People vs. Pajo

In a rape case where the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is her parent, the concurrence of minority and relationship, when alleged in the information and proven with moral certainty, qualifies the crime and warrants the imposition of the death penalty under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The victim’s credible, uncorroborated testimony may suffice for conviction; the moral ascendancy of a father over his daughter substitutes for the element of force or intimidation.

Jose Pajo y Bagtong, an ex-convict, lived with his live-in partner Imelda Liquigan and his two minor daughters AAA (born April 13, 1983) and BBB (aged 12) in a one-room dwelling. Their mother had left the family when the children were very young. Pajo frequently drank alcohol and often became intoxicated. In the shared sleeping quarters, Pajo and Liquigan slept on the bed with their infant, while the two girls slept on the floor, sometimes separated only by a curtain. Between August 1996 and January 1997, Pajo repeatedly sexually abused AAA, with Liquigan actively facilitating some of the attacks.

• Parties: Jose Pajo y Bagtong (ex-convict) and Imelda Liquigan y Kasibayan (his live-in partner). The complainants were AAA (14-year-old daughter of Pajo) and BBB (12-year-old daughter). CCC, Pajo’s sister and the girls’ aunt, initiated the complaint.

• Living Arrangement: The family occupied a single room; Pajo and Liquigan slept on the bed with their infant, while AAA and BBB slept on the floor, sometimes divided only by a curtain. Pajo habitually drank heavily.

• August 18, 1996 Incident (First Rape): Pajo, intoxicated, ordered AAA to undress and get on the bed. He directed Liquigan, who was already naked, to spread AAA’s legs apart. He then summoned BBB to suck his penis to achieve an erection. With AAA lying on the bed and Liquigan holding her legs apart, Pajo positioned himself on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina. Afterward, he withdrew and had intercourse with Liquigan while directing AAA to suck Liquigan’s breast. The episode ended when noises were heard outside.

• September 18, 1996 Incident (Second Rape): While the children were watching a VHS tape downstairs, Pajo called AAA upstairs. He and Liquigan were naked on the bed. Pajo, drunk, ordered AAA to undress. Liquigan was told to spread AAA’s legs. Pajo then lay on top of AAA and penetrated her. When Liquigan failed to hold the legs apart properly, Pajo slapped her. Afterward, Pajo had intercourse with Liquigan and ordered AAA to insert her fingers into Liquigan’s vagina and hold her breast. The incident stopped when the lights went out.

• Late November 1996 Incident (Acts of Lasciviousness): While AAA was sleeping on the floor, she awoke to find her father beside her touching her vagina. She became upset; Pajo withdrew his hand and returned to bed with Liquigan.

• January 31, 1997 Incident (Third Rape): At around midnight, Pajo, drunk, woke AAA by tapping her feet and led her to the downstairs bathroom. He was already naked. He ordered her to remove her clothes, then instructed her to lean against the wall and open her legs. He penetrated her vagina. AAA felt pain and wished her father would die so the abuse would stop. The act ended when the dog barked; Pajo told her to fetch a pail of water.

• BBB’s Ordeal: BBB testified that during the August 1996 incident, she was ordered to stand guard at the door and later to perform fellatio on Pajo to facilitate his erection. She corroborated AAA’s account of that rape.

• Discovery and Complaint: On February 18, 1997, CCC spoke to BBB, who disclosed the molestations. The next day, CCC and her brother brought the girls to the barangay center and then to the DSWD and police. The girls gave written statements. AAA was examined by both the PNP Crime Laboratory and the NBI.

• Medical Evidence: The PNP medico-legal officer found AAA’s hymen with deep healed laceration at 6 o’clock and shallow healed lacerations at 3, 7, and 10 o’clock, concluding she was in a non-virgin state, with no external signs of violence. The NBI report described an intact hymen with a small orifice (2.0 cm) precluding complete penetration by an average male organ without injury, but noted physical scars on AAA’s body (left temple, left leg, right gluteal area).

• Defense: Pajo and Liquigan denied the charges. They claimed the charges were fabricated, motivated by: (a) Pajo having chastised the girls for allegedly stealing ₱2,000 in school; (b) his siblings’ interest in his house; and (c) envy over his work “Destiny Philippines 2000.” Pajo asserted he merely used his daughters to arouse him due to alcohol-induced impotence to satisfy Liquigan, and argued the acts were unlikely to have occurred in the presence of other family members.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Pajo maintained that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, contending that AAA’s testimony was uncertain as to penetration during the August 1996 incident.

• Lack of Criminal Nature: Pajo argued that he merely used his daughters to arouse himself to overcome alcohol-induced impotence, not to satisfy personal lust, and that no medical perversion was proven.

• Inherent Improbability: Pajo claimed it was unlikely the rapes occurred inside a common dwelling in the presence of other family members.

• Delay in Reporting: Pajo contended that AAA’s six-month delay in reporting the assaults, and her coming forward only after BBB revealed her own abuse, rendered her accusations unbelievable.

• Improper Motive: Pajo alleged that the charges were instigated by his siblings (CCC and her brother) due to revenge and greed — over the scolding for theft, desire to possess his house, and envy of his literary work.

• Inapplicability of Charges: Pajo insisted that if the crimes were committed, Liquigan should have been charged as a co-principal, not merely an accomplice, casting doubt on the prosecution’s theory.

• Medical Report Inconsistencies: Pajo highlighted the conflict between the PNP report (non-virgin state, no external injuries) and the NBI report (intact hymen, small orifice, presence of physical scars), arguing this raised reasonable doubt.

• Credible Testimonies: The People maintained that AAA’s clear, detailed, and consistent testimony, fully corroborated by BBB, established the rapes beyond reasonable doubt.

• No Improper Motive: The People argued that no improper motive on the part of AAA, BBB, or CCC was shown, and that the defense’s allegations of fabrication were uncorroborated and implausible.

• Moral Ascendancy: The People contended that the father’s moral and physical dominance over his minor daughter substituted for the element of force or intimidation.

• Prosecutorial Discretion: The People asserted that the determination of the nature and degree of participation with which an accused is charged rests solely with the prosecution.

• Credibility and Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution proved the three counts of rape beyond reasonable doubt through the testimonies of AAA and BBB, overcoming the conflicting medical reports and alleged delay in reporting.

• Qualifying Circumstances: Whether the victim’s minority and her relationship to the offender as his daughter were sufficiently alleged and proved to justify the imposition of the death penalty.

• Effect of Medical Inconsistencies: Whether the discrepancies between the PNP and NBI medico-legal findings negated the commission of rape or the presence of force.

• Defense Claims of Improbability and Improper Motive: Whether the court a quo erred in rejecting the defense of fabrication based on alleged family enmity and the purported improbability of the rapes occurring in the family dwelling.

• Credibility and Sufficiency of Evidence: The trial court’s assessment of AAA’s credibility was accorded great respect, as no substantial facts were overlooked that would affect the result. AAA’s straightforward narration of each incident, unshaken on cross-examination, and BBB’s corroboration proved the rapes. The failure to report immediately was adequately explained by AAA’s youth and fear of her father, a recognized phenomenon in incestuous rape cases.

• Qualifying Circumstances: The Informations expressly alleged that AAA was 13 years old and that Pajo was her parent. Her birth certificate (showing birthdate April 13, 1983) and Pajo’s own admission in court established both minority and relationship beyond doubt. Thus, the qualifying circumstances under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, were properly pleaded and proven, mandating the death penalty for each count.

• Effect of Medical Inconsistencies: The inconsistency between the medical reports did not warrant reversal. The presence or absence of physical injuries is not an element of rape; the force required is relative. In father-daughter rape, moral ascendancy suffices in lieu of actual physical force. Moreover, medical evidence is not indispensable; the credible testimony of the victim alone is enough to convict.

• Defense Claims of Improbability and Improper Motive: The argument that the rapes were improbable because committed in the family home is contrary to settled doctrine — lust is no respecter of place or time. The unsupported allegations of family feud, envy, and monetary interest were insufficient to overcome the natural reluctance of a rape victim’s family to endure the public humiliation of a trial unless the crime truly occurred. The prosecution’s decision to charge Liquigan as an accomplice rather than a principal did not affect Pajo’s culpability and rested within prosecutorial discretion.

• Moral Ascendancy as Substitute for Force/Intimidation — In incestuous rape, the father’s moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter replaces the requirement of physical force or intimidation. The victim’s submission born of fear, respect, and parental authority suffices to establish the element of force.

• Credibility of Child Victims — The determination of a child witness’s competence and credibility rests primarily with the trial judge, who observes the witness’s demeanor and intelligence. Such findings are accorded great weight and finality, especially in rape cases where the victim’s testimony is often the sole evidence of guilt.

• Delay in Reporting Rape — The failure of a rape victim, particularly a minor, to immediately report the crime to family members or authorities does not impair her credibility. Delay may be attributed to the victim’s age, the offender’s moral ascendancy, and threats or intimidation.

• Medical Evidence Not Indispensable — A medical examination and a finding of physical injuries are not essential to a conviction for rape. The victim’s credible testimony, if positive and convincing, is sufficient to establish the crime.

• Prosecutorial Discretion in Filing Charges — The prosecution has the sole discretion to determine what charges to file and what degree of complicity to impute to each accused. The failure to charge a co-accused as a principal does not diminish the guilt of the accused.

• Improper Motive in Rape Cases — It is contrary to human experience for a relative of a rape victim to encourage the victim to file a false charge and thereby expose the family to dishonor and public scandal. The absence of convincing evidence of improper motive strengthens the credibility of the complainant.

• “When a father commits rape against his own daughter, the former’s moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation.”

• “Lust is no respecter of time or place.”

• “No member of a rape victim’s family would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor to the family unless the crime was in fact committed.”

• “The determination of the competence and credibility of a child to testify rests primarily with the trial judge who sees the witness, notices her manner, her apparent possession or lack of intelligence, as well as her understanding of the obligation of an oath.”

• People vs. Garigadi, G.R. No. 110111, October 26, 1999 — Cited for the rule that the trial judge’s assessment of a child witness’s credibility is given great weight.
• People vs. Cheng Ho Chua, 305 SCRA 28 (1999) — Referred to as authority that appellate courts accord respect to trial courts’ factual findings unless substantial facts were overlooked.
• People vs. Alitagtag, 309 SCRA 325 (1999) — Used to emphasize that in rape, the victim’s testimony is often the principal evidence.
• People vs. Cabanela, 299 SCRA 153 (1998) — Cited for the principle that lust respects neither time nor place.
• People vs. Medina, 300 SCRA 98 (1998) — Referred to for the Court’s abhorrence of bestiality and incestuous acts.
• People vs. Abangin, 297 SCRA 655 (1998) — Applied for the doctrine that family members would not instigate a false rape charge.
• People vs. Emocling, 297 SCRA 214 (1998) — Cited for the ruling that delay in reporting rape by a minor does not impair credibility.
• People vs. Bartolome, 296 SCRA 615 (1998) — Used for the controlling principle that a father’s moral ascendancy substitutes for violence or intimidation.
• People vs. Torejos, G.R. No. 132217, February 18, 2000 — Relied upon for the award of civil indemnity and moral damages in qualified rape cases.
• People vs. Abapo, G.R. No. 133387-423, March 31, 2000 — Applied regarding finality of judgments where no appeal is perfected.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Imposes the death penalty when rape is committed with the qualifying circumstances that the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the victim’s parent. The trial court correctly applied this provision, and the Supreme Court affirmed the death sentences.

• Section 1(b), Rule 122, Rules of Court (1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure) — Provides that appeals from RTC judgments imposing penalties other than life imprisonment or death are taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal. Applied to dismiss Pajo’s appeal on the acts of lasciviousness convictions.

• Section 3(c), Rule 122, Rules of Court — Governs appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty is life imprisonment or where a lesser penalty is imposed for offenses committed on the same occasion as a death-eligible crime; appeal is taken by notice of appeal. Liquigan’s appeal was dismissed for non-compliance.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, JJ., concurred.

Four justices maintained the view that Republic Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, but they submitted to the majority’s ruling upholding the law’s constitutionality and the imposition of the death penalty in this case. No separate concurring opinions were written.

N/A — The decision was per curiam and unanimous in result; no dissenting opinion was registered.