People vs. Ohayas

A killing is murder when the accused is positively identified as the sudden and unexpected shooter of an unarmed victim, and treachery is present because the attack was deliberate, swift, and sudden, leaving the victim no opportunity to defend himself; denial and alibi cannot overcome positive identification where physical impossibility is not shown.

Ohayas was a balut vendor in Sitio Bonbon, Pinamungajan, Cebu, the locality of Armando Kyamko, Jr., a 12-year-old boy. The legal backdrop is Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes murder.

At around 8:00 o’clock in the evening of May 31, 1996, 12-year-old Armando Kyamko, Jr. was with his friends, 15-year-old Sany Candelasa and 18-year-old Lou Managaytay, relaxing and conversing under a kalachuchi tree along the national road in Sitio Bonbon, Pinamungajan, Cebu. Sany and Lou were seated under the tree, while Armando, Jr. was standing in front of them at a distance of approximately one arm’s length. The place was illuminated by lights coming from Sany’s house, and several persons were in the vicinity, including the victim’s father, Armando, Sr., who was at the opposite side of the road.

Suddenly, both Sany and Lou saw accused-appellant Ohayas, a balut vendor in their place, with three other persons coming from Sitio Campo. Ohayas and his companions walked toward the three lads; Lou noticed that Ohayas had a shotgun in his hands while his companions carried torches. When Ohayas’s group was only seven arms’ length away from the victim’s group, Ohayas suddenly, and without any warning, shot Armando, Jr., who was hit in his right abdomen. Not contented, Ohayas continued to fire at the victims, who were shocked by the turn of events. Sany was hit on his right finger, while Lou, although not directly hit, suffered injuries when the bullets ricocheted. After being hit, Armando, Jr. managed to call his father for help before he fell to the ground; Sany and Lou ran to their respective houses to seek refuge.

Armando, Jr. expired on the same night while still on board the vehicle on his way to Pinamungajan District Hospital. On the following day, Dr. Jesus Cerna conducted an autopsy and reduced his findings in Necropsy Report No. 96-N-109, which stated that the cause of death was shock secondary to shotgun (pellet) wounds on the body. Ohayas fled the day after the incident and hid for three years until he was apprehended on February 6, 1999.

According to Ohayas, he was mauled at Sitio Bonbon by a certain “Toper” prior to the shooting incident, and because of that, his cousins Eddie Yaguno, Florencio Owas, Jerry Yaguno, Roberto Owas, and Cerilo Bolodo wanted to avenge him; he prevented them from doing so. On the day of the shooting, he claimed he was fishing at sea, and at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening he heard gunshots coming from Sitio Bonbon. He felt afraid, stopped fishing, and went home; on the way, SP03 Socrates Bancog told him that someone died in the shooting and that Ohayas would be blamed, and advised him to take precautionary measures because the victim’s relatives might retaliate. He took refuge at the house of his neighbor. Ohayas further claimed that he was cooking fish when SP03 Bancog and other policemen went to his house to investigate; he was not arrested but was advised to leave, and his house was searched for a shotgun but none was found. He contended that Eddie Yaguno killed the victim because Yaguno owned the shotgun, and he explained that he transferred to Basak, Pedro several months after the shooting because he could no longer afford to pay rent.

The RTC and CA gave weight to the prosecution witnesses’ consistent identification of Ohayas as the shooter and treated the inconsistencies raised by the defense as minor and collateral.

• Inconsistencies in Prosecution Evidence: Accused-appellant contended that the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies contained inconsistencies on the position of Armando, Jr., Lou, and Sany, the number of shots fired at the victim, the reaction of his companions after the shooting, how the victim fell, and the exact location of the wounds.
• Denial and Alibi: Accused-appellant maintained that he was fishing at sea when the shooting occurred, that he heard gunshots from Sitio Bonbon and went home, and that Eddie Yaguno killed the victim because Yaguno owned the shotgun.

• Sufficiency of Evidence and Identification: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant killed Armando Kyamko, Jr., despite the alleged inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing so as to qualify it as murder.
• Alibi and Denial: Whether accused-appellant’s denial and alibi could overcome the prosecution’s positive identification and establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene.
• Damages: Whether the damages awarded should be modified in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

• Sufficiency of Evidence and Identification: Yes. The prosecution witnesses were consistent in positively identifying accused-appellant as the shooter, and the inconsistencies cited by the defense concerned only minor details and collateral matters that did not impair their credibility.
• Treachery: Yes. The killing was attended by treachery because the attack was sudden and unexpected on an unarmed 12-year-old victim without provocation, denying him any opportunity to defend himself.
• Alibi and Denial: No. Accused-appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene, so his denial and alibi could not overcome the prosecution’s evidence.
• Damages: Modified. The SC ordered ₱75,000 civil indemnity, ₱75,000 moral damages, ₱75,000 exemplary damages, and ₱50,000 temperate damages, with 6% interest per annum from finality.

• Sufficiency of Evidence and Identification: The SC applied the elements of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any qualifying circumstance mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. It found all these requisites established. Prosecution witnesses Sany and Lou were in unison in identifying Ohayas as the person who shot Armando, Jr. Although the defense pointed to inconsistencies on the position of the victim and witnesses, the number of shots fired, the reaction of Ohayas’s companions, how the victim fell, and the exact location of the wounds, these were minor and collateral. Inconsistencies on minor details do not affect the substance of the witnesses’ declarations or the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the accused. The shooting happened so quickly that the witnesses’ instinct was to seek cover from the bullets, and the SC cannot expect them to focus on every specific detail of a sudden violent incident. The inconsistencies even tended to bolster, rather than weaken, the witnesses’ credibility because they showed that the testimonies were not contrived or rehearsed.
• Treachery: The SC defined treachery as when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. Here, treachery was apparent from the suddenness of the attack: Armando, Jr., a 12-year-old victim who was merely talking to his friends, was suddenly shot by Ohayas. The shooting was deliberate, swift, and sudden, denying the victim the opportunity to protect or defend himself; he was unarmed and unaware of the harm about to happen to him. The killing was therefore attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
• Alibi and Denial: The SC held that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. Where there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail. In this case, the defense failed to establish that it was physically impossible for Ohayas to have perpetrated the offense. His denial and alibi could not overcome the prosecution’s positive identification and evidence.
• Damages: The SC modified the damages awarded by the CA in line with recent jurisprudence. It ordered Ohayas to pay the heirs of Armando Kyamko, Jr. ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000 as moral damages, and ₱75,000 as exemplary damages for the crime of murder. It also awarded ₱50,000 as temperate damages even though the records did not show that the prosecution proved the amount actually expended for medical, burial, and funeral expenses, because prevailing jurisprudence allows temperate damages as it cannot be denied that the victim’s heirs suffered pecuniary loss due to the crime committed. All damages awarded earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the finality of the judgment until fully paid.

• Murder under Article 248 — The elements are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. The SC found all elements present because Armando, Jr. was killed, Ohayas was identified as the shooter, treachery attended the killing, and the killing was neither parricide nor infanticide.
• Treachery (alevosia) — Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Its essence is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the victim’s part. The SC applied it because Ohayas suddenly shot a 12-year-old victim who was merely talking to friends, leaving him unarmed and unaware of the harm about to happen.
• Alibi — For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. The SC rejected Ohayas’s alibi because the defense failed to establish physical impossibility.
• Minor inconsistencies in witness testimony — Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their declarations or the veracity or the weight of their testimonies. Where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the accused, minor inconsistencies do not impair credibility. The SC applied this rule to the inconsistencies on positions, number of shots, reactions, how the victim fell, and wound location.
• Temperate damages — Temperate damages may be awarded even without proof of the amount actually expended for medical, burial, and funeral expenses because it cannot be denied that the victim’s heirs suffered pecuniary loss due to the crime committed. The SC awarded ₱50,000 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.

• “Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their declarations or the veracity or the weight of their testimonies.” — The SC used this rule to reject Ohayas’s attack on the prosecution witnesses’ credibility based on minor inconsistencies.
• “The shooting in this case was deliberate, swift and sudden, denying the victim the opportunity to protect or defend himself. He was unarmed and unaware of the harm about to happen to him.” — This passage applies treachery to the facts and explains why the killing was qualified as murder.
• “Where there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.” — The SC used this standard to reject Ohayas’s claim that he was fishing at sea during the shooting.
• “Accused-appellant shall pay the heirs of Armando Kyamko, Jr. PhP75,000 as civil indemnity, PhP75,000 as moral damages, and PhP75,000 as exemplary damages for the crime of murder. The Court also deems it proper to award temperate damages in the amount of PhP50,000.” — This passage states the modified damages awarded to the victim’s heirs.

• People vs. Edgar Allen Alvarez, G.R. No. 191060, February 2, 2015 — Cited for the elements of murder.
• People vs. Fundador Camposano y Tiolanto, G.R. No. 207659, April 20, 2016 — Cited for the rule that minor inconsistencies tend to bolster rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses.
• People vs. Rosalito Caboquin y Del Rosario, G.R. No. 137613, November 14, 2001 — Cited for the definition of treachery.
• People vs. Mariano Toyco, Sr., G.R. No. 138609, January 17, 2001 — Cited for the essence of treachery as a sudden and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without provocation.
• People vs. Alberto Anticamaray Cahillo, G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011 — Cited for the requisites of alibi and physical impossibility.
• People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016 — Cited for the updated amounts of damages for murder.
• People vs. Yolando Libre, G.R. No. 192790, August 1, 2016 — Cited for the award of temperate damages despite lack of proof of actual expenses.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder; the SC applied it by holding that the killing of Armando Kyamko, Jr. was murder because it was attended by treachery and was neither parricide nor infanticide.