People vs. Mores

Treachery is present when the offender employs means that insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself and without affording the victims any opportunity to defend themselves, as in the deliberate rolling of a live grenade into a crowded dance floor where the sudden explosion gave the victims no chance to escape or seek cover.

On January 24, 1994, during the town fiesta of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, a farewell ball was being held at the Multi-Purpose Gymnasium in Barangay Bagumbayan. At approximately 6:00 p.m. that evening, appellant Ramil Mores, then a member of the Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU), approached a group of acquaintances at Madugo Bridge displaying a hand grenade and uttering, "Gusto nyo pasabugin ko ito?" (Do you want me to explode this?). Hours later, at around 9:00 p.m., while the gymnasium was packed with revelers dancing and seated around the dance floor, Mores positioned himself approximately five arm's lengths from witnesses inside the gymnasium. He pulled the grenade from his left pocket, transferred it to his right hand, and rolled it on the floor toward the crowded dance area. The resulting explosion killed Ramie Balasa and injured fourteen other persons.

The Threat at Madugo Bridge:
At approximately 6:00 p.m. on January 24, 1994, appellant Ramil Mores approached Daryl Famisaran, Esteban Galaran Jr., and their companions at Madugo Bridge. Mores, holding a hand grenade, asked them, "Gusto nyo pasabugin ko ito?" (Do you want me to explode this?), causing the group to disperse immediately. Esteban Galaran Jr. corroborated this incident, stating that he knew Mores and Famor as fellow CAFGU members.

The Grenade Throwing Incident:
At around 9:00 p.m. the same evening, during the farewell ball at the Roxas Gymnasium, Daryl Famisaran was standing on the second bench from the ground floor on the right side of the stadium near the entrance. He observed Mores approximately five arm's lengths away, together with co-accused Delio Famor, whispering to each other. Famisaran saw Mores pull out a round object from his left pocket, transfer it to his right hand, and throw it on the floor toward the dancing area as if rolling a ball. A commotion and explosion ensued immediately after.

The Victims and the Blast:
Delfa Ylanan was with Ramie Balasa, Manny Balasa, and Malyn Balasa in front of a table approximately two meters from Orpha Famisaran when she saw an object the size of a fist roll toward Orpha, who kicked it before it exploded. Ramie Balasa sustained mortal shrapnel wounds to the chest and left leg, with a shrapnel fragment embedded in the right anterior wall of his heart causing hypovolemic shock and massive blood loss, leading to his death. Myra Suarez was dancing with Louie Faina when the explosion occurred approximately two arm's lengths behind her, causing wounds to her back that required hospitalization. Noel Faminialagao sustained injuries to the back of his right leg. Dr. Efren Faustino testified that approximately forty persons were treated for shrapnel injuries at the Roxas District Hospital, with twenty-four medico-legal certificates issued.

Police Investigation:
SPO2 Walfredo Lafuente, who was approximately 200 meters from the gymnasium, heard the explosion and arrived at the scene twelve to fifteen minutes later. En route, he met Mores, Famor, and an unidentified person near a store approximately fifty meters from the gymnasium, about ten minutes after the explosion. Police investigators recovered metal fragments and a safety lever (Serial No. UM-204-A-2) from the blast area.

Defense of Denial and Alibi:
Co-accused Delio Famor claimed he was sleeping at his house in Fabella Village, approximately 100 meters from the gymnasium, with his wife and child when the explosion occurred. His wife Concepcion allegedly woke him up upon hearing the blast. He denied being with Mores at the gymnasium and claimed he was tortured by CIS operatives during investigation. Appellant Mores, tried in absentia, did not present evidence but argued through counsel that the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent and that Famor's acquittal should benefit him.

• Lack of Treachery: Appellant maintained that the prosecution failed to establish that he consciously adopted the method of attack to insure execution without risk to himself. He argued that throwing the grenade was done at the spur of the moment, and the short distance between him and the explosion negated any concern for his own safety, thereby precluding treachery.

• Effect of Co-Accused's Acquittal: Petitioner argued that since the prosecution theory posited that both he and Famor were together at the crime scene, Famor's acquittal based on alibi necessarily destroyed the prosecution's entire theory and mandated appellant's own acquittal.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant contended that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses were fraught with inconsistencies and contradictions that rendered them unworthy of credence, and that the trial court erred in giving them weight.

• Flight as Indicative of Guilt: While admitting he failed to appear at subsequent hearings and remains at large, appellant asserted that his continued presence in the vicinity of Roxas immediately after the explosion negates consciousness of guilt, arguing that a true perpetrator would have fled the town entirely.

• Presence of Treachery: The People argued that the deliberate rolling of the grenade into a crowded dance floor, which suddenly exploded and gave the victims no opportunity to defend themselves or seek cover, constituted treachery, as appellant positioned himself safely from the blast radius.

• Independence of Co-Accused's Acquittal: The prosecution maintained that Famor was acquitted due to insufficient evidence of conspiracy, not because his alibi was believed, and therefore the appellant's conviction remained unaffected by his co-accused's exoneration.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The People asserted that the minor inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies were inconsequential and actually corroborated the central fact of the grenade being rolled toward the dance floor, with the trial court's assessment of credibility being entitled to great weight.

• Flight Indicates Guilt: The prosecution argued that appellant's unexplained flight and continued absence from court proceedings, despite having been granted bail, constituted a strong indication of guilt.

• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present in the commission of the crime.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

• Proof of Guilt: Whether the guilt of the accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• Effect of Co-Accused's Acquittal: Whether the acquittal of co-accused Famor necessitates the acquittal of appellant Mores.

• Flight: Whether appellant's failure to flee the municipality immediately after the crime and his subsequent absence from court proceedings negate the inference of guilt.

• Treachery: Treachery was present. The deliberate rolling of the live grenade on the floor toward the crowded dance floor, resulting in a sudden explosion that afforded the victims no chance to escape or find protective cover, constituted treachery under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant consciously adopted a method of attack that insured execution without risk to himself, positioning himself safely from the blast area while ensuring the victims, who were unarmed and unsuspecting, could not defend themselves.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The trial court did not err in crediting the prosecution witnesses' testimonies. Minor inconsistencies regarding peripheral matters do not detract from the credibility of witnesses when the core narrative—that appellant rolled the grenade toward the dance floor—remains consistent and corroborated. Findings of fact by the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court.

• Proof of Guilt: Guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The positive identification by eyewitness Daryl Famisaran, corroborated by physical evidence (grenade fragments and safety lever) and medical testimony regarding the cause and nature of the victims' injuries, established appellant's authorship of the crime.

• Effect of Co-Accused's Acquittal: The acquittal of co-accused Famor does not benefit appellant. Famor was acquitted due to the prosecution's failure to prove conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, not because the trial court believed his alibi. The presence of appellant at the crime scene was never doubted by the trial court; the acquittal of one accused does not automatically extend to a co-accused when the evidence against the latter is independent and sufficient.

• Flight: Unexplained flight is indicative of guilt. While non-flight does not necessarily connote innocence, flight—defined as voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or criminal proceedings—is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Appellant's continued absence from court proceedings after arraignment, despite being on bail, constitutes flight indicative of guilt.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery requires two concurring elements: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed. The essence lies in the sudden, deliberate, and unexpected attack that affords the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In this case, rolling a grenade into a crowded area where it exploded suddenly satisfied these elements.

• Complex Crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. Here, the single act of throwing the grenade resulted in one murder and multiple attempted murders, constituting a complex crime.

• Flight as Evidence of Guilt — Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest, detention, or criminal proceedings. While flight is indicative of guilt, its converse (non-flight) does not necessarily indicate innocence. Unexplained flight is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.

• Effect of Co-Accused's Acquittal — The acquittal of a co-accused does not automatically result in the acquittal of another accused when the acquittal is based on lack of evidence proving conspiracy, rather than on a finding that the co-accused was not present at the crime scene. Each accused is entitled to a separate and independent judgment based on the evidence against him.

• Binding Nature of Factual Findings — When the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of testimonies, and its assessment of probative weight, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect by the Supreme Court.

• "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — Defining treachery under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code.

• "The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape." — Articulating the fundamental nature of treachery.

• "Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true. Culprits behave differently and even erratically in externalizing and manifesting their guilt. Some may escape or flee – a circumstance strongly illustrative of guilt – while others may remain in the same vicinity so as to create a semblance of regularity, thereby avoiding suspicion from other members of the community." — Clarifying that while flight indicates guilt, remaining at the scene does not create a presumption of innocence.

• "The wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as a lion." — Cited to underscore the evidentiary value of flight.

• "When the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect." — Establishing the standard of review for factual findings.

• People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640 — Followed for the procedure of remanding death penalty cases to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review before final review by the Supreme Court.

• People v. Angelio and Olaso, G.R. No. 197540, February 27, 2012, 667 SCRA 102 — Cited for the definition and elements of treachery.

• People v. Cabtalan and Cabrillas, G.R. No. 175980, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 174 — Cited for the definition of treachery and for the current amounts of damages awards in murder cases.

• People v. Adallom, G.R. No. 182522, March 7, 2012, 667 SCRA 652 — Cited for the binding nature of trial court factual findings when affirmed by the appellate court.

• People v. Asilan, G.R. No. 188322, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 405 — Cited for the principle that flight indicates guilt but non-flight does not necessarily indicate innocence.

• People v. Camat, G.R. No. 188612, July 30, 2012, 677 SCRA 640 — Cited for the definition of flight and its evidentiary value, and for the current amounts of damages in attempted murder cases.

• People v. Esparas, G.R. No. 120034, August 30, 1996 — Cited by the trial court for the principle that automatic appeal applies to death convicts who escape.

• Article 14(16), Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery as a qualifying aggravating circumstance when the offender employs means that insure execution without risk to himself from the defense the offended party might make.

• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Governs complex crimes, providing that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder, providing for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

• Republic Act No. 9346 — Prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, mandating instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chief Justice, Chairperson), Lucas P. Bersamin, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Bienvenido L. Reyes.