People vs. Pacificador

For offenses punishable under special laws, the prescriptive period is governed by Act No. 3326, and the registration of a deed constitutes constructive notice that triggers the running of the prescriptive period.

Respondent Arturo Pacificador, then Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), and Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., President of Philippine Smelters Corporation (PSC), were charged with violating R.A. 3019. The charge stemmed from the sale of NASSCO's parcels of land and reclaimed areas in Camarines Norte to PSC for P85,144.50, allegedly grossly disadvantageous to the government given the fair market value of P862,150.00 at the time. The sale was executed and registered in late December 1975 and early January 1976.

• The Transaction: From December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, respondent Arturo Pacificador, as NASSCO Chairman, and Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., as PSC President, allegedly conspired to sell NASSCO's parcels of land, the Jose Panganiban Smelting Plant, and approximately 50 hectares of reclaimed and foreshore areas in Camarines Norte to PSC. The consideration was P85,144.50, manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government given the fair market value of P862,150.00 at the time, resulting in undue injury to the government amounting to P777,005.50.
• Registration: The subject Deed of Sale dated December 29, 1975 was registered shortly after its execution with the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Norte. The Original Certificate of Title in the name of NASSCO was cancelled, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13060 was issued in the name of PSC.
• Civil Case: On February 28, 1977, PSC filed an action for quieting of title with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, docketed as Civil Case No. 2882.
• Criminal Charge: The Information for violation of R.A. 3019 was filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 27, 1988, more than twelve years after the alleged commission of the crime.

• Applicable Law on Prescription: Petitioner argued that R.A. 3019 provides its own 15-year prescriptive period under Section 11, and because the statute does not specify when the period begins to run, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code should apply suppletorily.
• Discovery Rule Application: Petitioner maintained that the crime should be deemed discovered only on May 13, 1987, when the Solicitor General filed a complaint with the PCGG, making the October 27, 1988 filing of the Information well within the prescriptive period.
• Concealment of Crime: Petitioner contended that ordinary principles of prescription do not apply because respondent effectively concealed his criminal acts. The registration of the Deed of Sale was merely constructive notice of the deed's existence, not of the fraudulent acts, especially during the authoritarian regime when investigative arms of the government were prevented from instituting complaints.

• Applicable Law on Prescription: Respondent countered that Act No. 3326 governs the prescription of offenses punishable under special laws, not the Revised Penal Code.
• Constructive Notice: Respondent argued that the registration of the Deed of Sale is the correct reckoning point for prescription because it gives notice to the whole world not only of its existence but also of all facts contained therein.
• Failure to State an Offense: Respondent maintained that the Information should be dismissed on the additional ground that it does not charge an offense, the issue of whether the contract was disadvantageous to the government having been settled in San Mauricio Mining Co. v. Ancheta.
• Double Jeopardy: Respondent asserted that the dismissal of the criminal case on the ground of prescription is tantamount to acquittal, barring re-prosecution under Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

• Prescription of Offenses under Special Laws: Whether Act No. 3326, rather than Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, governs the computation of the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. 3019.
• Reckoning Period and Constructive Notice: Whether the registration of the Deed of Sale constitutes constructive notice that triggers the running of the prescriptive period, notwithstanding claims of concealment and the prevailing political regime at the time.

• Prescription of Offenses under Special Laws: Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescription for offenses penalized by special laws like R.A. 3019. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply. The prescriptive period under Section 11 of R.A. 3019 at the time of the commission of the crime (1975-1976) was 10 years; the 15-year period introduced by B.P. Blg. 195 in 1982 cannot be given retroactive effect as it is unfavorable to the accused. Accordingly, the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986.
• Reckoning Period and Constructive Notice: The registration of the Deed of Sale constitutes constructive notice to the whole world, including the government, of its contents. Even if reckoned from February 28, 1977 (when the civil case for quieting of title was filed), the crime had already prescribed when the Information was filed on October 27, 1988. The cases of People v. Duque and Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto were distinguished; in those instances, the nature of the illegal acts (misrepresentation in illegal recruitment, and conspiracy to cover up behest loans) made discovery impossible at the time of commission. Here, there was no specific showing of acts preventing discovery other than bare assertions, and no allegation that government officials conspired with respondent to conceal the transaction.

• Prescription of Offenses under Special Laws — Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescriptive periods for offenses penalized by special laws. The prescriptive period begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, or if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
• Constructive Notice by Registration — The registration of deeds in the public real estate registry constitutes constructive notice to the whole world of the deed's existence and its contents, including all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. Such notice triggers the running of the prescriptive period for criminal offenses related to the registered document.
• Liberal Construction of Statutes of Limitation — Statutes of limitation in criminal cases are acts of amnesty and liberality by the State in favor of the offender. They are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused, as time gradually wears out proofs of innocence and eventually destroys proofs of guilt.

• "Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides: SECTION 2. Prescription should begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment."
• "The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out."

• Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 317 SCRA 272 (1999) — Followed for the rule that Act No. 3326 governs the prescriptive period for special laws and for the "discovery rule." Distinguished on facts, as Desierto involved concealed behest loans where conspiracy made discovery impossible at the time of the transaction.
• People v. Duque, 212 SCRA 607 (1992) — Distinguished. Involved illegal recruitment where misrepresentation prevented discovery until the POEA ascertained the lack of license.
• People v. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241 (1992) — Followed. Applied Act No. 3326 for determining the reckoning period for prescription in a violation of R.A. 3019.
• People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 389 (1923) — Followed. Defined the nature of statutes of limitation as acts of amnesty that must be liberally construed in favor of the accused.
• San Mauricio Mining Co. v. Ancheta, 105 SCRA 371 (1981) — Cited by respondent regarding the legality and adequacy of consideration in the contract of sale.

• Section 2, Act No. 3326 — Governs prescription of offenses under special laws. Provides that prescription begins from the commission of the violation, or if not known, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings. Applied as the governing law for computing the prescriptive period of the R.A. 3019 violation.
• Section 11, R.A. No. 3019 (as amended by B.P. Blg. 195) — Provides the prescriptive period for offenses under the Anti-Graft Law. The 10-year period (prior to the 1982 amendment introducing a 15-year period) was applied because the longer prescriptive period cannot be given retroactive effect if unfavorable to the accused.
• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — Computes prescription of offenses from discovery by the offended party/authorities and is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. Held inapplicable to special laws, which are governed by Act No. 3326.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena.