People vs. Opero

In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, the offender's liability for the killing attaches whenever death results by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, regardless of whether the death was intended or accidental, and Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply where the person killed is the same person intended to be robbed.

Diego Opero, together with Reynaldo Lacsinto, Milagros Villegas, and Asteria Avila, was charged with robbery with homicide before the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila in connection with the death of Liew Soon Ping, the wife of Dr. Hong, at Room 314 of the House International Hotel on Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila. Lacsinto and Villegas did not appeal their convictions, Villegas having been convicted as a mere accessory after the fact. Avila was acquitted. The case reached the Supreme Court on automatic review because of the death penalty imposed on Opero.

At about 4:00 in the morning of April 27, 1978, Salvador Oliver, a GSIS security guard assigned to the House International Hotel on Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila, was informed by fellow security guard Demetrio Barcing that the latter had picked up a little girl, about three years old, loitering on the second floor of the building. Hotel janitor Rafael Ordona identified the child as a resident of Room 314. Oliver telephoned the room and, receiving no answer, brought the child there with Barcing. Upon knocking without response, Oliver pushed the door open and detected a foul odor. Covering his nose, the three entered and found a dead person lying face down on a bed, both feet tied. Oliver notified the Manila Police homicide division. Patrolman Fajardo arrived with funeral parlor personnel and discovered a crying baby attempting to climb out of a crib near the bed.

The dead body was that of Liew Soon Ping. Room 314 had been ransacked, with personal belongings scattered about. The victim's hands and feet were tied, her body was bloated, and a towel was bound around her mouth. Photographs of the body and the room's condition were taken under Patrolman Fajardo's supervision. Fajardo learned that the occupants of Room 314 were Dr. Hong, his wife Liew Soon Ping, their three children, and two maids named Mila and Ester. After a preliminary inquiry, Fajardo issued an advance report naming three suspects — Diego Opero, Milagros Villegas, Asteria Avila — and a fourth unidentified suspect, whose names had been furnished by neighbors.

A follow-up team was formed, and a separate police team was dispatched to Leyte and Samar. Dr. Hong, who was in Cebu at the time of the incident, returned to Manila and reported to the police, making an inventory of missing personal effects valued at ₱30,221.00. The police subsequently received radio messages that Reynaldo Lacsinto could be found at a schoolhouse in Moriones, Tondo, Manila, and that Opero and Avila had been picked up by the Samar Philippine Constabulary, with some stolen articles — a camera, flashlight, billfold, and other personal belongings — recovered from them. Lacsinto was taken to police headquarters and, after being apprised of his constitutional rights in the presence of his father, gave a statement admitting his participation and narrating in detail the commission of the robbery. The Samar P.C. turned over Opero, Villegas, and Avila to Sgt. Yanguiling, who brought them to Manila along with the stolen articles and statements taken by the Samar P.C.

Opero was further investigated at Manila Police Headquarters and gave a supplemental statement admitting that he had robbed the victim and identifying some of the missing articles recovered from his possession. He described in detail how he planned the robbery, named his co-accused as willing participants, and narrated that he and Lacsinto subdued the victim by assaulting her, tying her hands and feet, stabbing her, and stuffing her mouth with a piece of pandesal. Villegas identified stolen clothes given to her by Opero. Avila denied participation and, on advice of counsel, gave no further statement. A reenactment of the crime was conducted at the scene under Opero's direction, with photographs taken.

Dr. Angelo Singian, Chief of the Medico-Legal Division of the Western Police District, autopsied the body and found, among numerous external injuries, cord and ligature marks on the arms and feet, a towel tied around the mouth, and superficial stab wounds. Internal findings revealed an impacted bolus of white bread measuring 3 x 2.5 cm in the oropharynx, contusion on the tongue, and marked congestion of the larynx and trachea. The cause of death was asphyxiation by suffocation from the impacted bolus in the oropharynx and compression of the neck with a broad cloth. According to Dr. Singian, the pandesal slid into the neckline, causing asphyxiation, due to the victim's own movements — movements attributable to the hogtying by the assailants, since an unrestrained victim could have removed the pandesal from her mouth.

• Lack of Intent to Kill (Article 4, Paragraph 1): Appellant argued that he never intended to kill the deceased, his intention being merely to rob her, and that if he had intended to kill her he could have easily done so with the knife; therefore, his liability should be only for robbery.
• Wrongful Person Doctrine (Article 49, Paragraph 1): Appellant maintained that Article 49, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code should apply because the felony committed was different from that intended, warranting the imposition of the penalty corresponding to the offense intended rather than the penalty for robbery with homicide.

• Criminal Liability for the Killing: Whether the absence of intent to kill reduces appellant's liability from robbery with homicide to simple robbery, pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Applicability of Article 49: Whether Article 49, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, governing the penalty when the crime committed is different from that intended, applies to appellant's situation.

• Criminal Liability for the Killing: No. Appellant's liability remains for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, because a direct and intimate connection existed between the robbery and the killing, and death supervening by reason or on the occasion of the robbery is immaterial whether it was intended or accidental.
• Applicability of Article 49: No. Article 49, paragraph 1 applies only where the felony committed befalls a person different from the one intended; here, the intended victim was the very person killed.

• Criminal Liability for the Killing: The Court applied the settled doctrine that when a direct and intimate connection exists between the robbery and the killing, regardless of which precedes the other or whether they are committed simultaneously, the crime is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Appellant's contention that he intended only to rob and not to kill was unavailing. The stuffing of the pandesal into the victim's mouth would not have produced asphyxiation had it not slid into the neckline, a displacement caused by the victim's own movements — but those movements were attributable to what appellant and his co-accused did to her, since had they not hogtied her she could have removed the pandesal. Even if the death were considered accidental, it is settled that when death supervenes by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, it is immaterial that the occurrence of death was by mere accident; what is decisive is that death results by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The Court did, however, appreciate the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, under paragraph 3 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, since the intention was evidently to prevent the deceased from making an outcry.

• Applicability of Article 49: Article 49, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty to be imposed upon principals when the crime committed is different from that intended. The Court found this provision inapplicable because it has been applied only to cases where the crime committed befalls a different person from the one intended, as explicitly ruled in People vs. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150. In the instant case, the intended victim — not any other person — was the one killed as a result of the intention to rob. The situation contemplated under Article 49 is entirely different: it applies where the different felony from that intended befalls someone other than the intended victim, as when a person intending to kill a stranger accidentally kills his own father, making the intended felony homicide but the crime actually committed parricide. The proper mitigating circumstance in appellant's favor is instead paragraph 3 of Article 13 — not having intended to commit so grave a wrong as that committed — which is distinct from the scenario addressed by Article 49.

• Robbery with Homicide as a Special Complex Crime — When a direct and intimate connection exists between the robbery and the killing, regardless of which of the two precedes the other or whether they are committed at the same time, the crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The Court applied this doctrine to reject appellant's argument that his lack of intent to kill reduced his liability to simple robbery.

• Death by Accident on the Occasion of Robbery — When death supervenes by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, it is immaterial that the occurrence of death was by mere accident; what is important and decisive is that death results by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The Court relied on this doctrine to hold that even if the asphyxiation from the displaced pandesal could be considered accidental, liability for robbery with homicide still attached.

• Article 49, RPC — Error in Person — Article 49, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, governing the penalty when the crime committed is different from that intended, applies only to cases where the crime committed befalls a different person from the one intended to be the victim. The Court found this inapplicable because the intended victim was the same person who was killed.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong — Under paragraph 3 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong as that committed may be appreciated when the circumstances indicate no intention to kill, as where the intent was merely to prevent the victim from making an outcry. The Court appreciated this circumstance but offset it against one of two aggravating circumstances present, leaving the other to justify the death penalty.

• "It was been repeatedly held that when direct and intimate connection exists between the robbery and the killing, regardless of which of the two precedes the other, or whether they are committed at the same time, the crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on robbery with homicide, defining the essential relationship between the robbery and the killing that gives rise to the special complex crime.

• "it is a settled doctrine that when death supervenes by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, it is immaterial that the occurrence of death was by mere accident." — This formulation articulates the principle that accidental death during a robbery does not exempt the offender from liability for robbery with homicide, directly rejecting the appellant's theory.

• "The foregoing provision has been applied only to cases when the crime committed befalls a different person from the one intended to be the victim." — This passage defines the narrow scope of Article 49, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, limiting its application to errors in person and excluding cases where the intended victim is the one actually killed.

• People vs. Hernandez, 46 Phil. 48 — Cited as authority for the doctrine that a direct and intimate connection between robbery and killing constitutes the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, regardless of the sequence of the two acts.

• People vs. Sia Bonkia, 60 Phil. 1 — Cited together with U.S. vs. Samea, 5 Phil. 227 as authority for appreciating the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong when the intent was merely to prevent the victim from making an outcry.

• People vs. Mangulabnan, 99 Phil. 992 — Cited for the doctrine that when death supervenes by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, it is immaterial that the occurrence of death was by mere accident, drawing on decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain.

• People vs. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150 — Cited as the explicit ruling that Article 49, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code applies only where the crime committed befalls a different person from the one intended, also citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain.

• Article 4, Paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Cited by appellant as basis for arguing that criminal liability attaches only for the felony intended. The Court found it inapplicable to reduce liability, holding instead that the special complex crime of robbery with homicide attaches when death results by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.

• Article 49, Paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty when the crime committed is different from that intended. The Court held this provision inapplicable because it applies only where the felony befalls a person different from the intended victim, which was not the case here.

• Article 13, Paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — Defines the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. The Court appreciated this circumstance in appellant's favor, as the intent was to prevent the victim from crying out rather than to kill, but offset it against one of two aggravating circumstances.

• Superior Strength and Dwelling (Aggravating Circumstances) — Two aggravating circumstances were present. One was offset by the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong; the remaining aggravating circumstance warranted imposition of the higher imposable penalty within the range of reclusion perpetua to death.

Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, and De Castro, Jr. concurred. Melencio-Herrera, J., concurred in the result. Fernando, C.J., took no part.