People vs. Pascual

Conspiracy exists where the accused come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and each performs a role in the common design; the act of one is the act of all, so all conspirators are equally guilty of murder even if only one fired the fatal shot.

Olympio Galgo owned and operated the Blue Sky Restaurant in Kalookan City. The accused-appellants were members of the Kalookan City Police Department: Major Raymundo Pascual, Pat. Mario Salvador, Pat. Rustico Morelos, and Pat. Virgilio Gutierrez. The victim was a civilian restaurant owner; the accused were police officers.

Olympio Galgo owned and operated the Blue Sky Restaurant in Kalookan City. At about 2:00 a.m. on March 27, 1971, Rustico Morelos came to the restaurant and asked to talk to the owner; Galgo identified himself and agreed to go with Morelos after being told that Major Raymundo Pascual was waiting for them at the Caltex gas station across the street. On the way, Galgo was flanked by Morelos and Mario Salvador, who had joined them, each holding Galgo by the shoulder. Virgilio Gutierrez arrived when the three were at the back of the station and kicked Galgo twice; Morelos and Salvador pushed Galgo down. Pascual was already with them, and as Galgo tried to rise, Pascual shot him point-blank. Wenceslao Rivas, an errand boy at the restaurant, and Eulaha Vena, a waitress, witnessed the shooting. They immediately reported it to Paula Salceda Galgo, the victim's widow, and the three went to the Kalookan City Police Headquarters; they were told Galgo was at the Kalookan City General Hospital, then learned he had been transferred to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital, where they found him dead. Vena also testified that three or four days earlier, Pascual and Salvador had demanded protection money from Galgo, who begged to be excused because his restaurant had been operating for less than a month. Paula corroborated the attempted extortion and testified to the damages she sustained.

Two hours after the incident, Gutierrez executed a sworn statement declaring that Galgo was killed when he grabbed Gutierrez's gun and it went off during their struggle for it. On the basis of that statement, the Kalookan City Police investigator recommended the filing of an information against Gutierrez for homicide through simple negligence. Paula lodged a complaint with the NBI, which conducted its own investigation and recommended the filing of murder and robbery charges against Major Pascual, Pat. Mario Salvador, Pat. Rustico Morelos, and Pat. Gutierrez. Acting Fiscal Rogelio de Leon of Kalookan City made his own investigation and, on October 26, 1971, filed in the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal an information for homicide against Gutierrez only. Dissatisfied, the widow appealed to the Department of Justice, which directed the filing of an amended information charging Pascual, Gutierrez, Salvador, and Morelos with murder; this was done on December 10, 1971. Pascual, Morelos, and Salvador voluntarily surrendered and pleaded not guilty at arraignment. Gutierrez failed to appear despite notice, causing the forfeiture of his bond; he later resurfaced and pleaded not guilty.

At trial, the prosecution relied heavily on Rivas and Vena. The defense version was a reiteration of Gutierrez's sworn statement, with Pascual adding that he was at the Society Restaurant across the Caltex gas station when he heard the shot that killed Galgo. Rodolfo Marante, a dishwasher at the Society Restaurant, corroborated Pascual, saying he saw Pascual with somebody at the precise moment the shot was fired. Gregorio Manansala testified that it was as Galgo fell from the gunshot that Pascual came rushing out of the Society Restaurant. Emily Gliponeo, cashier at the Blue Sky Restaurant, retracted the statements she had executed at the NBI on March 28, 1971, in which she had corroborated Rivas and Vena; she now said she did not see the shooting because she never left the Blue Sky Restaurant when she heard the shot. Ernesto Baltao was the boy Galgo had allegedly slapped, for which act Galgo was being taken to police headquarters that early morning.

Gutierrez adopted the defense of his co-accused and reaffirmed his claim that Galgo was shot when the gun he was trying to wrest from Gutierrez went off and hit the victim in the stomach. Later, however, he again raised the arguments in his motion to dismiss and pointed to Pascual as Galgo's killer. The trial court found against all the accused. It gave credence to the prosecution's version and held that Pascual was the killer, shooting Galgo while Galgo was trying to get up after being pushed to the ground by Morelos and Salvador. The trial court found insufficient evidence to prove conspiracy and treated Morelos, Salvador, and Gutierrez as accomplices. All the defendants appealed.

• Gutierrez's Lack of Prior Knowledge: Appellant Gutierrez argued that he should not have been considered an accomplice because he had no prior knowledge of Pascual's intention to kill Galgo.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellants Pascual, Morelos, and Salvador argued that the trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses and not to Gutierrez's testimony that Galgo was shot during their struggle for the gun.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution eyewitnesses and rejecting the defense version that Galgo was shot during a struggle for Gutierrez's gun.
• Gutierrez's Liability: Whether Gutierrez should be considered an accomplice only, or not liable, because he allegedly had no prior knowledge of Pascual's intent to kill Galgo.
• Conspiracy: Whether the accused-appellants conspired to kill Galgo, making all of them equally liable for the act of Pascual in firing the fatal shot.
• Qualification of the Crime: Whether the killing was murder qualified by treachery, and whether the other alleged aggravating circumstances could be separately considered.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The trial court's assessment of credibility is accorded great weight absent arbitrariness; Rivas and Vena had no motive to falsely testify and their minor inconsistencies did not impair their credibility.
• Gutierrez's Liability: No. Gutierrez was not merely an accomplice; he was a conspirator, and his claim of lack of prior knowledge did not absolve him because he acted in concert pursuant to the common design.
• Conspiracy: Yes. The facts showed a common plan to kill Galgo for refusing extortion; each accused performed a role, and in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
• Qualification of the Crime: Yes. The killing was murder qualified by treachery; taking advantage of public position, abuse of superior strength, and nocturnity were absorbed in treachery.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The SC applied the rule that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is given great weight on appeal absent a showing that it was reached arbitrarily. The trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor—the flush of face, tone of voice, dart of eyes, or fearful pause—which cannot be discerned from the sterile record. The SC agreed with the trial court that the prosecution version was more credible: Rivas and Vena could not have concocted the narration of Galgo being shot by Pascual after being manhandled, had no motive to testify falsely, and would naturally have been reluctant to testify against armed policemen who could retaliate. Pascual's claim that the widow implicated him because of a partner's revenge was preposterous; by his own admission he was not among those who raided the massage parlor, and it was not believable that the widow would accuse an innocent man of murder to gratify a threat. The defense's point that Rivas and Vena did nothing to help Galgo did not render their testimony suspect; Rivas was an errand boy and Vena a waitress, and they could not be expected to face four armed policemen when their employer was helpless. The inconsistencies cited were not substantial: Rivas did not know firearms and could not specify the weapon; his delay was due to the NBI taking his statement 42 days later; Vena's date discrepancy was an honest typographical error, and her inability to remember details was due to tension and the speed of the crime. By contrast, the defense evidence was inventive: all four accused were together at 2:00 a.m. near the victim's restaurant without satisfactory explanation; the arrest for slapping Baltao was a minor offense and did not justify four officers, including a major, arresting the lone unarmed Galgo; it was incredible that Galgo would wrest Gutierrez's gun after leaving his restaurant when he could have resisted inside his own property with relatives and employees; the corroboration by Marante and Manansala was too pat; and the co-accused were eager to exculpate their superior, with Gutierrez's flip-flopping making him unreliable.
• Gutierrez's Liability: The SC rejected Gutierrez's contention that he could not be an accomplice because he had no prior knowledge of Pascual's intent. His participation was not passive: he arrived at the back of the gas station and kicked Galgo twice, beginning the punishment. His declarations were ambivalent and flip-flopping—he first claimed Galgo grabbed his gun, then adopted his co-accused's defense, then moved to dismiss and pointed to Pascual as the killer. His final stance rejected the role of scapegoat and insisted that Pascual fired the shot. The SC found him unreliable as a witness, not least because of possible fear of Major Pascual, but his conduct and the common design made him a conspirator rather than a mere accomplice.
• Conspiracy: The trial court held insufficient evidence of conspiracy, but the SC disagreed. The SC applied Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code and found that all the accused-appellants came to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decided to commit it. The facts showed a common plan to kill Galgo for his refusal to submit to the accused's extortion. Each had a role: Morelos fetched Galgo from the restaurant; Salvador waited outside and joined Morelos in restraining him; Gutierrez appeared and kicked him twice; Morelos and Salvador pushed him before the waiting Pascual; Pascual shot him as he tried to rise. Pascual pulled the trigger, but the other three acted in concert with him in pursuance of the common design to murder the helpless Galgo. Every one must suffer the same penalty, for in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. The SC cited People vs. Veronas, People vs. De Guzman, and People vs. Diño.
• Qualification of the Crime: The SC affirmed the trial court's finding that Pascual was the killer, shooting Galgo while Galgo was trying to get up after being pushed to the ground by Morelos and Salvador. Galgo was not in a position to defend himself when the bullet was fired. The crime was murder, qualified by treachery under the Revised Penal Code. The other aggravating circumstances alleged—taking advantage of public position, abuse of superior strength, and nocturnity—were deemed absorbed in treachery and could not be separately considered. The SC cited Article 248(1) and Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code, and People vs. Mori, People vs. Sespeñe, and People vs. Garciola.

• Conspiracy — The SC found conspiracy where the accused came to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decided to commit it, as shown by their common plan to kill Galgo for refusing to submit to their extortion and by their coordinated roles. The SC rejected the trial court's finding of insufficient evidence of conspiracy.
• Act of One Is the Act of All — In a conspiracy, every conspirator must suffer the same penalty, for the act of one is the act of all. The SC applied this to hold that even though Pascual fired the fatal shot, Morelos, Salvador, and Gutierrez were equally guilty of murder because they acted in concert pursuant to the common design.
• Credibility of Trial Court's Assessment — The trial court's conclusions on witness credibility are accorded great weight on appeal absent a showing that they were reached arbitrarily, because the trial judge observes the witness's demeanor on the stand. The SC applied this to uphold the trial court's credence to Rivas and Vena and its rejection of the defense version.
• Treachery — The SC held that treachery qualified the killing because Galgo was not in a position to defend himself when he was shot while trying to rise after being pushed to the ground. The crime was therefore murder.
• Absorption of Aggravating Circumstances in Treachery — Taking advantage of public position, abuse of superior strength, and nocturnity are deemed absorbed in treachery and cannot be separately considered. The SC applied this in affirming the murder conviction while disregarding those separate aggravating circumstances.

• "The trial court has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness on the stand and is able to ascertain therefrom whether he is telling the truth or lying in his teeth." — The SC used this to explain why the trial court's credibility findings are given great weight on appeal.
• "The facts as we read them show quite clearly that all the accused-appellants came to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decided to commit it." — The SC rejected the trial court's finding of insufficient evidence and established conspiracy among the four accused-appellants.
• "Pascual was indeed the one who pulled the trigger, but the other three accused-appellants acted in concert with him in pursuance of their common design to murder the helpless Galgo. Every one must therefore suffer the same penalty, for in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all." — The SC applied the conspiracy rule to hold all four equally liable despite only Pascual firing the fatal shot.
• "The crime committed by Pascual was murder, qualified by treachery as defined in Revised Penal Code." — The SC affirmed the qualification of the killing as murder due to treachery.

• People vs. Veronas, 179 SCRA 423 — Cited by the SC in support of the conspiracy ruling and the rule that the act of one is the act of all.
• People vs. De Guzman, 162 SCRA 145 — Cited by the SC in support of the conspiracy ruling and the rule that the act of one is the act of all.
• People vs. Diño, 160 SCRA 197 — Cited by the SC in support of the conspiracy ruling and the rule that the act of one is the act of all.
• People vs. Mori, 55 SCRA 382 — Cited by the SC in support of the rule that the other aggravating circumstances are absorbed in treachery.
• People vs. Sespeñe, 102 Phil. 199 — Cited by the SC in support of the rule that the other aggravating circumstances are absorbed in treachery.
• People vs. Garciola, 90 Phil. 285 — Cited by the SC in support of the rule that the other aggravating circumstances are absorbed in treachery.

• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and a decision to commit it; the SC applied it to find the four accused-appellants conspirators.
• Article 248(1), Revised Penal Code — Cited by the SC in holding that the killing was murder qualified by treachery.
• Article 14(16), Revised Penal Code — Cited by the SC in connection with treachery as the qualifying circumstance.