People vs. Puno

A schizophrenic reaction, absent a complete deprivation of intelligence or total deprivation of freedom of the will at the time of the crime, does not constitute legal insanity but may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance analogous to illness diminishing will-power without depriving consciousness of acts.

Ernesto Puno, a 28-year-old jeepney driver, had a documented history of chronic schizophrenia of the paranoid type, having been treated as an outpatient at the National Mental Hospital and Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital from 1962 to 1970. He lived in Malabon, Rizal, near the victim, Francisca Col, a 72-year-old widow. The defense of insanity under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code was interposed, requiring an examination of his mental state at the precise moment of the killing.

On September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno entered the bedroom of Francisca Col, a 72-year-old widow, in Malabon, Rizal. Upon seeing her sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by calling her a witch ("mangkukulam" and "mambabarang"), repeatedly slapped her, and struck her several times on the head with a hammer until she died. The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, who were in the house. They testified that Puno's eyes were reddish and his look was baleful. After the killing, Puno went to Lina's room where Hilaria had taken refuge and threatened them not to call the police or report the killing, warning that he would take revenge on them if they did.

Puno then fled to his parents' house and subsequently to the house of his second cousin in Bulacan. Disregarding his threats, Lina notified the police. A medico-legal officer conducted an autopsy and certified that the victim died of intracranial, traumatic hemorrhage caused by a hard instrument. Puno's father later surrendered him to the police. He was brought to the National Mental Hospital and subsequently indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal, with evident premeditation, abuse of superiority, and disregard of sex alleged as aggravating circumstances.

Puno testified that he did not remember killing the victim and believed that persons who are "mangkukulam" or "mambabarang" must be killed. His wife and sister-in-law testified that on the day of the killing, Puno's eyes were reddish, he complained of a headache, he hallucinated about a bumble bee, and he violently boxed their dog. His cousin testified that when Puno arrived in Bulacan, he was soaking wet, cuddled a puppy he called "Diablo," sang songs, and exhibited unusual behavior. Three psychiatrists testified for the defense, but their findings revealed that Puno acted with discernment and was not completely deprived of reason. The trial court observed Puno's conduct during trial and concluded he was sane, convicting him of murder and sentencing him to death.

• Defense of Insanity: Counsel de oficio contended that the trial court erred in not sustaining the defense of insanity, arguing that Puno had chronic schizophrenia since 1962 and was suffering from the illness when he killed the victim, depriving him of discernment and freedom of will.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Counsel de oficio argued that the trial court erred in appreciating evident premeditation, abuse of superiority, and disregard of sex as aggravating circumstances.

• Legal Insanity: Whether the accused was legally insane under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code such as to be exempt from criminal liability.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Whether the killing was qualified as murder by abuse of superiority.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether evident premeditation, disregard of sex, and dwelling were properly appreciated as aggravating circumstances.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the accused's mental illness and voluntary surrender could be appreciated as mitigating circumstances.

• Legal Insanity: No. Puno was not legally insane because he was not completely deprived of reason or freedom of will at the time of the killing, as shown by his threats to the witnesses and the psychiatrists' findings that he acted with discernment.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Yes. The killing was qualified as murder by abuse of superiority, as Puno, armed with a hammer, took advantage of his superior strength over the unarmed, 72-year-old female victim.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Evident premeditation was not appreciated for lack of evidence on the time of determination, acts of persistence, and sufficient interval. Disregard of sex was not appreciated due to lack of deliberate intent to insult the victim's sex. Dwelling and disregard of old age were appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Yes. Voluntary surrender and the offender's mental illness (mild psychosis or schizophrenic reaction), which diminished his will-power without depriving him of consciousness, were appreciated as mitigating circumstances offsetting the generic aggravating circumstances.

• Legal Insanity: Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, insanity requires complete deprivation of intelligence or total deprivation of freedom of the will at the time of the crime. Mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude imputability. The evidence showed Puno had chronic schizophrenia, but the psychiatrists testified he acted with discernment and could distinguish right from wrong. His threats to the witnesses after the killing further demonstrated his awareness of the wrongfulness of his act. Thus, he was not exempt from criminal liability.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Abuse of superiority was established because Puno, a 28-year-old male armed with a hammer, attacked a 72-year-old unarmed and defenseless female victim who could not offer any resistance.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Evident premeditation requires proof of the time the offender determined to commit the crime, an act manifesting cling to that determination, and a sufficient interval for reflection. None of these were proven. Disregard of sex requires evidence of deliberate intent to offend or insult the victim's sex, which was absent. However, dwelling and disregard of respect due to the victim's old age were properly appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances.
• Mitigating Circumstances: The generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling and disregard of old age were offset by the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and mental illness. The accused's schizophrenic reaction diminished his will-power without depriving him of consciousness of his acts, analogous to a circumstance that diminishes will-power. With the offsetting of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the medium period of the penalty for murder was imposed.

• Legal Insanity under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code — Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, meaning the accused is deprived of reason and acts without the least discernment, or when there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of mental faculties, such as schizophrenia, does not exclude imputability if the accused acted with discernment.
• Evident Premeditation — Requires proof of (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit clung to his determination, and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and execution to allow reflection upon the consequences.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Illness — An offender's mental illness (mild psychosis or schizophrenic reaction) that diminishes his will-power without depriving him of consciousness of his acts can be considered a mitigating circumstance analogous to illness diminishing will-power.

• "Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime." — This defines the strict standard for the exempting circumstance of insanity, requiring complete deprivation of intelligence or total deprivation of freedom of the will.
• "Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability." — This clarifies that conditions like schizophrenia, absent total deprivation of reason or will, do not exempt an accused from criminal liability.
• "However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set by the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender to the authorities and, as contended by counsel de oficio, the offender's mental illness (mild psychosis or schizophrenic reaction) which diminished his will-power without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts." — This establishes that mental illness not amounting to legal insanity can still serve as a mitigating circumstance.

• People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658 — Cited for the definition of legal insanity under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688 — Cited for the definition of insanity requiring complete deprivation of intelligence or total deprivation of freedom of the will.
• People vs. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841 — Cited as an analogous case where an accused with schizophrenia was convicted of murder because his plea of insanity was rejected.
• People vs. Guzman, 107 Phil. 1122 — Cited for the definition of abuse of superiority when a man with a deadly weapon attacks an unarmed and defenseless woman.
• People vs. Ablates, L-33304 — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Balneg, 79 Phil. 805 — Cited for the proposition that an erroneous belief that killing a witch is a public good can be considered a mitigating circumstance analogous to illness diminishing will-power.

• Article 12, Revised Penal Code — Defines exempting circumstances, including insanity, requiring complete deprivation of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of the crime.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder, including abuse of superiority as a qualifying circumstance.
• Article 64(4), Revised Penal Code — Provides that when the aggravating and mitigating circumstances offset each other, the medium period of the penalty shall be imposed.

Barredo, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur. Fernando, C.J., concurred in the dissent of Justice Makasiar, expressing a preference for a liberal reading of Durham vs. US and calling for a reexamination of the M'Naghten doctrine in light of advances in medical science.

• Makasiar, J. — Dissented, arguing that the accused should be acquitted because he was mentally ill when he committed the killing. The dissent emphasized that the accused had chronic schizophrenia of the paranoid type for eight years, and his "social recovery" did not mean he was "cured." The dissent argued that at the time of the killing, the accused was suffering from an onset of schizophrenic reaction, acting under the delusion that the victim was a "mangkukulam" harming him, and thus killed her in self-defense against a perceived threat, not the actual person.
• Teehankee, J. — Concurred in the dissent of Justice Makasiar.