People vs. Peralta

An extrajudicial confession is inadmissible where counsel merely witnessed its signing and did not assist the accused throughout custodial investigation; evidence seized in a search incident to an unlawful warrantless arrest is likewise inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.

Appellants were employees of the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas: Garcia as a driver in the Security and Transport Department, and Peralta, Datuin Jr., De Leon, Flores, and Loyola as laborers in the Currency Retirement Division. The appeal tests the constitutional guarantees against compelled self-incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions and of evidence allegedly seized after a warrantless arrest.

According to the prosecution, Pedro Labita of the Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP), now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), went to the Theft and Robbery Section of the Western Police District Command (WPDC) about 10:00 a.m. on November 4, 1992, and filed a complaint for qualified theft against Santiago Peralta, Armando Datuin Jr., Ulysses Garcia, Miguelito de Leon, Librando Flores, and Antonio Loyola. Labita submitted to SPO4 Cielito Coronel punctured P100 and P500 bills with a face value of P194,190.00, which had allegedly been recovered by the BSP Cash Department during its cash counting of punctured currency bills submitted by different banks; the bills were rejected by the BSP money counter machine and later submitted to the investigation staff of the BSP Cash Department, which determined that they were punctured notes already due for shredding and no longer intended for circulation. According to the prosecution, these notes were stolen from the BSP by the accused before they could be shredded. On the basis of Labita’s complaint, Garcia was apprehended in front of Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Piñas City, while waiting for a passenger bus on his way to the BSP, and was brought to the police station; on November 4, 5, and 6, 1992, while in police custody, Garcia gave three separate statements admitting his guilt and participation, identifying the other named accused as his cohorts, and narrating their participation. On the basis of Garcia’s sworn statements, the other named accused were invited for questioning and subsequently charged with qualified theft together with Garcia.

Garcia, for his part, testified that he had served as a driver of the CBP armored car from 1978 to 1994. On November 4, 1992, between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., a man who identified himself as a police officer arrested him without a warrant while he was waiting for a passenger bus in front of Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Piñas City; the officer dragged him across the street and forced him to ride a car. Inside the car, he was blindfolded, his hands were handcuffed behind his back, and he was made to bend with his chest touching his knees; somebody hit him from behind, and some occupants said he would be salvaged if he did not tell the truth. When the occupants mentioned perforated notes, he told them he knew nothing about those notes. At a safe house, somebody mentioned the names of his co-accused, and he denied knowing them; whenever he denied knowing them, somebody boxed him on the chest, and somebody poured water on his nose while he was lying on a bench. He was able to spit out the water at first, but somebody covered his mouth, and he could not breathe; when he could no longer bear the torture, he decided to cooperate, and the water pouring stopped. His ears were hit with open palms, and as he was being brought down, he felt somebody return his personal belongings to his pocket. His blindfold and handcuffs were removed at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw at the WPDC on U.N. Avenue, Manila, where SPO4 Coronel asked him his name, age, and address; Labita’s arrival interrupted the interview, and Labita instructed Coronel to get Garcia’s wallet and examine its contents. Coronel supposedly found three pieces of P100 perforated bills in Garcia’s wallet and insisted that they had been recovered from the wallet, and Coronel took down Labita’s statement.

Garcia further claimed that it was Labita, not he, who gave the answers appearing in his alleged three sworn statements dated November 4, 5, and 6, 1992. At about 6:00 p.m. on November 5, 1992, he was brought to the cell of the Theft and Robbery Section of the WPD; at about 8:00 p.m., he was brought to the office of Col. Alladin Dimagmaliw, where his co-accused were also inside. He did not identify his co-accused but merely placed his hands on the shoulders of each upon request, while Labita took pictures. Garcia came to know Atty. Francisco Sanchez of the Public Attorney’s Office on November 4, 1992, at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw, when SPO4 Coronel introduced Sanchez to him and told him that Sanchez would be his lawyer; Garcia did not agree to have Sanchez as his lawyer, Sanchez left after talking to Coronel, and Garcia did not meet Sanchez again. He was not present when Sanchez allegedly signed the three sworn statements. During the hearing on April 6, 2000, Atty. Sanchez manifested in open court that he did not assist Garcia when the police investigated him and that he signed the three sworn statements only as a witness. Garcia signed the statements because SPO4 Coronel warned him that if he did not, he would again be tortured by water cure. SPO4 Coronel caused the arrest without any warrant of De Leon, Loyola, and Flores on the basis of Labita’s complaint, effected on November 5, 1992, by SPO1 Alfredo Silva and SPO1 Redelico, and by letter dated November 6, 1992, Coronel forwarded the case to the Duty Inquest Prosecutor assigned at the WPDC Headquarters.

The RTC found that all the accused used to work for the BSP: Garcia was a driver assigned to the Security and Transport Department, while Peralta, Datuin Jr., De Leon, Flores, and Loyola were laborers assigned to the Currency Retirement Division, whose main task was to haul perforated currency notes from the currency retirement vault to the basement of the BSP building for shredding. On several occasions during the period 1990-1992, they handed to Garcia perforated currency notes placed in a coin sack, which he loaded in an armored escort van and delivered to someone waiting outside the premises of the building; the RTC held that these coordinated acts unerringly led to the conclusion that they had conspired to pilfer the perforated currency notes belonging to the BSP. The RTC rejected Garcia’s disclaimer of his own confessions as an eleventh-hour concoction to exculpate himself and his co-accused, found his allegations of torture and coerced confessions unsupported by evidence, and held that the recovery of three pieces of perforated P100 bills from Garcia’s wallet and the flight of Peralta and Datuin Jr. were indicative of the guilt of the accused.

• Admissibility of Confessions: Appellants argued that Garcia’s three sworn statements were obtained without the assistance of counsel, in violation of Article III, Section 12(1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution, and were therefore inadmissible.
• Admissibility of Perforated Notes: Appellants contended that the three P100 perforated notes allegedly confiscated from Garcia after his arrest were “fruits of the poisonous tree” and inadmissible.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Appellants maintained that the trial court erred in finding them guilty of qualified theft.
• Demurrer to Evidence: Appellants De Leon, Loyola, and Flores argued that the RTC erred in denying their demurrer to evidence and motion for reconsideration, and in failing to consider their evidence, including the testimony of State Auditor Esmeralda Elli.

• Assistance of Counsel: The OSG contended that Atty. Francisco Sanchez III of the Public Attorney’s Office duly assisted Garcia during the custodial investigation.
• Waiver of Illegal Arrest: The Solicitor General argued that appellants waived the illegality of their arrest when they entered a plea.
• Effect of Excluding the Notes: The Solicitor General further contended that excluding the three punctured currency bills would not alter the findings of the trial court.

• Extrajudicial Confessions: Whether Garcia’s three sworn statements were admissible despite the absence of counsel during custodial investigation.
• Perforated Currency Notes: Whether the three P100 perforated notes were admissible despite being seized in a warrantless search following an unlawful warrantless arrest.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the remaining admissible evidence was sufficient to prove appellants’ guilt for qualified theft beyond reasonable doubt.
• Demurrer to Evidence: Whether the RTC erred in denying the demurrer to evidence filed by De Leon, Loyola, and Flores.

• Extrajudicial Confessions: No. Garcia was not assisted by counsel; Atty. Sanchez signed only as a witness, and a written waiver without counsel’s assistance has no evidentiary relevance.
• Perforated Currency Notes: No. The notes were obtained from a warrantless search following an unlawful warrantless arrest; the waiver of the arrest’s illegality did not extend to the search, and the exclusionary rule barred their admission.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. Without the confessions and the perforated notes, the remaining evidence was utterly inadequate to overturn the presumption of innocence.
• Demurrer to Evidence: No. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion; the confessions then constituted prima facie evidence of guilt, and their inadmissibility became apparent only after Atty. Francisco testified.

• Extrajudicial Confessions: The SC noted that the signature of Atty. Sanchez on the confessions was affixed after the word “SAKSI”; he testified that he had not assisted Garcia and signed only as a witness. The RTC admitted the confessions because Garcia had expressed in writing his willingness to give them without counsel, but the SC called this manifest error. The right to counsel requires that any waiver be in writing and executed in the presence of counsel; counsel must ascertain voluntariness and understanding and advise and assist continuously from the first question until signing. The lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to witnessing the signing of a pre-prepared confession. Without counsel’s assistance, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance, and the confessions are inadmissible under Article III, Section 12; the torture question becomes moot.
• Perforated Currency Notes: The SC found that the police arrested Garcia without a warrant while he was merely waiting for a passenger bus after being pointed out by BSP Cash Department personnel. At that time he had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any crime, and he was not acting in a manner that would engender a reasonable ground to suspect that he was committing a crime; none of the circumstances under Section 5 of Rule 113 was present. Although Garcia did not raise the illegality before entering his plea and is deemed to have waived it, the waiver is limited to the arrest and does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure. The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures; without a judicial warrant, these are allowed only in the six exceptional circumstances the SC listed. Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, the subsequent search was similarly illegal, and the perforated notes were inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. The Solicitor General’s argument that De Leon, Flores, and Loyola waived the illegality by entering a plea is untenable because it was Garcia who was unlawfully arrested and searched; the legality of an arrest can be contested only by the party whose rights were impaired, and objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: The SC found that the prosecution sufficiently proved the theft of the perforated currency notes for retirement, but failed to present sufficient admissible evidence pointing to appellants as the authors. The evidence showed that other people had similar access to the shredding machine area and the currency retirement vault. Labita pinpointed appellants because of an anonymous phone call informing his superior of the people allegedly behind the theft and because of the unexplained increase in their spending, which was incompatible with their income, but Labita did not submit sufficient evidence to support the allegation. Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated notes, the remaining evidence was utterly inadequate to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.
• Demurrer to Evidence: The SC held that the trial judge’s determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to establish a prima facie case rests on sound judicial discretion, and the denial of a motion to dismiss may not be disturbed absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The inadmissibility of Garcia’s confessions did not become apparent until after Atty. Francisco testified in court. Even if the confiscated perforated notes were held inadmissible, the confessions would still have constituted prima facie evidence of the guilt of appellants. On that basis, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in denying the demurrer to evidence.

• Effective and vigilant counsel in custodial investigation — The right to counsel requires effective, vigilant, and independent representation. Counsel must ascertain that the confession is voluntary and that the accused understands its nature and consequences, and must advise and assist the accused continuously from the first question until the signing of the confession; the lawyer cannot be a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession. A waiver of the right must be in writing and executed in the presence of counsel; without counsel’s assistance, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance, and the confession is inadmissible.
• Waiver of the illegality of arrest — Failure to raise the illegality of an arrest before entering a plea waives that objection, but the waiver is limited to the arrest and does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure of evidence.
• Warrantless search and the exclusionary rule — Without a judicial warrant, a search is allowed only in the exceptional circumstances of (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) search of a moving motor vehicle, (4) customs search, (5) stop-and-frisk situations, and (6) consented search. Where the arrest is incipiently illegal, the subsequent search is similarly illegal, and the evidence obtained is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.
• Personal nature of objections to unlawful search and seizure — The legality of an arrest can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired; objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal, and third parties cannot avail themselves of it.
• Demurrer to evidence — The trial judge’s determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to establish a prima facie case rests on sound judicial discretion; denial of a demurrer may not be disturbed absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
• Presumption of innocence — A conviction cannot stand on evidence that is inadmissible; without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, the remaining evidence was utterly inadequate to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.

• "The right of the accused to counsel demands effective, vigilant and independent representation. The lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of an extra-judicial confession." — This opening statement frames the SC’s rule on the quality of counsel required during custodial investigation.
• "A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not enough. Without the assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance." — The SC rejects the RTC’s reliance on Garcia’s written waiver because no counsel assisted him.
• "Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal." — The SC uses this rule to exclude the perforated notes seized after Garcia’s warrantless arrest.
• "Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, the remaining evidence would be utterly inadequate to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence." — The SC concludes that the prosecution’s remaining evidence cannot sustain the conviction.

• People vs. Binamira, 277 SCRA 232, 238, August 14, 1997 — Cited for the rule that the lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession.
• People vs. Patungan, 354 SCRA 413, 424, March 14, 2001 — Cited for the requirement of effective, vigilant, and independent counsel.
• People vs. Gerolaga, 331 Phil. 441, October 15, 1996 — Cited for the rule that a written waiver without counsel’s assistance has no evidentiary relevance.
• Hizon vs. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 358, 371, December 13, 1996 — Cited for the constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures and the exceptions to warrantless searches.
• Malacat vs. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 462, 479, December 12, 1997 — Cited for the exceptional circumstances allowing a warrantless search.
• People vs. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 885, April 3, 1998 — Cited for the rule that an incipiently illegal arrest makes the subsequent search similarly illegal.
• People vs. Valdez, 363 Phil. 481, 487, March 3, 1999 — Cited for the exclusionary rule.
• Uy vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344 SCRA 36, 67, October 20, 2000 — Cited for the rule that objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal.

• Article III, Section 12(1) and (2), 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right to remain silent and to competent and independent counsel, requires any waiver to be in writing and in the presence of counsel, and prohibits torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or other means vitiating free will. The SC applied it to exclude Garcia’s uncounseled confessions.
• Article III, Section 12, 1987 Constitution (inadmissibility clause) — Provides that any confession or admission obtained in violation of Section 12 is inadmissible in evidence. The SC applied it to Garcia’s three sworn statements.
• Rule 113, Section 5, Rules of Court — Lists the circumstances justifying arrest without a warrant. The SC found none present when Garcia was arrested while waiting for a passenger bus.
• 1987 Constitution (unreasonable searches and seizures) and the exclusionary rule — Prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and makes evidence obtained in violation legally inadmissible. The SC applied it to the three perforated P100 notes seized after the unlawful arrest.