People vs. Nitafan

A judge may not motu proprio initiate the dismissal of a criminal information based on grounds that are personal to the accused and must be raised through a motion to quash; after the accused has pleaded without moving to quash, only the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the offense, extinction of the offense or penalty, or double jeopardy may be entertained, and even then only upon a proper motion. When a judge initiates the quashal, he compromises judicial impartiality and violates the prosecution’s right to due process.

Three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, as amended, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, were filed against Imelda R. Marcos. The charges involved the illegal maintenance of foreign exchange deposit accounts abroad without Central Bank authority. The cases were originally filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, consolidated with related cases pending in the RTC of Manila, and eventually re-raffled to Branch 52, presided over by Judge David G. Nitafan.

• Filing of Informations: On January 9, 1992, three criminal informations were filed against private respondent Imelda R. Marcos in Branch 158 of the RTC of Pasig. The charges alleged violation of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, as amended, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 — specifically, unlawful maintenance of foreign exchange deposit accounts abroad, including an account at Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, S.A., Suisse, and accounts at Swiss Bank Corporation in the names of Maler II and Maler I Foundations, without Central Bank authority.
• Arraignment and Consolidation: Private respondent was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The prosecution subsequently moved to consolidate the three Pasig cases with 21 related cases pending before Branch 26 of the RTC of Manila, arguing that the transactions formed part of a series devised by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to conceal ill-gotten wealth. Branch 158 granted consolidation on the condition that the presiding judge of Branch 26 interpose no objection.
• Re-raffle to Branch 52: Upon transfer to Manila, the cases were re-raffled and re-assigned to Branch 52 presided by respondent Judge David G. Nitafan, where they were re-numbered as Criminal Case Nos. 92-107942 to 92-107944.
• Show Cause Orders: Without any motion to quash having been filed by the accused, respondent judge issued two orders on July 20, 1992. The first required the prosecution to show cause why Criminal Case No. 92-107942 should not be dismissed on the ground that applying Central Bank Circular No. 960 to acts committed before its publication made it an ex post facto law. The second required a showing of why the other two cases should not be dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy, positing that the cases formed a single continuous crime with those pending in Branch 26 and that separate prosecutions would amount to “worm multiplication or amoeba reproduction” vexing the accused.
• Dismissal Orders: On August 7, 1992, respondent judge dismissed Criminal Case No. 92-107942, ruling that the Central Bank circular was an ex post facto law. On August 10, 1992, he dismissed the two remaining cases on double jeopardy grounds and characterized the prosecution as part of a “sustained political vendetta.”
• Denial of Reconsideration: The prosecution’s motions for reconsideration were denied in a single 19-page order dated September 7, 1992, in which respondent judge criticized the Secretary of Justice’s media statements and reaffirmed his earlier rulings.

• Lack of Authority to Dismiss Motu Proprio: Petitioner maintained that under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, only the accused may file a motion to quash; a judge has no power to motu proprio initiate dismissal of a criminal information, as doing so makes him both counsel for the accused and judge, violating due process and judicial impartiality.
• Presumption of Constitutionality: Petitioner argued that the Central Bank circular enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality and could not be declared an ex post facto law absent a proper challenge from the accused, which was never lodged.
• No Double Jeopardy: Petitioner contended that double jeopardy could not attach where no first jeopardy had yet arisen — there had been no conviction, acquittal, or dismissal without the accused’s express consent in the related cases pending before Branch 26.
• Waiver of Objections: Petitioner pointed out that private respondent had been arraigned and pleaded not guilty without filing any motion to quash, thereby waiving all grounds for quashal except those specifically reserved under Section 8 of Rule 117, none of which applied.

• Ex Post Facto Law: Respondent judge asserted that Central Bank Circular No. 960 was published imperfectly (the text appearing in the Official Gazette but not in its Table of Contents) and that applying it to acts predating its publication rendered it an ex post facto law violative of the Constitution.
• Double Jeopardy: Respondent judge argued that the three cases and the 21 cases in Branch 26 formed a “continuous crime” or series of transactions such that separate prosecutions would place the accused in double jeopardy, unduly vexing her with multiple proceedings.
• Consolidation and Docket Management: Respondent judge opposed consolidation on the ground that criminal procedure has no counterpart to civil consolidation under Rule 31, and insisted that having already studied the cases, it would be unfair to “pull out” the cases; he also invoked the need to unclog his docket.
• Judicial Independence: In his order denying reconsideration, respondent judge emphasized that judges must decide cases according to their independent appreciation of the facts and law, free from extraneous influences such as media criticisms by the Secretary of Justice.

• Authority to Dismiss Motu Proprio: Whether a trial judge may, motu proprio and without any motion from the accused, initiate the dismissal of a criminal information on grounds of ex post facto law and double jeopardy after the accused has been arraigned and has entered a plea.
• Ex Post Facto Law: Whether the application of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to acts allegedly committed prior to its publication renders the circular an ex post facto law, thereby warranting dismissal of the information.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the pendency of related criminal cases before another branch constitutes double jeopardy barring separate prosecution of the three informations.

• Authority to Dismiss Motu Proprio: A judge has no authority to motu proprio initiate dismissal of a criminal information. Section 1, Rule 117 explicitly states that the accused may move to quash at any time before entering a plea; Sections 2, 3, and 8 consistently refer to the accused as the party who files the motion. A motion contemplates initial action by the accused, who is best positioned to know the grounds for objection. When a judge initiates the quashal, he pre-judges the prosecution’s case, takes the side of the accused, and forfeits the impartiality required of a neutral tribunal — thereby violating both the prosecution’s and the accused’s right to due process. After arraignment and plea without a motion to quash, the accused is deemed to have waived all objections except the non-waivable grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the offense, extinction of the offense or penalty, and double jeopardy, and even those grounds must be properly raised through a motion.
• Ex Post Facto Law: The dismissal on the ground that the circular was an ex post facto law was improper. Every law enjoys a presumption of constitutionality until declared otherwise by the Supreme Court. Neither the accused nor the Solicitor General challenged the constitutionality of the circular; a lower court cannot solely rule on constitutionality nor declare a law void absent a direct and proper challenge. The ground was, in any event, not properly before the court.
• Double Jeopardy: No double jeopardy barred the prosecution. Double jeopardy requires the concurrence of three requisites: (a) a first jeopardy that has attached prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (c) the second jeopardy is for the same offense. Under Section 7, Rule 117, first jeopardy attaches only upon a valid indictment before a competent court, after arraignment, entry of a valid plea, and conviction, acquittal, or dismissal without the accused’s express consent. Here, there was no showing that the accused had been arraigned or had entered a plea in the Branch 26 cases, and regardless, those cases remained pending — no judgment on the merits, no acquittal, no conviction, and no termination had occurred. The fifth requisite for attachment of first jeopardy was completely absent.

• Motion to Quash Is Personal to the Accused — Under Rule 117, Sections 1, 2, 3, and 8, the right to file a motion to quash belongs exclusively to the accused and may be waived by failure to assert it before plea. A court cannot motu proprio initiate or assume that right without compromising judicial neutrality and the due process rights of both parties. A judge who does so effectively acts as counsel for the accused and as judge simultaneously, which is impermissible.
• Requisites of Double Jeopardy — For double jeopardy to attach, three elements must concur: (1) a first jeopardy has attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy is for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included in the first. First jeopardy attaches only upon: (a) a valid complaint or information, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) entry of a valid plea, and (e) conviction, acquittal, or dismissal without the express consent of the accused. Pending cases where none of these terminating events has occurred do not give rise to double jeopardy.
• Presumption of Constitutionality — A statute or regulation carries a strong presumption of constitutionality. Courts, especially lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law unless it is directly assailed in an appropriate action and is essential to the disposition of the case.

• “A motion contemplates an initial action originating from the accused. It is the latter who is in the best position to know on what ground/s he will base his objection to the information. Otherwise, if the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case of the prosecution but also takes side with the accused. This would violate the right to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal.” — This passage encapsulates the core ratio that a judge’s motu proprio dismissal undermines judicial impartiality and due process.
• “Under said Section, the first jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.” — This formulation of the requisites of first jeopardy is repeatedly cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• Padilla v. CA, 269 SCRA 402 — Cited for the principle that every law carries a presumption of constitutionality; applied to support the ruling that a lower court cannot unilaterally declare CB Circular No. 960 unconstitutional.
• People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238; People v. Tampal, 244 SCRA 202 — Cited for the three requisites of double jeopardy; used to establish that no first jeopardy could have attached in the Branch 26 cases.
• Cudia v. CA, G.R. No. 110315, January 16, 1998; Guerrero v. CA, 257 SCRA 703 — Cited for the specific elements required for first jeopardy to attach, underscoring the absence of a terminating event in the related cases.

• Section 1, Rule 117, Rules of Court — “At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or information.” The provision vests the right to move for quashal solely in the accused, not the court.
• Section 2, Rule 117 — Requires that the motion to quash be in writing, signed by the accused or his counsel, and distinctly specify the factual and legal grounds; the court is proscribed from considering grounds not stated therein except lack of jurisdiction.
• Section 8, Rule 117 — Failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before plea constitutes a waiver, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction, extinction of the offense or penalty, and double jeopardy.
• Section 7, Rule 117 — Defines the circumstances under which a prior conviction, acquittal, or dismissal constitutes a bar to subsequent prosecution; applied to demonstrate the absence of a first jeopardy.
• Section 4, Central Bank Circular No. 960, as amended — The substantive offense charged; the court did not rule on its validity but emphasized the presumption of constitutionality.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concurred.