People vs. Odtuhan

A declaration of nullity of a first marriage obtained after contracting a second marriage does not extinguish criminal liability for bigamy, nor can it serve as a ground to quash the information, because criminal culpability attaches upon commission of the offense and the nullity decree is a matter of defense that may not be raised in a motion to quash, which is confined to defects apparent on the face of the information.

Respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina on July 2, 1980, and then married Eleanor A. Alagon on October 28, 1993, during the subsistence of the first marriage. In August 1994, respondent filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina, which the RTC of Pasig City granted on February 23, 1999, declaring that marriage void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. Alagon died on November 10, 2003. In June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon discovered respondent's prior marriage and filed a complaint-affidavit charging him with bigamy. The case requires resolution of whether a post-offense judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage may be used to defeat a bigamy prosecution at the motion-to-quash stage.

Respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina on July 2, 1980. On October 28, 1993, while his marriage to Modina subsisted, respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon. Sometime in August 1994, respondent filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70, granted the petition and declared the marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.

On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent's previous marriage with Modina and filed a complaint-affidavit charging respondent with bigamy. On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information alleging that, on or about October 28, 1993, in Manila, respondent, being then legally married to Jasmin Modina and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Eleanor A. Alagon, which second marriage had all the essential requisites for validity.

On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion praying that he be allowed to present evidence in support of his motion to quash, that the motion to quash be granted, and that the case be dismissed. He moved to quash on two grounds: (1) that the facts alleged do not charge the offense of bigamy, and (2) that criminal liability had been extinguished, both premised on the judicial declaration that his first marriage was null and void ab initio. On September 4, 2008, the RTC denied the Omnibus Motion, holding that the information's allegations — a valid first marriage, its subsistence at the time of the second marriage, and the second marriage's compliance with essential requisites — constituted bigamy, and that a declaration of nullity is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. The RTC denied reconsideration on February 20, 2009.

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, which granted the petition on December 17, 2009, applying the ruling in Morigo vs. People and holding that if evidence established the first marriage was void ab initio, one essential element of bigamy would be lacking. The CA further noted that respondent was in a better position than the accused in Morigo because he had obtained the favorable declaration of nullity before the bigamy complaint was filed. The People then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Petitioner argued that the information charging respondent with bigamy sufficiently alleged all the elements constituting the offense, as it stated that respondent was legally married to Modina, that the marriage had not been legally dissolved, that he contracted a second marriage with Alagon, and that the second marriage had all essential requisites for validity.
• Non-Extinguishment of Criminal Liability: Petitioner maintained that the subsequent court judgment declaring respondent's first marriage void ab initio did not extinguish his criminal liability, which had already attached upon commission of the offense, and that the time of filing the criminal complaint was material only for determining prescription.

• Facts Do Not Charge Bigamy: Respondent argued that the facts alleged in the information did not constitute the offense of bigamy because his first marriage with Modina had been judicially declared null and void ab initio, rendering one essential element of the crime wanting.
• Extinction of Criminal Liability: Respondent contended that the declaration of nullity of his first marriage extinguished his criminal liability, and that he was in an even better position than the accused in Morigo vs. People because he had contracted the second marriage after filing the petition for nullity and obtained a favorable declaration before the bigamy complaint was filed against him.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Whether the information filed against respondent sufficiently alleges all the elements constituting the crime of bigamy.
• Effect of Declaration of Nullity on Criminal Liability: Whether the subsequent judicial declaration declaring respondent's first marriage void ab initio extinguished his criminal liability for bigamy or provided a valid ground to quash the information.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Yes. The information contained all four elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and the declaration of nullity of the first marriage constitutes evidence aliunde that may not be considered in a motion to quash, which tests only the sufficiency of allegations on the face of the information.
• Effect of Declaration of Nullity on Criminal Liability: No. Criminal culpability attaches upon commission of the offense, and a subsequent declaration of nullity does not extinguish that liability; the declaration is a matter of defense that may be raised only during trial, not in a motion to quash.

• Sufficiency of the Information: The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of an information is whether the facts alleged therein, hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime as defined by law; evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic to the information must not be considered. The information alleged that respondent was legally married to Modina, that the marriage had not been legally dissolved, that he contracted a second marriage with Alagon, and that the second marriage had all essential requisites for validity — satisfying all four elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent's evidence of the court decree declaring the first marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license sought to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information, which is a matter of defense that cannot be raised in a motion to quash. The Court distinguished Morigo vs. People, where the first marriage was void from the start because the parties merely signed the marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer — meaning there was no marriage to speak of when the second marriage was contracted. In the present case, respondent's first marriage was presumably valid until judicially declared void, and he contracted the second marriage before obtaining that declaration.

• Effect of Declaration of Nullity on Criminal Liability: Criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon commission of the offense, and from that instant liability appends until extinguished as provided by law; the time of filing the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining prescription. The Family Code requires a judicial declaration of absolute nullity before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, and so long as no declaration exists, the presumption is that the marriage exists. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. To allow respondent's line of defense would enable a person who commits bigamy to evade prosecution by simply filing a petition for declaration of nullity and hoping for a favorable decision before anyone files a complaint. The issue of the declaration of nullity obtained after contracting the subsequent marriage is immaterial for purposes of establishing that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute an offense, and neither may such defense be interposed in a motion to quash as an exception to the rule that facts contrary to the allegations are matters of defense raisable only during trial.

• Hypothetical Admission Doctrine in Motion to Quash — A motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test of sufficiency is whether the facts alleged, hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime as defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic to the information must not be considered. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that respondent's decree of nullity could not be considered at the motion-to-quash stage, as it constituted evidence aliunde seeking to establish a fact contrary to the information's allegations.

• Attachment of Criminal Liability Upon Commission of the Offense — Criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon commission of the offense, and from that instant liability appends until extinguished as provided by law. The time of filing the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining prescription. The Court applied this principle to hold that respondent's criminal liability for bigamy attached when he contracted the second marriage on October 28, 1993, and the subsequent declaration of nullity in 1999 did not extinguish that liability.

• Presumption of Validity of Marriage Until Judicially Declared Void — Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity; the nullity must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts, and only when so declared can the marriage be held void. So long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. A person who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The Court relied on this doctrine to reject the argument that the first marriage was void from the beginning and thus no bigamy could have been committed.

• "What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage." — This passage articulates the core principle governing bigamy liability: the critical moment is the commission of the second marriage while the first remains legally subsisting, regardless of subsequent events.

• "Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy." — This passage defines the doctrine of presumed validity of marriage and its consequences for bigamy prosecution, establishing that the risk of prosecution falls on the party who contracts a second marriage without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity.

• "If we allow respondent's line of defense and the CA's ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him." — This passage states the policy rationale for rejecting the CA's approach, highlighting the practical danger of permitting post-offense declarations of nullity to defeat bigamy charges.

• Morigo vs. People, 466 Phil. 1013 (2004) — Distinguished. In Morigo, the first marriage was void from the start because the parties merely signed the marriage contract without a solemnizing officer, so there was no marriage to speak of when the second marriage was contracted. The Court distinguished this from the present case, where the first marriage was presumably valid until judicially declared void, and the second marriage was contracted before that declaration.

• Montañez vs. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012, 684 SCRA 315 — Followed. The Court applied the same reasoning: a declaration of nullity obtained after contracting a second marriage does not negate bigamy liability, as criminal culpability attaches upon commission of the offense.

• Teves vs. People, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 307 — Followed. The Court cited Teves for the proposition that the Family Code requires a judicial declaration of nullity before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted, and that a person who contracts a second marriage before such declaration assumes the risk of prosecution for bigamy.

• Antone vs. Beronilla, G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 615 — Followed. The Court relied on Antone for the definition of a motion to quash as a hypothetical admission of facts, the rule that evidence aliunde may not be considered, and the principle that a declaration of nullity obtained after the subsequent marriage is immaterial for purposes of quashing the information.

• Article 349, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes bigamy as the contracting of a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by judgment. The Court found that the information alleged all four elements of this offense: (1) the offender was legally married; (2) the first marriage had not been legally dissolved; (3) he contracted a second marriage; and (4) the second marriage had all essential requisites for validity.

• Rule 117, Sections 4, 5, and 6, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs motions to quash. Section 4 provides that if the defect is curable by amendment, the prosecution may be given opportunity to correct it. Section 5 allows the court to order another information filed if the motion is sustained. Section 6 prohibits the filing of another information when the quashal is based on extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. The Court invoked these provisions to explain the proper scope and consequences of a motion to quash.

• Family Code (Executive Order No. 209) — The Court cited the Family Code as having settled the requirement that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is necessary either as a cause of action or a ground for defense, and that parties may not judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage without submitting it to competent courts.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Roberto A. Abad, Jose Catral Mendoza, and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen concurred with the decision. No separate concurring opinions were written.