People vs. Peralta

Where conspirators commit three separate and distinct crimes of murder in furtherance of a common design, each conspirator is guilty of three separate murders and must suffer the corresponding penalty for each offense; quasi-recidivism mandates that each penalty be imposed in its maximum period, and multiple death penalties may legally and practically be imposed on each conspirator.

The New Bilibid Prisons at Muntinlupa, Rizal housed inmates who, as early as 1956, had arrayed themselves into two rival gangs: the "Sigue-Sigue," composed predominantly of Tagalog inmates, and the "OXO," comprised mainly of prisoners from the Visayas and Mindanao. Since then, bloody riots between the two groups had resulted in the deaths of many members and suspected sympathizers. Prison officials segregated known members by housing "Sigue-Sigue" in Building 1 and most "OXO" members in Building 4, with Visayan and Mindanao inmates — from whom the "OXO" drew most of its members — confined in brigade 4-A of that building. All six accused were convicts serving final sentences at the penitentiary at the time of the incident.

Since 1956, inmates of the New Bilibid Prisons at Muntinlupa, Rizal had arrayed themselves into two warring gangs: the "Sigue-Sigue," composed predominantly of Tagalog inmates, and the "OXO," comprised mainly of prisoners from the Visayas and Mindanao. The rivalry produced repeated bloody riots that claimed the lives of many members and suspected sympathizers. Prison officials sought to avert violent clashes by segregating known members, housing "Sigue-Sigue" in Building 1 and most "OXO" members in Building 4, where Visayan and Mindanao inmates were confined in brigade 4-A.

At about 7:00 a.m. on February 16, 1958, while inmates were preparing to attend Sunday mass, a fight erupted between rival gang members in the plaza where prisoners were assembled, causing a large commotion. The fight was quelled and those involved were led away for investigation, while the rest were ordered to return to their quarters. Hardly had conditions normalized when a riot broke out in Building 1, a known "Sigue-Sigue" lair, whose inmates attempted to invade Building 4. The timely arrival of guards forced the invaders to retreat. Moments later, another riot erupted inside Building 4 itself, as inmates of brigade 4-A destroyed the lock of their door and rampaged from one brigade to another.

The invading prisoners from 4-A, mostly "OXO" members and sympathizers, first entered brigade 4-B, where Romeo Pineda, the quarter-in-charge, testified that he saw Jose Carriego surrender his club to Andres Factora, an "OXO" member from 4-A; as Carriego turned to walk away, Factora clubbed him on the nape, then struck him again in the face while he lay prostrate, whereupon Amadeo Peralta and Leonardo Dosal repeatedly stabbed him. Pineda's account was corroborated by Juanito Marayoc and Avelino Sauza, both inmates of 4-B, who positively identified Factora, Peralta, and Dosal as Carriego's assailants. Carriego sustained a lacerated wound on the lower lip, contusion and hematoma at the back of the neck, and five penetrating chest wounds that punctured his lungs, causing death by internal hemorrhage.

From 4-B, the invaders went down and forcibly entered brigade 4-C, aided by Visayan prisoners confined there. According to Oscar Fontillas, an inmate of 4-C, Factora, Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita, Ernesto Fernandez, and Jose Tariman forced open the door. Fontillas saw Factora, Larita, and Fernandez kill Eugenio Barbosa, while the rest ordered the Visayans to leave and the "Manila boys" (Tagalogs) to remain. Antonio Pabarlan testified that he saw Peralta stab Barbosa as Dosal, Larita, Florencio Luna, Parumog, and Factora clubbed him. Jose Halili added that Barbosa was beaten and stabbed while trying to hide under a cot, with Luna, Larita, Pedro Cogol, and Eilel Tugaya standing guard to repel intervention. Carlos Espino also identified Parumog, Peralta, Factora, and Larita as Barbosa's assailants. Barbosa died from shock secondary to internal hemorrhage in the abdomen, having sustained lacerated and penetrating wounds.

After killing Barbosa, the invaders hunted for Santos Cruz, another Tagalog. Halili testified that Peralta, Larita, Cogol, and Tugaya took Cruz to 4-A from 4-C; that Cruz knelt and pleaded, "Maawa kayo sa akin. Marami akong anak," but Luna and Peralta were unmoved and stabbed him to death. Pabarlan declared that Cruz was brought to 4-A, slipped back to his cell, was recaptured by Factora, Dosal, and Luna, and was clubbed and stabbed to death near the fire escape by Parumog, Dosal, Factora, and Peralta. Fontillas and Espino corroborated these accounts and identified Larita as one of Cruz's assailants. Cruz died from a fractured skull, having also sustained seven punctured chest wounds, two of which were penetrating.

Peralta admitted killing Carriego but claimed self-defense, testifying that Carriego attacked him near the door of 4-A and clubbed him on the head, after which he stabbed Carriego with an improvised ice pick. Dosal likewise admitted killing Santos Cruz and claimed self-defense, asserting that Cruz and others invaded 4-A and that he stabbed Cruz after being hit. Factora admitted clubbing Carriego and Santos Cruz but claimed he acted under compulsion, his co-accused having threatened to kill him if he disobeyed. Parumog, Larita, and Luna raised alibi, testifying that they were elsewhere during the riot — Parumog and Larita claimed to have been in the trustee brigade for investigation, and Luna claimed to have remained in his cell throughout. The trial court rejected all defenses, crediting the positive identification by multiple prosecution witnesses, and found conspiracy attended the commission of the murders. It convicted all six accused of multiple murder and sentenced each to death, with joint and several indemnity of ₱6,000 to the heirs of each victim.

• Self-Defense (Peralta): Peralta maintained that he killed Jose Carriego in self-defense, alleging that Carriego attacked him near the door of 4-A, clubbed him on the head, and that he stabbed Carriego only after parrying a second blow and squeezing Carriego's head with his hands.
• Self-Defense (Dosal): Dosal argued that he killed Santos Cruz in self-defense, claiming that Cruz and other inmates invaded brigade 4-A, that Cruz declared he would kill Dosal, struck him on the head and nose with a sharp instrument, and that Dosal stabbed Cruz repeatedly only after being attacked.
• Compulsion/Duress (Factora): Factora claimed he clubbed Carriego and Santos Cruz under compulsion of his co-accused, who threatened to kill him if he disobeyed their orders; he denied killing Barbosa, asserting the latter was already dead.
• Alibi (Parumog, Larita, Luna): Parumog testified he was in the trustee brigade office for investigation after the plaza fight and was implicated only because he refused to testify against his co-accused. Larita claimed he was unaware of the killings and was brought to the trustee brigade for investigation, returning to his brigade only in the afternoon. Luna asserted he remained in his cell throughout the riot and did not even help barricade the brigade.

• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy attended the commission of the three murders, such that all six accused are liable as co-principals for all three killings regardless of their individual participation in each.
• Multiple Penalties: Whether each conspirator may be sentenced to multiple death penalties corresponding to the number of separate and distinct murders committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation is inherent in conspiracy and was properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
• Quasi-recidivism: Whether the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism was properly appreciated, requiring the penalty for each offense to be imposed in its maximum period.

• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established through circumstantial evidence of concerted action — the accused were all from brigade 4-A, all "OXO" members or sympathizers, all armed with improvised weapons, and acted with teamwork precision in selectively killing Tagalog inmates, indicating a common design.
• Multiple Penalties: Yes. Each conspirator is guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder and must suffer the corresponding penalty for each offense, as the act of one is the act of all; multiple death penalties may legally and practically be imposed.
• Evident Premeditation: No. Evident premeditation is not inherent in conspiracy; the absence of the former does not necessarily negate the existence of the latter, and no evidence showed how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out.
• Quasi-recidivism: Yes. All six accused were serving sentences by final judgment at the New Bilibid Prison when the offenses were committed, satisfying the requisites of Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code and mandating that the penalty for each offense be imposed in its maximum period.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. While conspiracy must be established by positive evidence, direct proof is not essential because conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy and can seldom be proved by direct evidence; competent and convincing circumstantial evidence suffices. The trial court correctly identified several circumstances proving conspiracy beyond doubt: all three victims were Tagalogs singled out from among many others confined in Building 4, showing preselection; all accused were armed with improvised weapons, showing preparation; the accused accomplished the killings with teamwork precision, going from one brigade to another attacking previously marked targets; and almost the same group participated in all three killings. All accused were inmates of brigade 4-A, were "OXO" members or sympathizers, and all victims were "Sigue-Sigue" members. The evidence proved that the accused acted in concert from the moment they bolted their common brigade until they killed their last victim. While Parumog, Larita, and Luna did not participate in the actual killing of Carriego, as co-conspirators they are equally guilty because in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all; it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator take a direct part in every act. The defenses of self-defense (Peralta and Dosal), duress (Factora), and alibi (Parumog, Larita, Luna) were all rejected as belied by the positive testimonies of multiple prosecution witnesses who identified the accused as participants. The alibis were particularly weak because no record of the alleged investigation of Parumog and Larita was presented, and Luna's claim that he "just waited in one corner" while his cellmates barricaded their brigade was unnatural.

• Multiple Penalties: The settled rule is that once conspiracy is proved, all conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals, and the act of one is the act of all. Consequently, if conspirators commit three separate and distinct crimes of murder in effecting their common design, each is guilty of three murders and must suffer the corresponding penalty for each offense. This principle was applied in People vs. Masin, where the Court held that seven conspirators should be held responsible for three murders, and in People vs. Macaso, where each appellant was found guilty of eleven murders and sentenced to life imprisonment for each crime. The rule on imposition of multiple penalties where an accused is found guilty of two or more separate and distinct crimes charged in a single information — provided the accused did not object to the multiplicity of charges — was established in U.S. vs. Balaba and reiterated in U.S. vs. Jamad and People vs. Guzman. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes that courts have the power to impose multiple penalties, which should be served simultaneously or successively. There is no statutory prohibition against multiple death penalties; Article 70 presumes judicial power to mete out multiple penalties without distinction as to the nature and severity of the penalties. The imposition of a penalty and the service of sentence are distinct concepts: the court imposes the proper penalty based on the nature, gravity, and number of offenses charged and proved, without concern for the practicality of service. Multiple death penalties can be served simultaneously, as the nature of capital sanctions necessitates simultaneous service. The practical importance of multiple death penalties lies in accurately projecting the convict's extreme criminal perversity, thereby reducing the possibility of an improvident executive clemency grant.

• Evident Premeditation: Evident premeditation is not inherent in conspiracy. Unlike evident premeditation, which requires a sufficient period of time to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection, conspiracy arises at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and decide to commit it. In this case, the conspiracy was merely inferred from the acts of the accused; there was no proof of how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, precluding a finding of evident premeditation. The Court relied on People vs. Custodia, where it was held that where conspiracy is merely inferred from the acts of the accused in the perpetration of the crime, without proof of attendant deliberation and selection of method, time, and means, the existence of evident premeditation cannot be taken for granted.

• Quasi-recidivism: All six accused were serving sentences in the New Bilibid Prison by virtue of convictions by final judgments at the time they committed the offenses. Peralta was serving sentences for robbery, evasion of sentence, and murder; Factora for illegal possession of hand grenade and frustrated homicide; Dosal for frustrated homicide and murder; Parumog for qualified theft; Larita for robbery in band with physical injuries and rape; and Luna for homicide, murder, and evasion of sentence. This satisfies the first paragraph of Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, which mandates that the penalty for each offense be imposed in its maximum period. The severe penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified by the convict's perversity and incorrigibility.

• Conspiracy as a Rule of Collective Criminal Liability — A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is generally not a separate indictable offense in the Philippines except when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor, as in treason, rebellion, and sedition. Rather, conspiracy is viewed as a rule for collectivizing criminal liability: once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation, because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. In this case, the Court applied the doctrine to hold all six accused liable for all three murders, even though not all participated in every killing.

• Proof of Conspiracy by Circumstantial Evidence — While conspiracy must be established by positive evidence, direct proof is not essential because conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy and can seldom be proved by direct evidence. Competent and convincing circumstantial evidence suffices. Conspiracy may be inferred where two or more persons aimed by their acts toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative. It is not essential that there be proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime; it is sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. The Court found conspiracy established through the concerted action of the accused in selectively targeting Tagalog inmates, their preparation of weapons, and their teamwork in moving from brigade to brigade.

• Multiple Penalties for Multiple Offenses Committed in Furtherance of Conspiracy — Where conspirators commit more than one offense in furtherance of a common design, each conspirator is liable for all of the crimes committed and must suffer the corresponding penalty for each offense. Conviction for multiple felonies demands the imposition of multiple penalties. The two exceptions are the complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and the special complex crime (e.g., robbery with homicide), where only a single penalty is prescribed regardless of the number of separate felonies committed. In this case, the three murders were separate and distinct, not constituting a complex crime, so three separate death penalties were imposed on each accused.

• Imposition of Penalty vs. Service of Sentence — The imposition of a penalty and the service of sentence are distinct concepts. The court imposes the proper penalty based on the nature, gravity, and number of offenses charged and proved, without regard to the possibility or practicality of service. Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they must be executed simultaneously under Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. The practical importance of multiple death penalties lies in accurately reflecting the convict's criminal perversity and deterring improvident grants of executive clemency.

• Quasi-recidivism (Article 160, Revised Penal Code) — A quasi-recidivist is one who, after conviction by final judgment, commits a new felony before beginning to serve sentence or while serving the same. The penalty for the new felony must be imposed in its maximum period. In this case, all six accused were serving final sentences at the New Bilibid Prison when they committed the murders, so the penalty for each offense was imposed in its maximum period.

• "Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all." — This passage articulates the foundational principle of collective criminal liability in conspiracy, the central doctrine upon which the Court imposed three separate murder convictions on each accused.

• "The imposition of a penalty and the service of sentence are two distinct, though related, concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and proved, whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity and character of the penalty or penalties imposed." — This passage establishes the analytical framework distinguishing the judicial function of sentencing from the executive function of serving sentence, justifying the imposition of multiple death penalties despite the physiological impossibility of executing more than one.

• "Conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or agreement; however, to establish conspiracy, 'it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors committed shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.'" — This passage defines the quantum and nature of proof required to establish conspiracy, emphasizing that concerted action toward a common unlawful objective suffices even without direct evidence of a prior agreement.

• "Evident premeditation is not inherent in conspiracy as the absence of the former does not necessarily negate the existence of the latter." — This passage clarifies the relationship between two distinct legal concepts, rejecting the trial court's assumption that conspiracy necessarily entails evident premeditation, and establishing that each must be independently proved.

• U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260 — Leading case establishing the rule that upon conviction of two or more offenses charged in a single information, all prescribed penalties for each offense should be imposed, to be executed under Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court applied this doctrine to impose three separate death penalties on each conspirator.
• U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305 — Reiterated the Balaba doctrine, imposing separate penalties for parricide, two murders, and frustrated murder, holding that the trial court erred in applying Article 48 (complex crime) instead of Article 70 (multiple penalties). Followed as controlling precedent for the imposition of multiple penalties.
• People vs. Masin, 64 Phil. 757 — Held that where seven conspirators committed three separate murders, each should be held responsible for all three crimes, with the same penalty imposed for each. The projected imposition of three death penalties was not carried out only for lack of the then-requisite unanimity. Applied to support multiple murder convictions per conspirator.
• People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819 — After finding conspiracy in the commission of eleven murders, the Court held each appellant guilty of as many crimes of murder as there were deaths, sentencing each to life imprisonment for each crime. Followed for the principle of multiple liability per conspirator.
• People vs. Villa, 81 Phil. 193 — Held that conspirators in rape are each responsible not only for the rape they personally committed but also for those committed by co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. Cited to illustrate the ensnaring nature of conspiracy across different crimes.
• People vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379 — Held that non-accountable public officers who conspired with a municipal treasurer in malversation were principally liable, demonstrating that conspiracy imputes the felonious act of one conspirator to all. Cited to illustrate collective liability in conspiracy.
• People vs. Custodia, 97 Phil. 698 — Held that where conspiracy is merely inferred from the acts of the accused, without proof of deliberation and selection of method, time, and means, evident premeditation cannot be presumed. Applied to reject the trial court's finding of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Izon, 104 Phil. 690 — Acquitted a conspirator who was present at the conspiracy's discussion but uttered no word of approval or disapproval and had no active participation, establishing that mere presence at a conspiracy discussion is insufficient for conviction. Distinguished; in this case, all accused performed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.
• U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto, 36 Phil. 149 — Emphasized the significance of conspiracy in establishing the existence of the consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators. Cited for the foundational principle that conspiracy is a fact of vital importance in criminal liability.

• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as existing when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Applied to establish the existence of conspiracy among the six accused.
• Article 17, Revised Penal Code — Enumerates the categories of principals. Distinguished from co-conspirator liability: while a principal's criminal liability is generally limited to his own acts, a co-conspirator's responsibility includes the acts of fellow conspirators done in furtherance of the conspiracy.
• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Governs complex crimes, prescribing a single penalty — that for the most serious offense in its maximum period — regardless of the multiplicity of offenses. Distinguished from the present case, where the three murders were separate and distinct, not constituting a complex crime.
• Article 70, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when a culprit has to serve two or more penalties, they shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties permits; otherwise, successively in order of severity. Applied as the statutory basis for imposing multiple penalties, including multiple death penalties, on each conspirator.
• Article 160, Revised Penal Code — Imposes the penalty for a new felony in its maximum period when the offender is a quasi-recidivist, i.e., one who commits a new felony after conviction by final judgment, before beginning to serve sentence or while serving it. Applied to all six accused, who were serving final sentences at the New Bilibid Prison at the time of the murders.
• Article 296, Revised Penal Code — Presumes conspiracy in robbery committed by a band, such that any member present at the commission of a robbery by the band is punished as principal of any assault committed, unless he attempted to prevent it. Cited as an example of the principle that the act of one is the act of all.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concurred. Zaldivar, J., was on leave.