People vs. Oñate

A sudden and unprovoked attack upon an unsuspecting victim, without any warning, is attended by treachery, qualifying the killing as murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; voluntary surrender, whose genuineness is not impugned, is a mitigating circumstance that must be credited even where the supporting certification was not formally offered in evidence; and the minimum of an indeterminate sentence is fixed by the court's discretion within the range of the penalty next lower, guided by the purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to individualize the administration of criminal law.

Appellant Alfonso Oñate alias Bukay was charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code for the stabbing death of Jose "Peping" Ventosa in Bacolod City. The case implicates the law on qualifying circumstances, specifically treachery, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended), whose declared purpose is "to uplift and redeem valuable human material and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness."

On the evening of October 15, 1966, in Bacolod City, appellant Alfonso Oñate alias Bukay stabbed Jose "Peping" Ventosa, who died as a result. Appellant admitted the killing from the outset, offering to plead guilty to the lesser crime of homicide, but the trial judge rejected the offer and proceeded to trial.

According to eyewitness Rebecca Sy, she was seated in front of a store next to Funeraria Alisbo selling tuba when Ventosa came and asked for a glass; she answered that all her tuba had been consumed, whereupon Ventosa turned and walked toward the Provincial Hospital. He had not gone far when appellant, without saying a word, placed his hand on Ventosa's shoulder and stabbed him, hitting him in the side and in the forehead. Jimmy Tajanlangit, one of appellant's two companions that evening, denied that the deceased provoked a quarrel; he stated that when they saw Ventosa, appellant asked him and his companion to approach Ventosa for his unpaid drink, but he refused out of fear, whereupon appellant himself accosted Ventosa and, once close to him, suddenly stabbed him in the right side and forehead.

Appellant's version was that he and his companions, together with Ventosa, drank tuba in a sari-sari store on Burgos Street; Ventosa left without paying, and the storekeeper asked appellant to pay, but he promised to collect the amount from Ventosa. While standing near the corner of Lacson-Burgos Streets shortly after leaving the store, he saw Ventosa walking toward the Provincial Hospital in front of Funeraria Alisbo; he asked his companions to approach Ventosa for payment, but they refused, so he himself accosted Ventosa and demanded payment. Ventosa then laid hands on him, grabbing his collar and pushing him back and forth until he fell to the ground, after which Ventosa dipped his hand into his pocket as if to fish for something; fearing for his life, appellant drew his knife and stabbed Ventosa.

The trial court found the prosecution's eyewitnesses credible, noting their testimonies were not impugned or disproven by the accused, were free from material contradiction, and that no motive for false testimony was shown. The prosecution also presented three witnesses — Porfirio Arcobillas, a policeman, and George and Fernando Valencia — who testified that appellant was prone to resorting to his bladed weapon. The trial court concluded that the sudden attack upon Ventosa without warning was accompanied by treachery, qualifying the killing as murder.

A certification signed by Lt. Col. Domingo C. Tutaan, Provincial Commander, dated October 27, 1966, stated that appellant voluntarily surrendered to PC headquarters at about 180800 Oct. 1966 and was detained in the PC stockade. The certification was not formally offered as evidence by the defense, but the Solicitor General did not impugn its genuineness and truthfulness and recommended that appellant be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

• Voluntary Surrender: Appellant argued that the lower court erred in not appreciating his voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, relying on the certification of the PC Provincial Commander.
• Treachery: Appellant argued that the lower court erred in holding that the stabbing of the deceased was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery so as to qualify the killing as murder.

• Voluntary Surrender: The Solicitor General did not impugn the genuineness and truthfulness of the surrender certification and recommended that appellant be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Treachery: The prosecution's eyewitnesses, Rebecca Sy and Jimmy Tajanlangit, testified that appellant suddenly and without warning stabbed the deceased, establishing treachery; their testimonies were not impugned or disproven and were free from material contradiction.

• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the lower court erred in not appreciating the voluntary surrender of the accused as a mitigating circumstance.
• Treachery: Whether the lower court erred in holding that the stabbing of the deceased was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery so as to qualify the killing as murder.

• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. The certification of the PC Provincial Commander, whose genuineness and truthfulness the Solicitor General did not impugn, established that appellant voluntarily surrendered; the mitigating circumstance was credited notwithstanding the defense's failure to formally offer the certification.
• Treachery: Yes. The sudden, unprovoked attack upon Ventosa, who was walking along the street, was attended by treachery, qualifying the killing as murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Voluntary Surrender: The certification signed by Lt. Col. Domingo C. Tutaan certified that appellant voluntarily surrendered to PC headquarters at about 180800 Oct. 1966. Although the defense failed to formally offer the certification, the Solicitor General did not impugn its genuineness and truthfulness and in fact recommended crediting the mitigating circumstance. The Court overlooked the defense's oversight and credited voluntary surrender.

• Treachery: The trial court's finding of treachery rested on the credible testimonies of eyewitnesses Rebecca Sy and Jimmy Tajanlangit, who testified that appellant suddenly and without warning stabbed Ventosa. The Court reiterated the settled rule that findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal, the trial court being in a better position to decide, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless it has plainly overlooked facts of substance and value that might affect the result. The alleged discrepancies between the testimonies of the physician and the eyewitnesses were insubstantial and, per settled doctrine, lend weight rather than detract from credibility. The prosecution's additional witnesses — Porfirio Arcobillas, George Valencia and Fernando Valencia — showed appellant was prone to resorting to his bladed weapon, supporting the trial court's conclusions on the decisive issue of credibility.

• Penalty: With one mitigating circumstance (voluntary surrender) and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty for murder — reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death — should be imposed in its minimum period, which is reclusion temporal maximum (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years), per paragraph 3 of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the resulting penalty is neither death nor life imprisonment, the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence must be within the range of the penalty next lower — prision mayor maximum (10 years and 1 day) to reclusion temporal medium (17 years and 4 months). The determination of the minimum is not a mechanical act of computation but a consideration of various factors, keeping in mind the basic purpose of the law to uplift and redeem valuable human material. Considering appellant's age and other relevant factors, the Court set the minimum at 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and the maximum at 17 years, 4 months and 2 days of reclusion temporal, following the approach in People vs. Mansala, Jr. rather than the shorter range suggested by People vs. Pantoja.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — A sudden attack upon an unsuspecting victim, without any warning, is attended by treachery, qualifying the killing as murder. Applied: appellant met the deceased walking along the street and suddenly, without warning, stabbed him; the attack was held treacherous, and the killing was qualified as murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Voluntary Surrender — A mitigating circumstance that reduces the penalty for the offense. Applied: the certification of the PC Provincial Commander, whose genuineness and truthfulness were not impugned, established voluntary surrender even though the certification was not formally offered in evidence; the mitigating circumstance was credited.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Fixing the Minimum — The minimum of the indeterminate penalty is not a mechanical computation but a consideration of various factors, including the criminal as an individual (age, health, mentality, heredity, personal habits, conduct, education, proclivities, demeanor during trial, manner of the crime, gravity of the offense) and as a member of society (relationship with dependents, family, associates, and society at large), to individualize the administration of criminal law. Applied: the Court set the minimum at 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, within the range of the penalty next lower, to give sufficient incentive for the culprit to rehabilitate himself morally and socially.

• "THIS TO CERTIFY that ALFONSO OÑATE a detained prisoner has voluntarily surrendered to this Hq. at about 180800 Oct. 1966." — The certification of the PC Provincial Commander that established the factual basis for crediting voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, notwithstanding the defense's failure to formally offer it in evidence.
• "The record shows that the testimony of Rebecca Sy and Jimmy Tajanlangit have not been impugned not in any manner disproven by the accused. Their testimonies are free from any material contradiction and the accused has not shown any motive whatsoever that these eyewitnesses were impelled by any malicious or false motive in testifying in the manner they did." — The trial court's assessment of the prosecution eyewitnesses' credibility, which the Supreme Court declined to disturb on appeal.
• "(T)he penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code.) There being one mitigating circumstance, voluntary surrender, the penalty should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law." — The controlling rule from People vs. Pantoja on the penalty for murder attended by one mitigating circumstance.
• "... the penalty imposable upon him is the minimum period of the penalty for murder (see par. 3, Art. 63, Revised Penal Code), which is reclusion temporal maximum (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years). Since the resulting penalty is neither death nor life imprisonment, the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies (Sec. 2, Act No. 4103 as amended)." — The rule from People vs. Mansala, Jr. on the range of the indeterminate sentence where one mitigating circumstance attends murder, which the Court followed in fixing the penalty.

• People vs. Pantoja, 25 SCRA 468 — Controlling on the penalty for murder with one mitigating circumstance; cited for the rule that the penalty should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and for the increased indemnity of P12,000.
• People vs. Mansala, Jr., 31 SCRA 401 — Followed for the range of the indeterminate sentence where one mitigating circumstance attends murder; the Court preferred its approach over the shorter range suggested in Pantoja.
• People vs. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 — Cited for the purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the factors guiding the court in fixing the minimum penalty, including consideration of the criminal as an individual and as a member of society.
• People vs. Gonzales — Cited for the rule that the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower, determined without regard to circumstances modifying criminal liability.
• People vs. Dosal, G.R. Nos. L-4215-16 — Cited by the trial court for the proposition that a sudden attack without warning is accompanied by treachery, thereby qualifying the killing as murder.
• People vs. Ancheta, 60 SCRA 333 — Cited for the rule that appellate courts will not disturb trial court findings on credibility of witnesses, the trial court being in a better position to decide, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines murder and prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death; applied to qualify the killing as murder by treachery.
• Article 63, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties and one mitigating circumstance is present, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period; applied to fix the penalty at reclusion temporal maximum.
• Section 2, Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended) — Provides for the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law where the resulting penalty is neither death nor life imprisonment; applied to impose an indeterminate sentence.
• Section 1, Act No. 4225 — Provides that the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; applied in determining the minimum range of the sentence.

Castro, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Antonio, Muñoz-Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Martin, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concurred. Makasiar, J., took no part.