People vs. Pastores

Cooperation that is not indispensable to the commission of a crime renders the co-accused liable merely as accomplices, not as principals by indispensable cooperation, and in case of doubt as to the degree of participation, the lesser liability should prevail. An intact hymen does not preclude a conviction for rape where there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum.

Complainant Minda V. Reyes was a fourth-year BSE student at St. Mary's College in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. The three accused—Carlos Pastores, Edmund Magat, and Eugenio Villar—were residents of the same locality. The prosecution of rape was governed by Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, which required that the offense be initiated by a complaint signed by the offended party. After Reyes executed a sworn complaint before the Municipal Judge of Bayombong, the Provincial Fiscal conducted a separate investigation and filed an information in the Court of First Instance charging all three accused with rape committed through force, threat, and intimidation—a manner of commission differing from that alleged in the sworn complaint.

In the evening of August 5, 1966, Minda V. Reyes, a fourth-year BSE student at St. Mary's College in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, attended a coronation ceremony at the school together with her boyfriend, Augusto Brillantes. The affair ended at about 11:30 p.m., and the couple left the school past midnight. Because there were no more jeepneys to take Minda home to Solano, they decided to stroll along the streets of Bayombong. They walked to the capitol grounds, sat on a bench, and conversed for about two hours, then moved on to the Perez grandstand at the Clisoc Field to avoid being seen together at that late hour.

They had been seated at the grandstand for about thirty minutes when the three accused—Carlos Pastores, Edmund Magat, and Eugenio Villar—appeared and approached them. According to the prosecution's account, corroborated by both Minda and Augusto on the witness stand, Magat and Villar seized Minda by the hands while Pastores held Augusto at bay with a bolo. Magat and Villar began embracing and kissing Minda and touching her breast and private parts. Augusto tried to come to her aid twice, but Pastores boxed him each time, weakening him. Magat then dragged Minda up and down the grandstand; she struggled and managed to get up. Pastores then took her by the hand, threatened her with a knife, and ordered Magat, Villar, and Augusto to follow them to the dike, approximately 200 meters away. Upon reaching the dike, Pastores ordered Magat and Villar to take Augusto away, which they did, escorting him about 50 meters to the other side of the dike and holding him there until about 5:30 or 6:00 a.m.

Pastores and Minda walked a little farther. He began kissing and embracing her; she resisted, but he covered her mouth, laid her on the ground, slapped her face, boxed her sternum, and strangled her when she kept shouting. He removed her blouse, bra, skirt, and panties, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She continued struggling until his organ was dislodged; he attempted to reinsert it but desisted, after which she felt a sticky substance between her legs. Pastores threatened to kill her if she reported to the authorities and threatened to call his two companions. Feigning affection, Minda pretended to like him, and Pastores brought her to the house of one Mrs. Bongcad, introducing her as his sweetheart. When she reiterated her desire to go home to change clothes, he consented. She took a tricycle, stopped first at Augusto's residence to inform his mother, then proceeded to the municipal building and reported the incident to the police. Later that day, she was examined at the provincial hospital.

The defense presented a sharply different version. Magat and Villar testified that they had been walking home from a billiard hall when Pastores asked them to accompany him to the grandstand, as he feared his father's anger at his late arrival. Near the grandstand, they heard a woman crying and found Minda being embraced by Augusto. Pastores approached the couple, spoke privately with Augusto, and then informed his companions they were leaving. Minda allegedly ran after them, wanting to join them because Augusto was drunk and "making a fool of her." At a crossing near the Girl Scouts building, Pastores told Magat and Villar to go home, which they did. Pastores, for his part, testified that he and Minda walked together voluntarily to the dike, where they met several acquaintances to whom he introduced her as his girlfriend—introductions she acknowledged with smiles. They went to Mrs. Bongcad's house, took coffee, and Minda kissed him goodbye after receiving fifty centavos for transportation. Defense witnesses Pacita Bicera, Inocencio Ascado, and Concepcion Bongcad corroborated Pastores' account of Minda's seemingly amicable demeanor.

The examining physician, Dr. Benigno Rivera, Jr., testified that he found contusions in the vulva, congested condition and discoloration of the hymen, and a fresh laceration at the posterior fourchette—injuries indicating penetration past the labia majora. The hymen itself was intact, which the physician explained by noting that complainant's hymen was of the elastic type that returns to its original virginal appearance even after intercourse. The trial court credited the prosecution's evidence, found Pastores guilty as principal by direct participation, and found Magat and Villar guilty as principals by indispensable cooperation for their role in separating Brillantes from the complainant and standing guard over him, thereby enabling Pastores to commit the rape without interference.

• Jurisdiction: Appellants contended that the sworn complaint signed by the offended party charged rape committed while the complainant was in a state of coma or unconsciousness, whereas the information filed by the Provincial Fiscal alleged rape through force, threat, and intimidation; because the information charged a manner of commission different from that in the complaint, the complaint could not serve as the jurisdictional basis for the information under Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, and the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction.
• Insufficiency of Medical Evidence: Appellant Pastores argued that the examining physician found the complainant's hymen to be intact, which precluded a finding of rape.
• Credibility of Complainant's Conduct: Pastores maintained that the complainant's behavior when seen by defense witnesses Bicera, Bongcad, and Ascado—smiling, acknowledging introductions as his girlfriend, and kissing him goodbye—was inconsistent with her claim of having been raped.
• Liability of Magat and Villar: Defense counsel argued that the details of the commission of the offense did not satisfactorily support a finding of conspiracy, as the encounter between the accused and the complainant and her companion was purely by chance.

• Jurisdiction: Whether a complaint signed by the offended party charging rape committed in a particular manner (while the complainant was unconscious) can serve as the jurisdictional basis for an information charging rape committed in a different manner (through force, threat, and intimidation).
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Rape: Whether the crime of rape was proven notwithstanding the examining physician's finding that the complainant's hymen was intact.
• Liability of Co-Accused: Whether Magat and Villar are liable as principals by indispensable cooperation or merely as accomplices, given their role in separating and guarding the complainant's companion.

• Jurisdiction: Yes. The filing of the complaint for rape conferred jurisdiction on the court to try the offense, and a change in the allegations as to the manner of committing the crime did not divest the court of jurisdiction already acquired.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Rape: Yes. An intact hymen does not preclude a conviction for rape where there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum, and the medical evidence of contusions, congestion, and laceration corroborated the complainant's positive testimony.
• Liability of Co-Accused: No, Magat and Villar are not principals by indispensable cooperation but mere accomplices. Their cooperation in guarding Brillantes was not indispensable to the commission of the rape, as Brillantes had already been overpowered by Pastores, who was armed with a knife while Brillantes was unarmed.

• Jurisdiction: The Court relied on People vs. Bangalao, which involved the same factual situation—a complaint alleging rape by force and intimidation serving as the basis for an information charging rape of a minor and demented girl. The rationale is that complaints are prepared in municipalities, often without competent counsel, and the Fiscal thereafter conducts a separate investigation and files an information based on its results. Jurisdiction attaches upon the filing of the complaint for the crime of rape, irrespective of the manner in which it was committed. A change in the allegations as to the manner of commission does not divest the court of jurisdiction already acquired. The Court distinguished jurisdiction from the accused's right to demand acquittal unless the offense charged in the information is proved: even if the court cannot convict because the crime alleged differs from that proved, the court nonetheless has jurisdiction over the case.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Rape: The Court applied the established rule that rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape; it suffices that there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum. The examining physician found contusions in the vulva, congested condition and discoloration of the hymen, and fresh laceration at the posterior fourchette—indicating penetration past the labia majora. The intact hymen was explained by the physician's testimony that an elastic type of hymen returns to its original virginal appearance even after intercourse, and complainant's hymen was of this type. The complainant's positive declaration of the consummation of rape, combined with the medical findings, sufficed. As for the complainant's seemingly amicable conduct in the presence of defense witnesses, the Court found it consistent with her testimony that she pretended to like Pastores in order to escape further harm—a ruse that enabled her to obtain permission to go home and report the crime to the police. The Court found it implausible that a young college woman would fabricate a rape charge and recount the sordid details in open court unless she had truly been subjected to the outrage, and noted that her behavior demonstrated admirable presence of mind.

• Liability of Co-Accused: The Court agreed with defense counsel that the details of the offense did not support a finding of conspiracy, particularly because the accused encountered the complainant and Brillantes purely by chance. While Magat and Villar's act of separating Brillantes from the complainant and preventing him from rendering aid was undeniably cooperative, the Court did not view it as indispensable, so that the rape could not have been committed without it. At the grandstand, Brillantes had already proved no match for Pastores, who had boxed and effectively weakened him; Pastores was armed with a knife while Brillantes had no weapon. The awareness of Magat and Villar of Pastores' criminal design was established by Magat's informing his father, upon returning home, that Minda had been raped—despite not having witnessed the act at the dike. This demonstrated their knowledge of what Pastores intended when he asked them to guard Brillantes. Because their cooperation was not indispensable, they were liable only as accomplices. The Court applied the rule that in case of doubt as to the participation of an accused, the lesser liability should prevail, citing People vs. Tamayo, People vs. Crisostomo, and People vs. Balili. The penalty for an accomplice is one degree lower than that prescribed for a principal under Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code; thus, with Pastores sentenced to reclusion perpetua, Magat and Villar's penalty was reduced to reclusion temporal, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, each was sentenced to a minimum of eight years of prision mayor and a maximum of sixteen years of reclusion temporal.

• Intact hymen does not preclude rape conviction — The rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the female genitalia is not an indispensable element of rape. It is sufficient that there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum. An elastic hymen may return to its original virginal appearance even after sexual intercourse. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold Pastores' conviction despite the physician's finding of an intact hymen, relying on the medical evidence of contusions, congestion, and laceration at the posterior fourchette, combined with the complainant's positive testimony.

• Jurisdiction over rape attaches upon filing of complaint; variance in manner of commission does not divest jurisdiction — The power of the court is over the crime of rape, irrespective of the manner in which it is committed. Because complaints are prepared in municipalities often without competent counsel, and the Fiscal thereafter conducts a separate investigation and files an information based on its results, jurisdiction attaches upon the filing of the complaint. A change in the allegations as to the manner of committing the crime does not divest the court of jurisdiction already acquired. This must be distinguished from the accused's right to demand acquittal if the offense proved differs from that charged in the information.

• Distinction between principal by indispensable cooperation and accomplice — A principal by indispensable cooperation is one without whose act the crime could not have been committed. An accomplice is one who, not being a principal, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, but whose cooperation is not indispensable. Where the cooperation rendered—such as guarding a victim's companion—was not essential to the commission of the crime because the companion had already been overpowered and the principal was armed, the co-accused are liable only as accomplices.

• In case of doubt as to participation, the lesser liability should prevail — Courts lean toward the milder form of responsibility when the degree of an accused's participation is uncertain. An inference of guilty participation sufficient to hold an accused as an accomplice may be drawn from acts of concert and the form and manner of assistance rendered, where the same inference would not be drawn to hold the accused as a principal.

• "the rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the woman's genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape; it is enough that there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum." — This passage states the controlling rule on the medical element of rape, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence for the proposition that an intact hymen does not negate rape.

• "The power or jurisdiction of the court is not over the crime of rape when committed on a minor and demented girl, but over rape, irrespective of the manner in which the same may have been committed." — This quotation, drawn from People vs. Bangalao and adopted by the Court, articulates the rationale for upholding jurisdiction despite a variance between the complaint and the information as to the manner of commission.

• "Well known is the rule that in case of doubt as to the participation of an accused the lesser liability should prevail." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the doctrine of favoring the milder form of criminal responsibility when the degree of participation is uncertain, applied here to downgrade Magat and Villar from principals to accomplices.

• "as against an accomplice, a court will sometimes draw the inference of guilty participation in the criminal design from acts of concert in the consummation of the criminal act and from the form and manner in which assistance is rendered, where it would not draw the same inference for the purpose of holding the same accused in the character of principal." — This quotation from People vs. Balili defines the evidentiary standard distinguishing accomplice liability from principal liability, central to the Court's modification of the co-accused's conviction.

• People vs. Bangalao, 94 Phil. 354 — Controlling precedent on the jurisdictional issue. The Court held that an information charging rape committed on a minor and demented girl, based on a complaint alleging rape by force and intimidation, lawfully conferred jurisdiction. The Court followed this ruling directly to uphold the trial court's jurisdiction despite the variance between the complaint and the information.

• People vs. Canastre, 82 Phil. 480 — Cited for the proposition that the rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape.

• People vs. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980 — Cited for the rule that proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum suffices for a rape conviction.

• People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38 — Cited for the proposition that an accused who had knowledge of the criminal intention of others and only went along with them, without rendering indispensable cooperation, is liable only as an accomplice.

• People vs. Crisostomo, 46 Phil. 775 — Cited for the rule that accused who held the victims' companions to prevent them from rendering aid were convicted only as accomplices, even where circumstances indicated conspiracy, because their acts were not indispensable to the realization of the crime.

• People vs. Balili, G.R. No. L-14044, August 5, 1966, 17 SCRA 892-898 — Cited for the doctrine that courts may draw an inference of guilty participation sufficient for accomplice liability from acts of concert and the manner of assistance, where the same inference would not support principal liability; and that in case of doubt, courts lean to the milder form of responsibility.

• People vs. Tolentino, G.R. No. L-29419, August 30, 1971 — Cited as a decision collating subsequent cases following the Balili doctrine on accomplice liability.

• People vs. Mallari, 60 Phil. 400 — Cited for the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in fixing the minimum and maximum penalties for accomplices.

• Section 4, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Court — Requires that offenses of seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness be prosecuted only upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian. The appellants invoked this provision to challenge the trial court's jurisdiction, arguing that the information—alleging a manner of commission different from that in the sworn complaint—could not be based on the complaint. The Court upheld jurisdiction, ruling that the complaint for rape conferred jurisdiction irrespective of the manner of commission alleged.

• Article 52, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty for an accomplice is one degree lower than that prescribed for the principal. Applied to reduce Magat and Villar's penalty from reclusion perpetua (the penalty for the principal Pastores) to reclusion temporal.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law (Acts 4103 and 4225) — Applied to fix the indeterminate penalty for the accomplices: a minimum within the range of prision mayor and a maximum within the range of reclusion temporal, resulting in a sentence of eight years of prision mayor as minimum to sixteen years of reclusion temporal as maximum for each accomplice.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concurred.