People vs. Nabong

Words that incite the violent overthrow of the government and urge resistance to lawful authorities constitute sedition and are not protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech; the crime is consummated by the mere utterance of such seditious language, regardless of whether actual public disturbance results.

Ignacio Nabong, an attorney practicing in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, had been retained to defend Juan Feleo, a recognized communist leader in that province, against a charge of sedition. In late January 1931, Antonio D. Ora, the head of the communists in the Philippines, died in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija, and a necrological service was scheduled there for the evening of January 30, 1931. Major Silvino Gallardo of the Philippine Constabulary learned that the red flag would be displayed at the meeting as an emblem of the communists. He consulted the provincial fiscal, who rendered a written opinion that displaying the red flag would be unlawful. Major Gallardo subsequently met Nabong, showed him the fiscal’s opinion, and requested him to intercede with the communists to prevent the display. Nabong read the opinion, disagreed with it, and refused to cooperate, stating that if he were to go to Santa Rosa he would tell the communists that no law prohibited the flag and would induce them to display it, adding that a disturbance might result if they were forbidden.

• The Parties and the Request to Intervene: Appellant Ignacio Nabong was a practicing lawyer related by marriage to Juan Feleo, a recognized communist leader in Nueva Ecija whom Nabong was defending against a sedition charge. Upon learning that communists planned to display the red flag at the January 30, 1931 necrological service for Antonio D. Ora in Santa Rosa, Major Silvino Gallardo of the Constabulary obtained a written opinion from the provincial fiscal stating the display would be unlawful. Major Gallardo met Nabong, showed him the fiscal’s opinion, and requested him to prevent the flag’s display. Nabong read the opinion, expressly disagreed, and refused to accompany the authorities to Santa Rosa, declaring that if he went he would tell the communists that no law prohibited the red flag and would induce them to display it.

• The Journey to Santa Rosa and Feleo’s Promise: Major Gallardo, accompanied by deputy fiscal Villamor and other Constabulary officers, proceeded to Santa Rosa. En route they met Feleo, showed him the fiscal’s opinion, and secured his promise that the red flag would not be displayed until he had discussed the matter with communist leaders in Manila. Nabong initially remained in Cabanatuan but later left for Santa Rosa and arrived in time to participate in the meeting.

• The Display of the Flag and Feleo’s Arrest: Contrary to Feleo’s promise, the red flag was displayed at the meeting. Upon observing this and hearing Feleo make seditious utterances while speaking, Major Gallardo, with Constabulary personnel, entered the venue and arrested Feleo. The red flag was removed from the platform. The arrest caused disorder among the attendees, prompting Major Gallardo to briefly explain the reason for Feleo’s arrest. The proceedings later continued with other speakers.

• Nabong’s Speech and Arrest: After the arrest, Jacinto Manahan addressed the crowd, followed by Ignacio Nabong, who spoke for about twenty minutes in Tagalog. In the presence of deputy fiscal Villamor, Captain Cacdac, and Lieutenant Arambulo—all of whom understood Tagalog—Nabong criticized the Constabulary, stating substantially: “They committed a real abuse in seizing the flag. The members of the Constabulary are bad because they shoot even innocent women, as it happened in Tayug. — In view of this, we ought to be united to suppress that abuse. Overthrow the present government and establish our own government, the government of the poor. Use your whip so that there may be marks on their sides.” Captain Cacdac and Lieutenant Arambulo contemporaneously took notes of this part of the speech. Immediately after these words were uttered, Nabong was arrested.

• Defense Evidence: The defense presented testimony that Nabong went to Santa Rosa to prevent a disturbance and had attempted to persuade Feleo not to display the red flag. It was further urged that Nabong was well-disposed toward the government and that his language was not intended to advocate its violent overthrow. The trial court gave little weight to this evidence, and the Supreme Court found no error in that assessment. Additionally, it was shown that Nabong, at a meeting of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association convened in connection with the charge, admitted having advocated in Santa Rosa the overthrow of the government—an admission corroborated by a defense witness.

• Freedom of Speech: Appellant suggested that the sedition law under which he was prosecuted was incompatible with the free speech clause of section 3 of the Jones Law, thereby rendering the statute unconstitutional as applied to his utterances.

• Lack of Seditious Intent: Appellant maintained that his purpose in going to Santa Rosa was to prevent a disturbance, that he tried to dissuade Feleo from displaying the red flag, and that the words he spoke were not intended to incite the violent overthrow of the government.

• Interpretation of Language: Appellant argued that terms like “overthrow” could be interpreted to refer to a peaceful change through the elective franchise, and that the reference to the whip was not a literal incitement to violence but rhetorical speech.

• Seditious Character of the Speech: The prosecution contended that the language used by Nabong, taken in its ordinary sense, plainly urged the audience to overthrow the government by force and to use violence against the Constabulary, thereby constituting sedition under section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended.

• Constitutional Validity: The People maintained that the sedition law was a valid restriction on speech, consistent with the established principle that the constitutional guarantee of free speech does not confer an absolute right to utter words that endanger public peace and the security of the State.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Whether the information sufficiently charged an offense of sedition.

• Seditious Character of the Utterances: Whether the words spoken by the appellant, in their plain and obvious sense, incited the violent overthrow of the government and resistance to lawful authorities, thereby falling within the prohibition of the sedition statute.

• Freedom of Speech: Whether the sedition statute, as applied to the appellant’s speech, violated the guarantee of free speech contained in the Jones Law.

• Penalty: Whether the trial court erred in imposing only a fine, without imprisonment, given the circumstances of the offense and the offender.

• Sufficiency of the Information: The demurrer was properly overruled. The language alleged in the information, if proven, was of a character that manifestly tended to induce resistance to lawful authority and to disturb public order, and no error attended the trial court’s requirement that the accused plead.

• Seditious Character of the Utterances: The language used by Nabong clearly imported the overthrow of the Government by violence. The word “overthrow” could not reasonably be understood as a reference to an ordinary change through the elective franchise. The exhortation to use the whip—an instrument designed to leave marks—demonstrated an unmistakable intent to incite unlawful resistance and violence against the Constabulary. The words tended to instigate the poor to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, to suggest rebellious conspiracies, and to stir up the people against lawful authorities, in violation of section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended. It was immaterial that no actual rising resulted; the law punishes utterances that endanger public order even if no disturbance ensues.

• Freedom of Speech: The sedition law did not contravene the free speech clause of the Jones Law. The acts penalized constitute abuses of speech, not its legitimate exercise. The constitutional guarantee does not confer an absolute right to speak without responsibility, nor does it grant an unbridled license that immunizes every use of language. This principle, firmly established in American jurisprudence, was recognized as applicable, with the decision quoting the United States Supreme Court in Gitlow v. New York: “Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the public peace and to the security of the State.”

• Penalty: The trial court erred in omitting imprisonment. In view of the appellant’s profession as a lawyer—an office that obliged him, by reason of his intelligence, education, and oath, to exercise his influence in support of the State—his deliberate choice to advise the display of the red flag and to make common cause with communist agitators warranted the imposition of imprisonment. The penalty was accordingly increased to six months’ imprisonment in addition to the fine of ₱200. The offense was committed before the effectivity of the Revised Penal Code; since the penalty under the new Code was greater, no benefit accrued to the appellant under its provisions.

• Scope of Free Speech and Sedition — Freedom of speech and of the press does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility, nor does it provide an unrestricted license that immunizes every possible use of language. Utterances that, by their very nature, involve danger to the public peace and the security of the State—such as those inciting the violent overthrow of government or resistance to lawful authorities—are abuses of the right and may be punished as sedition.

• Seditious Utterances as a Consummated Offense — The crime of sedition is complete upon the mere making of seditious utterances that tend to endanger public order; it is not necessary that the words actually result in a rising of the people against constituted authorities. The law is aimed at the potential danger to public peace, not only at actual disturbance.

• Interpretation of Seditious Language — The seditious character of words is determined by their plain and obvious sense as they were evidently intended to be understood by the audience, considering the context and accompanying exhortations to violence. A call to “overthrow” the government, coupled with a command to use the whip to leave marks, is inconsistent with a benign interpretation referring to electoral processes.

• Lawyer’s Duty as Aggravating Factor — A lawyer, by reason of his intelligence, education, and oath of office, bears a heightened duty to support the State and uphold the law. The breach of that duty by actively advising illegal acts and inciting sedition may be considered in fixing the penalty, warranting the imposition of imprisonment in addition to a fine.

• “Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the public peace and to the security of the State. They threaten breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution. And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial, because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen.” — The Court adopted this formulation from Gitlow v. New York to explain why seditious speech is unprotected without requiring proof of actual disorder.

• “It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or unrestricted or unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.” — This passage encapsulates the Court’s rejection of the appellant’s free speech challenge.

• “…by reason of his intelligence and education, as well as by the obligation of his office as a lawyer, it was his duty to exercise his influence in support of the State. Instead of this he appears to have made the cause of Feleo and other communistic agitators his own.” — The Court grounded the increased penalty on the appellant’s special professional responsibility.

• Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) — The United States Supreme Court decision was invoked as persuasive authority establishing the principle that the constitutional guarantee of free speech does not protect utterances that endanger public peace and the security of the State. The Philippine Supreme Court directly quoted and applied its reasoning in rejecting the appellant’s constitutional challenge.

• People vs. Feleo, G.R. No. 36428 — A companion case arising from the same meeting; Feleo’s prosecution for his seditious speech was noted in a footnote, reflecting the coordinated prosecution of the communist leaders and their lawyer.

• Section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended by Act No. 1692 (Sedition Law) — The provision defined and punished seditious utterances, including those that tend to incite resistance to lawful authorities, disturb the public peace, or suggest rebellious conspiracies. The appellant’s speech fell squarely within its prohibition.

• Section 3 of the Jones Law (Philippine Autonomy Act) — The provision guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press was invoked by the appellant but held not to invalidate the sedition statute, as the acts punished constituted abuses of speech rather than its legitimate exercise.

• Articles 139 and 142 of the Revised Penal Code — Mentioned for the purpose of determining whether the new Code afforded any beneficial retroactive application; the penalty was found to be higher, so no reduction was available.

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concurred.

None.