People vs. Ong

A judge must voluntarily inhibit from a case when circumstances, such as disputed extrajudicial remarks indicating bias against a key witness combined with a judicial record favoring the opposing party, cast doubt on the judge's impartiality, even if the evidence is insufficient to compel inhibition.

Ten criminal cases for violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019 were filed against Imelda R. Marcos, intimately related to a forfeiture case involving ill-gotten Swiss bank deposits. Justice Gregory S. Ong previously sat as a regular member of the Sandiganbayan First Division that reversed a summary judgment forfeiting the Swiss deposits in favor of the Republic, a reversal later set aside by the Supreme Court. After consolidation, the criminal cases were raffled to the Fourth Division, chaired by Justice Ong.

• Related Forfeiture Case: Civil Case No. 0141 sought the forfeiture of Swiss deposits allegedly acquired unlawfully by the Marcoses. The First Division, including Justice Ong, initially granted summary judgment for the Republic. On reconsideration, a Special First Division, with Justice Ong concurring, reversed the forfeiture in favor of the Marcoses. The Supreme Court eventually set aside this reversal.
• Consolidation and Raffling: The ten criminal cases against private respondent were consolidated and raffled to the Fourth Division chaired by Justice Ong, after the Third Division Chair recused himself due to being a wedding sponsor of the private respondent.
• The Controversial Remark: Special Prosecutor Sulit visited Justice Ong's chambers to explain a motion seeking case reassignment. Sulit claimed Justice Ong stated, "Actually, ayaw ko sa kasong yan, idi-dismiss ko ‘yan, puro hearsay lang naman ang sinasabi ni Chavez nong umupo ako minsan sa trial nyo." Justice Ong denied making the remark, asserting the visit was purely social and that the Fourth Division Clerk of Court, who accompanied Sulit, disavowed hearing the statement.
• Alleged Hostility: Petitioner alleged Justice Ong expressed displeasure over a letter from prosecution witness Atty. Francisco Chavez requesting consolidation and was overheard calling Chavez "mayabang" (arrogant).
• Denial of Inhibition: Justice Ong denied the motion for inhibition, finding no prejudgment of the cases, no bias against the witness, and no judicial track record favoring the accused.

• Bias and Partiality: Petitioner argued that Justice Ong exhibited manifest bias in favor of Imelda Marcos and hostility towards the prosecution's key witness, Atty. Chavez.
• Prejudgment: The extrajudicial remark expressing intent to dismiss the cases based on the characterization of Chavez's testimony as hearsay demonstrated prejudgment of the merits.
• Judicial Track Record: Justice Ong's prior concurrence favoring the Marcoses in the related forfeiture case and his grant of private respondent's motion to travel evidenced a pattern of partiality.

• Justice Ong (Public Respondent): Public respondent denied making the controversial remark, claiming the prosecutor's visit was social and improperly aimed at convincing him to transfer the cases. He asserted no abuse of discretion in denying inhibition, as there was no prejudgment or bias.
• Imelda Marcos (Private Respondent): Private respondent countered that petitioner failed to adduce facts or evidence indicating arbitrariness, bias, or prejudice on the part of the public respondent.

• Compulsory Inhibition: Whether the circumstances warrant the compulsory inhibition of Justice Ong based on clear and convincing evidence of bias or prejudice.
• Voluntary Inhibition: Whether the disputed extrajudicial remark and prior judicial record constitute sufficient grounds to require Justice Ong to voluntarily inhibit himself to preserve the appearance of impartiality.

• Compulsory Inhibition: Compulsory inhibition was not warranted. The primary evidence of bias—the alleged extrajudicial remark—was disputed and did not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard required to disqualify a judge.
• Voluntary Inhibition: Voluntary inhibition was warranted. Although the evidence was insufficient to compel inhibition, the declarations by prosecutors regarding the remark unavoidably cast doubt on the judge's impartiality. Combined with his judicial record of favoring the accused in the forfeiture case, these circumstances should have prompted a circumspect judge to voluntarily recuse himself. Judges must avoid even the mere appearance of impropriety and must be like Caesar's wife—above suspicion.

• Voluntary Inhibition — Governed by the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. While reviewing tribunals generally defer to this discretion absent manifest arbitrariness, the discretion is not unlimited and must be based on a rational and logical assessment of circumstances. When circumstances cast doubt on a judge's impartiality, even if insufficient for compulsory inhibition, the judge must voluntarily inhibit to avoid the appearance of impropriety.
• Appearance of Impropriety — Judges must avoid not just impropriety but even the mere appearance of impropriety, as appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. The duty to promote confidence in the judicial system requires judges to be above suspicion; any act giving the appearance of impropriety is reprehensible.

• "For judges must be like Caesar’s wife – above suspicion."
• "Public respondent is reminded of the principle that judges should avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality."

• Gutierrez v. Santos, G.R. No. L-15824 — Cited as controlling precedent establishing that due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal.
• Webb v. People, G.R. No. 127262 — Distinguished; while opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings do not prove bias, the present case involved an extrajudicial remark.
• People v. Kho, G.R. No. 139381 — Followed for the principle that the authority for voluntary inhibition does not give judges unlimited discretion.

• Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court — Enumerates compulsory grounds for disqualification and provides for voluntary inhibition for just or valid reasons. Applied to determine that while compulsory grounds were absent, the circumstances warranted voluntary inhibition under the second paragraph.
• Article III, Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution — Guarantees due process, which requires a hearing before an impartial tribunal. Cited as the constitutional root of the rule on inhibition.

Reynato S. Puno, Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Renato C. Corona, Cancio C. Garcia