People vs. Pitoc

A married man who cohabits with a woman who is not his wife is guilty of concubinage under Article 437 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2716, regardless of whether the wife seeks a divorce. The phrase "for the purposes of the law establishing divorce" is explanatory, not a limitation, and the crime is committed upon the commission of any of the three specified grounds, none of which depends on the wife's purpose or intent to obtain a divorce.

The case involves the interpretation of Article 437 of the Penal Code, as amended by Section 1 of Act No. 2716, in relation to Act No. 2710, the Divorce Law. Article 437 originally penalized a married man who keeps a mistress in the conjugal dwelling or under scandalous circumstances elsewhere. Act No. 2716 amended the article by adding a provision that, for purposes of the divorce law, a husband who cohabits with a woman who is not his wife shall be considered guilty of concubinage. The defendant, Pedro Pitoc, had sustained illicit relations with his co-accused, Marciana del Basco, for several years prior to his marriage to Petronila Roque.

On February 21, 1921, Pedro Pitoc was legally married to Petronila Roque in the city of Manila. For several years prior to their marriage, Pitoc had sustained illicit relations with Marciana del Basco. Shortly after the marriage, Pitoc and his wife left Manila and went to Calumpit, Bulacan, to reside. Pitoc later returned to Manila, leaving his wife at Calumpit, promising to return on March 15, 1921. When he failed to return on March 17, 1921, his wife came to Manila to look for him, and later, together with Angel Roque, verified a complaint against her husband and his paramour, accusing them of the crime of concubinage. The complaint alleged that on or about June 23, 1921, and for some time prior to that date, Pitoc, being legally married to Petronila Roque, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally cohabited, lied, and had sexual intercourse with his co-accused, Marciana del Basco, who knew that Pitoc was legally united by marriage with the complainant.

Both defendants were found guilty as charged. Pitoc was sentenced to one year, eight months, and twenty-one days of prision correccional with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay one-half of the costs. He appealed, claiming that the evidence was not sufficient to prove him guilty of the crime of concubinage beyond a reasonable doubt, and that there was no evidence that the crime was committed "under scandalous circumstances." His co-defendant did not appeal.

It was not claimed that Pitoc kept a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, and the evidence was not sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he kept a mistress under "scandalous circumstances" at any other place. However, it was undisputed that before his marriage to Petronila Roque, the defendant and his co-accused had been living together for a number of years in illicit relations. After his marriage, Pitoc left his wife and came to Manila, where his wife found him living in the same house and under the same roof with his former paramour, staying around her store and keeping company with her, under circumstances strongly tending to show that they had resumed their former relations. Petronila Roque testified that she asked her husband if that woman was his paramour, and he answered yes; when she asked what her situation would be, he answered that he could not abandon that woman and that she could do anything she pleased. This evidence was not denied by the defendant.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Appellant argued that the evidence was not sufficient to prove him guilty of the crime of concubinage beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Absence of Scandalous Circumstances: Appellant argued that there was no evidence that the crime was committed "under scandalous circumstances."

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Attorney-General, as appellee, maintained the conviction, and the evidence of the defendant's conduct, including his admission to his wife that he could not abandon his paramour, was considered conclusive proof of cohabitation.

• Statutory Construction: Whether Section 1 of Act No. 2716, amending Article 437 of the Penal Code, added a third ground for the crime of concubinage — cohabitation with a woman who is not the wife — independent of the original two grounds.
• Meaning of "Cohabit": Whether the defendant's conduct constituted "cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife" within the meaning of the amended Article 437.

• Statutory Construction: Yes. The amendment added a third ground for the commission of the crime of concubinage. The phrase "for the purposes of the law establishing divorce" is explanatory, not a limitation, and the crime is not contingent upon the wife's purpose or intent to obtain a divorce.
• Meaning of "Cohabit": Yes. The defendant cohabited with a woman who was not his wife. The evidence was conclusive that Pitoc, after leaving his wife, went to live in the same house with his former paramour, and his admission that he could not abandon her established cohabitation within the meaning of the law.

• Statutory Construction: The Court analyzed Article 437 of the Penal Code, which specified two grounds for invoking the penalty: (1) keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or (2) keeping a mistress elsewhere under "scandalous circumstances." The purpose and intent of the amendment by Act No. 2716 was to add a third ground: cohabiting with a woman who is not the wife. The Court reasoned that although the words "for the purposes of the law establishing divorce" are intended to be explanatory, they are not words of limitation and are more or less surplusage. If a husband cohabits with a woman who is not his wife, he is guilty of the crime of concubinage regardless of whether the wife wants a divorce. The crime consists in the commission of any one of the three specified grounds, neither of which is dependent upon the purpose or intent of the wife to obtain a divorce.

• Meaning of "Cohabit": The Court noted that the word "cohabit" has many different meanings, each depending upon the sense in which it is used. In the context of a law intended to prohibit a married man from keeping a mistress, the word must relate to and be confined to the subject matter of the law itself. The Court adopted the definition from Corpus Juris: "to dwell or live together as husband and wife; to live together as husband and wife although not legally married; to live together in the same house, claiming to be married; to live together at bed and board." The Court also cited Words and Phrases, Bishop's work on Marriage, Divorce, and Separation, and Cox vs. State, all defining "cohabit" as dwelling or living together as husband and wife, usually but not always implying sexual intercourse, and comprising a continued period of time. Applying this definition to the facts, the Court found it undisputed that before his marriage, the defendant and his co-accused had been living together for a number of years in illicit relations. After his marriage, Pitoc left his wife and returned to Manila, going directly to the same house where his former paramour was living. His wife found him living in the same house and under the same roof with his former paramour, staying around her store and keeping company with her. The defendant admitted to his wife that the woman was his paramour and that he could not abandon her. This evidence, being undenied, was considered conclusive proof that the defendant cohabited with a woman who was not his wife, and he was therefore guilty of the crime charged.

• Cohabitation as a Ground for Concubinage — The amendment to Article 437 of the Penal Code by Act No. 2716 added a third ground for the crime of concubinage: a married man's cohabitation with a woman who is not his wife. The phrase "for the purposes of the law establishing divorce" is explanatory and not a limitation; the crime is committed regardless of the wife's intent to seek a divorce. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the defendant's resumption of living with his former paramour after his marriage constituted cohabitation within the meaning of the law.

• Definition of "Cohabit" in a Penal Statute — In the context of a penal statute prohibiting a married man from keeping a mistress, "cohabit" means to dwell or live together as husband and wife, although not legally married, and usually but not always implying sexual intercourse, comprising a continued period of time. The offense is not a single act of adultery but cohabiting in a state of adultery, which may be a week, a month, a year, or longer, but still constitutes one offense only. The Court applied this definition to the facts, finding that the defendant's living in the same house with his former paramour, coupled with his admission, established cohabitation.

• "The purpose and intent of the amendment was to add a third ground for the commission of the crime. When analyzed, the two acts should read. First, that, if any married man shall keep a mistress in his conjugal dwelling or second, should keep a mistress elsewhere under 'scandalous circumstance,' or, third, if he should 'cohabit with a woman who is not his wife.' In either event, he would then be guilty of the crime charged in article 437, and a conviction of either one of them would be sufficient to entitle a spouse to a divorce under the provisions of Act No. 2710." — This passage articulates the Court's construction of the amended Article 437, identifying the three distinct grounds for the crime of concubinage.

• "Although the words used in the amendment 'for the purposes of the law establishing divorce' are intended to be explanatory, they are not words of limitation, and are more or less surplusage. That is to say, if a husband cohabits with a woman who is not his wife, he is guilty of the crime of concubinage, regardless of whether show wants a divorce or not." — This passage establishes that the crime of concubinage is not contingent upon the wife's intent to obtain a divorce, a key point in the Court's statutory construction.

• "When used in that sense, it should be construed to mean 'to dwell or live together as husband and wife; to live together as husband and wife although not legally married; to live together in the same house, claiming to be married; to live together at bed and board.'" — This passage defines "cohabit" in the context of the penal statute, providing the canonical definition applied to the facts of the case.

• Cox vs. State, 23 South., 806; 117 Ala., 103; 41 L.R.A., 760; 67 Am. St. Rep., 166 — Cited as authority for the definition of "cohabit" as dwelling or living together as husband and wife, often with reference to persons not legally married, and usually but not always implying sexual intercourse.

• Article 437, Penal Code — The original provision penalizing a married man who keeps a mistress in the conjugal dwelling or under scandalous circumstances elsewhere, with the mistress suffering the penalty of destierro. The Court construed this article as specifying two grounds for the crime.
• Section 1, Act No. 2716 — The amendatory provision adding a third ground for concubinage: a husband who cohabits with a woman who is not his wife. The Court held that this amendment added a ground independent of the original two.
• Act No. 2710 — The Divorce Law, for the purposes of which the amendment was enacted. The Court held that the reference to this law in the amendment was explanatory and not a limitation on the crime.

Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concurred. Araullo, C.J., Avanceña, and Villamor, JJ., concurred in the result.