People vs. Montejo

Section 9 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court (the 50-kilometer rule) applies solely to civil cases; courts possess the inherent power to compel the attendance of witnesses in criminal cases regardless of the distance of their residence.

A criminal case for double homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Felix Wee Sit in Zamboanga City. The prosecution's key eyewitness, Patrolman Ernesto Uaje, was a permanent resident of Montalban, Rizal, which is hundreds of miles away from Zamboanga City.

• Original Filing: Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Criminal Case No. 3225
• Lower Court Decision: February 3, 1965 — Respondent Judge denied the prosecution's motion for an order of arrest or, alternatively, to cite the witness for contempt. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for not being "well-founded."
• Appeal: Directly to the SC via Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction
• SC Action: Petition was given due course; preliminary injunction was issued; respondents were required to answer. Case was submitted for decision based on memoranda instead of oral argument.

• The Crime: On August 15, 1963, a private jeep driven recklessly by accused Felix Wee Sit turned turtle on a public highway in Zamboanga City, causing the death of two students and serious physical injuries to four others.
• The Information: Criminal Case No. 3225 was filed against Wee Sit on September 23, 1963, based on the affidavit of Patrolman Ernesto Uaje, an eyewitness to the incident. Trial commenced on November 7, 1963.
• The Subpoena: Uaje returned to his permanent residence in Montalban, Rizal. The City Fiscal requested the CFI to issue a subpoena, which the respondent Judge issued for Uaje's appearance on February 1, 1965. The subpoena was served on Uaje in Montalban, Rizal on January 19, 1965.
• Failure to Appear: Uaje failed to appear on February 1, 1965.
• The Denied Motion: The City Fiscal moved for an order of arrest against Uaje, or alternatively, to cite him for contempt for willful failure to appear as a material witness. Respondent Judge denied the motion on February 3, 1965, relying on Section 9, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court (the 50-km rule). A motion for reconsideration was also denied.

• Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to compel the witness's attendance.
• Cited Section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 1799), Section 19(g) of Commonwealth Act No. 39 (Zamboanga City Charter), and Section 3, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court to argue for the court's authority to enforce process across the Philippines.

• Uaje was not a material or important witness because his own affidavit admitted he did not see how the accident occurred and was therefore not an actual eyewitness.
• The right to compulsory process under the Constitution and the Rules of Court (Section 1(g), Rule 115) is granted exclusively to the accused, not the prosecution.
• Section 9, Rule 23 applies to both civil and criminal cases because it is found under the topic "Procedure in Courts of First Instance" and makes no distinction between the two. Where the law makes no distinction, the interpreter should not make one.
• Since Uaje resided more than 50 km away, he was not bound to attend, and his failure to obey the subpoena could not constitute contempt of court.

• Procedural Issues: Whether respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for arrest or citation for contempt of the witness.
• Substantive Issues: Whether Section 9, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court (the 50-km rule) applies to criminal cases; whether the prosecution in a criminal case has the right to compel the attendance of a witness residing more than 50 kilometers from the place of trial.

• Procedural: The SC held that respondent Judge's denial of the motion, based on a clear misapprehension of the Rules of Court, amounted to grave abuse of discretion. The orders of February 3, 1965, were set aside.
• Substantive: The SC ruled that Section 9, Rule 23 applies solely to civil cases. Courts possess the inherent power to compel the attendance of persons to testify in a case pending therein (Section 5, Rule 135). In criminal cases, this inherent power is specifically recognized and operationalized under Section 6, Rule 119, which allows a court to order a material prosecution witness to give bail or be committed to prison if there is reason to believe they will not appear. Subjecting the prosecution to the 50-km rule would cause serious handicap in proving its case.

• Applicability of the 50-Kilometer Rule in Criminal Cases — Section 9, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, which exempts a witness from attending court if their residence is more than 50 kilometers from the place of trial, applies solely to civil cases and not to criminal cases.
• Inherent Power of Courts to Compel Attendance — Courts have the inherent power to compel the attendance of persons to testify in cases pending before them. This power cannot be clipped by a rule intended only for civil proceedings, especially in criminal cases where the prosecution would suffer serious handicap without the witness.

• Section 9, Rule 23, Rules of Court — Provides that a witness is not bound to attend as such before any court out of the province in which they reside unless the distance is less than 50 kilometers from their place of residence to the place of trial. The SC interpreted this to apply solely to civil cases.
• Section 5, Rule 135, Rules of Court — Grants every court the inherent power to compel the attendance of persons to testify in a case pending therein. The SC used this to justify compelling the attendance of the witness in a criminal case.
• Section 6, Rule 119, Rules of Court — Provides that if a court is satisfied by proof or oath that a material witness for the prosecution will not appear and testify when required, it may order the witness to give bail for their appearance, or commit them to prison until they comply or are legally discharged. The SC cited this as a specific recognition of the court's power to compel attendance in criminal cases.
• Section 1(g), Rule 115, Rules of Court — Grants the accused the right to have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses in their behalf. Respondents invoked this to argue the right is exclusive to the defense; the SC implicitly rejected this by affirming the court's inherent power to compel prosecution witnesses.