People vs. Pama

Conspiracy may be inferred from the concerted actions of multiple assailants — their simultaneous movement toward the victim, coordinated attack, and coordinated escape — establishing a joint purpose and design that renders each conspirator liable for the acts of all, regardless of who actually fired the fatal shots. A negative paraffin test result is not conclusive proof that a person did not fire a gun, as it is possible to fire a weapon and still test negative for gunpowder residues.

On the evening of October 2, 1985, at the Market Square Building in Iloilo City, two men — Joji Nograles and Cesar Habaradas — were shot in a succession of gunfire bursts. Noel Pama was apprehended shortly afterward at the IDECO compound across the Iloilo River, barefoot, shirtless, and soaking wet, where he told security guards he had been held up. Two co-accused, Leonardo Lava, Jr. and Robert Ignalaga, were never found and remained at large throughout the proceedings. Pama was charged in two separate Informations for the killing of Nograles and Habaradas, which were consolidated for joint trial before Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo.

At around 10:30 in the evening of October 2, 1985, successive bursts of gunfire rang from the ground floor of the Market Square Building in Iloilo City. Several persons in the area scampered to safety. After a few seconds, another burst was heard, whereupon three unidentified males were seen darting from the building into the adjacent J.M. Basa Street. Responding elements of the Iloilo Integrated National Police arrived to find two men — one already dead and the other seriously wounded. The dead man, sprawled in a pool of blood at the building's doorway with gunshot wounds on his right face and right thigh, was identified as Joji Nograles. The wounded man, Cesar Habaradas, asked the lawmen to rush him to a hospital. He was brought to St. Paul's Hospital, where he succumbed to two gunshot wounds that same evening. The policemen commenced a search for the suspects, one of whom was reported to have run toward the pier along Muelle Loney Street. Bystanders recounted that this suspect, upon reaching the pier, dove into the river below.

Meanwhile, at the nearby compound of the Iloilo Drydock and Engineering Company (IDECO) across the Iloilo River, security guards Anselmo Garocho and Rodolfo Bolao noticed an unidentified man walk by — barefoot, wearing only pants, and soaking wet. When accosted, he introduced himself as Noel Pama and claimed he had been held up by three men at a gasoline station along Muelle Loney Street, who divested him of his wallet, money, wristwatch, necklace, shirt, and shoes. He said he jumped into the river to escape when the holduppers threatened to kill him. The guards reported the incident to the police, and after some time, policemen led by Sgt. Ronaldo Porras arrived and took Pama to police headquarters. Pama's mother, Leonisa Pama, had arrived shortly after he called her by phone. At the headquarters, Pat. Celis conducted a body search and found P320.00 in the left back pocket of Pama's pants. A pair of tennis shoes found on a tugboat near the pier was brought to the headquarters; Pama was made to try them on, and they fit snugly.

According to the prosecution, eyewitness Jose Regacho testified that at around 10:00 p.m. that evening, he and a friend proceeded to the Irong-Irong Restaurant atop the Market Square Building. As they neared the open space near the stairway, Regacho saw a tall, curly-haired "mestizo" — later identified as Joji Nograles — talking to a female child about six or seven years old. Regacho then saw three persons briskly walking toward Nograles. Suddenly, one of the three men, whom Regacho identified in court as appellant Noel Pama, shot Nograles. Regacho and his companion turned and ran; as they fled, Regacho heard another shot, and upon reaching the outside of the alley, heard two more successive shots. Regacho testified that he was familiar with the faces of the three persons, having seen them on several occasions at the Irong-Irong Restaurant prior to October 2, 1985. Separately, Pat. Villavicencio, who had taken the wounded Habaradas to St. Paul's Hospital, testified that as they approached the hospital gate, Habaradas — breathing heavily and bleeding from his chest — declared that he was shot by Junior Lava and Noel Pama, and that his companion was left behind at the Market Square Building. Habaradas died at 11:20 p.m. that same evening.

Pama, for his part, denied participation in the killings. He testified that he was at Kweba Club drinking with a friend, Jojo Sorongon, and at about 10:45 p.m. went outside to buy cigarettes. Outside, he felt the urge to vomit and ran toward a gasoline station. At that moment, someone announced "hold-up" from behind, and three men took his wristwatch, necklace, shirt, and shoes. When one said "Tiruha na lang ina" (shoot him), he jumped into the water and swam 100 to 120 meters to the other side. His mother, Leonisa Pama, testified that she had given her son P300.00 earlier that afternoon to entertain his friend, and that the police found P150.00 in his wallet. Sgt. Mariano Palmes of the PC Crime Laboratory conducted a paraffin test on Pama and on both victims; all three casts yielded negative results for gunpowder residues. Capt. Luena Layador, Assistant Chief of the Chemistry Branch at Camp Crame, confirmed the negative findings on Pama's hands but testified that the paraffin test conducted was only 75% reliable, and that it is possible for a person to fire a gun and still test negative for gunpowder residues. The trial court found Pama guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. 19409 and Homicide in Criminal Case No. 19418, principally on the positive identification by Regacho, the declaration of Habaradas admitted as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae, and a finding of conspiracy among the three assailants.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in accepting the testimony of Jose Regacho, whom he characterized as a biased and "surprise" witness. Regacho came forward only upon the invitation of the father of Joji Nograles, did not furnish the police with any sworn statement, and was never investigated by police authorities regarding the incident. Appellant argued that Regacho's bare allegation that Pama fired a gun could not outweigh the expert finding that Pama was negative for gunpowder residue.
• Insufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Appellant asserted that the testimonies of Garocho, Villavicencio, Celis, and Porras constituted circumstantial evidence insufficient to support his conviction, quoting Moran for the proposition that circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant to the exclusion of others.
• Disregard of Scientific Findings: Appellant insisted that the trial court committed serious error in not considering in his favor the negative paraffin test results, which strongly indicated he never fired a gun. He argued that no documentary or oral evidence was presented by the prosecution to refute the expert testimony of Capt. Layador, the forensic chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: Whether the trial court erred in accepting the testimony of Jose Regacho, a witness who was not previously listed by the prosecution and who did not execute a sworn statement, over the findings of an expert witness.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the conviction was improperly based on circumstantial evidence insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Negative Paraffin Test: Whether the trial court erred in discarding the negative paraffin test results, which appellant claimed conclusively showed he never fired a gun.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: No. The trial court's assessment of Regacho's credibility was upheld, as appellate courts generally do not disturb such findings absent overlooked facts of substance, and no improper motive was shown for Regacho's testimony.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The convictions were based primarily on positive identification by Regacho and the dying declaration of Habaradas, not solely on circumstantial evidence; even if circumstantial evidence alone were considered, the concordant combination of circumstances produced conviction beyond reasonable doubt under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
• Negative Paraffin Test: No. A negative paraffin test is not conclusive proof that a person did not fire a gun, as it is possible to fire a weapon and still test negative for gunpowder residues, and the defense's own expert witness admitted the test was only 75% reliable.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: The rule is deeply embedded in jurisprudence that when the issue of witness credibility is concerned, appellate courts will generally not disturb the trial court's findings, the latter being in a better position having heard the witness and observed his deportment, unless facts of substance have been plainly overlooked. The trial court gave full faith and credit to Regacho's testimony, and nothing in the record compelled a contrary conclusion. That Regacho was not listed as a prosecution witness, did not submit to police investigation, and did not furnish a sworn statement did not diminish his credibility, as the natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal cases is of judicial notice. The prosecution is not precluded from calling a witness not listed in the information, and no law requires that a prosecution witness's testimony first be reduced in writing. Defense counsel failed during cross-examination to dent Regacho's testimony or create doubt as to his motive, and appellant offered no credible evidence of any improper motive that might have moved Regacho to testify falsely. Where no evidence shows any dubious reason or improper motive for a prosecution witness to testify falsely, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: It is not true that the convictions were based solely on circumstantial evidence; they rested primarily on the positive identification by Regacho and the declaration of Habaradas admitted as a dying declaration in Criminal Case No. 19418 and as part of the res gestae in Criminal Case No. 19409. The circumstantial evidence served only to strengthen the already formidable evidence. Even assuming arguendo that the convictions rested solely on circumstantial evidence, they would still be sufficient under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, which requires more than one circumstance, proven facts from which inferences are derived, and a combination of all circumstances producing conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The concordant combination of thirteen enumerated circumstances — from appellant being seen with two others at the Market Square Building, through the shooting, the coordinated escape, the dive into the river, the apprehension at IDECO, to the snug fit of the tennis shoes — produced conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy was likewise established: the presence of appellant and his companions at the scene, their simultaneous movement toward and concerted attack on the victims, and their coordinated escape revealed a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy; it may be shown by acts and circumstances from which a common design may logically be inferred. Where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and it does not matter whether appellant personally inflicted the fatal shots.

• Negative Paraffin Test: The absence of nitrates on a suspect's hand is not conclusive proof that he did not fire a gun. In People vs. Talingdan, the Court ruled that a negative paraffin finding is not conclusive, as it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when firing while wearing gloves or by washing the hands afterwards. Defense witness Capt. Layador herself testified that the paraffin test conducted on appellant was only 75% reliable, that more modern methods were already in use in other countries, and that several factors could affect the results. She admitted that even if a person had fired a gun, it was possible to test negative for gunpowder residues. The trial court, having found conspiracy, correctly ruled the negative paraffin result irrelevant as to whether appellant personally fired the fatal shots. Additionally, the dying declaration of Cesar Habaradas was properly admitted in Criminal Case No. 19418, satisfying all requisites: it was made under consciousness of impending death, it referred to the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's injury and impending death, and the declarant was a competent witness. Habaradas died about an hour after making the declaration, sustaining two bullet wounds to the thoraco-abdominal regions causing hemorrhage. The portion of his declaration relating to his companion Joji Nograles was likewise properly appreciated as part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 in Criminal Case No. 19409. No qualifying circumstances were established in Criminal Case No. 19418, so appellant could only be held liable for homicide.

• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential; conspiracy may be shown by acts and circumstances from which a common design may logically be inferred, and may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated. Where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all — each conspirator is liable for the acts of the others regardless of who personally inflicted the fatal injury. In this case, the simultaneous movement of three assailants toward the victims, their concerted attack, and their coordinated escape established a joint purpose and design beyond reasonable doubt.

• Credibility of Witnesses — Appellate courts will generally not disturb the trial court's findings on witness credibility, the latter being in a better position having heard and observed the witness, unless facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked which might affect the result. The natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal cases is of judicial notice. The prosecution is not precluded from calling a witness not listed in the information, and no law requires that testimony first be reduced in writing. Where no evidence shows any improper motive for a prosecution witness to testify falsely, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.

• Dying Declaration — A dying declaration is admissible when: (a) it was made under consciousness of an impending death; (b) the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's injury and impending death; and (c) the declarant was a competent witness. In this case, Habaradas's statement to Pat. Villavicencio — naming Noel Pama and Junior Lava as the shooters — was made while he was bleeding from chest wounds and died approximately one hour later, satisfying all three requisites.

• Res Gestae — Under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, statements made by a participant in a startling event, while under the stress of excitement caused by the event, may be admitted as part of the res gestae. The portion of Habaradas's declaration relating to his companion Joji Nograles having also been shot was properly appreciated as res gestae in Criminal Case No. 19409.

• Paraffin Test Not Conclusive — A negative paraffin test result is not conclusive proof that a person did not fire a gun. It is possible to fire a weapon and still test negative for gunpowder residues, as when firing while wearing gloves or washing the hands afterwards. The defense's own expert witness admitted the test was only 75% reliable and that several factors could affect results.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence — Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

• "The absence of nitrates in a suspect's hand is not conclusive proof that he did not fire a gun." — This passage states the controlling rule on the evidentiary value of negative paraffin test results, a frequently invoked principle in Philippine criminal jurisprudence.

• "The presence of the appellant and his two (2) companions at the Market Square Building, their simultaneous movement towards and concerted attack on Joji Nograles and Cesar Habaradas and their coordinated escape from the building, reveal nothing less than a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest which establish beyond reasonable doubt the existence of a conspiracy." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on how conspiracy is established through concerted acts and circumstances rather than direct proof.

• "Where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all." — This is the canonical formulation of the conspiracy liability doctrine applied in this case, rendering each conspirator liable for the acts of all regardless of who fired the fatal shots.

• "That Regacho came from nowhere, was not listed as a prosecution witness, did not submit himself to an investigation by any police authority and did not furnish any sworn statement, do not diminish or impair his credibility at all or place his testimony under suspicion." — This passage defines the rule that a witness's failure to execute a sworn statement or prior listing does not impair credibility, grounded in the judicial notice of people's natural reticence to get involved in criminal cases.

• People vs. Talingdan, 191 SCRA 333 [1990] — Controlling precedent on the inconclusiveness of negative paraffin test results; the Court quoted its ruling that a negative finding is not conclusive to show that a person has not fired a gun, as it is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates.
• People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440 [1979]; People vs. Bautista, 92 SCRA 465 [1979]; People vs. Abejuela, 92 SCRA 503 [1979] — Followed for the doctrine that appellate courts generally do not disturb trial court findings on witness credibility.
• People vs. Tingson, 47 SCRA 243 [1972] — Followed for the principle that direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy; it may be shown by acts and circumstances.
• People vs. Manlangit, 73 SCRA 49 [1976] — Followed for the principle that conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.
• People vs. Lunar, 45 SCRA 119 [1972]; People vs. Custodio, 47 SCRA 289 [1972] — Followed for the proposition that concerted action and community of interest establish conspiracy.
• People vs. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 488 [1976]; People vs. Alonzo, 73 SCRA 483 [1976]; People vs. Maranion, 199 SCRA 421 [1991] — Followed for the doctrine that where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all.
• People vs. Balbas, 122 SCRA 859 [1983]; People vs. Bustos, 171 SCRA 243 [1989] — Cited in support of the requisites and admissibility of dying declarations under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
• People vs. Pacabes, 137 SCRA 158 [1985]; People vs. Sabellano, 198 SCRA 196 [1991]; People vs. Caraig, 202 SCRA 357 [1991] — Followed for the judicial notice of the natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal cases.
• People vs. Manabat, 100 Phil. 603 [1956]; People vs. Bagsican, 6 SCRA 400 [1962]; People vs. Zapatero, 58 SCRA 450 [1974] — Followed for the rule that the prosecution is not precluded from calling a witness not listed in the information.
• People vs. Valera, 90 SCRA 400 [1979]; People vs. Angeles, 92 SCRA 432 [1979] — Followed for the principle that where no improper motive is shown for a prosecution witness to testify falsely, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.

• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as existing when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Applied to establish that the concerted actions of Pama and his two companions constituted conspiracy, rendering each liable for the acts of all.
• Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Sets the standard for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence: more than one circumstance, proven facts, and a combination producing conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Applied to hold that even if the convictions rested solely on circumstantial evidence, the thirteen enumerated circumstances satisfied this standard.
• Section 37, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Governs the admissibility of dying declarations. Applied to admit Habaradas's statement naming Pama and Lava as the shooters in Criminal Case No. 19418, all three requisites having been satisfied.
• Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Governs res gestae. Applied to admit the portion of Habaradas's declaration relating to his companion Joji Nograles in Criminal Case No. 19409.
• Section 5(2)(d), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution; Section 3(c), Rule 122, Rules of Court; Section 17, Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended — Provide that appeals from judgments imposing reclusion perpetua should be taken directly to the Supreme Court. Noted to explain why the trial court's erroneous forwarding to the Court of Appeals was corrected by certification to the Supreme Court.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concurred.