People vs. Navarro

A trial court judge cannot designate a particular prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. Because preliminary investigation is an executive function vested in the public prosecutor, a judge who orders a specific prosecutor to conduct such investigation encroaches upon the executive and administrative functions of the provincial or city prosecutor. Mere suspicion that prosecutorial officials will not adequately perform their duties does not justify judicial interference in the prosecutorial hierarchy.

T/Sgt. Jose Sanchez filed a complaint for qualified theft directly with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City against minor Carlos Barbosa. The pairing judge remanded the case for preliminary investigation and assigned it to Prosecutor Salvador Cajot. Before Cajot could act, Sanchez moved to withdraw the complaint, which Cajot granted. Respondent Judge Gloriosa Navarro set aside Cajot's order and specifically directed Assistant Prosecutor Novelita Villegas-Llaguno to conduct the preliminary investigation, prompting the Provincial Prosecutor to challenge the directive as an encroachment on executive functions.

• The Complaint: On February 20, 1990, T/Sgt. Jose V. Sanchez, a PC Investigator, filed a complaint for qualified theft directly with the RTC of Naga City against minor Carlos Barbosa. Sanchez was not authorized by the Provincial Prosecutor to file the case directly.
• Initial Remand: Pairing Judge Gregorio Manio, Jr. remanded the case for preliminary investigation and assigned the adjudication thereof to Prosecutor Salvador Cajot.
• Withdrawal of Complaint: Before Prosecutor Cajot could conduct the preliminary investigation, Sgt. Sanchez filed a motion to withdraw the complaint with the Prosecution Office. Acting on this motion, Prosecutor Cajot issued an Order dated March 21, 1990, approved by the Provincial Prosecutor, granting the withdrawal and ordering the release of the accused.
• Respondent Judge's Intervention: Respondent Judge Navarro ordered the Provincial Prosecutor and Prosecutor Cajot to explain their encroachment on the court's jurisdiction. On June 18, 1990, Respondent Judge Navarro set aside Prosecutor Cajot's order and directed Assistant Prosecutor Novelita Llaguno, who was assigned to her sala, to conduct the preliminary investigation within 15 days.
• Prosecution's Objections: Prosecutor Llaguno sought reconsideration, arguing that any resolution she might issue could countermand her superiors' prior orders and disrupt office procedures. Prosecutor Cajot also moved for reconsideration, asserting the prosecutor's exclusive power to dismiss and arguing that the court divested itself of jurisdiction upon remand. The Provincial Prosecutor moved to set aside the orders, arguing that the court had no authority to designate a particular prosecutor.
• Denial of Motions: Respondent Judge Navarro denied the motions. She distinguished the case of Abugotal vs. Tiro, claiming it applied only to reinvestigations, and expressed apprehension that the Provincial Prosecutor would implement Prosecutor Cajot's previous order. The Provincial Prosecutor's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on September 6, 1990.

• Petitioner argued that Respondent Judge Navarro committed grave abuse of discretion when she issued various orders appointing and designating a particular prosecutor to conduct the preliminary investigation.
• Petitioner maintained that such designation is contrary to extant jurisprudence vesting the power of preliminary investigation in the executive branch.

• Respondent Judge Navarro maintained that existing jurisprudence prohibiting the designation of prosecutors applies only to reinvestigations, not to cases where no preliminary investigation was conducted at all.
• Respondent argued that assigning Asst. Pros. Llaguno ensured compliance with the order for a "real" preliminary investigation and prevented the case from being assigned to those who had previously participated in erroneous procedures leading to the dismissal.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the respondent trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing various orders appointing and designating a particular prosecutor to conduct the preliminary investigation.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether a regional trial court judge can name or designate a particular assistant prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.

• Procedural: The Court found that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion. By designating a specific assistant prosecutor over the objections of the latter's superiors, the judge encroached upon an executive function and disrupted the hierarchy of officials in the prosecutory arm of the executive branch.
• Substantive: The Court ruled that a trial court cannot designate a particular prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. Preliminary investigation is an executive, not a judicial, function. The prosecutor is primarily responsible for ascertaining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. Because an RTC judge has no authority to conduct a preliminary investigation, the judge cannot directly order an assistant prosecutor to conduct one. The Court rejected the respondent's distinction between preliminary investigation and reinvestigation, holding that both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective. If a court cannot designate a prosecutor for a reinvestigation, there is more reason to prohibit it in original preliminary investigations, especially where the court has not even validly acquired jurisdiction over the case due to the unauthorized filing by a police officer.

• Executive Nature of Preliminary Investigation — Preliminary investigation to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof is an executive function vested in the public prosecutor. A judge performs a non-judicial function only as an exception in inferior courts out of necessity and practical considerations. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that a trial judge cannot interfere with the prosecutorial hierarchy by designating a specific prosecutor, as such action meddles in the executive and administrative functions of the provincial prosecutor.
• Distinction Between Preliminary Investigation and Preliminary Examination — Preliminary investigation proper, which resolves whether the accused should be held for trial, is executive in nature and lodged with the prosecutor. Preliminary examination, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, is judicial in nature and lodged with the judge. The Court relied on this distinction to emphasize that the judge's interference in the prosecutor's preliminary investigation was unwarranted.

• "It must be stressed that preliminary investigation is an executive, not a judicial, function."
• "That an RTC judge has no authority to conduct a preliminary investigation necessarily means that he cannot directly order an assistant prosecutor, particularly over the objections of the latter's superiors, to conduct a preliminary investigation. To allow him to do so is to authorize him to meddle in the executive and administrative functions of the provincial or city prosecutor."
• "If the trial court cannot designate the prosecutor who will conduct a reinvestigation, there is more cogent reason why it should not be allowed to do so in original preliminary investigations, particularly where — as in this case — the said trial court has not even validly acquired jurisdiction over the case because of the lack of authority of the police officer who filed the case."

• Abugotal vs. Tiro, 66 SCRA 196 (1975) — Controlling precedent. The Court held that while a court may order a reinvestigation of a criminal case pending before it, the court cannot choose the fiscal who will conduct it, as this prerogative is vested in the city fiscal as head of office. The Court applied this ruling to preliminary investigations, rejecting the respondent judge's attempt to distinguish it.
• Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 307 (1996) — Followed. The Court cited this case to distinguish between preliminary investigation (executive) and preliminary examination for a warrant of arrest (judicial).
• Castillo vs. Villaluz, 171 SCRA 39 (1989) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that preliminary investigation is an executive function and that a judge's conclusions from an investigation are not conclusively binding on the fiscal.

• Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court — Provides that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The Court cited this to establish the prosecutor's primary responsibility for ascertaining probable cause and conducting preliminary investigations.
• Section 1, Rule 112, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure — Defines preliminary investigation as an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the RTC has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof. The Court used this definition to show that preliminary investigation and reinvestigation have the same objective, making the respondent's distinction insubstantial.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ.