People vs. Moran

A prescription provision in a new penal statute that is favorable to the accused applies retroactively to offenses committed under the prior law it amended, and Article 22 of the Penal Code—mandating retroactivity of penal laws favorable to persons accused of a felony or misdemeanor—applies to offenses penalized by special laws, not merely to provisions of the Penal Code itself.

The accused were election inspectors of the first precinct of Binalonan, Pangasinan, charged with falsifying election returns in violation of the Election Law, then embodied in chapter 18 of the Administrative Code (section 2639). On March 9, 1922, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3030, an amendatory statute whose title declared its purpose to amend certain sections of chapter 18 (the Election Law) and chapter 65 (penalties for violations of certain administrative laws) of the Administrative Code "to make more effective the provisions and purposes of said Election Law." Section 71 of Act No. 3030 introduced, for the first time, a prescription period for election-law offenses: "Offenses resulting from violations of this Act shall prescribe one year after their commission." The prior Election Law contained no prescription provision, rendering such offenses imprescriptible. The criminal action against the accused had been commenced on December 20, 1920, more than one year after the commission of the offense during the 1919 elections.

Juan Moran, Fructuoso Cansino, and Hilario Oda served as election inspectors of the first precinct of the municipality of Binalonan, Pangasinan, during the 1919 elections. They were charged with falsifying election returns in violation of the Election Law, then codified in section 2639 of the Administrative Code. The criminal action was commenced on December 20, 1920, approximately one year and two months after the commission of the offense.

The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, presided over by Judge Nepomuceno, convicted the accused. On appeal, the Supreme Court rendered a decision on March 31, 1922, affirming the conviction but increasing the penalty of imprisonment to six months. By that date, Act No. 3030 had already taken effect, having been approved on March 9, 1922. Act No. 3030 was an amendatory statute whose title described it as "An Act to amend certain sections and parts of sections of chapter eighteen, known as the Election Law, and chapter sixty-five, on penalties for violations of certain administrative laws, of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven." Section 71 of the Act introduced a prescription provision stating that "Offenses resulting from violations of this Act shall prescribe one year after their commission," while section 72 provided that the Act "shall take effect on its approval."

After the Supreme Court's March 31, 1922 decision was published, the accused filed a motion for reconsideration and rehearing. While that motion was pending, on May 2, 1922, they filed a special motion alleging that the crime had prescribed under Section 71 of Act No. 3030, and praying that they be absolved from the complaint. The Attorney-General filed an answer and supplemental answer opposing the motion, and the accused filed replies thereto. Because the criminal action had been commenced on December 20, 1920—more than one year after the commission of the offense—the accused contended that the State's right to prosecute had been extinguished by the new prescription period. The Court found that under the prior Election Law, no prescription period had been fixed for election offenses, rendering them imprescriptible; the introduction of a one-year prescriptive period by Act No. 3030 was therefore more favorable to the accused.

• Prescription under Act No. 3030: The accused argued that the crime had prescribed under Section 71 of Act No. 3030, which provides that offenses resulting from violations of the Act shall prescribe one year after their commission, and that because the criminal action was commenced more than one year after the offense, they should be absolved from the complaint.
• Retroactive application of favorable penal laws: The accused maintained that Article 22 of the Penal Code, mandating retroactivity of penal laws favorable to the accused, applied to the prescription provision in Act No. 3030, and that the provision should be given retroactive effect since it was more favorable than the former law, which fixed no prescription period and thus rendered the offenses imprescriptible.

• "This Act" refers only to Act No. 3030: The Attorney-General argued that the phrase "this Act" in Section 71 of Act No. 3030 referred only to Act No. 3030 itself and not to the prior Election Law contained in the Administrative Code, under which the accused were convicted, so the prescription provision could not apply to their offense.
• Article 22 inapplicable to special laws: The prosecution contended that Article 22 of the Penal Code, providing for retroactivity of penal laws favorable to the accused, was not applicable to crimes penalized by special laws, because Article 7 of the Penal Code expressly provides that offenses punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the Code.
• Statutes of limitation are prospective: The prosecution cited American jurisprudence and doctrines from Corpus Juris and Ruling Case Law establishing that statutes of limitation in criminal cases do not apply to crimes previously committed unless the statute is clearly retroactive in its terms.

• Scope of Section 71: Whether the prescription period provided in Section 71 of Act No. 3030, referring to "this Act," applies only to Act No. 3030 or also to offenses under the prior Election Law contained in the Administrative Code.
• Applicability of Article 22 to Special Laws: Whether Article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws favorable to the accused, is applicable to crimes penalized by special laws, notwithstanding Article 7 of the Penal Code providing that offenses punishable under special laws are not subject to the Code's provisions.
• Retroactive Effect of Prescription: Whether the prescription provision in Section 71 of Act No. 3030 has retroactive effect, applying to offenses committed before its enactment, given that the prior Election Law fixed no prescription period.

• Scope of Section 71: Yes. The phrase "this Act" in Section 71 of Act No. 3030 refers to the Election Law as amended by Act No. 3030, because Act No. 3030 is an amendatory statute whose purpose was to reform the prior Election Law contained in the Administrative Code, and the offenses under both are the same, albeit with modifications.
• Applicability of Article 22 to Special Laws: Yes. Article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring retroactivity of penal laws favorable to the accused, applies to special laws, because Article 22 by its terms relates to penal laws other than the Penal Code itself, and Article 7 was not intended to exclude the application of Article 22 to special laws.
• Retroactive Effect of Prescription: Yes. The prescription provision in Section 71 of Act No. 3030 is retroactive because it is favorable to the accused, the prior law having fixed no prescription period and thus rendering the offenses imprescriptible; the new one-year period is less severe and more favorable, and Article 22 mandates its retroactive application.

• Scope of Section 71: Act No. 3030 is, as its title indicates, amendatory to several sections and parts of sections of chapter 18 of the Administrative Code, known as the Election Law, and chapter 65 on penalties for violations of various administrative laws. Each section of Act No. 3030 declares the sense in which each amended section is modified. The Act is not a new and distinct Election Law but rather the former Election Law with amendments and additions. When the Legislature used the words "this Act" in Section 71, it necessarily referred to the Election Law included in the provisions of the aforesaid chapters of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3030. The offenses resulting from violations of the former Election Law are the same offenses provided for in Act No. 3030, though with some modifications and increased penalties. Any interpretation that "this Act" refers only to Act No. 3030 and not to the prior Election Law would be contrary to good logic and sound reasoning.

• Applicability of Article 22 to Special Laws: Article 22 of the Penal Code provides that "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony or misdemeanor." Article 21 of the same Code provides that "no felony or misdemeanor shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission." Article 21 is general in its provisions and prohibits the Government from punishing any person for any felony or misdemeanor with any penalty not prescribed by law; it can only be invoked when a person is being tried for a felony or misdemeanor for which no penalty has been prescribed. Article 22, by contrast, clearly has no direct application to the provisions of the Penal Code itself, since for every felony or misdemeanor defined in the Penal Code a penalty has already been prescribed. Article 22 can only be invoked with reference to some other penal law—either penal laws existing prior to the Penal Code or laws enacted subsequent to it in which the penalty is more favorable to the accused. It follows that the Legislature, in enacting Article 7 (excluding special laws from the Penal Code's provisions), did not intend to provide that Article 22 should not be applicable to special laws. This interpretation is confirmed by the Supreme Court of Spain, which in two decisions (July 13, 1889 and April 26, 1892) applied Article 22 of the Penal Code to a special law (the Election Law of 1870), giving retroactive effect to the Penal Code's penalty provisions because they were more favorable to the accused. The case of United States vs. Parrone (24 Phil., 29) squarely decided this question: the Court held that Article 22 applied to a special law (Act No. 1189, as amended by Act No. 2126), imposing the lesser penalty provided by the later statute.

• Retroactive Effect of Prescription: The prescription of the crime is intimately connected with the prescription of the penalty, as the length of time fixed by law for prescription depends upon the gravity of the offense. A statute declaring prescription of the crime has no other purpose than to prevent or annul the prosecution of the offender and, ultimately, the imposition of the penalty. Provisions relative to the prescription of crimes and penalties are penal laws or form part thereof. Whether prescription is considered as substantive or procedural law, the same must have retroactive effect when favorable to the accused. The prior Election Law fixed no prescription period for election offenses, rendering them imprescriptible—the offender could be prosecuted at any time, even ten, twenty, or more years after commission. Act No. 3030, by fixing a one-year prescriptive period, shortened the effective prescription period and established less difficult conditions for its application, which is evidently more favorable and lenient to violators of the former law. This reduction implies an acknowledgment by the sovereign power that the greater severity of the former law was unjust. The sovereign power cannot, without committing an injustice, exercise the right to prosecute and punish under the conditions of the former law when it has already regarded those conditions as juridically burdensome. Article 22 of the Penal Code embodies this principle: penal laws shall have retroactive effect in so far as they favor the accused. It is not necessary for the Legislature to expressly state in every new penal law that it is retroactive; the general rule in Article 22 applies to all penal laws enacted in the future, and if the Legislature intends an exception, it must expressly so state. Since Act No. 3030 contains no such express exclusion of retroactivity, the prescription provision applies retroactively. Because the criminal action was commenced on December 20, 1920—more than one year after the commission of the offense—the crime had prescribed.

• Retroactivity of Penal Laws Favorable to the Accused (Article 22, Penal Code) — Penal laws shall have retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony or misdemeanor, even if a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving it. This principle applies not only to provisions of the Penal Code but also to special laws, because Article 22 by its terms relates to penal laws other than the Penal Code itself. The Legislature, in enacting Article 7 (excluding special laws from the Penal Code), did not intend to exclude the application of Article 22 to special laws. The retroactivity rule is deemed incorporated into every new penal law at the time of its enactment; it is unnecessary for the new law to repeat the retroactivity provision. If the Legislature intends a penal law not to have retroactive effect, it must expressly so state.

• Prescription as a Penal Law — Provisions relative to the prescription of crimes and penalties are penal laws or form part thereof. The prescription of the crime is intimately connected with the prescription of the penalty, as the prescriptive period depends upon the gravity of the offense. A statute declaring prescription of the crime has no other purpose than to prevent or annul the prosecution and punishment of the offender. Whether prescription is considered substantive or procedural law, a new prescription provision favorable to the accused must be given retroactive effect.

• Imprescriptibility as Maximum Severity — Where a prior law fixes no prescription period for an offense, the offense is imprescriptible, and the offender may be prosecuted at any time. The introduction of a prescription period by a new law is more favorable to the accused than the former law's silence, because it shortens the effective prescriptive period from infinity to a definite term. This reduction implies the sovereign power's acknowledgment that the former law's severity was unjust.

• Duty of Courts to Declare Prescription Sua Sponte — Once the State has lost its right to prosecute by prescription of the crime, the accused may at any stage of the proceeding ask that the case be dismissed. Not only that—the court itself, without necessity of any motion from the accused, is in duty bound to declare the crime prescribed. This duty is imperative upon courts at any moment the offense appears to have prescribed. The defense of prescription need not be pleaded in the trial court to be raised later, particularly where the prescription is provided by statute after termination of proceedings.

• "if the prescription of the crime, as well as of the penalty whereby criminal responsibility is extinguished, may, as is the case here with regard to the former, be provided by statute after the termination of all the proceedings in the trial court, as well as in the appellate court, and when the case has already been submitted for discussion and is awaiting only the final judgment; and if the prescription of the crime is but the extinguishment of the right of the State to prosecute and punish the culprit, it is beyond question that, once the State has lost or waived such right, the accused may, at any stage of the proceeding, ask and move that the same be dismissed and that he be absolved from the complaint." — This passage establishes the Court's holding that prescription may be invoked at any stage of the proceeding, even after judgment, when the prescriptive period is introduced by a statute enacted during the pendency of the case.

• "The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony or misdemeanor, even if they may be serving sentence, would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the penalty." — This articulates the ratio decidendi that Article 22's retroactivity mandate would be rendered meaningless if courts were not duty-bound to apply it sua sponte.

• "no period of prescription having been fixed in the former law, those offenses were imprescriptible, and the offender could be prosecuted and punished at any time and indefinitely, even ten, twenty, or more years after the commission thereof, whereas the new law, that is, Act No. 3030 in providing the period of one year for the prescription, has, in effect, shortened the time of prescription fixed in the old law by virtue of the silence thereof, reducing it to one year and has established less difficult conditions for the application of the same as regards those offenses, which is evidently more favorable and lenient to the violators of the said former law" — This passage defines the Court's reasoning that the absence of a prescriptive period in the prior law constituted maximum severity, and the introduction of a one-year period was per se favorable to the accused, triggering Article 22's retroactivity mandate.

• "the provisions of article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of laws favorable to persons accused of a felony or misdemeanor, is to be deemed as if also expressly made in any new law at the time of its enactment, when said law is a penal law, or one of a penal character, such as the prescription contained in section 71 of Act No. 3030 here in question" — This formulation establishes the doctrine that Article 22's retroactivity rule is automatically incorporated into every new penal law, making express restatement unnecessary.

• United States vs. Rama, R.G. No. 16247 — Followed. The Court had previously declared, sua sponte and without any allegation of prescription by the parties, that two crimes of homicide had prescribed because seventeen years had elapsed since their commission, exceeding the fifteen-year prescriptive period. This precedent supported the Court's holding that it has the duty to declare prescription even without a motion from the accused.

• United States vs. Parrone, 24 Phil., 29 — Followed as controlling authority. The Court held that Article 22 of the Penal Code applies to special laws, imposing the lesser penalty provided by a later amendatory statute (Act No. 2126) for falsification of a cedula certificate under Act No. 1189. This case squarely resolved the question of whether Article 22 applies to offenses penalized by special laws.

• Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez, 1 Phil., 468 — Followed. The Court held that the general rule of retroactivity of penal laws favorable to the accused has no application only where the later law is expressly made inapplicable to pending actions or existing causes of action. This means retroactivity need not be expressly stated in the new law; rather, non-retroactivity must be expressly stated if the Legislature so intends.

• United States vs. Cuna, 12 Phil., 241 — Discussed and distinguished. The Court reserved opinion on whether Article 22 applied to special laws. This reservation was resolved by United States vs. Parrone.

• United States vs. Lao Lock Hing, 14 Phil., 86, and United States vs. Calaguas, 14 Phil., 739 — Distinguished. These cases held that Article 7 of the Penal Code excludes special laws from the Penal Code's provisions, but Article 7 was not interpreted in connection with Article 22's retroactivity mandate. They have no application to the question of retroactivity.

• Ong Chang Wing, 40 Phil., 1046 — Discussed. The U.S. Supreme Court limited itself to determining whether the judgment amounted to a denial of due process, and did not resolve the applicability of Article 22 to special laws. The decision cannot be invoked in the present case.

• Article 22, Penal Code — "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony or misdemeanor, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving same." Applied as the controlling provision mandating retroactive effect for the prescription period in Act No. 3030, which was favorable to the accused. The Court held this provision applies to special laws, not merely to the Penal Code itself.

• Article 7, Penal Code — "Offenses punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code." Interpreted in connection with Article 22: the Court held that Article 7 was not intended to exclude the application of Article 22's retroactivity rule to special laws, because Article 22 by its terms relates to penal laws other than the Penal Code itself.

• Section 71, Act No. 3030 — "Offenses resulting from violations of this Act shall prescribe one year after their commission." Held to apply to offenses under the prior Election Law (Administrative Code) as amended by Act No. 3030, and given retroactive effect as favorable to the accused.

• Section 72, Act No. 3030 — "This Act shall take effect on its approval." The Court interpreted this provision as fixing the date from which prescription may be invoked (March 9, 1922), not as limiting retroactive effect.

• Section 2639, Administrative Code (Election Law) — Defined and punished the election-law violation (falsification of election returns) of which the accused were convicted. No prescription period was fixed in the prior Election Law for this offense.

• Article 3, Civil Code — "Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided." Discussed in the dissent as bearing on the general doctrine against retroactivity, but the majority held that Article 22 of the Penal Code constitutes an express provision for retroactivity of penal laws favorable to the accused.

Street, Avanceña, Villamor, and Romualdez, JJ., concurred with the majority opinion.

• Justice Malcolm (joined by Justices Johnson and Johns) — The dissent argued that Section 71's phrase "this Act" means only Act No. 3030 and cannot be stretched to cover the prior Election Law, because the first duty of courts is to apply the law as written, and the Legislature said "this Act," not "the Election Law as amended." The dissent further contended that Article 7 of the Penal Code expressly excludes special laws from the Penal Code's provisions, and that Article 22—found in a title and chapter of the Code relating to "Penalties"—refers to "penal laws" in the strict sense of laws defining crimes and prescribing punishments, not to prescription provisions which are procedural or remedial in nature. Citing extensive American authority (Corpus Juris, Ruling Case Law, Wharton), the dissent maintained that statutes of limitation in criminal cases are presumed prospective and do not apply to crimes previously committed unless the statute is clearly retroactive in its terms. The dissent warned that the majority's holding would effect a "general jail delivery" of at least ninety-one accused in thirty-two pending cases, contrary to the Legislature's express purpose of enacting "a more effective Election Law." The dissent concluded that not a single authority, Latin or American, supported the majority's position, and that the Court was usurping legislative prerogatives by writing retroactivity into a statute that contained no such provision.