People vs. Morales

The exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear requires the compulsion to be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat, and the duress, force, fear, or intimidation must be present, imminent, and impending, and not merely a threat of future injury.

On November 9, 1994, five individuals—the Tan siblings, their cousin, and their driver—were abducted while en route to school in Bacolor, Pampanga. The perpetrators initially demanded a P2,000,000 ransom, which was negotiated down to P92,000. The victims' father paid the amount in exchange for the release of the captives.

• The Abduction: On November 9, 1994, at around 6:30 a.m., the Tan siblings, their cousin Malou Ocampo, and driver Cesar Quiroz were onboard their family van in San Vicente, Bacolor, Pampanga. As the vehicle slowed down at a damaged portion of the road, appellant Arturo Malit poked a gun at the driver. Appellant Fernando Morales, along with co-accused Elmer Esguerra and Narciso Saldaña, simultaneously boarded the van. Esguerra took the wheel while the others blindfolded the victims. Romeo Bautista later joined the group at a gasoline station.
• Detention and Negotiation: The victims were transported to a house in Bataan. Victim Jefferson Tan wrote a note to his father, which Bautista and Saldaña delivered. Jefferson was later escorted to a PLDT office in Balanga to speak with his father, Feliciano Tan, to negotiate the ransom. The original demand of P2,000,000 was reduced to P1,500,000. Jefferson was then sent home to procure the money.
• Ransom Delivery: Upon Jefferson's arrival home, Feliciano Tan, advised by the police, did not allow Jefferson to return to the kidnappers. Feliciano negotiated the ransom down to P92,000. He proceeded to the designated pickup site at Gumi, Lubao, where appellants Malit and Morales boarded his vehicle. Malit received the ransom money, and Esguerra handed over the keys to the van where the children were held.
• Defense Version: Appellants Morales and Malit claimed they were lured to the area under the pretense of a construction job. They alleged that Saldaña suddenly flagged down the van, prompting them to walk away, but Bautista chased them and forced them into the vehicle at gunpoint. Both claimed they merely cooked for and attended to the victims out of fear of their co-accused. Malit asserted he was released before the ransom delivery, while Morales claimed he was still under threat because their co-accused were waiting a kilometer away.

• Exempting Circumstance of Uncontrollable Fear: Appellants maintained that they acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, having been forced at gunpoint by their co-accused to participate. Morales argued the threat persisted during the ransom delivery because their co-accused were nearby.
• Lack of Conspiracy: Appellants contended that conspiracy was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Morales argued that the prosecution witnesses were unaware of the threats made against the appellants, and Saldaña's extrajudicial confession was inadmissible to prove conspiracy.
• Inadmissibility of Co-Accused's Confession: Malit argued that Saldaña's extrajudicial confession was invalid because Saldaña was not informed of his right to counsel of choice, given that counsel was merely provided by the investigating officer.
• Suppression of Evidence and Denial of New Trial: Malit asserted that the prosecution suppressed the testimony of driver Cesar Quiroz, whose affidavit failed to name Malit. He further argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial to present Quiroz's testimony.

• Rejection of Uncontrollable Fear: The prosecution argued that the defense of uncontrollable fear was untenable, given the appellants' active participation in the kidnapping and their failure to escape when they boarded Feliciano Tan's vehicle alone to receive the ransom.
• Existence of Conspiracy: The prosecution maintained that conspiracy was adequately proven by the concerted acts of the appellants, from the initial abduction to the collection of the ransom.
• Validity of Extrajudicial Confession: The prosecution contended that Saldaña's confession was admissible because the government was obligated to provide counsel when none was available, and the assisting lawyer was impartial and competent.

• Uncontrollable Fear: Whether the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury applies to appellants.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was adequately proven.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether appellants' guilt for kidnapping for ransom was established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Admissibility of Confession: Whether the extrajudicial confession of co-accused Saldaña was inadmissible for violating his right to counsel of choice.
• New Trial: Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

• Uncontrollable Fear: The defense was rejected. For the exempting circumstance to prosper, the duress must be present, imminent, and impending, and of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape. Appellants had a clear opportunity to escape when they boarded Feliciano Tan's vehicle unaccompanied to receive the ransom, as their co-accused were a kilometer away. Their active participation in the abduction and ransom collection further belied their claim of fear.
• Conspiracy: Conspiracy was adequately proven. The coordinated acts of the accused—waiting at a damaged road section to slow the target vehicle, Malit poking a gun at the driver, Morales opening the door, guarding the victims, and receiving the ransom—demonstrated a common purpose or design.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. It is highly improbable for kidnappers to involve unwilling strangers in a meticulously planned crime, as such persons could abort the kidnapping or expose the plan to authorities. The trial court's assessment of witness credibility, favoring the prosecution's straightforward testimonies over the appellants' conflicting accounts, is binding on review.
• Admissibility of Confession: The extrajudicial confession was admissible. The government is obligated to provide counsel when the accused cannot afford one. The fact that the investigating officer requested Atty. Mallari to assist Saldaña did not cast doubt on the lawyer's impartiality, especially since no bias or incompetence was shown, and Saldaña's rights were duly explained.
• New Trial: The denial of the motion for new trial was proper. A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence requires that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at trial with reasonable diligence. The affidavit of driver Cesar Quiroz was available even before trial. Moreover, the affidavit did not categorically exculpate Malit.

• Uncontrollable Fear (Art. 12, par. 6, RPC) — A person acting under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability only if the duress, force, fear, or intimidation is present, imminent, and impending, and induces a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is insufficient. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.
• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It is established by acts showing closeness and coordination indicating a common purpose or design, such that the participants performed specific acts with such precision as to indicate a common intent.
• Right to Counsel during Custodial Investigation — If the accused cannot afford counsel, the government, particularly the investigating officer, is incumbent to provide one. The counsel provided is presumed impartial absent conclusive evidence of bias or incompetence.
• New Trial based on Newly Discovered Evidence — Requires the concurrence of three requisites: (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that it could probably change the judgment.

• "In order that the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat."
• "It is improbable that a group of kidnappers would risk the success of their well-planned criminal scheme by involving unwilling persons, much less strangers, who could abort the kidnapping by refusing to cooperate in its execution."

• People v. Del Rosario, 365 Phil. 292 (1999) — Followed. Defined the requisites of the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear, requiring the duress to be present, imminent, and impending.
• People v. Borja, 91 SCRA 340 (1979) — Followed. Held that duress as a valid defense should not be speculative or remote.
• People v. Vallejo, 382 SCRA 192 (2002) — Followed. Stated that extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary absent conclusive evidence of vitiated consent.
• People v. Bongalon, 374 SCRA 289 (2002) — Followed. Enumerated the requisites for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

• Article 267, Revised Penal Code — Defines kidnapping and serious illegal detention and imposes the penalty of death if the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. Applied to convict the appellants of kidnapping for ransom.
• Article 12(6), Revised Penal Code — Exempts from criminal liability any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. Interpreted strictly to require imminence and no opportunity to escape.
• Section 2, Rule 121, Rules of Court — Enumerates the grounds for a new trial, including newly discovered evidence. Applied to deny the motion for new trial due to lack of reasonable diligence.
• Section 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Vests the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal actions with the prosecutor. Applied to uphold the prosecution's discretion in choosing which witnesses to present.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ. Three members maintained their adherence to the separate opinion expressed in People v. Echegaray that R.A. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is unconstitutional, but submitted to the ruling of the majority.