People vs. Pimentel

A conviction cannot rest on hearsay evidence and admissions that, even if accepted, fall short of proving every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt; mere suspicion of guilt, no matter how strong, must not sway judgment against the accused.

Pimentel was the incumbent Municipal Mayor of Tago, Surigao del Sur, with Salary Grade 27, while Reyes was the incumbent Barangay Captain of Unaban, Tago, Surigao del Sur, with a salary grade below 27. The subject construction materials—286 sacks of cement and 280 ten-millimeter steel bars, valued at ₱121,366.80—were government properties owned by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Sur, granted to the Unaban Farmers Association for the construction of a Multi-Purpose Drying Pavement (MPDP). The materials were procured through the Department of Agriculture and delivered to Barangay Unaban on December 17, 2013, where Reyes received them in his capacity as Barangay Captain. The dispute arose after the materials were transported from Barangay Unaban on January 11, 2014, prompting a Sangguniang Bayan inquiry and a criminal complaint filed by former Barangay Captain Edna Salamo before the Ombudsman.

In August 2013, the Samahang Magsasaka ng Unaban Foundation requested assistance from the Department of Agriculture (DA)-Regional Field Unit 13 for the grant of a Multi-Purpose Drying Pavement (MPDP). Foundation President Jesus E. Salamo was designated to transact with the DA. A purchase request for 286 bags of cement and 280 ten-millimeter steel bars, valued at ₱121,366.80, was granted by the DA through the Provincial Government of Surigao del Sur. All paperwork for the purchase contained the instruction to deliver the materials to the site of the Foundation. On December 17, 2013, Twinkle Star, sub-contractor of the winning bidder GIBB Marketing, delivered the materials to Barangay Unaban, Tago, Surigao del Sur, where Reyes, in his capacity as Barangay Captain, received them. The materials were kept in the multi-purpose hall of Barangay Unaban.

During the first week of February 2014, Foundation President Salamo reported to Councilor Wilfredo M. Yu that the materials had been borrowed by Pimentel and transported to Socorro, Surigao del Norte, on January 11, 2014, without the Foundation's knowledge and consent. The Committee on Agriculture of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tago scheduled a meeting on February 13, 2014, to conduct an inquiry. The Committee found that Reyes received the materials on December 17, 2013, and entrusted or lent them to Pimentel; that the materials were transported to Socorro on January 11, 2014; that upon inspection on February 6, 2014, the Provincial Agriculturist discovered the materials were missing; and that replacement materials were delivered on February 7 and 11, 2014, allegedly paid for by Pimentel. On May 30, 2014, former Barangay Captain Edna Salamo filed a complaint before the Ombudsman, alleging that the materials were diverted to Socorro at Pimentel's instance and with Reyes's approval, to be used in the construction of Pimentel's private resort. She averred that Pimentel admitted in a live radio interview to having used the materials for personal purposes. Barangay Councilor Fortunato Ortuyo, Jr. and Barangay Tanod Junrey Quico executed a joint affidavit corroborating the complaint, as did Foundation President Salamo.

Pimentel and Reyes filed their respective counter-affidavits before the Ombudsman, in which they admitted the allegations in the first ten paragraphs of former Barangay Captain Salamo's affidavit-complaint as matters of public record, but vehemently denied the imputation of criminal liability. Critically, paragraph 14 of Pimentel's counter-affidavit stated that he caused the loading of the materials onto a forward truck and instructed the driver to deliver them to "our private resort in Socorro, Surigao del Norte." Paragraph 16 of Reyes's counter-affidavit contained a substantially identical statement, referring to "our private resort in Socorro, Surigao del Norte." During trial before the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution elected not to present any witnesses, relying instead on documentary exhibits whose existence the defense had admitted. The defense presented Pimentel and Reyes as witnesses, formally offering their counter-affidavits as evidence.

At trial, Pimentel testified that he did not take the materials for his own private use, but transferred them to nearby Barangay Gamut—which had higher ground—to save them from flooding caused by typhoon Agaton. He claimed the rains lasted about three weeks to a month, and that after the floods receded, approximately twenty percent of the cement bags had hardened. He told the Barangay Council not to use the damaged materials, purchased replacements, and had them delivered to the MPDP construction site. When confronted on cross-examination with his counter-affidavit statement that the materials were brought to his private resort in Socorro, Pimentel claimed that statement was false, noting that Socorro was approximately 200 kilometers away from Tago, reachable only via a rough road and a one-hour boat ride. Reyes corroborated Pimentel's account, testifying that the materials were brought to Barangay Gamut because the road to Surigao del Norte was impassable due to flooding. He stated he was in the truck during the transport and that Pimentel was not present when the materials were extracted from Barangay Unaban.

The Sandiganbayan, in its Decision dated October 4, 2019, found both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, relying principally on the admissions in their counter-affidavits and former Barangay Captain Salamo's affidavit-complaint. The Sandiganbayan concluded that the accused, in conspiracy with each other, acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in giving Pimentel unwarranted benefits, and that Reyes consented to the transfer of materials for Pimentel's personal use, thereby committing malversation. The Sandiganbayan denied their Motion for Reconsideration on January 24, 2020.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding both accused Pimentel and Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Malversation of Public Property under Article 217 of the RPC, given that the prosecution presented no witnesses and relied on hearsay evidence and limited admissions.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Yes, the Sandiganbayan erred. The prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of both accused beyond reasonable doubt, having relied on hearsay evidence and admissions that, even if accepted, fell short of establishing all elements of the crimes charged.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: The prosecution's case rested on two principal pieces of evidence: former Barangay Captain Salamo's affidavit-complaint and the counter-affidavits of Pimentel and Reyes. Salamo was never presented as a witness during trial, and the allegations in her affidavit-complaint were not based on her personal knowledge but on the "observation and investigation" of the Sangguniang Bayan Committee on Agriculture as reflected in Committee Report No. 01-14. Under established doctrine, an affidavit is hearsay when its maker does not take the witness stand, because the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. The defense admitted only the existence of the prosecution's documentary exhibits, not the truthfulness of the statements therein. Thus, Salamo's affidavit-complaint alone could not provide the evidentiary weight needed to convict. As for the counter-affidavits, while paragraph 6 admitted the first ten paragraphs of Salamo's complaint as matters of public record, the same paragraph vehemently and specifically denied the imputation of criminal liability. Paragraphs 14 and 16, cited by the Sandiganbayan, admitted at most only that the materials were brought to Socorro—nothing more. Nowhere in either counter-affidavit did the accused admit to using the materials for Pimentel's personal benefit. The Sandiganbayan's conclusion that the materials were in fact used in the construction of Pimentel's private resort was unsupported by any explicit statement in Committee Report No. 01-14 or by any other evidence. The prosecution presented no witnesses at trial, leaving the defense unable to cross-examine Salamo or any member of the Sangguniang Bayan. While the inconsistency between the accused's counter-affidavits (stating the materials were brought to Socorro) and their testimonies (claiming the materials were brought to Barangay Gamut) raised suspicion, mere suspicion of guilt, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against the accused. The constitutional presumption of innocence demands that the prosecution establish guilt through the strength of its own evidence, not the weakness of the defense. Because the prosecution failed to prove each element of the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt, the acquittal of both accused was warranted.

• Hearsay Nature of Affidavits — An affidavit is treated as hearsay evidence when its maker did not take the witness stand. Affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon, because they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another person who may omit or misunderstand parts of the affiant's statements, and the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine. The Court applied this doctrine to former Barangay Captain Salamo's affidavit-complaint, which was based on a Sangguniang Bayan committee report rather than personal knowledge and whose affiant was never presented as a witness, rendering it bereft of substantial evidentiary value.

• Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof — The presumption of innocence in favor of an accused is a constitutional guarantee requiring the State to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. Every reasonable doubt entitles the accused to an acquittal. Mere suspicion of guilt, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against the accused. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the prosecution's reliance on hearsay evidence and admissions insufficient to establish all elements of the crimes charged failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

• Judicial Admissions; Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court — The act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him or her. The Court acknowledged this rule but clarified that the admissions in the accused's counter-affidavits—at most admitting only that the materials were brought to Socorro—did not amount to proof beyond reasonable doubt of all elements of the crimes charged, particularly the use of the materials for Pimentel's personal benefit.

• "Basic is the rule in this jurisdiction that an affidavit is treated merely as hearsay evidence when its maker did not take the witness stand." — This passage articulates the doctrinal basis for excluding Salamo's affidavit-complaint, a critical step in the Court's reasoning that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction.

• "Requiring proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt necessarily means that mere suspicion of the guilt of the accused, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against him." — This formulation captures the ratio decidendi: the inconsistency between the accused's counter-affidavits and their testimonies generated suspicion, but suspicion alone cannot substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt.

• "In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it." — Quoted from Patula vs. People, this passage underscores the principle that the prosecution's case must stand or fall on its own evidence, a principle the Court found the prosecution failed to satisfy.

• Republic of the Philippines vs. Manotoc, et al., 681 Phil. 380 (2012) — Cited for the doctrine that affidavits, even if acknowledged before a notary public and classified as public documents, remain hearsay evidence unless the affiants testify on the witness stand. The Court applied this principle to hold Salamo's affidavit-complaint inadmissible for want of the affiant's testimony.

• Patula vs. People, 685 Phil. 376 (2012) — Cited for the principle that the prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, must prove each and every element of the crime charged, and must rely on the strength of its own evidence rather than the weakness of the defense. The Court relied on this formulation to conclude that the prosecution's failure to discharge its burden entitled both accused to acquittal.

• Catubao vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 227371, October 2, 2019 — Cited for the rule that the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt each element of the crime is upon the prosecution, and that any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the accused.

• Unchuan vs. Lozada, 603 Phil. 410 (2009) — Cited as authority for the proposition that an affidavit is hearsay when its maker did not take the witness stand.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Penalizes public officers who cause undue injury to any party, including the government, or give any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of official functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or the giving of unwarranted benefits beyond reasonable doubt.

• Article 217, Revised Penal Code (Malversation of Public Funds or Property) — Penalizes any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property and who appropriates, takes, misappropriates, or consents or, through abandonment or negligence, permits another person to take such public funds or property. The Court found that while the first three elements (public officer, custody by reason of office, public property) were stipulated, the fourth element—appropriation, misappropriation, or consent to the taking—was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• Section 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him or her. The Sandiganbayan relied on this provision to admit the counter-affidavits of the accused as judicial admissions; the Court acknowledged the applicability of the rule but held that the admissions therein were insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Inting, Dimaampao, and Singh, JJ., concurred. Caguioa, J., filed a separate concurring opinion, the text of which is not included in the provided source material.