People vs. Ordona

Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance absent clear evidence of how and when the plan to kill was hatched; treachery, however, qualifies the killing as murder when the offender consciously adopts a sudden and unexpected mode of attack against an unarmed victim who has no opportunity to defend himself, even if the attack is frontal.

Accused-appellant Pedrito Ordona y Rendon was a neighbor of prosecution witness Samuel Cartagenas along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. The victim, Ireneo A. Hubay, was a boarder at the residence of Samuel's mother in the same vicinity. Ordona was charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the Information alleging that the killing was committed with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength, with evident premeditation and treachery.

On January 1, 2005, in Quezon City, accused-appellant Pedrito Ordona y Rendon was charged with the murder of Ireneo A. Hubay. The Information alleged that Ordona, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength, with evident premeditation and treachery, attacked and stabbed Hubay on the trunk with a bladed weapon, inflicting mortal wounds that caused his death. Ordona pleaded not guilty at arraignment, and trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented three witnesses: Samuel Cartagenas, his wife Marissa Cartagenas, and PSI Dean Cabrera. Samuel personally knew both Ordona, who was his neighbor, and Hubay, who was a boarder at his mother's house. On the day of the incident, Samuel and Marissa were talking at the doorway of their house along E. Rodriguez Avenue when they saw Ordona loitering by the corner, apparently waiting for someone. After some time, Ordona left but returned five minutes later. Hubay then emerged from the house holding some food. Ordona approached Hubay with a stainless knife, called his attention by saying "Pare," and suddenly stabbed him in the left shoulder. Samuel and Marissa were standing about two feet away. Hubay managed to run, but Ordona gave chase and caught up with him. Despite Hubay's pleas for mercy, Ordona stabbed him in the left torso. Hubay died immediately upon being brought to the hospital. PSI Cabrera, representing the Medico-Legal Officer, testified that Hubay died of hemorrhage and shock from the second stab wound.

Ordona testified as the lone defense witness. He claimed that on the day of the incident, he went to his mother-in-law's house to fetch his wife, but on the way he encountered a certain Cornelio de Leon who was running amok, which prevented him from reaching his destination. He was arrested five days later, and no bladed weapon was recovered from him. Ordona denied knowledge of Hubay's identity.

The Regional Trial Court found Ordona guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, crediting the prosecution's version and appreciating both evident premeditation and treachery as qualifying circumstances. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in toto, finding the prosecution witnesses credible and their alleged inconsistencies minor and immaterial. The appellate court agreed that both qualifying circumstances were present, noting that Ordona's behavior established he was intentionally waiting for his victim to appear.

• Material Inconsistencies in Prosecution Testimonies: Ordona argued that there were material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's main witnesses, specifically that Marissa did not testify that she saw him leave the house for a few minutes, and that Samuel and Marissa presented different accounts on how the crime scene was illuminated.
• Absence of Treachery: Ordona contended that treachery could not be appreciated because the purported attack was not sudden or unexpected; he had called Hubay's attention before approaching him, and Hubay "was aware of the imminent danger to his life."
• Absence of Evident Premeditation: Ordona argued that the prosecution failed to establish any overt act indicating his resolution to kill Hubay, which is indispensable for appreciating evident premeditation.

• Inconsistencies Are Immaterial: The Office of the Solicitor General asserted that the alleged inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies neither pertained to nor involved the essential elements of murder.
• Presence of Evident Premeditation: The OSG maintained that Ordona's behavior clearly established his deliberate plan to kill Hubay.
• Presence of Treachery: The OSG argued that treachery attended the commission of the crime because the attack was sudden and unexpected.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether accused-appellant Pedrito Ordona is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation was properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.
• Treachery: Whether treachery was properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Yes. The conviction for murder was affirmed, the prosecution having established through credible eyewitness testimony that Ordona stabbed Hubay, causing his death.
• Evident Premeditation: No. The prosecution failed to establish the time when the accused resolved to commit the crime or any overt act manifesting his determination to kill, as required by the three requisites of evident premeditation.
• Treachery: Yes. The attack was sudden and unexpected, the victim was unarmed and unable to defend himself, and the accused consciously adopted the mode of attack by lurking outside the residence and waiting for the victim to emerge.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The determination of witness credibility is a function best left to the trial courts, whose findings are generally accorded great respect and weight. The alleged inconsistencies cited by the accused-appellant — Marissa's failure to testify that she saw Ordona leave momentarily, and the differing accounts on the source of illumination — were minor and did not relate to the essential elements of murder. Both witnesses testified that the place was well-lit and that they saw Ordona stab Hubay twice. Slight variances in testimony that are immaterial to the crime charged do not affect a witness's credibility. The act of stabbing was clearly established.

• Evident Premeditation: For evident premeditation to qualify a killing as murder, three requisites must be proven with the same certainty as the criminal act itself: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and execution to allow reflection. The prosecution failed to establish when Ordona resolved to kill Hubay. There was no evidence on record showing the moment the plan was hatched. The act of lurking outside the house could hardly be considered an overt act indicating a resolution to kill. Evident premeditation must be based on external, notorious, and evident acts indicating deliberate planning — not mere presumptions or inferences, no matter how logical or probable.

• Treachery: The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation. Two requisites must be established: (1) the victim was not in a position to defend himself at the time of the attack, and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack. Both elements were present. Hubay was unarmed and casually outside his residence when Ordona suddenly stabbed him, leaving no opportunity to retaliate or parry the attack. Ordona consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of attack by lurking outside the residence, waiting for Hubay to appear, calling him "Pare" while walking toward him with a bladed weapon, and immediately stabbing him. Although the attack was frontal, it was done suddenly and unexpectedly; a frontal attack, when made suddenly and leaving the victim without any means of defense, is treacherous. The second stabbing further demonstrated treachery, as Hubay was already wounded and unprepared to defend himself.

• Requisites of Evident Premeditation — Evident premeditation requires proof of three elements with the same certainty as the criminal act itself: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and execution to allow reflection upon the consequences of the act. It is indispensable to establish how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time elapsed before it was carried out. The circumstance must be based on external, notorious, and evident acts — not mere presumptions or inferences. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove any of the three requisites, and the act of lurking outside the house was insufficient to establish deliberate planning.

• Requisites of Treachery — Treachery is present when two requisites concur: (1) the victim was not in a position to defend himself at the time of the attack, and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation. A frontal attack, when made suddenly and leaving the victim without any means of defense, is treacherous. In this case, both requisites were satisfied: the unarmed victim was casually outside his residence when suddenly stabbed, and the accused consciously adopted his mode of attack by lying in wait and striking without warning.

• Respect for Trial Court Findings on Credibility — The determination of witness credibility is a function best left to the trial courts, whose findings and conclusions are generally accorded great respect and weight. Disregard is warranted only when the trial court erred in appreciating facts and circumstances or made unsound inferences. Slight variances in testimony that are immaterial to the crime charged do not affect a witness's credibility.

• "Evident premeditation must be based on external facts which are evident, not merely suspected, which indicate deliberate planning. There must be direct evidence showing a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the accused meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victim." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Abadies, articulates the canonical standard for proving evident premeditation and explains why the Court struck it down in this case.

• "A frontal attack, when made suddenly, leaving the victim without any means of defense, is treacherous." — This formulation clarifies that treachery does not require an attack from behind; the element of suddenness and the victim's inability to defend are the controlling considerations.

• "[Evident premeditation] must be based on external acts which must be notorious, manifest and evident-not merely suspecting-indicating deliberate planning." — Quoted from People vs. Borbon, this passage underscores that presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical, cannot substitute for clear and positive evidence of planning and preparation.

• People vs. Abadies, 436 Phil. 98 (2002) — Cited for the canonical formulation of the requisites of evident premeditation and the essence of treachery. The Court relied on this case to articulate the standard that premeditation must be based on external, evident facts, not mere suspicion.
• People vs. Borbon, 469 Phil. 132 (2004) — Cited for the principle that evident premeditation must be established by clear and positive evidence showing planning and preparation, and that mere presumptions and inferences will not suffice.
• People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016 — Cited as the controlling authority for the proper award of damages when the crime is consummated murder and the penalty is reclusion perpetua, fixing civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages at P100,000.00 each.
• People vs. Acuram, 284-A Phil. 756 (1994) — Cited for the doctrine that the determination of witness credibility is best left to the trial courts and that their findings are generally accorded great respect.
• People vs. Rabutin, 338 Phil. 705 (1997) — Cited for the principle that slight variances in witness testimony, if immaterial to the crime charged, do not affect credibility.
• People vs. Ablao, 299 Phil. 276 (1994) — Cited for the proposition that a frontal attack, when made suddenly and leaving the victim without means of defense, is treacherous.
• Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) — Cited for the imposition of six percent (6%) interest per annum on all damages awarded from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder. The provision enumerates the qualifying circumstances, including treachery (paragraph 1) and evident premeditation (paragraph 5). The Court applied this provision to classify the killing as murder, finding treachery — but not evident premeditation — sufficiently proven.
• Republic Act No. 9346 — Referenced in connection with People vs. Jugueta for the proposition that when the penalty for consummated murder would be death but is reduced to reclusion perpetua due to R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages should each be P100,000.00.

Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ., concurred.