People vs. Musa, Jr.

Conspiracy may be inferred from the accused's concerted acts — presence at the scene, being armed, and simultaneous flight — and treachery still qualifies a killing even when the victim was forewarned, so long as the execution of the attack made it impossible for him to defend himself or retaliate.

The accused and the victims were residents of the same locality in Putiao, Pilar, Sorsogon, and Felipe Musa Jr. is the son of Felipe Sr. The killing was prosecuted as Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with treachery and evident premeditation alleged as qualifying circumstances.

Felipe Musa Jr., Allan Reolo, Randy Lleno and Angelo (Gil) Mabini, together with Silverio Manjares Jr., were charged with Murder in an Information alleging that on July 17, 1988, at Barangay Putiao, Pilar, Sorsogon, they conspired and mutually helped one another, with intent to kill, armed with stones, and with treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, in attacking and throwing stones at Zaldy Marifosque and thereby causing his death. All the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and the case was tried on the merits.

At 9:00 p.m. of July 17, 1988, brothers Javier "Bebot" Marifosque and Zaldy Marifosque were inside their house at Putiao, Pilar, Sorsogon, getting ready for bed, when stones suddenly fell on their roof. They looked out the window and saw Musa, Reolo, Mabini, Lleno and Manjares standing in the middle of the road and pelting stones at their house. Bebot and Zaldy ran to the house of Musa's father, Felipe Sr., seventeen meters away, to report the stoning. The five accused followed them and stood in front of the Musa house, where Felipe Jr. attacked Bebot and hit him with a piece of wood above the left ear. Felipe Sr. grabbed his son and beat him up, ordered his other son Ricardo to get a rope so they could tie Felipe Jr., and when the latter heard this he scampered away. Felipe Sr. reassured Bebot and Zaldy that he would take full responsibility for his son's acts.

On their way home, Bebot walked five meters ahead of Zaldy because of fear that they might be waylaid. After they passed a jeepney parked on the other side of the road, the five accused suddenly appeared. Musa, Lleno and Manjares hurled stones at Zaldy, who was hit on the face and fell to the ground, while Mabini and Reolo stood behind the other three holding stones. Bebot ran to their house to get a weapon to use against the assailants.

Barangay Tanod Ireneo Mendez was asleep in his house nearby when he was awakened by the sound of stones hitting the road and by shouts for help saying, "Don't kill me." He went out and saw Zaldy sprawled on the road with five individuals standing around him; when he shouted, "Hey, what is that," the five men ran away. He was able to get a good look at their faces because the area was lit with a fluorescent lamp, and when he approached Zaldy he recognized him as Bebot's brother. Bebot arrived carrying a lead pipe, but the assailants were gone. Together, Mendez and Bebot brought Zaldy to the Albay Provincial Hospital, where Dr. Cesar Ong Chua, the resident physician of the Department of Surgery, performed a craniectomy or burr holing on the skull to evacuate the hematoma or blood clot surrounding the brain. Dr. Chua found that Zaldy suffered massive internal bleeding caused by strong force applied directly to his head, and Zaldy died the next day after the operation.

The defense claimed that in the evening of July 17, the five accused were drinking in front of Alcazar's Store in Putiao, Pilar, Sorsogon, and later transferred to Realubit's Store. Musa left the group to relieve himself, and Zaldy and Bebot suddenly attacked him with a lead pipe for allegedly throwing stones at their house. Musa tried to parry the blows and hit Zaldy with a stone, then ran toward his house, while the other accused were allegedly unable to help him because of shock. While the case was pending trial, accused Silverio Manjares Jr. died.

The RTC rejected Musa's theory of self-defense, noting that the medical certificate showed only abrasions that could not have been caused by the lead pipes the Marifosque brothers allegedly used, and it relied on the positive identification of the accused by Bebot, who recognized them as residents of the same locality, corroborated by Mendez, who saw the faces of the five near the victim after the assault.

• Conspiracy: Appellants argued that there was no conspiracy because there was no prior agreement to commit the crime, the prosecution's evidence only proved their presence at the scene, which is insufficient, and only three of the assailants stoned the victim while the two others ran away.
• Treachery: Appellants contended that the killing was not attended by treachery because the victim was forewarned of an attack against him, the assault having been preceded by the stoning of his house and the challenge made by Musa to the Marifosque brothers.
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Self-Defense: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in convicting them beyond reasonable doubt; Musa maintained that he acted in self-defense, claiming that Zaldy and Bebot attacked him with a lead pipe.

• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was established beyond reasonable doubt despite the absence of a prior agreement and the claim that only three of the five accused actually stoned the victim.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing notwithstanding that the victim had been forewarned by the earlier stoning of his house and Musa's challenge.
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Self-Defense: Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and whether Musa's claim of self-defense should be credited.
• Penalty and Civil Liability: Whether the trial court imposed the correct penalties and awarded the correct damages.

• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established; proof of a prior agreement is unnecessary because conspiracy may be inferred from conduct, and the accused's presence at the scene, their being armed with stones, and their simultaneous flight showed a common design.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery qualified the killing; even if the victim had been forewarned, the execution of the attack made it impossible for him to defend himself or retaliate.
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Self-Defense: Yes. The conviction stood on the positive identification by Bebot and Mendez, whose testimonies were not shown to be tainted by improper motive, while Musa failed to prove self-defense by clear and convincing evidence.
• Penalty and Civil Liability: Partly. The penalties of Musa, Reolo and Lleno were affirmed, but Mabini's indeterminate penalty was corrected to reflect his minority, and the damages were modified to include exemplary damages and a recomputed award for loss of earning capacity.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, since it may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding with respect to the commission of the offense, and it is not necessary to show that the persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of the unlawful scheme. Conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim, in which case the act of one becomes the act of all and each is deemed equally guilty. Here, Bebot and Mendez both saw the five appellants at the scene; Bebot testified that Musa, Manjares and Lleno hurled stones at the victim while Mabini and Reolo stood behind them holding stones, and Mendez averred that when he shouted, all of them immediately fled. Their physical presence at the scene, their being armed with stones, and their simultaneous flight all manifested a common design and a unity of purpose and action leading to the conclusion that they acted in conspiracy.
• Treachery: Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was warned of the danger to his person, as long as the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unarmed and unsuspecting victim who does not give any slightest provocation, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself. The records showed that appellants hid themselves and lay in wait for Bebot to pass by before pelting Zaldy with stones, so that there was a deliberate and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim who was in a helpless position to defend himself or retaliate against the five assailants who continuously hurled stones at him. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself.
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Self-Defense: Where an accused invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the attendance of such justifying circumstance; otherwise, having admitted the killing, conviction is inescapable. The medical certificate showed that Musa suffered only abrasions, which could not have been caused by the lead pipes allegedly used by the Marifosque brothers. The conviction rested on the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses: Bebot clearly and categorically identified appellants, whom he recognized as residents of the same locality, and his testimony was corroborated by Mendez, who saw the faces of the five appellants near the victim after the assault. As there was no indication that the prosecution witnesses were moved by any improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so moved and their testimonies must be given full faith and credence. The SC will not interfere with the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses absent any indication that some material fact was overlooked or neglected.
• Penalty and Civil Liability: At the time of the commission of the crime in 1988, the penalty prescribed for Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death; there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty was imposed in its medium period, reclusion perpetua. For Mabini, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority required the imposition of the penalty next lower in degree pursuant to Article 68, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code, which is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium, and with no modifying circumstance appreciated, the medium period — reclusion temporal minimum, or twelve years and one day to fourteen years and eight months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term must be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, ranging from four years, two months and one day to ten years; hence, the trial court erred in imposing the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty, and consistent with People vs. Paredes, Mabini was sentenced to four years, ten months and twenty days of prision correccional as minimum to twelve years, four months and ten days of reclusion temporal as maximum. The award of civil indemnity of P50,000.00 was affirmed; considering the attendance of treachery, P25,000.00 was awarded as exemplary damages, since insofar as the civil aspect of the crime is concerned, exemplary damages of P25,000.00 are recoverable if there is present an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or ordinary, in the commission of the crime. Moral damages were increased from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, appellants are liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, which partakes of the nature of actual damages and must be duly proven; the victim's service record showed that he was holding the position of Supervising Civil Engineering Draftsman at the Department of Public Works and Highway (Region V, Legazpi City) when he died at the age of 30 on July 18, 1988, with a salary of P58.21 per day and a gross annual income of P20,955.60, and using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, the award for loss of earning capacity was fixed at P349,225.07.

• Conspiracy inferred from concerted acts — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence; it may be inferred from the conduct of the parties showing a common understanding, and it is unnecessary to show that they met and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of the unlawful scheme. Conviction is proper once it is shown that the accused acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill the common design, in which case the act of one is the act of all. The SC applied this to the five accused, whose presence at the scene, being armed with stones, and simultaneous flight manifested a common design and unity of purpose.
• Treachery despite forewarning — Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was warned of the danger to his person, so long as the execution of the attack made it impossible for him to defend himself or retaliate. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed and unsuspecting victim who gives no slightest provocation, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. The SC applied this because the accused hid themselves and lay in wait before pelting Zaldy with stones, leaving him helpless against five assailants.
• Self-defense — burden of proof — An accused who invokes self-defense must prove by clear and convincing evidence the attendance of the justifying circumstance; failing that, and having admitted the killing, conviction is inescapable. Musa's claim failed because the medical certificate showed only abrasions that could not have been caused by the lead pipes he said were used against him.
• Minority as privileged mitigating circumstance — Under Article 68, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code, a person over fifteen but under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the crime is entitled to the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law. Mabini, 17 years and 3 months old at the time of the crime, was thus sentenced to the penalty next lower in degree — prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium — and, with no modifying circumstance, to its medium period, reclusion temporal minimum.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law applied to a minor offender — The minimum term of the indeterminate penalty must be taken from the penalty next lower in degree than that actually imposed. The SC corrected the trial court, which had imposed the maximum term of prision mayor, and fixed the minimum at prision correccional, following People vs. Paredes.
• Exemplary damages for an aggravating circumstance — Insofar as the civil aspect of the crime is concerned, exemplary damages of P25,000.00 are recoverable if there is present an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or ordinary, in the commission of the crime. The SC applied this because treachery qualified the killing.
• Loss of earning capacity — proof and formula — Indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages and must be duly proven. The SC used the victim's service record showing his position and salary, and the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, computing net earning capacity as two-thirds of (80 minus age at death) multiplied by gross annual income less living expenses.

• "Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was warned of the danger to his person as long as the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate." — The rule that defeats the appellants' principal argument against the qualifying circumstance; it separates forewarning from the actual capacity to resist.
• "The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack by an aggressor or an unarmed and unsuspecting victim who does not give any slightest provocation, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself." — The canonical formulation of treachery as applied to the ambush of Zaldy.
• "Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense." — The evidentiary rule that allowed the SC to find conspiracy despite the absence of a prior agreement.
• "Where an accused invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the attendance of such justifying circumstance; otherwise, having admitted the killing, conviction is inescapable." — The burden-shifting rule that disposed of Musa's defense.

• People vs. Tanoy, G.R. No. 115692, 12 May 2000, 332 SCRA 12 — Cited for the rule that treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was warned of the danger to his person.
• People vs. Samson, G.R. No. 124666, 15 February 2002 — Cited for the essence of treachery; also cited in connection with exemplary damages.
• People vs. Orbita, et al., G.R. No. 122104, 19 January 2000 — Cited for the definition of conspiracy as an agreement to commit a crime and a decision to commit it.
• People vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 118423, 16 June 1999 — Cited for the rule that proof of the agreement may be inferred from the conduct of the parties.
• People vs. Givera, G.R. No. 132159, 18 January 2001, 349 SCRA 513 — Cited for the rule that the act of one conspirator is the act of all.
• People vs. Aguilar, 354 Phil. 360 (1998) — Cited for the requirement that self-defense be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Paredes, 332 Phil. 633 (1996) — Controlling precedent for the computation of the indeterminate penalty of a minor offender entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance.
• People vs. Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, 23 August 2001 — Cited for the award of exemplary damages where an aggravating circumstance, qualifying or ordinary, attends the commission of the crime.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Murder; at the time of the commission of the crime in 1988, the penalty was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, and with no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the medium period — reclusion perpetua — was imposed on Musa, Reolo and Lleno. The SC noted that R.A. 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, changed the penalty to reclusion perpetua to death.
• Article 68, paragraph (2), Revised Penal Code — The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority; applied to Mabini, 17 years and 3 months old at the time of the crime, lowering the penalty by one degree.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to Mabini to fix the minimum term from the penalty next lower in degree than that actually imposed, correcting the trial court's imposition of the maximum term.
• Article 2206, Civil Code — Basis for the award for loss of earning capacity, which partakes of the nature of actual damages and must be duly proven.