People vs. Pardo

Two deaths produced by two separate shots constitute two separate murders, not a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires a single act killing two persons at the same moment.

Between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening of March 27, 1946, a stage show was going on at the Galley Building, the former GI mess hall converted into a show-house at Isabela de Basilan, City of Zamboanga. Among the spectators were Jose Pardo, Agapito de la Cruz, Tomas Pesario, Capt. Berthram Burchfield of the United States Army, and Francisco Cañete. Burchfield and Cañete were seated a few meters apart inside watching a vaudeville show.

According to the prosecution, Pardo approached De la Cruz in the one-peso seats and asked what had happened between Burchfield and one Miguel Nuñal, and De la Cruz answered that all he knew was that the Captain kicked Miguel. All of a sudden Pardo snatched the .45 caliber automatic pistol sticking out between De la Cruz's shirt and pants, saying let me have it, to shoot the Captain. Once in possession, Pardo pulled out his .25 caliber pistol, handed it to De la Cruz as an exchange, and left. Afraid Pardo might carry out his threat, De la Cruz asked Pesario, who was beside them and heard the conversation, to look after Pepito because he might shoot the Captain. Pesario followed Pardo outside, saw him peeping through a slit on the wall on the right side of the door to ascertain Burchfield's position seated against the wall about one meter from the door, called to him, and received Pardo's shirt which Pardo took off and threw to him. When De la Cruz arrived outside looking for them, he saw Pardo in a camiseta with the .45 caliber pistol in his right hand with finger on the trigger, and almost simultaneously saw him fire two shots from outside through the side galvanized iron wall. One shot struck Burchfield, who died at the Zamboanga General Hospital at 9:30 of the same night, while the other missed and instantly killed Cañete. Two holes were found in the wall about a foot apart, a slug lodged in Burchfield's left leg, and another bullet was found not far from Cañete's body. Thereafter De la Cruz returned inside, found Burchfield wounded and bleeding opposite where Pardo had fired and saw the Filipino later identified as Cañete lying a few meters away in line with the Captain, then accompanied home a lost child amid the confusion and tried to look for Pesario, while Pardo and Pesario ran.

Pardo, for his part, testified that he went early to the theater with a jug of tuba and chatted in a dressing room with performers he had long known. He presented witnesses that Nuñal had created trouble by crashing the gate at gunpoint, misrepresenting himself as military police, bringing townspeople and children inside free and boasting he was King of Isabela, that De la Cruz insolently entered without a ticket also claiming to be military police, that Pesario also entered without a ticket, and that Burchfield later had Nuñal kicked and placed under arrest for making people enter free and throwing stones at the building. Pardo claimed that while intoxicated in the dressing room, De la Cruz told him Nuñal wanted to see and talk to him, led him outside where Nuñal was not present, ordered him to surrender his .25 caliber pistol, gave him the .45 caliber pistol, took him to the exact spot behind Burchfield, and ordered him to shoot with Pardo's own gun pressed against the nape of his neck from behind under threat of death, reinforced by Pesario's menacing presence and fear of Nuñal as underworld leader.

The events precipitating the prosecution were Pardo's arrest, his hiding of the gun in his house and refusal after arrest to disclose where it was while denying he had put it away, Pesario's sleeping that night on the ground floor of Pardo's house on a mat and pillow furnished by Pardo's wife while Pardo spent the night upstairs unconcerned, and Pardo's extrajudicial confession agreeing in essential particulars with De la Cruz's and Pesario's testimony, admittedly obtained without physical violence or intimidation but later repudiated as allegedly induced by Detective Pedro Basilio's promise to take care of him.

• Credibility: Petitioner argued that the CFI erred in giving greater weight to the prosecution evidence, maintaining that the defense version was more logical, coherent, trustworthy and probable.
• Compulsion: Petitioner argued that he was forced to shoot by Agapito de la Cruz at the point of his own gun pressed against the nape of his neck, while intoxicated and cowed by De la Cruz, Pesario and Nuñal.
• Confession – Promise of Immunity: Petitioner argued that his confession should be rejected because he relied on Detective Pedro Basilio's promise to tell all and sign the statement in exchange for Basilio taking care of him so nothing would happen to him, and Basilio was not presented in rebuttal to deny it.
• Confession – Form and Language: Petitioner argued that the confession was incompetent because it was not sworn to and was written in language he did not speak or understand.
• Discharge of Co-Accused: Petitioner argued that the exclusion of his two co-defendants and their use as prosecution witnesses was illegal and unnecessary.

• Voluntariness: Respondent countered that appellant discharged the firearm of his own volition, unaided and uncoerced, after deliberately snatching De la Cruz's pistol and exchanging his own weapon.
• Public Authority: Respondent countered through the Solicitor General that the CFI was mistaken in holding the crimes were committed in contempt of or with insult to public authority, since mere status as a United States Army officer does not confer public authority.

• Compulsion and Credibility: Whether appellant shot Capt. Burchfield and Francisco Cañete voluntarily or only under compulsion exerted by De la Cruz at gunpoint.
• Admissibility of Confession: Whether appellant's extrajudicial confession was voluntary and admissible despite the alleged promise of immunity, lack of oath, and language used.
• Discharge of Co-Accused: Whether the discharge of De la Cruz and Pesario and their use as state witnesses invalidates their testimony.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killings so as to qualify them to murder.
• Complex Crime: Whether the two deaths constitute a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code or two separate murders.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether contempt of public authority, nocturnity, and evident premeditation attended the crimes.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether intoxication and voluntary confession mitigate liability under Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Compulsion and Credibility: No. Appellant acted voluntarily; his compulsion story is illogical, incoherent and improbable against the convincing prosecution evidence.
• Admissibility of Confession: Yes. The confession is voluntary and admissible; no improper promise was proved, and oath, writing, or common language are not required if translated.
• Discharge of Co-Accused: No error invalidates the testimony; improper discharge does not affect competency or admissibility under Act No. 2709.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery qualified the killings to murder because victims inside had no intimation and assailant was unseen, ensuring execution without risk.
• Complex Crime: No complex crime. Two shots causing two deaths are two separate murders, since Article 48 requires a single act.
• Aggravating Circumstances: None present. Contempt of public authority, nocturnity, and evident premeditation were all rejected for lack of proof or absorption.
• Mitigating Circumstances: None present. Intoxication was unproved and extrajudicial repudiated confession is not voluntary confession under Article 13, paragraph 7.

• Compulsion and Credibility: The SC found the prosecution evidence convincing through De la Cruz and Pesario, showing deliberate snatching of the pistol, exchange of weapons, peeping to locate Burchfield, removal of shirt, and firing. The compulsion theory defied normal intelligence because hardened gunmen would not use a crude, inaccurate method through a wall, entrust firing to an unwilling drunken tool unable to aim or concentrate, risk betrayal without benefit, or incur undiminished liability. Nuñal sitting dangerously close to Burchfield clashed with participation, post-killing conduct showed Pardo as leader by education and social position rather than cowed subordinate, hiding the gun showed guilty conscience, and Pesario sleeping on the ground floor on a mat while Pardo slept upstairs disproved ascendancy over appellant.
• Admissibility of Confession: The SC did not believe Basilio made any immunity promise, since De la Cruz and Pesario had already accused appellant as principal if not sole party, removing need for deception. Even if uttered, appellant could not have taken it as freedom or non-use because Basilio was a rankless detective not directing the investigation, while Lieut. Frazer of the CID and other American officers were in charge and Frazer and Detective Bella advised appellant of his constitutional right not to incriminate himself or sign Exhibit O, and appellant was intelligent and educated enough to know Basilio lacked authority to commit. Lack of oath does not make a confession incompetent under People vs. Santos doctrine, writing is not required, and a statement in another language is admissible if translated, here translated into Chavacano by Basilio as interpreter and sworn to by him with Bella present, while Frazer testified appellant himself speaks English.
• Discharge of Co-Accused: The SC held the challenge idle under uniform holdings that any error in excluding co-accused under Act No. 2709, now Section 9, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, does not invalidate testimony given by them. The sole object of the law is to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary exclusions from the complaint, having nothing to do with admissibility or competency as witnesses, as settled in People vs. Castañeda and Fernandez and related cases.
• Treachery: The SC held treachery undeniably present and qualifying, not merely aggravating, to elevate the crimes to murders. Appellant fired from outside through the wall while victims were inside watching the show without the slightest intimation of his plan and without even seeing him, affording every opportunity to insure commission without danger to himself.
• Complex Crime: The SC held the CFI erred in finding a complex crime because the two murders were not the result of a single act. Burchfield's death was produced by a shot different from that which killed Cañete, proved by two shots fired, two wall holes about a foot apart, a slug in Burchfield's leg, and another bullet near Cañete. Under People vs. Layos, Article 48 requires a single act such as killing two persons at the same moment with a single bolo stroke or single shot, so appellant is guilty of two separate murders under People vs. Mabug-at.
• Aggravating Circumstances: The SC rejected contempt of or insult to public authority because the only proof was Burchfield's status as United States Army officer, which does not confer public authority under People vs. Smith and People vs. Yboa, and the circumstance cannot apply where the public authority himself is injured. Nocturnity was unavailable because nighttime was not sought to insure commission or immunity, the notion to kill having arisen only shortly before commission after Nuñal's punishment, and nocturnity is absorbed in treachery as part of the treacherous means. Evident premeditation failed because only minutes elapsed between threat and shooting and the pistol was grabbed almost immediately before firing, leaving no sufficient time for reflection as required.
• Mitigating Circumstances: The SC rejected intoxication because no evidence showed appellant was drunk when he killed; possession of a gallon of tuba alone does not prove influence of liquor, no witness including appellant testified he was intoxicated, his movements indicated sobriety, and there was no proof he drank much himself or the wine was consumed where companions and troupe girls shared drinks. The extrajudicial confession is not the voluntary confession in Article 13, paragraph 7, because it was made outside the SC and was repudiated as allegedly involuntary, contrary to the philosophy of the extenuation.

• Treachery as qualifying circumstance — Treachery exists when the offender employs means ensuring execution without risk from defense, such as unseen attack on unsuspecting victims; here firing unseen through a wall qualified the killings to murder rather than merely aggravating.
• Complex crime under Article 48, Revised Penal Code — A complex crime requires a single act producing two or more grave or less grave felonies, such as killing two persons at the same moment with a single bolo stroke or single shot; two deaths from two distinct shots are two separate crimes.
• Evident premeditation — Requires sufficient time between determination and execution to allow reflection on consequences; a few minutes and grabbing the weapon immediately before shooting negates it.
• Nocturnity absorbed in treachery — Nighttime sought as part of the treacherous means to insure execution is not taken as a separate aggravating circumstance independent of treachery, and must be shown to have been sought for immunity.
• Contempt of public authority — Being a United States Army officer does not confer public authority under penal laws, and the circumstance cannot apply where the public authority himself is the injured party.
• Intoxication as mitigating circumstance — Mere possession of liquor without proof the offender was under its influence at commission does not mitigate; movements showing sobriety defeat the claim.
• Voluntary confession under Article 13, paragraph 7, Revised Penal Code — An extrajudicial confession later repudiated is not the voluntary plea of guilt contemplated, which presupposes acknowledgment before the SC trying the case.
• Form of confession — A confession need not be under oath nor in writing to be competent and admissible.
• Translated confession — A statement written in language the accused does not speak is admissible if translated to him, as by an interpreter who swears to what the accused said.
• Discharge of co-accused under Act No. 2709, now Section 9, Rule 115 — The law aims only to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary exclusion from the complaint; error in discharge does not affect admissibility or competency of the discharged accused as witnesses.
• Penalty for multiple murders under Article 70 — Successive service of reclusion perpetua for each murder is subject to the forty-year maximum duration of imprisonment.

• "According to said article, in order that the crime may be considered double homicide, it is necessary that it be the result of a single act, as in the case of killing two persons at the same moment with the single stroke of the bolo or with a single shot." — States the single-act test for complex crime under Article 48 and why two shots cannot qualify.
• "The sole object of Act No. 2709, (now section 9, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court), "is to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary exclusions from the complaint of persons guilty of the crime charged and it has nothing to do with the admissibility of their testimony or their competency as witness."" — Defines the limited purpose of the discharge law and preserves state-witness testimony.
• "these circumstances cannot be taken into account where it is the public authority himself who is injured by the committal of the offense." — States the bar against applying contempt of public authority when the authority is the victim.
• "There is no legal provision which makes it necessary that a confession be made under oath." — States the canonical rule sustaining unsworn extrajudicial confessions.

• People vs. Layos, 60 Phil., 224 — Controlling on complex crime; followed to hold two deaths require a single act.
• People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil., 967 — Controlling on separate murders; followed to convict for two murders.
• U.S. vs. Corrales, 28 Phil., 362 — Controlling on confession; followed that oath is unnecessary.
• People vs. Batañgan, 54 Phil., 834 — Controlling on confession; followed that writing is not required.
• People vs. Nicolas, 72 Phil., 104 — Controlling on translated statements; followed to admit Chavacano translation.
• People vs. Castañeda and Fernandez, 63 Phil., 480 — Controlling on discharge of co-accused; followed that error does not affect competency.
• U.S. vs. Smith, 39 Phil., 553 — Controlling on public authority; followed that U.S. Army officership is not public authority.
• People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil., 307 — Controlling on contempt of authority; followed that it does not apply where the authority is injured.

• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Defines complex crime from a single act; applied to reject complex double murder where two shots killed two victims.
• Article 13, paragraph 7, Revised Penal Code — Provides voluntary confession as mitigating; applied to deny mitigation to a repudiated extrajudicial confession.
• Article 70, Revised Penal Code — Limits successive service of penalties; applied so two reclusion perpetua terms shall not exceed forty years.
• Act No. 2709, now Section 9, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court — Governs discharge of accused to be state witness; applied to uphold testimony of De la Cruz and Pesario despite challenge to discharge.