People vs. Noynay and Ruiz

The mitigating circumstances of provocation and obfuscation cannot be credited where the offended party’s acts were lawful and proper and did not constitute sufficient provocation immediately preceding the killing; an alibi is destroyed by eyewitness testimony placing the accused at or near the scene.

Buenaventura Ruiz and Martin Noynay were related by marriage. The charge was asesinato.

Martin Noynay owned a carabao that was destroying sugar cane planted by Silvestre Arriesgado. Arriesgado caught the carabao and took it to Noynay’s house, accompanied by his nine-year-old son, Jose. At Noynay’s house they found Noynay and Buenaventura Ruiz. Arriesgado told Noynay that the carabao had destroyed the sugar cane and that Noynay had to pay damages. Noynay replied that he did not have to pay anything because his carabao was tied. Arriesgado then told Noynay that if he did not wish to pay, he would take the carabao to the lieutenant of the barrio, and he started to do so.

At that point Noynay grabbed a spear from the azotea of his house, and he and Ruiz pursued Arriesgado. Arriesgado began to run but was overtaken under a tree about 82 meters from Noynay’s house. Jose ran and hid behind some clumps of maguey, and from there he saw Noynay stab his father in the shoulder with a spear. Arriesgado picked up a stone and threw it at Noynay, striking him in the forehead. Noynay then stabbed Arriesgado in the side with the spear. Ruiz said, “let us finish him,” and stabbed Arriesgado twice in the breast with a dagger. The two men ran away, Noynay toward his house and Ruiz toward the provincial road. Jose went to where his father had fallen, and a few moments later the wounded man died.

Rosa Malinao, Arriesgado’s wife, was told by her daughter Maria that the defendants were pursuing her husband. She ran toward the scene and saw the defendants running away. When she reached the place where her husband had been killed, she found Jose crying. She asked him who had killed his father, and he replied that Martin Noynay and Buenaventura Ruiz had killed him. When she asked why they had attacked his father, he replied that it was because the deceased had taken the carabao to Noynay and demanded payment for the sugar cane the carabao had destroyed.

Ruiz set up an alibi, alleging that when Arriesgado was killed he was in a cockpit 7 kilometers away. Feliciano Pepito testified that at noon on the day in question he met Ruiz going toward Noynay’s house, to whom Ruiz was related by marriage. Agripina de la Rama saw Ruiz about noon going from the scene of the crime toward the provincial road. The corpse of Silvestre Arriesgado showed that he had been wounded with two different kinds of instruments.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Buenaventura Ruiz, as appellant, argued that the trial court erred in not declaring that the prosecution evidence did not establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Preponderance of Evidence and Reasonable Doubt: He argued that the preponderance of evidence was at least in his favor and that, if he had not conclusively shown his innocence, he should be acquitted by reasonable doubt.
• Acquittal: He argued that the trial court erred in not acquitting him.
• Alibi: He set up the defense that when the deceased was killed he was in a cockpit 7 kilometers away.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution evidence established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Buenaventura Ruiz for the killing of Silvestre Arriesgado.
• Alibi: Whether Ruiz’s alibi that he was in a cockpit 7 kilometers away when the killing occurred should be credited.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstances of provocation and obfuscation under Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed by the trial court should be modified.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The SC found the evidence left no doubt as to Ruiz’s guilt, citing Jose Arriesgado’s direct testimony, Rosa Malinao’s testimony, and the corpse’s wounds from two different instruments.
• Alibi: No. The alibi was refuted by Feliciano Pepito and Agripina de la Rama, who placed Ruiz near the scene around noon, contradicting his claim that he was in a cockpit from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m.
• Mitigating Circumstances: No. The deceased’s acts were lawful and proper and did not constitute sufficient provocation immediately preceding the killing; obfuscation was not justified because it did not arise from lawful sentiments.
• Penalty: Modified. The penalty is fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, instead of the lower court’s eight years and one day.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The SC reviewed the evidence and found no doubt as to Ruiz’s guilt. Jose Arriesgado, the deceased’s nine-year-old son, testified to Ruiz’s direct participation: after Noynay stabbed the deceased with a spear, Ruiz said “let us finish him” and stabbed the deceased twice in the breast with a dagger. Rosa Malinao, the deceased’s wife, saw Ruiz and Noynay running away from the scene. The corpse showed wounds from two different instruments, corroborating the eyewitness account. These facts supported the conviction.
• Alibi: Ruiz claimed he was in a cockpit 7 kilometers away when the killing occurred. The SC held this alibi destroyed by Feliciano Pepito, who met Ruiz at noon going towards Noynay’s house, and Agripina de la Rama, who saw Ruiz about noon going from the scene of the crime towards the provincial road. Their testimony contradicted Ruiz’s claim that he was in the cockpit from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. and placed him near the scene.
• Mitigating Circumstances: The trial court credited provocation and obfuscation under Article 13, Nos. 4 and 6. The SC held the evidence did not warrant a finding of sufficient provocation or threat immediately preceding the act. The deceased’s taking of the carabao to Noynay and demanding payment for destroyed sugar cane, and his taking the carabao to the barrio lieutenant when Noynay refused to pay, were perfectly legal and proper. They gave no reasonable cause for provocation as to Noynay and none at all as to Ruiz. The finding of obfuscation was also unjustified: the deceased was within his right, and the defendants pursued and deliberately killed him without rational cause. Obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments, and the SC quoted U.S. vs. Taylor that an uncontrollable burst of passion is not extenuating unless provoked by prior unjust or improper acts.
• Penalty: Because the mitigating circumstances were improperly credited, the SC modified the penalty. It sentenced Ruiz to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, instead of the prison sentence imposed by the lower court, and affirmed the decision as modified, with costs against the appellant.

• Provocation (Article 13, No. 4, Revised Penal Code) — Requires sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act. The SC held that the deceased’s lawful demand for payment and taking of the carabao to the barrio lieutenant did not constitute provocation, especially as to Ruiz.
• Obfuscation (Article 13, No. 6, Revised Penal Code) — Requires that the accused acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to produce passion or obfuscation, and the obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments. The SC rejected it where the deceased acted within his rights and the accused had no rational cause for provocation.
• Alibi — A defense that the accused was elsewhere when the crime was committed. The SC held Ruiz’s alibi was destroyed by witnesses who placed him near the scene around noon, contradicting his cockpit alibi.
• Eyewitness Testimony — The SC relied on Jose Arriesgado’s testimony as to Ruiz’s direct participation, corroborated by the corpse’s wounds from two different instruments.

• “The evidence was carefully considered by the trial judge. It leaves no doubt in our minds as to the guilt of the appellant.” — The SC used this to affirm Ruiz’s conviction after reviewing the evidence.
• “The action of the deceased in taking the carabao to Noynay and demanding payment for the sugar cane destroyed, and in taking the carabao to the lieutenant of the barrio when Noynay refused to pay was perfectly legal and proper and constituted no reasonable cause for provocation as to Noynay and certainly none at all as far as the appellant was concerned.” — The SC rejected the mitigating circumstance of provocation.
• “The finding that the defendants acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation was likewise not justified by the evidence of record.” — The SC rejected the mitigating circumstance of obfuscation.
• “The fact that an offense was committed in an uncontrollable burst of passion (con arrebato y obcecacion) should not be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance unless it appears that it was provoked by prior unjust or improper acts.” — The SC quoted this rule to explain why obfuscation was unavailable.

• U.S. vs. Taylor, 6 Phil. 162 — The SC cited this case for the rule that obfuscation is not an extenuating circumstance unless provoked by prior unjust or improper acts.

• Article 13, Nos. 4 and 6, Revised Penal Code — The trial court credited the mitigating circumstances of provocation and obfuscation under these provisions; the SC held the evidence did not support either, and modified the penalty.