People vs. Paradeza

The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege, not a natural right or a component of due process, and it may be validly waived; the withdrawal of an appeal after the filing of the appellee’s brief is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which may grant it where the accused acknowledges the conviction, accepts the sentence, and no substantial reasons of law or policy compel denial.

Romeo F. Paradeza, a fisherman engaged in catching bangus fry, resided in Barangay Macarang, Palauig, Zambales, a few houses away from Lailani Gayas, a 26-year-old woman whose mental ability was that of a 6- to 7-year-old child. On August 13, 1998, Paradeza allegedly entered the Gayas residence, threatened the victim with a knife, and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. The following month, an Information for rape was filed against him, alleging that he knew of the victim’s mental disability and committed the act through force, threats, and intimidation. After a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court convicted Paradeza and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He appealed the conviction but, before the case was submitted for decision, moved to withdraw his appeal.

Prosecution Evidence:
Early in the evening of August 13, 1998, the private complainant Lailani Gayas was at their house in Barangay Macarang, Palauig, Zambales, with her younger brother Joseph who was watching television. As she was about to go out, the appellant, Romeo F. Paradeza, who was about to enter their house, grabbed her. He brought her back inside and laid her on a bamboo bed. He undressed her, removed her underwear, and took out a knife, placing it on top of the “banguera.” Frightened, the victim allowed appellant to fondle her breasts. Appellant then undressed, went on top of the private complainant, and inserted his phallus into her vagina. She felt pain and noticed blood flowing from her private part. Appellant covered her mouth, told her not to tell his wife Vivian, and twisted her arms. After the assault, he used her clothing to wipe her pudendum, dressed her, put on his own clothes, and went home.
The victim later told her grandmother and mother, Carmelita Gayas, about the incident. Carmelita brought her to Dr. Nicanor Egalla, the Municipal Health Officer, for medico-legal examination. Dr. Egalla found the victim to be mentally retarded. His examination disclosed a healed laceration of the hymen at 3:00, 6:00, and 9:00 o’clock positions and a fresh laceration at the 6:00 o’clock position of the vulva, injuries consistent with sexual intercourse.
The Department of Social Welfare and Development referred the victim to Estrella B. de Sesto, a professional psychologist and guidance counselor at Columban College, Olongapo City. Ms. de Sesto found that while the victim had a chronological age of 26, her mental ability was equivalent to that of a 6- or 7-year-old child.

Defense Evidence:
Appellant raised denial and alibi. He testified that on the date and time in question, he was out at sea the whole night with his wife catching bangus fry; afterwards, he sold his catch to a neighbor and went to sleep. He claimed that the rape charge was fabricated because he refused to heed the demand of the victim’s grandmother that he vacate the place where he was residing. He further asserted that the private complainant was not a credible witness, as she was widely known in the neighborhood to be a “flirt.” He admitted knowing that the victim had a mental disability.

Rebuttal:
The prosecution presented Albert Araña, the barangay captain of Macarang, who testified that he had known the victim for about eight years and refuted the allegation that she was a woman of loose morals. He also described her family as poor and peaceable, not known for creating trouble in the community.

Trial Court’s Finding:
The trial court found the complainant to be a credible witness and convicted the appellant of the crime charged, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

• On the Merits: Appellant, through his brief, ascribed as sole error that the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
• Withdrawal of Appeal: In the motion to withdraw, appellant maintained that the withdrawal of his appeal was a matter within his right as the accused; he accepted the trial court’s judgment and was willing to serve the sentence imposed. He effectively urged that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege that could be waived, and that no substantial reason existed to prevent him from abandoning his appeal.

• Opposition to Withdrawal: The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion to withdraw. It pointed out that since both the appellant’s and appellee’s briefs had already been filed, the approval of the withdrawal was no longer a matter of right but a matter of discretion, and argued that the court should deny the motion. The OSG further sought the imposition of stiffer penalties, implying that the withdrawal was being used to escape the possibility of a higher penalty on appeal.

• Grant of Motion to Withdraw Appeal: Whether the motion to withdraw the appeal should be granted despite the filing of the appellee’s brief and the opposition of the Office of the Solicitor General.

• Grant of Motion to Withdraw Appeal: The motion to withdraw the appeal was granted in the exercise of the Court’s sound discretion. Under Rule 50, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, applied to criminal cases through Rule 124, Section 18 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the withdrawal of an appeal is a matter of right only before the filing of the appellee’s brief; thereafter, it is discretionary. While the OSG’s brief had been filed, the appellant had not yet filed his reply brief, a situation that supported a more liberal application of the rule. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege, not a natural right or an element of due process, and like any other right it may be waived. The appellant, functionally illiterate, of very low socio-economic standing, and facing a sentence of reclusion perpetua, was effectively wagering his life on the appeal, a point not always fully understood by a convict. His decision to withdraw and accept the judgment of conviction demonstrated respect for the court’s authority, conserved judicial time and resources, and opened the earliest possible path for reformation, aligning with the ideal of a just and compassionate society. No substantial reasons of law and policy were found to deny the motion; accordingly, the withdrawal was allowed, and the trial court’s judgment became final and executory.

• Right to appeal as a statutory privilege — The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is a mere statutory privilege granted by law and may be waived. Because it is a statutory remedy whose sole object is the protection of the accused, an accused may validly relinquish it, subject to the court’s discretion when the procedural rules so require.
• Withdrawal of appeal after appellee’s brief — Under Rule 50, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of the appellee’s brief. After the appellee’s brief is filed, the withdrawal is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In exercising that discretion, the court may consider factors such as the stage of the proceedings (including whether the appellant has yet to file a reply brief), the personal circumstances and comprehension of the accused, the gravity of the penalty, the acceptance of the judgment, and the conservation of judicial resources.

• “An appeal is a ‘resort to a superior (i.e. appellate) court to review the decision of an inferior (i.e. trial) court or administrative agency.’ As a statutory remedy to correct errors which might have been committed by the lower court, the object of an appeal is simply and solely the protection of the accused. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and is not a natural right or part of the due process. Like any other right or privilege, it may be waived.” — This passage articulates the core ratio on the waivable nature of the right to appeal.
• “In making his appeal, he is actually wagering his life as against his sentence below, a point not often stressed to or understood by the convict.” — This language underscores the humane consideration that influenced the Court’s discretionary ruling.
• “His exercise of the option to withdraw appeal before the case is submitted for this Court’s decision, but fully cognizant of its legal consequences at this stage of the case, not only saves the Court precious time and resources. It also opens soonest the path for the reformation of the contrite offender, pursuant to the ideal of a just and compassionate society envisioned in our fundamental law.” — This excerpt highlights the policy justification for granting the withdrawal.

• U.S. v. Laguna, 17 Phil. 532 (1910) — Followed; cited for the principle that the object of an appeal is simply and solely the protection of the accused.
• U.S. v. Yu Ten, 33 Phil. 122 (1916) — Followed; cited for the settled doctrine that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and is not a natural right or a part of due process.

• Rule 50, Section 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that an appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of the appellee’s brief; thereafter, the withdrawal may be allowed in the discretion of the court. The Court applied this provision by analogy through Rule 124, Section 18 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, noting that while the appellee’s brief had been filed, the appellant had not yet filed his reply brief, a circumstance that militated in favor of a liberal exercise of discretion.
• Rule 124, Section 18, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure — States that the provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46, and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in civil cases shall apply to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent. This was the bridge provision that made the civil rule on withdrawal of appeal applicable to the criminal appeal.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.