People vs. Nelmida

A complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code does not arise when multiple accused, acting in conspiracy, fire multiple shots at multiple victims, as the severalty of the acts prevents the application of the "single act" requirement. In such instances, the accused are liable for as many separate crimes as there are victims.

On 5 June 2001, Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, and his security escorts—comprising members of the Philippine Army, Philippine National Police, and civilian aides—were traveling home aboard the mayor's yellow pick-up vehicle. Upon reaching Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, armed men positioned on both sides of the road opened fire on the vehicle using high-powered firearms. The attack resulted in the deaths of PO3 Hernando Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Ramon Dacoco, while five others sustained injuries; the mayor and one other passenger remained unharmed. Wenceslao Nelmida and Ricardo Ajok, along with several co-accused, were charged with the crime. One accused, Samuel Cutad, was discharged to serve as a state witness.

• The Ambush: On 5 June 2001, at around 3:00 p.m., Mayor Tawan-tawan and his escorts were traversing San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte. Appellants and their co-accused, positioned in a diamond formation on both sides of the road, opened fire on the vehicle using high-powered firearms. State witness Samuel Cutad, who had been instructed to wait at a nearby shed, observed the attack from five meters away.
• Identification of Assailants: Macasuba Tandayao and PFC Gapor Tomanto, who were seated in the vehicle, positively identified Wenceslao firing an M-16 rifle from a squatting position on the right side of the road. Macasuba also identified Ricardo and several co-accused among the ambushers. Samuel corroborated these identifications, being well-acquainted with the assailants who had stayed at his aunt's house prior to the incident.
• Casualties: PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco died from gunshot wounds. Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, and Juanito sustained injuries, while Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun Palanas were uninjured.
• Flight and Arrest: Immediately after the ambush, the assailants fled. Wenceslao moved from his residence to his father’s house, then to his son’s house in Kolambugan, and finally to Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental, where he was arrested on 29 August 2001. Ricardo fled to Ozamis City and later to Puting Bato, Sapad, Lanao del Norte, where he was arrested on 20 December 2001.
• Defense Version: Wenceslao claimed he was at home feeding pigs and entertaining visitors seeking election returns when the ambush occurred; he fled due to his wife's trauma from the strafing of their house. Ricardo claimed he was at home attending to his wife who had just given birth; he fled due to fear of political harassment by Mayor Tawan-tawan's supporters.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Appellant Wenceslao argued that the prosecution witnesses' testimonies were tainted with glaring inconsistencies—such as discrepancies on where PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni hitched a ride, the failure of PFC Angni and Samuel to name Wenceslao in their affidavits, and the omission of Wenceslao's name in the police spot reports—which cast doubt on their credibility.
• Ill-Motive: Wenceslao contended that the prosecution witnesses were driven by ill-motive to eliminate him as a political rival and to exact revenge for his opposition to Mayor Tawan-tawan in the 1998 elections. Samuel’s testimony was allegedly motivated by self-preservation and leniency.
• Alibi and Denial: Both appellants maintained that they were in their respective homes at the time of the ambush and denied participation.
• Flight as Indication of Guilt: Wenceslao asserted that his temporary absence from his residence was due to his wife's trauma from the strafing of their house, not a consciousness of guilt.
• Failure of Prosecution: Ricardo argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The prosecution maintained that the alleged inconsistencies referred to minor and trivial matters that strengthened, rather than destroyed, the witnesses' credibility. Positive identification in open court prevails over inconsistencies in affidavits, which are often incomplete and inferior to testimonial evidence.
• Denial and Alibi: Denial is a negative and self-serving defense that cannot overcome affirmative and categorical testimony. Alibi requires proof of physical impossibility to be at the crime scene, which was not met here given the short distance between the appellants' residences and the ambush site.
• Flight: Flight from the scene and subsequent hiding are indications of guilt.
• Conspiracy: The concerted actions of the accused demonstrated conspiracy, making the act of one the act of all.

• Credibility: Whether the prosecution witnesses were credible despite alleged inconsistencies and ill-motive.
• Alibi and Denial: Whether the defenses of alibi and denial can prevail over the positive identification by prosecution witnesses.
• Complex Crime vs. Separate Offenses: Whether the crime committed is a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code or separate offenses of murder and attempted murder.
• Qualifying Circumstances: Whether treachery and evident premeditation were properly appreciated.

• Credibility: The prosecution witnesses' testimonies were credible. Inconsistencies on minor and collateral matters do not affect credibility but are indicative of truthfulness, showing that the witnesses were not coached. The failure to name the appellant in affidavits does not discredit open-court testimony, as affidavits are often incomplete and taken ex parte. No ill-motive was proven; the presumption is that witnesses were not moved by improper motives, especially since they were victims seeking justice.
• Alibi and Denial: Alibi and denial cannot prevail over positive identification. For alibi to prosper, it must be physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene—a condition unmet given the seven-kilometer distance between the appellants' residences and the ambush site. Denial is inherently weak, particularly when corroborated only by relatives, as in Wenceslao's case, or entirely unsubstantiated, as in Ricardo's case.
• Complex Crime vs. Separate Offenses: The crime is not a complex crime. Article 48 requires a "single act" constituting two or more felonies. When multiple assailants fire multiple shots resulting in multiple casualties, the severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article 48. Conspiracy does not merge multiple acts into a single act for purposes of Article 48; rather, it imposes collective responsibility for separate crimes. Appellants are liable for two counts of murder and seven counts of attempted murder.
• Qualifying Circumstances: Treachery was present because the sudden and coordinated ambush afforded the victims no opportunity to defend themselves. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery. Evident premeditation was not appreciated due to lack of evidence on the time the appellants determined to commit the crime and acts manifestly indicating clinging to that determination.

• Complex Crime under Article 48 — Requires a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies. Singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law; singularity of criminal act is required. When various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
• Conspiracy and Article 48 — Conspiracy does not convert multiple acts of multiple perpetrators into a single act under Article 48. It makes each conspirator criminally liable for each crime committed by the others, resulting in separate liabilities for separate offenses. The act of one is the act of all, but the severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article 48.
• Treachery — Exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms of execution that tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. Requires: (a) no opportunity for the victim to defend himself; (b) deliberate and conscious adoption of the means.
• Credibility of Witnesses — Trial court's findings on credibility are accorded high respect. Inconsistencies on minor details strengthen credibility. Affidavits are inferior to open-court testimony.

• "The applicability of Article 48 depends upon the singularity of the act, thus the definitional phrase 'a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies.' ... singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law."
• "In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. ... Each one is criminally responsible for each one of the deaths and injuries of the several victims. The severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article 48."

• People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 (1955) — Distinguished. Applied Article 48 due to impossibility of ascertaining who killed whom and lack of conspiracy, which is an exception, not the general rule.
• People v. Valdez, 364 Phil. 259 (1999) — Followed. Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger constitutes distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime.
• People v. Sanidad, 450 Phil. 449 (2003) — Overruled/Criticized. Incorrectly relied on Lawas and Abella in a non-prisoner context where conspiracy was proven.
• People v. De los Santos, 122 Phil. 55 (1965); People v. Abella, 181 Phil. 285 (1979); People v. Garcia, 185 Phil. 362 (1980); People v. Pincalin, 190 Phil. 117 (1981) — Distinguished. Exceptional cases involving prison riots where Article 48 was applied despite multiple acts, not intended to establish a general doctrine contrary to Lawas.
• People v. Hon. Pineda, 127 Phil. 150 (1967) — Followed. Established the deeply rooted doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.

• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Penalty for complex crimes. Applied to clarify that it requires a "single act" and does not apply when multiple acts result in multiple casualties.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Murder. Applied to qualify the killings with treachery.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Rules for indivisible penalties. Applied to impose reclusion perpetua for murder (no mitigating/aggravating).
• Article 51, Revised Penal Code — Penalty for attempted crimes. Applied to lower the penalty by two degrees.
• Article 61, in relation to Article 71, Revised Penal Code — Rules for graduating penalties. Applied to determine the penalty next lower in degree.
• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Rules for penalties with three periods. Applied to impose the medium period for attempted murder.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the indeterminate penalty for attempted murder (4 years 2 months of prision correccional to 10 years of prision mayor).
• Civil Code Articles 2206, 2224, 2230 — Damages. Applied to award civil indemnity, moral, temperate, and exemplary damages.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe