People vs. Nitafan

A memorandum check, defined as a check in ordinary form with the word "memorandum," "memo," or "mem" written across its face, is covered by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) because it is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. The law punishes the mere issuance of a worthless check, and the purpose for which it was issued or any private understanding that it not be presented for payment is immaterial to the offense.

Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila with violation of B.P. 22 for issuing a postdated check (Philippine Trust Company Check No. 117383) in the amount of P143,000.00 as partial payment of a pre-existing obligation, which check was subsequently dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Lim moved to quash the Information, arguing that B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check, which he characterized as a promissory note and thus civil in nature. The trial court granted the motion to quash, ruling that B.P. 22 was unconstitutional. The People, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the Supreme Court.

• Nature of the Charge: Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged with violating B.P. 22 for issuing a postdated check (dated February 9, 1985) for P143,000.00 to Fatima Cortez Sasaki, knowing he had insufficient funds. The check was dishonored upon presentment, and Lim failed to pay the amount or make arrangements for payment within five banking days after receiving notice of dishonor.
• Motion to Quash: Lim moved to quash the Information, contending that (1) B.P. 22 was unconstitutional, and (2) the check he issued was a "memorandum check," which he argued was in the nature of a promissory note and thus a civil obligation, not within the penal statute's coverage.
• Trial Court Ruling: The RTC, presided over by respondent Judge Nitafan, issued an Order on 1 September 1986 quashing the Information, agreeing that B.P. 22 was unconstitutional.
• Supreme Court Intervention: The Solicitor General filed the present petition. During the pendency of this case, the Supreme Court had already sustained the constitutionality of B.P. 22 in Lozano v. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, 18 December 1986). Thus, the sole remaining issue was the applicability of B.P. 22 to a memorandum check.

• Coverage of B.P. 22: The People argued that the law, B.P. 22, does not distinguish between ordinary checks and memorandum checks. It penalizes the issuance of "any check" without sufficient funds. Since a memorandum check is drawn on a bank, it falls within the statutory definition and purpose of the law.
• Purpose of the Law: The petitioner maintained that the legislative intent behind B.P. 22 was to curb the pernicious practice of issuing unfunded checks, and exempting memorandum checks based on private understandings would frustrate this objective and allow evasion of the law.

• Nature of Memorandum Check: Respondent Lim argued that a memorandum check, while in the form of an ordinary check, is given and accepted more as a memorandum of indebtedness or a promise to pay, akin to a promissory note. Therefore, it is civil in nature and outside the purview of the penal statute B.P. 22.
• Reliance on Precedent: Citing U.S. v. Isham, Lim contended that such checks are understood not to be presented for payment but to be redeemed by the maker, making them evidence of debt enforceable through civil action, not criminal prosecution.

• Statutory Coverage: Whether a memorandum check issued as partial payment of a pre-existing obligation falls within the coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

• Statutory Coverage: A memorandum check is covered by B.P. 22. A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, drawn on a bank, and payable on demand. It therefore fits the definition of a check under Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law and falls within the plain meaning of "any check" as used in B.P. 22. The law punishes the act of issuing a worthless check, not the purpose for which it was issued. Any private agreement or understanding that the check not be presented is immaterial to the commission of the offense, which is malum prohibitum. To hold otherwise would undermine the law's purpose of preventing the circulation of worthless checks and erode public faith in checks as reliable instruments of commerce.

• Memorandum Check as a Check under B.P. 22 — A memorandum check, characterized by the word "memorandum," "memo," or "mem" written across its face, is an evidence of debt but retains the legal characteristics of an ordinary check. It is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. Consequently, it is subject to the penal provisions of B.P. 22, which makes no distinction between types of checks.
• Malum Prohibitum Nature of B.P. 22 — The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, guarantee, or evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum. The law punishes the act itself, and the knowledge of insufficient funds at the time of issue is the critical mens rea. The purpose for which the check was issued or any conditions attached to its presentment are not elements of the offense and do not exempt the issuer from liability.

• "A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of B.P. 22 which does not distinguish but merely provides that '[a]ny person who makes or draws and issues any check knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . . which check is subsequently dishonored . . . shall be punished by imprisonment . . .'" — This passage underscores the principle of statutory construction ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus (where the law does not distinguish, we ought not distinguish) applied to the coverage of B.P. 22.
• "To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of check be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provision of B.P. 22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was enacted — to stem the proliferation of unfunded checks." — This highlights the Court's policy rationale for rejecting the memorandum check defense, emphasizing the law's intent to protect the integrity of commercial transactions.

• Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. 63419, 18 December 1986, 146 SCRA 323 — Controlling precedent that upheld the constitutionality of B.P. 22 as a valid exercise of police power and not an imprisonment for debt. The Court relied on this to dispose of the constitutional challenge and focused on the remaining statutory interpretation issue.
• U.S. v. Isham, 17 Wall 496 (U.S. Supreme Court) — Cited by the respondent to argue that a memorandum check is a promissory note. The Supreme Court distinguished or implicitly rejected its application, noting that under Philippine law and the specific context of B.P. 22, a check drawn on a bank is the operative fact for criminal liability.

• Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, Section 1 — The penal provision that punishes any person who makes, draws, and issues any check knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds, which is subsequently dishonored. The Court applied this provision, holding that the term "any check" includes a memorandum check.
• Negotiable Instruments Law, Section 185 — Defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand." The Court used this definition to classify a memorandum check as a check within the contemplation of B.P. 22.

Chief Justice Marcelo B. Narvasa was on leave. All other Associate Justices concurred: Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo (ponente), and Melo.

N/A — The decision was unanimous among the justices who participated.