People vs. Palmones

A dying declaration is admissible only if the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death at the time the statement was made, and the prosecution bears the burden of proving that consciousness; absent such proof, the statement is inadmissible hearsay, and the weakness of the defense of alibi cannot supply the deficiency in the prosecution's evidence.

Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar Palmones were charged with the murder of SPO2 Asim Mamansal, a policeman assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. The case was tried before Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato, 12th Judicial Region. The prosecution's case rested primarily on the theory that the victim, before dying, orally identified the two accused as his assailants — statements the trial court admitted as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae. The defense presented alibi, with each accused claiming to be elsewhere at the time of the shooting.

On the evening of April 27, 1997, at around 10:00 p.m., SPO2 Asim Mamansal was shot while walking near the house of his companion, Alicia Villamor, in Barangay Magsaysay, Kidapawan, Cotabato. Villamor, whom the victim's daughter identified as his mistress, was at his side when the shooting occurred but testified that she could not identify the assailants because it was dark. Barangay kagawad Alex Siago, who was among the first to reach the victim, likewise testified that the two passengers on a passing motorcycle — which Inspector Tagum briefly pursued — were not the accused. Patricio Fuertes brought the victim to the Kidapawan Doctor's Hospital.

At the hospital, the victim was attended to first by Dr. Caridad Jalipa and then by Dr. Mark Aguayo, the surgeon-on-duty. Dr. Aguayo testified that before operating on the victim, he asked Mamansal whether he knew who had shot him, and the victim replied that he did not. Dr. Aguayo further testified that Sonny Boy Redovan, the victim's nephew, told him in the emergency room that the assailant could not be identified because the area where the shooting happened was dark. The victim's vital signs were stable prior to the operation, which began at around 12:00 midnight and lasted approximately four hours. The victim developed cardio-respiratory arrest at around 8:30 the following morning and died.

The prosecution's case centered on the testimonies of Sonny Boy Redovan and Police Inspector Alexander Camilon-Tagum. Redovan testified that upon arriving at the emergency room, he asked his uncle what had happened and who the perpetrators were, and the victim answered that he had been waylaid by "Juany and Tony Palmones," the nicknames of the two accused. He claimed to have conversed with the victim for about an hour but did not immediately report what the victim told him, doing so only after the burial on April 28, 1997. Inspector Tagum testified that upon arriving at the hospital, he confronted the victim and asked "who shot you?" and the victim answered "Juany and Tony Palmones." Tagum admitted, however, that before reaching the hospital he had already been informed by radio that the assailants were Juany and Tony Palmones, and that he did not reduce his findings to writing.

The victim's wife, Mila Arimao Mamansal, testified that she spoke with Redovan at the hospital but that he did not tell her anything about the alleged assailants; she only heard Redovan identify the accused to the Chief of Police on April 29, 1997. The victim's daughter, Asmyra Mamansal, testified that during her thirty-minute conversation with her father, he never told her who had shot him, instead asking her to take down the name Alice Villamor. Patricio Fuertes, who brought the victim to the hospital, testified that he heard the victim tell police officers that he did not recognize his assailants. Alicia Villamor testified that when she spoke with the victim at the hospital, he told her he did not see who had shot him.

For their defense, both accused presented alibi. Anthony Melchor Palmones testified that at the time of the incident he was at his home in Kisulan, Sultan Kudarat — at least two hours away from the crime scene — having a drinking session with friends from 8:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., corroborated by SPO1 Ramil Bahian and Jolito Silva. Anthony Baltazar Palmones testified that he was at his home on Datu Piang Street, Kidapawan, drinking "tuba" with Rodolfo Barrientos and Jerry Barrientos from around 5:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m., corroborated by both Barrientoses. He admitted stepping out briefly to buy tuba from a nearby store 10 to 15 meters away for 2 to 5 minutes.

The trial court convicted both accused on May 8, 1998, relying principally on the alleged dying declaration and the weakness of the defense of alibi. The Office of the Solicitor General, in a Manifestation in Lieu of Brief, recommended acquittal, finding that the identity of the assailants was not sufficiently established and that the trial court erred in admitting the alleged dying declaration.

• Reasonable Doubt: Accused-appellants argued that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the identity of the assailants not having been sufficiently established.
• Weakness of Defense: Accused-appellants contended that the trial court erred in convicting them based on the weakness of their defense rather than on the strength of the prosecution's evidence.
• Insufficiency of Facts: Accused-appellants maintained that the facts established by all the evidence did not support the lower court's finding of guilt.
• Bias and Prejudice: Accused-appellants alleged that the trial court committed palpable error and demonstrated clear bias in favor of the prosecution and against the accused.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of Sonny Boy Redovan and Inspector Alexander Tagum.
• Identification by Victim: Accused-appellants contended that the trial court erred in finding that the victim was able to identify his assailants before he died.
• Dying Declaration as Hearsay Exception: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in considering the alleged dying declaration of the victim as an exception to the hearsay rule.
• Res Gestae: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in considering the alleged dying declaration as part of the res gestae rule.

• Insufficiency of Identification: The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the People, recommended acquittal, reasoning that the identity of the assailants was not sufficiently established by the prosecution's evidence and that the trial court erred in admitting the alleged dying declaration as an exception to the hearsay rule.

• Admissibility of Dying Declaration: Whether the alleged statements of the victim identifying his assailants were admissible as a dying declaration under Section 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
• Admissibility as Res Gestae: Whether the alleged statements of the victim were admissible as part of the res gestae.
• Sufficiency of Identification: Whether the prosecution sufficiently established the identity of the assailants to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
• Reliance on Weakness of Defense: Whether the weakness of the accused's defense of alibi could sustain a conviction absent positive identification.

• Admissibility of Dying Declaration: No. The alleged statements were inadmissible as dying declarations because the prosecution failed to prove that the victim made them under a consciousness of impending death, as required by Section 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
• Admissibility as Res Gestae: No. The statements lacked the requisite spontaneity, having been made at the hospital some thirty minutes to an hour after the shooting, with the trip from the crime scene constituting an intervening event affording opportunity for deliberation.
• Sufficiency of Identification: No. The testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses claiming the victim identified his assailants were contradicted by the attending physician, the victim's wife and daughter, and his companion at the time of the shooting, all of whom stated the victim said he could not identify his assailants.
• Reliance on Weakness of Defense: No. The weakness of the defense of alibi cannot be held against the accused in the absence of clear and positive identification, the prosecution being required to rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.

• Admissibility of Dying Declaration: The requisites for admissibility of an ante mortem statement are: (a) it must concern the crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for murder, parricide, or homicide in which the decedent was the victim. The prosecution failed to establish the second requisite. No proof was presented that the victim was conscious of impending death. Neither Redovan nor Tagum asked the victim whether he believed he was going to die. While the law does not require the declarant to explicitly state his perception that he has given up hope of life, the circumstances surrounding the declaration must justify the conclusion that he was conscious of impending death. The victim's vital signs were stable prior to operation, and from the time he was brought to the hospital at 10:30 p.m. until his operation at 12:00 midnight, he was able to talk intelligently with at least four other persons on various matters. The strength of his vital signs and his capacity to converse belied any conclusion that he was under the consciousness of death.

• Admissibility as Res Gestae: Res gestae refers to exclamations and statements made by participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after its commission, when the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate or fabricate. The element of spontaneity is critical, evaluated through five factors: (1) the time lapsed between the occurrence and the statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement. The victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but allegedly uttered the statements some thirty minutes to an hour later. The statements were made not at the crime scene but at the hospital. The trip from the crime scene to the hospital constituted an intervening event that could have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation. These circumstances indubitably showed that the statements lacked the requisite spontaneity.

• Sufficiency of Identification: A thorough reading of the testimonies revealed that it was doubtful the victim ever uttered the alleged ante mortem statements. The testimonies of Redovan and Tagum were contradicted not only by defense witnesses but by the prosecution's own witnesses. Dr. Aguayo, an impartial and disinterested witness, categorically stated that the victim told him he did not recognize who had shot him, and that Redovan told him the victim could not identify the assailants because of darkness. The victim's wife and daughter, who both spoke with him before he died, denied that he ever identified his assailants. Alice Villamor, the victim's companion during the shooting, categorically stated that recognition was impossible because the area was dark, and that the victim told her at the hospital he did not see who had shot him. As the victim's lover, Villamor had no motive to lie for the defense and every reason to seek justice for his death.

• Reliance on Weakness of Defense: The trial court based its conviction on the alleged ante mortem statements and the apparent weakness of the defense of alibi. With the statements ruled inadmissible and the identification doubtful, the weakness of the alibi could not be held against the accused in the absence of clear and positive identification. In a criminal prosecution, the State must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense; the infirmity of the alibi cannot strengthen the prosecution's evidence.

• Dying Declaration — A dying declaration is an exception to the hearsay rule, admissible when the declarant made the statement under a consciousness of impending death, concerning the cause and surrounding circumstances of his death, in a criminal case where his death is the subject of inquiry. The requisites are: (a) the declaration must concern the crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for murder, parricide, or homicide in which the decedent was the victim. The prosecution bears the burden of proving consciousness of impending death; while the declarant need not explicitly state his perception, the circumstances must justify the conclusion that he was conscious of impending death. In this case, the victim's stable vital signs and continued capacity to converse with multiple persons belied any such consciousness.

• Res Gestae — Statements are admissible as part of the res gestae when made as spontaneous reactions inspired by the excitement of the occasion, with no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate or fabricate. The element of spontaneity is critical and is evaluated through five factors: (1) the time lapsed between the occurrence and the statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement. In this case, the statements failed to qualify because an appreciable time had elapsed, they were made at the hospital rather than the crime scene, and the trip from the crime scene constituted an intervening event affording opportunity for deliberation.

• Strength of Prosecution Evidence vs. Weakness of Defense — In a criminal prosecution, the State must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The weakness of the accused's alibi cannot be held against them in the absence of clear and positive identification, and any infirmity in the defense cannot strengthen the prosecution's evidence.

• "In the instant case, it was not established by the prosecution that the statements of the declarant concerning the cause and surrounding circumstances of his death were made under the consciousness of impending death. No proof to this effect was ever presented by the prosecution." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the inadmissibility of the dying declaration, establishing the prosecution's burden to prove consciousness of impending death.

• "These circumstances, taken together, indubitably show that the statements allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in order for these to be admitted as part of the res gestae." — This passage applies the five-factor spontaneity test to the facts and concludes the statements are inadmissible as res gestae.

• "And while their alibi may not have been proven so satisfactorily as to leave no room for doubt, such an infirmity can not strengthen the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, the reason being that in a criminal prosecution, the State must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense." — This passage restates the fundamental principle that the prosecution must stand on its own evidence and cannot rely on defense weakness to secure a conviction.

• People vs. Gado, 298 SCRA 466 — Cited for the general rule that a dying declaration is hearsay and inadmissible as evidence.
• People vs. Viovicente, 286 SCRA 1 — Cited for the requisites of admissibility of an ante mortem statement as a dying declaration.
• People vs. Bergante, 286 SCRA 629 — Cited alongside Viovicente for the requisites of a dying declaration.
• People vs. Lazarte, 200 SCRA 361 — Cited for the definition of "consciousness of impending death" as requiring that the declarant be fully aware that he is dying or going to die soon, or have a "settled hopeless expectation." Also cited for the principle that the State must rely on the strength of its own evidence.
• People vs. Bautista, 271 SCRA 613 — Cited for the proposition that the law does not require the declarant to explicitly state his perception that he has given up the hope of life.
• People vs. Narca, 275 SCRA 696 — Cited for the principle that the circumstances surrounding the declaration must justify the conclusion that the declarant was conscious of impending death.
• People vs. Sanchez, 213 SCRA 70 — Cited for the definition of res gestae as spontaneous statements made immediately before, during, or after the commission of a crime.
• People vs. Manhuyod, Jr., 290 SCRA 257 — Cited for the five factors used to determine whether statements offered as res gestae were made spontaneously.
• People vs. Somontano, 128 SCRA 415 — Cited for the principle that the State must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.

• Section 30, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that a witness can testify only to facts within personal knowledge; hearsay is excluded. This provision establishes the general inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, against which the dying declaration exception is measured.
• Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides the exception for dying declarations: the declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of impending death, may be received in a criminal case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. The Court applied this provision to test the admissibility of the victim's alleged statements and found the requisite of consciousness of impending death unmet.

Justices Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima concurred.