People vs. Ortiz-Miyake

A conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale requires sufficient evidence proving the offense was committed against three or more persons, and a trial court may not adopt facts from a prior judgment in a different case to supply this element, as doing so violates the accused's right to confront the witnesses against him.

Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, arising from her representations to three complainants—Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo, and Rosamar del Rosario—that she could secure them employment as factory workers in Taiwan. The applicable statutory framework consisted of Articles 13(b), 34, 38, and 39 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018; Republic Act No. 8042 (the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) was enacted while the case was pending but did not apply retroactively because the offense was committed in 1992. A prior conviction for estafa had already been rendered against the appellant by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque in Criminal Cases Nos. 74852-53, involving complainants Generillo and Del Rosario, and had become final and executory.

In 1992, Elenita Marasigan, a 32-year-old unmarried sales representative, was introduced to accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake by co-complainants Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. Appellant promised Marasigan a job as a factory worker in Taiwan for a fee of P5,000.00. At the time, Marasigan had a pending application for overseas employment with a recruitment agency, but because appellant's fee was substantially lower, she withdrew her money from the agency and paid appellant. The initial payment of P5,000.00 was followed by additional demands, and by the middle of the year Marasigan had paid a total of P23,000.00 on installment basis. Aside from two receipts, appellant did not issue receipts for these payments despite Marasigan's repeated requests.

Appellant assured Marasigan that obtaining a Taiwanese visa would not be a problem and showed her a plane ticket allegedly issued in her name, providing a photocopy while promising to deliver the original before departure. Marasigan was never issued a visa, nor was she given the promised plane ticket. When she went to the travel agency that had issued the ticket, she was informed that she had not been booked for any flight and that the agency's staff did not even know appellant. She then proceeded to appellant's supposed residence and was told that appellant did not live there. Verification with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) confirmed that appellant was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. By the time Marasigan sought to recover her money, appellant could no longer be located.

The prosecution also sought to prove that Generillo and Del Rosario had been similarly victimized. In lieu of their testimonies—both were abroad—the prosecution presented Lilia Generillo, Imelda's mother, and Victoria Amin, Rosamar's sister. Lilia Generillo testified that she gave her daughter P8,000.00 to cover an application for placement abroad made through appellant, and that she twice accompanied her daughter to appellant's residence, though she was not involved in the transactions and was not present when payments were made. Victoria Amin testified that she gave her sister a total of P10,000.00 for processing fees, but she had never met appellant and was not present when payments were made; she assumed the money was paid to appellant based on receipts her sister showed her. Neither Generillo nor Del Rosario was able to leave for abroad. A POEA representative, Riza Balberte, testified that appellant was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.

Appellant, the sole witness for the defense, denied that she recruited the complainants for overseas employment. She claimed that the payments made to her were solely for purchasing plane tickets at a discounted rate through her connections with a travel agency, and that she was paid only P8,000.00 by Marasigan, as shown by a receipt. She insisted that she had purchased discounted tickets for the complainants upon partial payment, guaranteeing the balances, and that she was obliged to pay the full cost when the complainants failed to remit the remaining amounts. The trial court found the prosecution's evidence more credible and, on December 17, 1993, convicted appellant of both crimes as charged. In convicting her of illegal recruitment in large scale, the trial court adopted the facts and conclusions from a prior, final estafa decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque involving Generillo and Del Rosario, treating those facts as its own findings.

• Insufficiency of Evidence for Large Scale Illegal Recruitment: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in convicting her of illegal recruitment in large scale because the evidence presented was insufficient, particularly since only one of the three complainants—Marasigan—testified at trial.
• Denial of Recruitment Activity: Appellant maintained that she did not recruit the complainants for overseas employment but merely purchased plane tickets for them at a discounted rate through her connections with a travel agency, and that the payments were solely for that purpose.
• Absence of Estafa Elements: Appellant contended that she did not misappropriate the money paid by Marasigan and that there was no damage to the complainant that would substantiate a conviction for estafa.

• Reduction to Simple Illegal Recruitment: The Solicitor General argued that the conviction should be reduced to simple illegal recruitment, submitting that the trial court erred in adopting the facts from the prior MeTC Parañaque estafa decision to prove that illegal recruitment was committed against Generillo and Del Rosario, since illegal recruitment was proven only against Marasigan.
• Violation of Right to Confrontation: The Solicitor General further argued that the adoption of facts from the prior estafa decision violated appellant's right to confront the witnesses against her—specifically Generillo and Del Rosario—who did not testify in the illegal recruitment case, citing Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the Rules of Court.

• Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale: Whether the trial court erred in convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale based on facts adopted from a prior estafa judgment, and whether the evidence sufficiently established the commission of the offense against three or more persons.
• Simple Illegal Recruitment: Whether appellant is guilty of simple illegal recruitment for her acts committed against Marasigan.
• Estafa: Whether appellant is guilty of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code for falsely pretending to possess the power to deploy Marasigan for overseas employment.

• Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale: No. The conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale cannot stand because the trial court improperly adopted facts from a prior estafa judgment to establish the third element—that the offense was committed against three or more persons—and the substitute witnesses for two complainants lacked personal knowledge of the transactions.
• Simple Illegal Recruitment: Yes. Appellant was found guilty of simple illegal recruitment under Article 38(a) of the Labor Code for undertaking recruitment activity without a license or authority, as proven by the testimony of Marasigan and the POEA certification.
• Estafa: Yes. The conviction for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code was affirmed, the elements of deceit and damage being indisputably present, and conviction under the Labor Code for illegal recruitment not precluding punishment under the Revised Penal Code for estafa.

• Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale: The Labor Code defines illegal recruitment in large scale as requiring three elements: (a) the accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Articles 34 and 38; (b) the accused did not have a license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement; and (c) the offense was committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group. While the law does not require that at least three victims testify at trial, there must be sufficient evidence proving the offense was committed against three or more persons. The trial court's conclusion that the offense was committed against Generillo and Del Rosario rested solely on its adoption of the facts in a prior, final estafa decision of the MeTC of Parañaque. This adoption was erroneous for two reasons. First, the right to confrontation guaranteed under Rule 115, Section 1(f) and Rule 130, Section 47 of the Rules of Court permits the utilization of prior testimonies of absent witnesses under specific conditions—namely, that the witness is deceased or unable to testify, that the testimony was given in a former proceeding involving the same parties and subject matter, and that the adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine. The exception covers testimonies, not previous decisions or judgments. A previous judgment, while admissible to prove that an accused was previously convicted, is hearsay as to the truth of the facts stated therein and may not be used to prove guilt in a subsequent case. Second, the substitute witnesses—Lilia Generillo and Victoria Amin—had no personal knowledge of the transactions between appellant and their respective relatives; neither was present during negotiations or payments. Their averments that appellant illegally recruited Generillo and Del Rosario were thus unfounded. For insufficiency of evidence and the absence of the third element, the conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale could not be affirmed.

• Simple Illegal Recruitment: The evidence sufficiently proved that appellant undertook recruitment activity against Marasigan. Appellant represented to Marasigan that she had the ability to send people to work as factory workers in Taiwan, collected fees totaling P23,000.00, and promised employment abroad—all without a license or authority from the POEA, as confirmed by the POEA certification. Appellant's defense that she merely purchased plane tickets was belied by the evidence; her pretext that the fees were payments for a plane ticket was a desperate attempt to exonerate herself. No improper motive was attributed to Marasigan, who had no reason to testify falsely. Appellant's bare denial was uncorroborated, and she failed to present the travel agency employee she named as her contact, which would have supported her claim. Accordingly, appellant was guilty of simple illegal recruitment under Article 38(a), penalized under Article 39(c) of the Labor Code.

• Estafa: Conviction under the Labor Code for illegal recruitment does not preclude punishment under the Revised Penal Code for estafa. The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant violated Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code by falsely pretending to possess the power to deploy persons for overseas placement, thereby deceiving Marasigan into paying P23,000.00 for a promised job in Taiwan. The elements of deceit and damage were indisputably present. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and given that the amount of P23,000.00 exceeds P22,000.00, the maximum penalty was correctly fixed within the range of six years, eight months, and twenty-one days to eight years, and the minimum within the range of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. The trial court's imposition of the indeterminate sentence was therefore correct.

• Elements of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale — Simple illegal recruitment requires two elements: (a) the accused undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Articles 34 and 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) the accused does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement. Illegal recruitment in large scale requires a third element: the offense is committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group. The Court applied this framework to hold that while the first two elements were satisfied as to Marasigan, the third element was not proved because the evidence against Generillo and Del Rosario was insufficient.

• Right to Confrontation and Its Exceptions — The right of confrontation serves two purposes: to secure the opportunity of cross-examination, and to allow the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. This right is not absolute; prior testimony of an absent witness may be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule when the witness is deceased or unable to testify, the testimony was given in a former proceeding involving the same parties and subject matter, and the adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine. The exception covers testimonies of witnesses, not previous decisions or judgments. The Court held that the trial court's adoption of facts from a prior estafa decision did not fall within this exception and violated the accused's right to confrontation.

• Prior Judgments as Hearsay in Subsequent Prosecutions — A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of the crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as the previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its use as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case would violate the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him. The Court applied this principle to reject the trial court's reliance on the prior MeTC Parañaque estafa decision.

• Illegal Recruitment and Estafa May Coexist — Conviction under the Labor Code for illegal recruitment does not preclude punishment under the Revised Penal Code for the felony of estafa arising from the same acts. The Court affirmed both convictions, holding that the elements of estafa under Article 315(2)(a)—false pretense of possessing power to deploy persons for overseas placement, deceit, and damage—were independently established.

• "A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous decision is hearsay." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for rejecting the trial court's adoption of the prior estafa judgment as substantive evidence of guilt in the illegal recruitment case, defining the hearsay limitation on prior judgments.

• "Every conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to its appreciation of the evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of another court, especially where what is presented is only its decision sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein and upon which the decision is based." — This passage reinforces the principle that each conviction must rest on the evidence actually presented before the convicting court, not on borrowed findings from a different proceeding.

• "In illegal recruitment in large scale, while the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons." — This passage clarifies the evidentiary standard for the third element of illegal recruitment in large scale, distinguishing the number of victims required from the number of witnesses required to testify.

• People vs. Coral, G.R. Nos. 97849-54, March 1, 1994 — Cited for the elements of simple illegal recruitment, specifically that the accused must undertake recruitment activity without a license or authority.
• People vs. Coronacion, G.R. No. 97845, September 29, 1994 — Cited for the third element of illegal recruitment in large scale, namely that the offense must be committed against three or more persons.
• People vs. Turda, G.R. Nos. 97044-46, July 6, 1994 — Cited for the doctrine that conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code does not preclude punishment for estafa under the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Estenzo, L-41166, August 25, 1976 — Cited for the two purposes of the right to confrontation: securing cross-examination and allowing the judge to observe the witness's deportment.
• People, et al. vs. Villaluz, L-33459, October 20, 1983 — Cited for the exception to the hearsay rule allowing admission of prior testimony of unavailable witnesses.
• Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil. 75 (1930) — Cited for the proposition that a previous judgment may only prove prior conviction, not guilt in a subsequent case.

• Article 13(b), Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended) — Defines recruitment and placement as any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, including referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Applied to determine whether appellant's acts constituted recruitment activity.
• Article 38, Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018 — Defines illegal recruitment and provides that illegal recruitment committed against three or more persons constitutes illegal recruitment in large scale, an offense involving economic sabotage. Applied to distinguish simple illegal recruitment from illegal recruitment in large scale.
• Article 39, Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018 — Prescribes penalties: life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00 for illegal recruitment constituting economic sabotage (large scale), and imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight years, or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00, or both, for simple illegal recruitment. Applied to determine the proper penalty for simple illegal recruitment.
• Article 315(2)(a), Revised Penal Code — Defines estafa committed by means of false pretenses, specifically by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions. Applied to convict appellant of estafa for falsely pretending to possess the power to deploy Marasigan for overseas employment.
• Rule 115, Section 1(f), Rules of Court — Guarantees the accused's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses at trial, with an exception for utilizing prior testimony of a deceased or unavailable witness given in another case involving the same parties and subject matter, provided the adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine. Applied to hold that the trial court's adoption of a prior judgment did not fall within the exception.
• Rule 130, Section 47, Rules of Court — Makes admissible the testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case involving the same parties and subject matter, against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine. Applied in conjunction with Rule 115 to delineate the scope of the exception to the right of confrontation.

Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concurred.