People vs. Parayno

Trial testimony that implicates an accused in an act not mentioned in the witnesses’ affidavits and preliminary investigation statements cannot support conviction beyond reasonable doubt when the omission creates an explanation consistent with innocence. A killing is homicide, not murder, where evident premeditation and superior strength are not proved and the evidence does not conclusively show that the blow was fatal or that the accused intentionally rolled the victim into the river.

Marciano Parayno and his son Jose Parayno were charged with murder for the death of Rodrigo Fernandez, the nine-year-old son of Francisco Fernandez. The Information invoked Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and alleged conspiracy, evident premeditation, and taking advantage of superior strength. The defense raised a drowning accident and a possible grudge stemming from a prior fishtrap dispute between Jose Parayno and Francisco Fernandez.

On September 1, 1956, at about 2:30 p.m., Francisco Fernandez was cutting grass on the pilapil of his fishpond in Barrio Capataan, San Carlos, Pangasinan, when his nephews Leonardo Fernandez (Adong) and Federico Fernandez (Maning), both 13, called out that something had happened to his nine-year-old son Rodrigo Fernandez (Opring). Francisco went to them, and after they pointed to a spot in the river where Rodrigo’s body had disappeared, he plunged in and retrieved the lifeless body. He tried artificial respiration, but Rodrigo was already dead. The incident was reported to the barrio lieutenants of Capataan and Quitong, the river being their common boundary, and the San Carlos police investigated; that same afternoon, Marciano Parayno and his son Jose Parayno were arrested at their house about 130 meters from the scene and brought to the poblacion for investigation.

At about 9:30 p.m. that day, the Municipal Health Officer of San Carlos autopsied the body. His September 2, 1956 report listed marked swelling with discoloration of the right side of the neck near the lower part of the right ear; a pale face with livid lips; bluish finger and toe tips; and wrinkled or contracted skin with folds (cutis anserina) on the hands and feet. The report concluded that the neck injury was probably caused by a hard and blunt object, while the other findings showed asphyxia by drowning, supported by the history of bloody froth from the nostrils after recovery. On September 3, 1956, Marciano and Jose Parayno were charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; the Information alleged conspiracy, evident premeditation, superior strength, and that they struck Rodrigo with a piece of wood and, after rendering him unconscious, rolled him into the river. Both pleaded not guilty.

According to the prosecution, shortly after lunch Federico and Leonardo set out to gather payar fruits beside the river and were joined by Rodrigo after his father allowed him. They crossed a bamboo bridge, walked westward along the banks, and climbed a payar tree on the pilapil of Marciano’s fishpond about 100 meters from the bridge. Marciano and Jose approached, and the old man shouted, “I will beat you all. Do not get those payar fruits.” The boys hurried down—Federico first, Rodrigo second, Leonardo last—and ran west because the route through the bamboo bridge was watery. About three or four meters from the tree, Federico and Leonardo jumped into the river and swam across its four-to-five-meter width. From the opposite dike they looked back and saw Rodrigo, who did not know how to swim, still on the other side. At that point Marciano and Jose reached him; Marciano struck Rodrigo from behind with a piece of wood about the diameter of the boy’s wrist and two and a half feet long, with a forward and downward motion from the level of the old man’s neck. Rodrigo fell on the pilapil about one and a half feet from the river’s edge. Federico and Leonardo then heard Jose tell his father, “Let us roll him, father, so that it will be concluded that he drowned.” Marciano laid aside the wood, and he and Jose rolled Rodrigo’s body into the water in one shove; the body sank and disappeared.

The two boys called Francisco, who was cutting grass about 60 to 70 meters away, and told him that Mama Cianong had struck Rodrigo and rolled him into the river. Francisco rushed to the scene and asked the accused, still on the opposite side about 15 meters away, “What have you done to my son?” They ignored him and left toward their house, Marciano carrying the piece of wood he had picked up after the rolling. Francisco searched the river and found Rodrigo’s body near his fishtrap about three and a half meters from where the body had been rolled in; blood oozed from the boy’s mouth and nose, and the neck below the right ear was swollen. The Municipal Health Officer testified that the neck swelling, four inches long and three inches wide and elliptical in a vertical direction, could have been caused by a hard blunt instrument like wood or bamboo applied with strong force; such an injury could produce immediate unconsciousness lasting from several minutes to several hours and could cause death. He also said the other findings were signs of drowning. On cross-examination, he admitted that the neck injury could have been caused by a violent fall against branches or a wooden stump if the fall was strong, and that the congested eyes, discolored lips, and skin folds were indices of drowning.

The defense presented Francisco Fernandez (not the victim’s father) and Evaristo Caranto, who said they were at the place to buy fish and shrimp and waited in Francisco’s hut because it was raining. They saw Federico, Leonardo, and Rodrigo playing on the payar branches across the river; the river was four to five meters wide, the water almost reached the top of the pilapil because it was rainy season, and the current was swift. They warned the boys, called the father, and heard a voice from the direction of Marciano’s house telling the children to get down. The boys hurried down; Leonardo and Federico descended first, but Rodrigo lost his hold and fell on the pilapil, feet first, then on his right back side. Leonardo and Federico returned, held him by the sides, and dragged him toward the river bank because he seemed unconscious and his head was dropping forward. At the fishtrap, Leonardo crossed by clinging to its side; Federico tried to follow but slipped and fell into the water, pulling Rodrigo down with him. Federico lost his hold, and Rodrigo sank and disappeared. The witness called Francisco, who rushed over; Leonardo and Federico allegedly said they were scared by the angry voice of Lakay Marciano and rushed down from the tree. Francisco became angry, said the old man was a beast and would answer for his son’s death, took his bolo, and crossed toward Marciano’s house. The defense witnesses said they did nothing because they feared the current, but helped try to revive the boy after Francisco retrieved him.

Jose Parayno testified that he and his father were roofing their house the whole day of September 1, 1956; he heard shouts that someone had drowned but did not go down because it was raining, and was surprised when Francisco Fernandez and his father Felimon came and shouted, “You are a beast, you will answer for the death of my child.” He learned that Francisco blamed them because the children were frightened by voices from the direction of their house about 150 meters from the payar tree. He admitted seeing the three boys atop the payar tree but did not know whether it was the one on their pilapil, and said his father was in the house and did not hear the accusation because he was deaf. He knew of no reason for the boys to testify falsely, but recalled that in 1955 Francisco built a fishtrap very near his own; he demanded its removal, Francisco first refused, and later Francisco removed it and transferred it farther down the river. Marciano Parayno testified that he never went to the payar tree that afternoon; his house was about 120 meters away and the tree was not visible because of bamboo groves. He denied that Francisco came to their place, said neighbors went to their house when a policeman asked them to come to the poblacion, and maintained that he never struck the boy or rolled his body into the water; he did not even know the boy had drowned until the policeman told him that Francisco had blamed him and his son. Former policeman Tomas Rosario testified that he investigated the drowning and that Leonardo and Federico told him then that Marciano had shouted from his place, that Rodrigo fell and held his head as they rushed down, and that they later found Rodrigo missing; they did not mention that Marciano struck Rodrigo or that Jose suggested rolling the body. Rosario took the accused to the poblacion because Francisco blamed them, and he claimed he made a verbal report to the Chief of Police but did not tell the Chief that he knew they were innocent even after a murder case was filed.

• Injury and Striking Motion: Appellants argued that the vertical injury behind the victim’s right ear could not have been inflicted by the taller, 61-year-old Marciano on the 9-year-old Rodrigo, given Leonardo Fernandez’s testimony that Marciano struck from behind with a forward and downward motion from the level of his neck.
• Absence of Fracture: Appellants argued that the size of the wood and the described striking motion should have caused a fracture in the boy’s head, so the absence of a fracture made the prosecution testimony improbable.
• Alternative Cause of Injury: Appellants argued that the neck injury could have been caused by Rodrigo’s fall from the payar tree, which rendered him unconscious, or by his fall against a blunt object on the river bank when he and Federico fell into the water.
• Jose Parayno’s Participation: Appellants argued that the CFI erred in imposing the same penalty on both accused and finding them equally guilty; Jose was implicated only during trial, when the witnesses claimed he suggested and helped roll the body, a fact not mentioned in their affidavits before the Chief of Police or their testimonies before the Justice of the Peace during the preliminary investigation, and the imputation was an afterthought due to Francisco Fernandez’s grudge over the fishtrap dispute.

• Jose Parayno’s Participation: Whether Jose Parayno’s conviction is supported beyond reasonable doubt by trial testimony that he suggested and helped roll the victim into the river, when the witnesses’ affidavits and preliminary investigation statements did not mention that participation.
• Marciano Parayno’s Liability: Whether Marciano Parayno is guilty of murder or homicide for striking Rodrigo Fernandez with a piece of wood, given that the victim died of drowning and the evidence did not conclusively show that the blow was fatal or that he intentionally rolled the body into the river.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation qualified the killing to murder.
• Superior Strength: Whether taking advantage of superior strength qualified the killing to murder.
• Penalty: Whether the CFI correctly imposed the same penalty on both accused, and whether Marciano Parayno should be sentenced for homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Jose Parayno’s Participation: No. The trial testimony that Jose suggested and helped roll the body was not mentioned in the witnesses’ affidavits and preliminary investigation statements, creating reasonable doubt as to his participation; he was acquitted.
• Marciano Parayno’s Liability: Homicide, not murder. Marciano’s blow with a piece of wood was established, but the evidence did not conclusively show that the injury was fatal or that he intentionally rolled the body into the river; the victim died of drowning.
• Evident Premeditation: No. There was no proof that Marciano conceived the killing with sufficient time to reflect, and the intent to kill was not even apparent from his threat to beat the children.
• Superior Strength: No. The fact that Marciano was 61 and the victim was 9 did not by itself establish taking advantage of superior strength under the circumstances.
• Penalty: No as to the CFI’s penalty on both accused. Jose was acquitted, and Marciano was sentenced for homicide to an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

• Jose Parayno’s Participation: The SC found the charge worthy of consideration because the witnesses’ affidavits before the Chief of Police and their statements during the preliminary investigation uniformly omitted any participation by Jose in rolling the body. In the affidavits, Francisco, Federico, and Leonardo said Rodrigo fell and rolled down the bank because Marciano struck him with a piece of wood; none mentioned that Jose participated in striking or rolling the victim. During the preliminary investigation, Leonardo maintained that Marciano alone hit Rodrigo, while Federico first suggested that Jose also rolled the body but later qualified that when Marciano hit Rodrigo, the latter fell and rolled down the bank until submerged. These statements generated doubts about the trial testimony that Jose suggested and helped roll the body. The SC noted that the affidavits were given immediately after the occurrence, when the affiants had no time to contrive, and there was no reason why all of them failed to mention the alleged rolling if it were true. The late revelation during trial gave a ring of truth to the suspicion that the imputation was an afterthought of the victim’s father designed to implicate Jose. Applying the rule that evidence capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, does not fulfill moral certainty and cannot support conviction, the SC acquitted Jose upon reasonable doubt, citing U.S. vs. Maaño, People vs. Pacana, and People vs. Bautista.
• Marciano Parayno’s Liability: The SC rejected the argument that the vertical injury could not have been inflicted by Marciano. It held that with the accused hitting the victim from behind in a sideward, forward, and downward motion, the injury would naturally be more or less vertical; even considering a sideward-downward motion, the injury described by the physician was not improbable. The absence of a fracture was conjectural and did not make the positive testimony that Marciano struck the victim improbable, because the resulting injury would depend on the degree of force applied. The SC also rejected the alternative causes of injury. The defense witness said Rodrigo fell feet first and then on his right back side near the trunk of the tree, but the ground was soft and slippery because it had been raining, and the river bank was covered with water; there was no evidence of a stump or hard object in the vicinity. The doctor also testified that the neck injury could only be produced by a very strong impact against a blunt instrument. Mere possibilities could not stand against the positive testimony that Marciano struck the boy. However, the evidence did not conclusively show that the neck injury was fatal or that Marciano intentionally rolled the body into the river; the indubitable evidence was that the victim died of drowning. Marciano was therefore liable for the consequences of his unlawful beating, but only for homicide.
• Evident Premeditation: The SC ruled out evident premeditation because there was nothing in the record to suggest that Marciano conceived the thought to kill Rodrigo and had sufficient time thereafter to reflect on the consequences of his act. The intent to kill was not even apparent, considering that Marciano merely threatened the children with the words “I will beat you all, do not get there payar” and chased them when they got down. True to his warning, Marciano beat Rodrigo with a piece of wood, but the evidence was not conclusive whether that injury was or could have been fatal, the indubitable evidence being that the victim died of drowning. Considering also the doubt on whether Marciano intentionally rolled the body into the river, the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was ruled out.
• Superior Strength: The SC held that Marciano could not, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, be said to have taken advantage of superior strength in the commission of the offense, notwithstanding that he was 61 years old while the victim was only 9.
• Penalty: Homicide is punished by reclusion temporal. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed by law should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term should be within the range of reclusion temporal medium, while the minimum should be within the range of prision mayor. Considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding the drowning, the SC held that Marciano was entitled to the maximum benefits allowed under the law and fixed the minimum at six years and one day of prision mayor, as medium, and the maximum at seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal. Jose was acquitted, with costs de oficio.

• Reasonable Doubt and Two Explanations — When inculpatory facts admit of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill moral certainty and cannot support conviction. The SC applied this to Jose Parayno because the witnesses’ affidavits and preliminary investigation statements omitted his alleged suggestion and participation in rolling the body, while their trial testimony added it.
• Credibility and Prior Statements — Affidavits and records of preliminary investigation are admissible to test the credibility of witnesses. The SC gave weight to the witnesses’ omission of Jose’s participation in their immediate affidavits and preliminary statements, finding the later trial imputation doubtful.
• Murder vs. Homicide — A killing is murder only when a qualifying circumstance is proved; absent evident premeditation and superior strength, it is homicide. The SC reduced Marciano’s conviction because the qualifying circumstances were not established and the victim died of drowning.
• Evident Premeditation — Requires proof that the accused conceived the killing and had sufficient time to reflect before acting. The SC found no such proof; Marciano’s threat to beat the children did not show a premeditated intent to kill.
• Superior Strength — Taking advantage of superior strength must be proved from the circumstances; age difference alone is not enough. The SC ruled it out despite Marciano being 61 and Rodrigo 9.
• Intent to Kill — Intent to kill was not apparent from Marciano’s threat to beat the children and from a blow that did not conclusively cause death; the victim died of drowning. The SC used this to reject evident premeditation.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — For homicide, the maximum term must be within reclusion temporal medium and the minimum within prision mayor; the accused may receive the maximum benefits allowed. The SC applied this to Marciano’s sentence.

• “If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused of the crime charged and the other consistent "with their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.” — The SC used this rule to acquit Jose Parayno because the evidence on his participation admitted an explanation consistent with innocence.
• “The crime committed, however, appears to be homicide — not murder.” — The SC ruled out evident premeditation and superior strength, reducing Marciano Parayno’s conviction from murder to homicide.
• “This should not be construed, however, as a suggestion that the conclusion reached should necessarily result in the acquittal also of accused Marciano Parayno. The evidence may not be clear and convincing that he rolled the body of the victim into the river. The boy could have fallen into the water, and drowned accidentally as a result of the beating. Nevertheless, he should answer for the consequences of his act.” — The SC distinguished Jose’s acquittal from Marciano’s liability, holding Marciano answerable for the unlawful beating even though the intentional rolling was doubtful.
• “In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed by law for the crime committed should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the law on indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of the penalty should be within the range of reclusion temporal medium, while the minimum should be within the range of prision mayor.” — The SC applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law in fixing Marciano’s penalty for homicide.

• U.S. vs. Maaño, 2 Phil. 718 — Cited in support of the rule that evidence capable of two explanations, one consistent with innocence, does not satisfy moral certainty and cannot support conviction.
• People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 — Cited for the same reasonable-doubt rule applied to Jose Parayno’s acquittal.
• People vs. Bautista, 81 Phil. 78 — Cited for the same reasonable-doubt rule applied to Jose Parayno’s acquittal.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The Information charged murder under this article; the SC held that the qualifying circumstances were not established, so the crime was homicide, not murder.
• Homicide penalty under the Revised Penal Code — The SC stated that homicide is punished by reclusion temporal and imposed the penalty in its medium period absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix Marciano’s minimum and maximum terms: the maximum within reclusion temporal medium and the minimum within prision mayor, with the maximum benefits allowed to the accused.