People vs. Pinto

Peace officers who exceed the bounds of a lawful mission and kill or wound persons without lawful justification cannot invoke the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, and where unlawful aggression is absent, self-defense likewise fails as a justifying circumstance; conspiracy may be inferred from concerted acts showing joint purpose and design even without prior agreement, and aberratio ictus does not mitigate criminal liability where the accused acted with disregard for human life.

The Legazpi City Police Department had been conducting surveillance of Francisco Bello since October 1970 based on information that he was conducting an "obstacle course" or training men for combat. On December 25, 1970, the police secured a search warrant from the City Court of Legazpi authorizing the search of Bello's house and premises in Mariawa, Legazpi City, on the ground of probable cause to believe he illegally possessed a garand rifle, a Thompson submachinegun, and two automatic pistols. The police also suspected Bello of having shot one Salustiano Botin the night before, though no warrant of arrest had been issued. At a confidential conference at the residence of Mayor Gregorio Imperial, the Chief of Police briefed his officers on how to serve the search warrant and orally directed them to arrest Bello; the officers were divided into three teams augmented by Philippine Constabulary personnel.

On December 25, 1970, the Legazpi City Police, armed with a search warrant for illegal possession of firearms against Francisco Bello, deployed three teams to barrio Homapon and the road to Mariawa. Team 3 was under the charge of Sgt. Salvador de la Paz and included patrolmen Buenaflor and Pinto, along with PC member Wilfredo Romero. The teams proceeded on foot along the muddy road to Mariawa after one of their vehicles bogged down. As they walked in single file, Romero noticed the members of his team running and heard someone shout "Pondo!" (stop), followed by a shot and then a burst of gunfire. Romero saw "flashes of fire" from the direction where Buenaflor was deployed. The vehicle passing by was a "McArthur type" jeep owned by the Anduiza family, carrying Fr. Felix Capellan, Mrs. Zenaida Tiongson and her six children, and a driver, returning from a lechonada party at the hacienda of Bello's mother. The jeep had only a canvas top with no cover on the sides and back. As the driver shifted to high gear, Mrs. Tiongson saw blinking lights some 300 yards ahead, and Fr. Capellan instructed the driver to go faster. A single shot was followed by rapid automatic firing from the left rear side of the jeep. Nine-year-old Richard Tiongson was hit in the back, the bullet travelling obliquely through his left kidney, liver, and right auricle; he died the following morning from massive hemorrhage. His sister, thirteen-year-old Maria Theresa, was wounded in the right buttocks, with a bullet fragment remaining lodged in her pelvic area. Four empty .30 caliber carbine shells were later found near the coconut tree where Pinto had been deployed, and ballistic examination confirmed they had been fired from Pinto's carbine.

After the Tiongson shooting, the police proceeded to Bello's residence in Mariawa, where they were met by a volley of fire. They searched the premises and found firearms and ammunition, though Bello was not present. The following day, Chief of Police Adornado issued Special Order No. 24 assigning several officers, including Pinto and Buenaflor, to maintain peace and order in Homapon and to determine the whereabouts of Bello. Sgt. de la Paz further divided Team 3 into groups, with Buenaflor and Pinto composing Group II. On December 27, 1970, at around 5:00 a.m., Bello was at the residence of Inocencia Malbas in sitio Ando, Talahib, Daraga, Albay — a barrio outside the jurisdiction of Legazpi City. According to prosecution eyewitness Inocencia Malbas, Bello was on the balcony wearing a red shirt and jacket when she heard a successive burst of gunfire and Bello gradually fell to the floor with his hands above his head, followed by another burst. She saw a man holding a long firearm, later identified as Pinto, near a pili tree about eight meters from Bello, and another man crouching near the stairs. Buenaflor then came up the house, pointed a gun at Inocencia and her husband, and told them to lie flat. Rosalio Andes, a son of Francisco Andes who had arrived with Bello's group, was also killed; Inocencia found his body near the pili tree with no weapon nearby.

The appellants denied firing at the Tiongson jeep. Pinto testified that he fired only a single warning shot in the air and did not use his carbine during the Tiongson incident. Buenaflor claimed he carried a .38 caliber Tell revolver and did not fire at the jeep. For the Bello incident, both appellants invoked self-defense: Buenaflor stated he called out to Bello to surrender and his shout was answered by a gunshot from the balcony, after which he fired his Thompson submachinegun. Pinto corroborated this account and claimed he shot Rosalio Andes in self-defense when Andes menacingly approached him with a bolo. The prosecution's principal eyewitness, Inocencia Malbas, testified that she heard no shout to surrender and no gunshot from Bello's direction before the appellants fired. Physical evidence corroborated her account: NBI Agent Rafael Señora found no bullet marks at the crime scene attributable to the .22 caliber firearms allegedly used by Bello's men, and Buenaflor himself admitted that the magazine of Bello's garand was "intact" and that he did not determine whether it had been fired. Pinto further testified that Bello was smoking with his back towards them when he was shot and was not holding a gun at that moment. Four separate informations were filed against Pinto and Buenaflor on July 26 and August 24, 1971, charging them with the murder of Andes, the murder of Bello, the murder of Richard Tiongson, and the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson. Both pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Circuit Criminal Court appreciated evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance and treachery, nighttime, and use of public position as aggravating circumstances for the killing of Bello and Andes, and qualified the crimes against the Tiongson children by treachery aggravated by use of public position.

• Fulfillment of Duty: Appellants maintained that the killings were perpetrated in the course of the performance of their official duties as peace officers in obedience to the lawful order of their superiors, invoking the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Self-Defense: Appellants argued that in the killing of Bello and Andes, they acted in self-defense, claiming that Bello fired the first shot from the balcony after Buenaflor called on him to surrender, and that Rosalio Andes menacingly approached Pinto with a bolo, prompting Pinto to shoot him.
• Denial of Shooting at Tiongsons: Appellants denied having fired their guns at the jeep bearing the Tiongson family, with Pinto asserting he did not fire his carbine during that incident and Buenaflor claiming he did not fire his revolver at the vehicle.

• Fulfillment of Duty: Whether the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code applies to exempt the appellants from criminal liability.
• Self-Defense: Whether the elements of self-defense, particularly unlawful aggression, were present in the killing of Bello and Andes.
• Culpability for Tiongson Shooting: Whether the appellants fired at the Tiongson jeep despite their denials, based on circumstantial evidence.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy existed between the appellants in both shooting incidents.
• Aberratio Ictus: Whether mistake in the identity of the victim (aberratio ictus) exempts or mitigates criminal liability.
• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Whether treachery and evident premeditation attended the commission of the crimes, and whether the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position was properly appreciated.
• Proper Penalty: What penalties should be imposed given the constitutional abolition of the death penalty and the presence of one aggravating circumstance.

• Fulfillment of Duty: No. The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty does not apply because, while the appellants originally set out to perform a legal duty, they exceeded the ambit of their mission, acting with only a search warrant and an oral order to apprehend Bello, and abused their authority resulting in unauthorized and unlawful consequences.
• Self-Defense: No. Unlawful aggression — the condition sine qua non of self-defense — was not established; the prosecution eyewitness contradicted the appellants' claim that Bello fired first, and physical evidence confirmed that Bello's firearms had not been discharged.
• Culpability for Tiongson Shooting: Yes. The appellants' denials were overcome by circumstantial evidence, including eyewitness testimony of flashes of fire from Buenaflor's direction and four empty .30 caliber carbine shells matching Pinto's weapon found at his deployment position.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established in both incidents by the appellants' concerted acts showing joint purpose and design, notwithstanding the absence of prior agreement; their simultaneous firing at the Tiongson jeep in defiance of superior orders demonstrated unity of purpose.
• Aberratio Ictus: No exemption or mitigation. Mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on the intended victim, because the accused acted with disregard for the life of the actual victims without checking their identity.
• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Treachery was present in all four crimes, qualifying the killings to murder and the wounding to frustrated murder; evident premeditation was not proven beyond reasonable doubt; the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position was properly appreciated under Article 14(1) of the Revised Penal Code; nighttime was absorbed by treachery.
• Proper Penalty: Reclusion perpetua for each of the three murders (the death penalty having been constitutionally abolished), and an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum for the frustrated murder, with civil indemnity of ₱50,000 for each murder.

• Fulfillment of Duty: The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code requires two requisites: (a) the offender acted in the performance of a duty, and (b) the injury or offense committed was the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. While the appellants originally set out to serve a search warrant — a legal duty — they went beyond the ambit of their mission. They were armed with only a search warrant and an oral order to apprehend Bello, for which no warrant of arrest had been issued. No proof existed that Bello had been convicted of any offense or was a dangerous fugitive from justice that would warrant a "shoot-to-kill" order. The suspicion that Bello was maintaining a private army was not sufficient justification for his being killed without due process of law. In the absence of the second requisite, the justification fails. The police theory that Bello had shot Salustiano Botin was likewise insufficient to justify his arrest without a warrant, as no complaint had been lodged and no warrant of arrest had been secured. The appellants' propensity for rash judgment was further demonstrated in the Tiongson incident: they fired upon the Anduiza jeep believing Bello was its passenger, without any inquiry as to the identity of its passengers. Sound discretion dictated that, absent responding shots after the alleged warning, the most they could have done was shoot the tires to render the jeep immobile and verify the passengers' identity.

• Self-Defense: Self-defense under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code requires unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation by the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non. The appellants claimed Buenaflor called on Bello to surrender and his shout was answered by a gunshot from the balcony. However, the principal prosecution eyewitness, Inocencia Malbas, testified that she heard no such shout to surrender and no gunshot from Bello's direction before the appellants fired. Physical evidence corroborated her account: NBI Agent Señora found no bullet marks at the crime scene attributable to the .22 caliber "paltik" firearms allegedly used by Bello's men. Buenaflor himself admitted that the magazine of Bello's garand was "intact" and that he did not manipulate the rifle to determine whether bullets had been used. Pinto's own testimony that Bello was smoking with his back towards them when shot, and was not holding a gun at that moment, further undermined the claim of unlawful aggression. As for Rosalio Andes, even Buenaflor admitted he did not see Andes attack Pinto, and Inocencia saw no weapon near the fallen Rosalio. A mere threatening attitude does not constitute unlawful aggression. Pinto's testimony that Rosalio menacingly approached with a bolo after Buenaflor had already released a burst of fire was characterized as contrary to human behavior. An accused who admits inflicting fatal injury and invokes self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence; the appellants failed to present sufficiently strong evidence to support their claim.

• Culpability for Tiongson Shooting: The appellants' denials were overcome by multiple pieces of circumstantial evidence. Sgt. Romero testified that he saw "flashes of fire" from the direction of Buenaflor as the jeep passed by, and this testimony was corroborated by PC member Rafael Jacob of Team 2, who testified that sporadic firing came from Team 3. Defense witness Mariano Rico, who led Team 1, was "sure" he heard gunshots when the jeep had just passed Team 2. Four empty .30 caliber carbine shells were found near the coconut tree where Pinto was deployed, and ballistic examination confirmed they had "significant similar individual characteristics" with test shells fired from Pinto's carbine. Although the ballistic report indicated the lead bullet from Richard's body was fired from a Smith & Wesson type firearm, and Buenaflor carried a .38 caliber Tell revolver, expert findings serve only as a guide after considering all facts. The undisputed fact remained that Romero specifically identified Buenaflor as the one who fired as the jeep passed, and no evidence was presented that Romero would prevaricate. Additionally, Buenaflor's motive for wanting to eliminate Bello was established through the unrebutted testimony of Rogelio Escober: Buenaflor and another officer had borrowed Bello's jeep, which was later found to have been used in dumping a murder victim's body, and Bello had agreed to execute a sworn statement on the matter, prompting warnings from Buenaflor's colleague that "something might happen" to Bello. The combination of all these circumstances produced a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

• Conspiracy: Prior agreement between the appellants is not essential to prove conspiracy, as it may be inferred from their own acts showing joint purpose and design. In the Tiongson incident, unity of purpose and design was shown by the fact that only the two of them fired their guns when the Anduiza jeep passed by, in defiance of their superior's order not to shoot without clearance. Conspiracy having been proved, guilt is imposable on both appellants in equal degrees, and it was not necessary to pinpoint who between Pinto and Buenaflor actually caused the death of Richard or the wounding of Maria Theresa. The same conspiracy was evident in the killing of Bello and Andes, shown by the manner of their concerted action.

• Aberratio Ictus: The fact that the victims were different from the ones the appellants intended to injure cannot save them from conviction. Aberratio ictus, or mistake in the identity of the victim, carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim, because the accused acted with such disregard for the life of the victim(s) — without checking carefully the latter's identity — as to place himself on the same legal plane as one who kills another willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously. Neither may mistake in killing one man instead of another be considered a mitigating circumstance.

• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Treachery attended the commission of all four crimes. The killing of Richard Tiongson, Francisco Bello, and Rosalio Andes, as well as the wounding of Maria Theresa Tiongson, were all so sudden that the victims were left defenseless, as shown by both testimonial evidence and the nature and location of the wounds. Treachery qualified the killings to murder and the wounding to frustrated murder. Nighttime was absorbed by treachery, as there was no proof it was specifically sought. Evident premeditation was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The appellants took advantage of their public position in perpetrating the crimes, which was properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Article 14(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Proper Penalty: Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. With no mitigating circumstance and one aggravating circumstance (taking advantage of public position), the proper penalty was death. However, in view of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty, reclusion perpetua was imposed for each of the three murders. For the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa, applying Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable was prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty was six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum. The indemnity of eight thousand pesos imposed by the lower court for Maria Theresa was respected, as while there was evidence of her hospitalization expenses at the Sacred Heart Clinic, there was no proof of expenses incurred at the Camp Crame Hospital.

• Justifying Circumstance of Fulfillment of Duty (Article 11, RPC) — Two requisites must concur: (a) the offender acted in the performance of a duty, and (b) the injury or offense committed was the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. In the absence of the second requisite, the justification becomes incomplete, converting it into a mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69. The Court found that while the appellants originally set out to perform a legal duty, they exceeded the bounds of their mission, depriving Bello and two others of their lives without lawful justification.

• Self-Defense (Article 11[1], RPC) — Three elements must be present: (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non; there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim committed unlawful aggression. A mere threatening attitude does not constitute unlawful aggression. An accused who admits inflicting fatal injury and invokes self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's.

• Conspiracy — Prior agreement is not essential; conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused showing joint purpose and design. Where conspiracy is proved, the guilt or culpability is imposable on all conspirators in equal degrees, and it is not necessary to pinpoint which conspirator actually caused the specific injury.

• Aberratio Ictus — Mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on the intended victim, where the accused acted with disregard for the life of the victim without checking identity. It is not a mitigating circumstance.

• Treachery — Present when the attack is so sudden that the victim is left defenseless, as shown by testimonial evidence and the nature and location of the wounds. Treachery qualifies killing to murder and wounding to frustrated murder. Nighttime is absorbed by treachery where there is no proof it was specifically sought.

• "In order that the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code may be successfully invoked, the defense has to prove that these two requisites are present: (a) the offender acted in the performance of a duty and (b) the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty." — This passage states the controlling two-pronged test for the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty and is the foundation for the Court's rejection of the appellants' primary defense.

• "Aberratio ictus or mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim. The main reason behind this conclusion is the fact that the accused had acted with such a disregard for the life of the victim(s) — without checking carefully the latter's identity as to place himself on the same legal plane as one who kills another willfully, unlawfully and feloniously." — This defines the doctrine of aberratio ictus as applied to peace officers who fire indiscriminately at a vehicle without verifying the identity of its passengers.

• "Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness an vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation—not condonation— should be the rule; otherwise we would offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation." — Quoted from the Oanis case, this passage articulates the standard of official conduct expected of peace officers and the principle that notoriety of a suspect cannot justify the taking of human life without legal justification.

• "Prior agreement between the appellants to lull their intended victim is not essential to prove conspiracy as the same may be inferred from their own acts showing joint purpose and design." — This states the canonical formulation of how conspiracy is established through circumstantial evidence of concerted acts, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• Calderon vs. People and Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 216 (1954) — Cited as controlling authority for the standard that the judgment and discretion of public officers in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits and in conformity with the spirit and purpose of the law. Also cited for the principle that aberratio ictus carries the same gravity as intentional killing.

• People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943) — Cited for the principle that the notoriety of a criminal cannot justify precipitate action at the cost of human life, and that where precipitate action costs an innocent life without circumstances warranting such action, condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule.

• People vs. Sazon, G.R. No. 89684, September 18, 1990 — Cited for the principle that proof of bad moral character of the victim establishes only a probability that he committed a crime but cannot justify his annihilation, and for the requirement of unlawful aggression as condition sine qua non of self-defense.

• People vs. Madriaga IV, G.R. No. 73057, March 8, 1989 — Cited for the standard of circumstantial evidence under Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court: where there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which inferences are derived are proven, the combination of all circumstances may produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

• Article 11, Revised Penal Code — Defines justifying circumstances, including fulfillment of duty (par. 5) and self-defense (par. 1). The Court applied the two-requisite test for fulfillment of duty and the three-element test for self-defense, finding neither justifying circumstance applicable.

• Article 13, Revised Penal Code — Defines mitigating circumstances; referenced in connection with the rule that the absence of the second requisite of fulfillment of duty converts the justification into a mitigating circumstance.

• Article 14(1), Revised Penal Code — Defines the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position; applied to both appellants as peace officers who used their official capacity in perpetrating the crimes.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines murder and prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death; applied with the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position, yielding the death penalty, which was reduced to reclusion perpetua due to constitutional abolition of the death penalty.

• Article 50, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for frustrated crimes as the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for the consummated crime; applied to determine the penalty for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson.

• Article 64(3), Revised Penal Code — Provides that where the penalty is divisible and there is one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the maximum period shall be imposed; applied in determining the proper penalty for murder.

• Article 69, Revised Penal Code — Provides for the imposition of a penalty next lower in degree when the penalty is not divisible and there are mitigating or aggravating circumstances; referenced in connection with incomplete justifying circumstances.

• Article 250, Revised Penal Code — Pertains to penalties for physical injuries; referenced in determining whether the penalty for frustrated murder should be further lowered by one degree.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the proper indeterminate penalty for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson: six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum.

• Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Governs circumstantial evidence, requiring more than one circumstance, proven facts from which inferences are derived, and a combination of circumstances producing conviction beyond reasonable doubt; applied to sustain the conviction based on the totality of circumstantial evidence.

Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concurred. Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurred but agreed with Justice Bidin's separate opinion.

N/A

Separate Concurring Opinion of Bidin, J.:

Bidin, J., concurred on the ground that since the appellants had been sentenced to suffer three (3) life imprisonments, the Indeterminate Sentence Law should no longer be applied.