People vs. Plana

The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by a credible eyewitness. For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish (a) presence in another place at the time of the commission of the offense, and (b) physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime. The Court also held that the act of one is the act of all when conspiracy is established, and that pleading not guilty at arraignment waives any irregularity in the arrest, curing any defect in the court's jurisdiction over the persons of the accused.

This case involves the automatic review of a death penalty conviction for the complex crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The four accused-appellants were charged with conspiring to rape and kill eighteen-year-old Helen Perote in Barangay Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz. The case arose from a criminal information filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15 of Roxas City, which found the accused guilty and imposed the supreme penalty of death, triggering automatic review by the Supreme Court.

On September 23, 1994, at around 10:30 in the morning, Felix Lagud was walking along the feeder road in Barangay Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz, on his way home to Poblacion Ilawod. He noticed movement about fifty meters to his left and saw three persons who seemed to be wrestling. Approaching to about twenty meters, Lagud saw three men holding a girl while another man was on top of her, raping her. He later saw the man on top raise his hand and stab the victim. Frightened that the assailants would see him, Lagud ran away and stayed at the house of Porferio Haguisan until 2:00 in the morning. Lagud identified accused-appellants Plana, Perayra, and Saldevea as the three men holding the girl, and later identified Banday as the fourth man who was on top of the victim when he saw them at the municipal hall after their arrest.

Rene Bustamante corroborated Lagud's testimony in part. Between 10:30 and 11:00 in the morning of September 23, 1994, Bustamante was looking for his carabao near the fishpond owned by accused-appellant Saldevea's brother. He heard men laughing and saw Saldevea, shirtless, pulling up his pants, together with three other men washing their hands at the fishpond. He recognized one of them as Perayra. On September 26, 1994, the body of Helen Perote was found near the fishpond, with no clothes on but her panty, already in an advanced state of decomposition.

Antonio Mendoza, barangay captain and storeowner, testified that on September 23, 1994, at past 8:00 in the morning, the accused-appellants arrived at his store, bought two bottles of ESQ whisky, and drank until almost 10:00 in the morning before leaving with the remaining half bottle. Amalia Rafael, the victim's older sister, was the last person to talk with Helen. Helen went to Amalia's house to tell her they were going to have a "milagrosa" at their other sister Susan's house. On her way to Susan's house, Amalia met the accused-appellants on the feeder road near the fishpond. They were not wearing shirts, only denim pants, and were obviously drunk. Amalia saw Plana with a knife tucked in his waist.

Dr. Ricardo Betita, Rural Health Officer of Cuartero, Capiz, conducted the post-mortem examination and found fourteen wounds on the victim, including multiple stab wounds, an avulsion on the nose and upper lip, and hymenal lacerations. The most probable cause of death was massive hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds. The victim died more than seventy-two hours before her body was found.

The defense interposed denial and alibi. Accused-appellants Plana and Banday claimed they were at the house of Plana's aunt and uncle, Vicente and Felomina Docutan, from 10:30 in the morning until 9:00 in the evening, cooking chicken for a celebration. Accused-appellants Saldevea and Perayra claimed they were at the house of Saldevea's sister-in-law, Monina Saldevea, where they had lunch and slept. Defense witnesses Julia Barrientos, Nolan Obena, Igleserio Farinas, Rolando Naelgas, and Monina Saldevea corroborated these alibis. Lagud was recalled to rebut Barrientos' testimony, denying that he was selling "amakan" on that date, as he had stopped that business in 1992.

• Defense of Alibi: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in not appreciating their defense of alibi and denial, maintaining that their testimonies, together with those of their witnesses, showed with clarity and beyond doubt that they were not at the scene of the crime and did not commit the offenses charged.

• Illegal Detention: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in not censuring the actuation of the police authorities in detaining them without a court-filed information or judicial order of detention, as well as the violation of their constitutional rights during their custodial interrogation.

• Inconsistencies in Prosecution Evidence: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in not appreciating the inconsistencies and inherent weaknesses and improbabilities of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which showed doubt of their guilt entitling them to acquittal.

• Crime Only Murder, Not Rape with Homicide: Accused-appellants argued that, granting arguendo that they were guilty of any crime, the crime was only murder because the rape of Helen had allegedly not been sufficiently established.

• Positive Identification: The prosecution presented eyewitness Felix Lagud, who positively identified the accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, corroborated by the testimonies of Rene Bustamante, Antonio Mendoza, and Amalia Rafael.

• Corroborating Evidence: The prosecution established that the accused-appellants were together drinking liquor on the morning of September 23, 1994; Lagud saw them raping and stabbing the victim; Bustamante saw them near the fishpond where the body was found; and the medical findings corroborated the commission of rape and homicide.

• Credibility of Witnesses and Defense of Alibi: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses' testimonies and in rejecting the defense of alibi and denial.

• Illegality of Detention: Whether the trial court erred in not censuring the police authorities for detaining the accused-appellants without a judicial order or information filed in court.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Rape with Homicide: Whether the crime committed was only murder, not rape with homicide, because the rape was allegedly not sufficiently established.

• Credibility of Witnesses and Defense of Alibi: No. The trial court correctly gave credence to the positive identification of the accused-appellants by Felix Lagud, whose testimony was straightforward, direct, and consistent. The defense of alibi failed because the accused-appellants admitted proximity to the scene of the crime, and it was not physically impossible for them to have committed the offense.

• Illegality of Detention: No. The accused-appellants waived their right to question the irregularity, if any, in their arrest by entering a plea of "not guilty" at their arraignment, thereby submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court and curing any defect in their arrest.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Rape with Homicide: No. The evidence on record indubitably established that, while the other accused-appellants forcibly held Helen, accused-appellant Banday had carnal knowledge of her, and thereafter they killed her. The medico-legal findings corroborated the commission of rape.

• Credibility of Witnesses and Defense of Alibi: The Court applied the well-entrenched rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance. The trial court is in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves. Lagud's testimony was straightforward, direct, and consistent, and he remained unwavering even under grueling cross-examination. His positive identification was corroborated by the testimonies of Bustamante, Mendoza, and Rafael. The defense of alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by credible witnesses. For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish (a) presence in another place at the time of the commission of the offense, and (b) physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime. The accused-appellants failed to satisfy these requisites because they admitted being in Barangay Cobe, where the crime was committed. The Court also noted that alibi becomes less plausible when corroborated by friends and relatives who may not be impartial witnesses, and the defense failed to impute any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify falsely.

• Illegality of Detention: The Court held that by pleading "not guilty" at their arraignment, the accused-appellants submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in their arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their persons, and this defect was waived by their plea.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Rape with Homicide: The Court found that the evidence on record indubitably established the commission of rape. Lagud categorically testified that while the other accused-appellants forcibly held Helen, Banday had carnal knowledge of her. The medico-legal findings corroborated this testimony, as Dr. Betita testified that the laceration in the hymen was caused only by sexual intercourse. The Court also found that conspiracy was established among the accused-appellants, as their individual acts, taken as a whole, revealed a shared common design to rape and kill Helen. They acted in unison and cooperation to achieve the same unlawful objective, making the act of one the act of all.

• Defense of Alibi — For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish (a) presence in another place at the time of the commission of the offense, and (b) physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting the alibi of the accused-appellants, who admitted being in Barangay Cobe where the crime was committed, making it not physically impossible for them to have been at the scene.

• Positive Identification vs. Denial and Alibi — Alibi is one of the weakest defenses in criminal cases and cannot prevail over, and is worthless in the face of, positive identification by credible witnesses that the accused perpetrated the crime. The Court applied this doctrine in affirming the conviction, as Lagud's positive identification was corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.

• Conspiracy — When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the accused-appellants' individual acts, taken as a whole, revealed a shared common design to rape and kill Helen, making all of them liable for the complex crime of Rape with Homicide.

• Waiver of Irregular Arrest — By pleading "not guilty" at arraignment, an accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in the arrest, as the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting the accused-appellants' claim of illegal detention.

• "Alibi is concededly one of the weakest defenses in criminal cases. It cannot prevail over, and is worthless in the face of, positive identification by credible witnesses that the accused perpetrated the crime." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on the relative weight of alibi versus positive identification, which was central to the Court's rejection of the defense.

• "For alibi to prosper, the following must be established: (a) the presence of accused-appellant in another place at the time of the commission of the offense and; (b) physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime." — This passage states the canonical two-part test for the defense of alibi, which the Court applied in finding that the accused-appellants failed to satisfy the requisites.

• "By so pleading, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in their arrest, for the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their persons." — This passage establishes the doctrine that pleading not guilty waives any irregularity in arrest, which the Court applied in rejecting the accused-appellants' claim of illegal detention.

• "The principle that the act of one is the act of all is applicable to accused-appellants in this case." — This passage states the application of the conspiracy doctrine, making all accused-appellants liable for the acts of each other in the commission of the crime.

• People vs. Mittu, 333 SCRA 121 (2000) — Cited as authority for the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of overlooked facts or circumstances.

• People vs. Andres, 296 SCRA 318 (1998) — Cited as authority for the same rule on credibility of witnesses.

• People vs. Tompong and Gumawa, G.R. No. 133191-93, July 11, 2000 — Cited as authority for the rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by credible witnesses.

• People vs. Bracamonte, 257 SCRA 489 (1996) — Cited as authority for the same rule on alibi versus positive identification.

• People vs. Agomo-o, 334 SCRA 279 (2000) — Cited as authority for the rule that alibi becomes less plausible when corroborated by friends and relatives who may not be impartial witnesses.

• People vs. Araneta, 300 SCRA 80 (1998) — Cited as authority for the same rule on alibi corroborated by relatives.

• People vs. Sumalde, 328 SCRA 374 (2000) — Cited as authority for the requisites of the defense of alibi.

• People vs. Salonga et al., 329 SCRA 468 (2000) — Cited as authority for the rule that there is no standard form of human behavioral response to a startling experience, and delay in reporting to authorities does not destroy witness credibility.

• People vs. De Leon, 248 SCRA 609 (1995) — Cited as authority for the same rule on delay in reporting to authorities.

• People vs. Lagarto, 326 SCRA 693 (2000) — Cited as authority for the finding of conspiracy among the accused-appellants.

• People vs. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 229 (1998) — Cited as authority for the finding of conspiracy and for the rule that pleading not guilty waives irregularity in arrest.

• People vs. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283 (1995) — Cited as authority for the rule on waiver of irregular arrest.

• People vs. Nazareno, 260 SCRA 256 (1996) — Cited as authority for the rule that the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the persons of the accused.

• People vs. Tahop, 315 SCRA 465 (1999) — Cited as authority for fixing the civil indemnity in cases of rape with homicide at P100,000.00.

• People vs. Ballenas, 330 SCRA 519 (2000) — Cited as authority for the award of moral damages to the heirs of the victim in a criminal proceeding without need of proof.

• People vs. Robles, 305 SCRA 273 (1999) — Cited as authority for the same rule on moral damages.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines the crime of rape and provides that when by reason or on occasion of the rape a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. The Court applied this provision in affirming the conviction and the death penalty for the complex crime of Rape with Homicide.

• Article 83, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 — Provides for the forwarding of records to the Office of the President upon finality of the decision for possible exercise of executive clemency. The Court ordered the records forwarded pursuant to this provision.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concurred.

• Four unnamed members of the Court — The decision notes that four members of the Court maintained their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless, they submitted to the ruling of the Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death penalty should be accordingly imposed.