whimsical attempt to disclaim prior admissions of guilt. The record established that Lapinid was assisted by Atty. Avelino Escobido, who signed the sworn declaration, and that Layog was asked if he was amenable to the services of Atty. Vargas, to which he answered affirmatively before confessing. The allegation of force and intimidation was not substantiated by evidence other than the appellants' own statements. The taking of the confessions was accordingly done with regularity and legality.

• Conspiracy: Three circumstances established conspiracy. First, Layog and Lapinid admitted in their sworn statements that at ten o'clock in the evening, while all four were in Quijano's house, they hatched the plan to kill Abundio — Quijano initiated the idea, suspecting the victim of witchcraft against his grandmother, and Gonzales proposed beheading so he could use the head to threaten his former factory manager. Second, the widow identified all four as mutually helping one another in killing her husband. Third, the four assailants remained together after the killing, took a tricycle to Mandaue with the head in a plastic bag, and were intercepted before executing the final phase of their plan. From inception to execution to disposal, the accused never deviated from their concerted plan. The act of one was thus the act of all.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Conviction: The combined weight of the eyewitness testimony, the extrajudicial confessions, the physical evidence of the severed head found in the appellants' possession, and the established conspiracy rendered the defense's version — that Gonzales acted alone and the others merely followed out of fear — untenable. The trial court's factual findings, being logical and supported by the record, were not disturbed.

• Conspiracy Doctrine — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. What is required is assent to the perpetration of the misdeed — a concurrence of wills, unity of action or purpose, or common and joint purpose and design. Where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all; it is not necessary to ascertain their individual participation in the final liquidation of the victim. In this case, conspiracy was established through a chain of circumstances spanning the planning, execution, and disposal phases: the accused hatched the plan in Quijano's house, carried it out with each performing a specific role, and remained together through the attempted disposal of the victim's head.

• Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony — A witness present at the scene of the crime and having no ill motive to fabricate is entitled to credence, and bare self-serving denials of the accused uncorroborated by disinterested witnesses cannot prevail over positive identification. The widow's testimony was given full weight because she witnessed the killing firsthand and no reason was shown why she would falsely implicate persons uninvolved in her husband's murder.

• Validity of Extrajudicial Confessions — An extrajudicial confession is valid when taken with the assistance of competent and independent counsel, and allegations of force or intimidation must be substantiated by evidence beyond the accused's own self-serving statements. Both confessions here were executed with named counsel who signed the documents, and the coercion claim was unsupported.

• "From the inception (the hatching of the idea of killing Abundio) to the execution of the crime and up to the planned disposal of the effect of said crime, the four accused thought and acted as one, never for a moment deviating from their concerted plan to kill." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on conspiracy, establishing that the continuous concerted conduct from planning through execution to disposal proves a common design.

• "No sane person would impulsively admit having killed a person and would allow himself to be taken in for investigation unless he really did commit the crime." — This statement supports the Court's assessment of the probative value of the accused's spontaneous admission to Pat. Togonon upon interception.

• "If such be the case then, the act of one is the act of all the others involved and each is to be held to the same degree of liability as the others." — This formulation, drawn from People vs. Taaca, encapsulates the controlling principle of collective liability under conspiracy.

• People vs. Arnis, L-48711, 144 SCRA 687 — Cited for the proposition that the lower court's findings on the existence of conspiracy should not be disturbed, being logical and based on evidence in the record.
• People vs. Taaca, L-35652, September 29, 1989 — Cited for the statutory definition of conspiracy: an agreement among two or more persons to commit a felony, requiring concurrence of wills or unity of purpose, and the principle that the act of one is the act of all.
• People vs. Asuncion, G.R. No. 83870, November 14, 1989 — Cited for the rule that where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and it is not necessary to ascertain individual participation in the final liquidation of the victim.

• Revised Penal Code, Article 248 — Defines and penalizes murder. The accused were convicted as co-principals of murder, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation as alleged in the information, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 8 — Defines conspiracy: two or more persons agreeing to commit a felony and deciding to commit it. The Court applied this provision to find that the four accused concurred in wills and purpose from planning to disposal.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concurred.