People vs. Montesclaros

An accomplice's civil liability must be apportioned according to the degree of participation in the crime, with the principal bearing a greater share than the accomplice; the accomplice is solidarily liable with the principal only for a fraction of the total civil indemnity and damages, not the entire amount. Additionally, qualifying or aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the Information and proved during trial to be appreciated, and the death of the principal pending appeal extinguishes both his civil liability ex delicto and the accomplice's subsidiary liability for his share.

ABC, the private complainant, was the 13-year-old daughter of appellant Ida Montesclaros, who worked as a waitress at the Bayanihan Beer House in Mabini, Cebu City. On February 19, 1995, Ida and ABC began renting a room in a house owned by Bartolome Tampus, a barangay tanod in Looc, Lapu-lapu City. Ida had been previously diagnosed with schizophrenia, paranoid type, and was treated as an outpatient at the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry Department from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995. The case was governed by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the rape provision in force at the time of the incidents in April 1995, and by the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which the Court applied retroactively.

ABC, a 13-year-old girl, resided with her mother, appellant Ida Montesclaros, in a room they rented from Bartolome Tampus, a barangay tanod, in Looc, Lapu-lapu City, beginning February 19, 1995. Ida worked as a waitress at the Bayanihan Beer House in Mabini, Cebu City. On April 1, 1995, at about 4:30 p.m., ABC was in the house with Ida and Tampus, who were drinking beer. According to ABC's testimony, both Ida and Tampus forced her to drink beer; after consuming three and one-half glasses, she became intoxicated and very sleepy. While ABC lay on the floor, she overheard Tampus request Ida to allow him to "remedyo"—a Visayan term for sexual intercourse—with her. Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he finished. Ida then left for work, leaving Tampus alone with ABC. When ABC awoke, she found the garter of her panties loose and rolled down to her knees, and she suffered pain in her head, thighs, buttocks, groin, and vagina, with bloodstains on her panties and short pants. When Ida returned the following morning, ABC kept crying, but Ida ignored her. ABC further testified that on April 4, 1995, around 1:00 a.m., while she was alone because Ida was at work, Tampus entered the room, threatened to kill her if she reported the previous assault, covered her mouth when she shouted, and forcibly had carnal knowledge of her. After the act, Tampus left, and when ABC told Ida about the incident, Ida again ignored her.

On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC sought help from her aunt, Nellie Montesclaros, and reported the rape, stating that her mother had sold her. ABC, together with Nellie and traffic enforcer Norma Andales, reported the incidents to the police. On May 9, 1995, Dr. Nestor A. Sator of the Philippine National Crime Laboratory Services conducted a physical examination of ABC and found a deep healed laceration at the seven o'clock position and a shallow healed laceration at the one o'clock position on her hymen. On September 22, 1995, ABC filed two complaints charging Tampus with rape on both dates, and charging Ida in conspiracy with Tampus for the April 1 incident.

Tampus denied raping ABC on April 1, 1995, claiming he left for the public market at 4:00 p.m. and returned at 6:00 p.m. to find ABC and Ida absent. He denied forcing ABC to drink beer and denied asking Ida for permission to have sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida corroborated this account, testifying that she and ABC left for the beer house at 4:00 p.m. and returned at 6:00 a.m. the following day, and that she always brought ABC with her and never left her alone. Tampus also denied raping ABC on April 4, 1995, claiming he was on duty at the barangay tanod outpost from midnight to 5:00 a.m. Defense witness Guillermo Berdin testified that Tampus reported for duty at 8:00 p.m. on April 3 and left at 5:00 a.m. on April 4, as reflected in the attendance logbook, but on cross-examination could not confirm whether the signature in the logbook belonged to Tampus. The trial court noted that Tampus's handwriting in the logbook entry on April 2 differed from that on April 3, and that his house was only 500 meters from the outpost, allowing a tanod to leave unnoticed.

Dr. Agustos B. Costas, Head of the Department of Psychiatry at the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, issued a Medical Certification showing that Ida was treated as an outpatient from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995 and was provisionally diagnosed with schizophrenia, paranoid type. Dr. Costas testified that Ida was not totally deprived of intelligence but that her judgment was affected, and that her schizophrenia could have diminished the exercise of her will-power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts. The trial court found ABC's testimony clear and straightforward, convicted Tampus of two counts of rape as principal, and found Ida guilty as an accomplice in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, appreciating the mitigating circumstance of illness under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification, and Tampus died on November 16, 2000, while his appeal was pending, leading to its dismissal.

• Against Human Nature: Appellant Ida argued that it is against human nature for a mother to allow her daughter to be raped.
• No Opportunity: Ida maintained that there was no instance when she left ABC alone in the house, as she always brought her daughter to the beer house with her.
• Insufficiency of Evidence Against Tampus: Ida argued that the trial court erred in convicting Tampus despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Insufficiency of Evidence Against Ida: Ida argued that the trial court erred in convicting her as an accomplice despite the prosecution's failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Guilt of Principal (Tampus): Whether the prosecution proved Tampus's guilt beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the rape of ABC on April 1, 1995.
• Guilt of Accomplice (Ida): Whether the prosecution proved Ida's guilt beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the rape of ABC on April 1, 1995.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Illness: Whether Ida's schizophrenia may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Relationship: Whether the parent-victim relationship between Ida and ABC may be appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code despite its omission from the Information.
• Apportionment of Civil Indemnity: Whether the accomplice should be held solidarily liable with the principal for the entire amount of civil indemnity, or whether civil liability should be apportioned according to the degree of participation.
• Exemplary Damages: Whether the award of exemplary damages was proper.

• Guilt of Principal (Tampus): Yes. Tampus's guilt as principal was established beyond reasonable doubt through the credible and straightforward testimony of ABC, corroborated by circumstantial evidence forming an unbroken chain pointing to Tampus as the rapist.
• Guilt of Accomplice (Ida): Yes. Ida's guilt as an accomplice was established beyond reasonable doubt, her prior acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and consenting to Tampus's request to have sexual intercourse with ABC satisfying all three requisites of accomplice liability under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Illness: Yes. Ida's schizophrenia was appreciated as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) because it diminished the exercise of her will-power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts, as established by the medical certification and Dr. Costas's testimony.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Relationship: No. The parent-victim relationship could not be appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance because it was not alleged in the Information, notwithstanding that it was proven during trial and not refuted by the accused.
• Apportionment of Civil Indemnity: The accomplice's civil liability must be apportioned proportionately. The principal should bear two-thirds and the accomplice one-third of the total civil indemnity and moral damages, reflecting their respective degrees of participation in the crime.
• Exemplary Damages: No. The award of exemplary damages was improper because no qualifying or aggravating circumstance was duly alleged in the Information and proved during trial, as required by the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and prevailing jurisprudence.

• Guilt of Principal (Tampus): The Court found ABC's testimony clear and straightforward, sufficient to conclude Tampus's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is highly inconceivable for a young girl to impute the crime of rape, implicate her own mother, submit to a physical examination, and subject herself to public trial if she were not truly a victim. Although ABC was asleep when the April 1 assault occurred, circumstantial evidence—comprising the forced drinking session, the overheard conversation between Tampus and Ida, the fact that Tampus and ABC were left alone, the bloodstained clothing and physical pain, Tampus's subsequent threat, and the second rape—formed a chain establishing Tampus's guilt beyond reasonable doubt under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. Tampus's denial and alibi could not prevail over ABC's positive identification, and the trial court's findings, sustained by the Court of Appeals, were accorded great weight and respect.

• Guilt of Accomplice (Ida): All three requisites of accomplice liability under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code were satisfied: (a) community of design—Ida had knowledge of and assented to Tampus's intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter; (b) cooperation by previous acts—Ida forced ABC to drink beer and gave express consent to Tampus's request; and (c) relation between the acts—Ida's acts of forcing ABC to drink and leaving her alone with Tampus were closely related to the eventual commission of rape. Ida's acts were not indispensable to the commission of the crime, because both Ida and Tampus forced ABC to drink, and Tampus already intended to rape ABC and could have done so even without Ida's consent; had Ida's participation been indispensable, she would have been liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The trial court correctly found that conspiracy was not proven but that Ida's prior acts of cooperation rendered her liable as an accomplice.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Illness: The Court applied Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, which recognizes as mitigating "such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts." Dr. Costas testified that Ida was provisionally diagnosed with schizophrenia, paranoid type, and treated from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995. While Ida was not totally deprived of intelligence, her judgment was impaired. The Court relied on prior jurisprudence holding that schizophrenia may be considered mitigating under Article 13(9) if it diminishes the exercise of will-power without depriving the accused of consciousness of acts. The medical certification and Dr. Costas's testimony established that Ida's schizophrenia diminished her will-power while she remained conscious of her acts.

• Qualifying Circumstance of Relationship: The Court noted that the undisputed fact that Ida was ABC's mother, coupled with ABC's minority, could have qualified the crime under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, increasing the penalty to death. However, both the minority of the victim and the relationship of the offender to the victim must be alleged in the Information and proved during trial to serve as qualifying circumstances. The 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9, require that qualifying and aggravating circumstances be stated in the Information. The Court applied these rules retroactively, following the principle that statutes governing court proceedings apply to actions pending and undetermined at the time of passage. Because the Information in Criminal Case No. 013324-L did not allege that Ida was ABC's mother, the relationship could not be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. Ida could thus be convicted only as an accomplice in simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua. In any event, Republic Act No. 9346 prohibited the imposition of the death penalty.

• Apportionment of Civil Indemnity: The Court rejected the trial court's imposition of joint and several liability on the accomplice for the entire civil indemnity, finding it erroneous for two reasons. First, it failed to account for the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal and the accomplice; Ida's acts were not indispensable, and Tampus could have raped ABC even without them. Second, Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code provides for solidary liability only within each class (principals among principals, accomplices among accomplices) and subsidiary liability for the quotas of other classes, not solidary liability across classes. The Court surveyed prior jurisprudence and found gross inconsistency in the apportionment of civil liability among principals, accomplices, and accessories. It held that civil indemnity and damages must be apportioned according to the degree of participation, with the principal bearing a greater share than the accomplice. Applying this principle, the Court assigned two-thirds of the total ₱100,000.00 (₱50,000.00 civil indemnity plus ₱50,000.00 moral damages) to Tampus and one-third to Ida, resulting in Ida's liability of ₱33,333.33, broken down into ₱16,666.67 civil indemnity and ₱16,666.67 moral damages. Because Tampus died pending appeal, his civil liability ex delicto was extinguished under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, and Ida's subsidiary liability for his share was likewise eliminated, following the principle that the accessory follows the principal—upon extinguishment of the principal obligation, no accessory obligation remains.

• Exemplary Damages: The Court found the Court of Appeals's award of exemplary damages erroneous. Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed in criminal cases when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Jurisprudence requires that aggravating circumstances be alleged in the Information and proved during trial. Although the minority of the victim was alleged, the relationship between Ida and ABC as parent and child was not alleged in the Information. Since the qualifying circumstance of relationship was not duly established in the Information, no aggravating or qualifying circumstance could be appreciated, and the award of exemplary damages was unwarranted.

• Accomplice Liability (Article 18, Revised Penal Code) — An accomplice is a person who, not being a principal under Article 17, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. Three requisites must concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowledge of the principal's criminal design and concurrence in that purpose; (b) cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and (c) a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the accomplice. The accomplice's prior acts of cooperation must not be indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, the person would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. In this case, Ida's acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and consenting to Tampus's request to rape ABC were not indispensable, because Tampus already intended to rape ABC and could have done so without Ida's participation.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Illness (Article 13(9), Revised Penal Code) — An illness of the offender that diminishes the exercise of will-power without depriving the offender of consciousness of acts may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. Schizophrenia may qualify under this provision when the accused is not totally deprived of intelligence but suffers impaired judgment. The medical certification and expert testimony of Dr. Costas established that Ida's schizophrenia diminished her will-power while she remained conscious of her acts.

• Allegation of Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances (Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure) — Every Information must state the qualifying and aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Both the minority of the victim and the relationship of the offender to the victim must be alleged in the Information and proved during trial to be appreciated as qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The 2000 Rules apply retroactively to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Because the Information did not allege Ida's parentage of ABC, the relationship could not qualify the crime.

• Apportionment of Civil Liability Among Principals, Accomplices, and Accessories (Articles 109 and 110, Revised Penal Code) — When two or more persons are civilly liable for a felony, courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond. Principals, accomplices, and accessories are solidarily liable only within their respective classes for their quotas, and are subsidiarily liable for the quotas of other classes, enforced first against the property of principals, then accomplices, then accessories. Civil liability must be apportioned according to the degree and nature of participation, with each principal shouldering a greater share than every accomplice, and each accomplice a greater share than every accessory. Courts have discretion in apportionment, but it must be guided by factual, legal, and equitable justification—not speculation or caprice. The Court adopted a two-thirds/one-third ratio between principal and accomplice in this case.

• Extinguishment of Civil Liability by Death of the Accused (Article 89, Revised Penal Code) — Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict as to personal penalties; as to pecuniary penalties, liability is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment. Upon the death of the principal pending appeal, his civil liability ex delicto is extinguished, and the accomplice's subsidiary liability for the principal's share is likewise eliminated, following the principle that the accessory follows the principal.

• Exemplary Damages in Criminal Cases (Article 2230, Civil Code) — Exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases only when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the Information and proved during trial. Without a duly alleged and proved aggravating or qualifying circumstance, the award of exemplary damages is not warranted.

• "The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the moral and actual damages, should be apportioned among the persons who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degree of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation in the criminal act." — This passage articulates the controlling principle for apportioning civil liability among principals, accomplices, and accessories, departing from prior inconsistent jurisprudence that imposed equal solidary liability regardless of degree of participation.

• "It is an injustice when the penalty and liability imposed are not commensurate to the actual responsibility of the offender; for criminal responsibility is individual and not collective, and each of the participants should be liable only for the acts actually committed by him." — This statement defines the ratio decidendi for the Court's rejection of equal solidary liability between principal and accomplice, grounding the apportionment rule in the principle of individual criminal responsibility.

• "Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship of the offender to the victim, either as the victim's parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, must be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order for them to serve as qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code." — This formulation restates the dual-allegation requirement for qualifying circumstances in rape cases, a doctrine frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

• "Upon the extinguishment of the principal obligation, there is no longer any accessory obligation which could attach to it; thus, the subsidiary liability of Ida is also extinguished." — This passage establishes the principle that the death of the principal extinguishes the accomplice's subsidiary liability for the principal's share of civil indemnity, applying the civilian maxim that the accessory follows the principal.

• People vs. Roche, G.R. No. 115182, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 91 — Cited as the source of the three requisites for accomplice liability under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code: community of design, cooperation by previous or simultaneous acts, and relation between the acts of the principal and the accomplice.

• People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 172697, September 25, 2007, 534 SCRA 147 — Cited for the proposition that schizophrenia may be considered a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code if it diminishes the exercise of will-power without depriving the accused of consciousness of acts.

• People vs. Opong, G.R. No. 177822, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 706 — Cited for the rule that both the minority of the victim and the relationship of the offender to the victim must be alleged in the Information and proved during trial to serve as qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B.

• People vs. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 135919, May 9, 2003, 403 SCRA 153 — Cited for the principle that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure should be given retroactive effect, following the rule that statutes governing court proceedings apply to actions pending and undetermined at the time of passage.

• People vs. Nulla, G.R. No. L-69346, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 471 — Cited as an example of proper apportionment under Articles 109 and 110 of the Revised Penal Code, where the Court determined the respective amounts for which the principal, accomplice, and accessory were liable, consistent with the requirement that courts specify each class's quota.

• People vs. Cortes, 55 Phil. 143 (2000) — Cited as an example where the principal was ordered to pay twice the share of the accomplice in civil indemnity, illustrating the principle of proportionate apportionment.

• Lumiguis vs. People, G.R. No. L-20338, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 842 — Cited as an example of apportionment where the sole principal was primarily liable for half of the civil indemnity and the four accomplices were primarily liable in solidum among themselves for the other half, demonstrating the Court's approach to dividing liability by class.

• United States vs. Magcomot, 13 Phil. 386 (1909) — Cited for the principle that criminal responsibility is individual and not collective, and each participant should be liable only for the acts actually committed by him.

• Article 18, Revised Penal Code — Defines accomplices as persons who, not being principals under Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. Applied to hold Ida liable as an accomplice for her prior acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and consenting to Tampus's plan to rape ABC.

• Article 13(9), Revised Penal Code — Provides as a mitigating circumstance "such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts." Applied to appreciate Ida's schizophrenia as a mitigating circumstance.

• Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for rape and provides that the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is under 18 and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The Court held that the qualifying circumstance of relationship was not applicable because it was not alleged in the Information.

• Article 89, Revised Penal Code — Provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to personal penalties, and as to pecuniary penalties, liability is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment. Applied to extinguish Tampus's civil liability ex delicto and, consequently, Ida's subsidiary liability for his share.

• Articles 109 and 110, Revised Penal Code — Article 109 provides that if there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond. Article 110 provides that principals, accomplices, and accessories are solidarily liable within their respective classes for their quotas and subsidiarily for those of other classes. Applied to correct the apportionment of civil indemnity between Tampus and Ida.

• Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure — Require that the Information state the designation of the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances, and that the acts or omissions and qualifying/aggravating circumstances be stated in ordinary and concise language. Applied retroactively to hold that the parent-victim relationship, not having been alleged in the Information, could not be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.

• Article 2230, Civil Code — Provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Applied to delete the award of exemplary damages because no aggravating or qualifying circumstance was duly alleged and proved.

• Republic Act No. 9346 — An Act prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines, signed into law on June 24, 2006. Cited to note that even if the qualifying circumstance had been appreciated, the death penalty could no longer be imposed.

• Rule 133, Section 4, Rules of Court — Provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Applied to sustain Tampus's conviction based on circumstantial evidence.

Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice; Renato C. Corona, Associate Justice; Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice; Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justice.