People vs. Montaner

A drawer of a postdated check who issues it in exchange for cash is liable for estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code when the check is dishonored for lack of funds and the drawer fails to pay within three days from notice, and a bare defense that the checks were merely entrusted blank to a third party is disregarded when contrary to common experience and unsubstantiated by corroborating evidence.

On May 17, 1996, Virginia Baby P. Montaner issued ten postdated Prudential Bank checks, totaling ₱50,000.00, to Reynaldo Solis in exchange for cash, representing that the checks were funded. Upon presentment on their due date, the checks were dishonored for the reason "account closed." Despite verbal and written demands, Montaner failed to pay the value of the checks, prompting the filing of an estafa charge.

• Issuance of Checks: On May 17, 1996, Montaner went to Solis's house and issued ten postdated Prudential Bank checks (dated June 17, 1996), each for ₱5,000.00, in exchange for ₱50,000.00 cash. Montaner represented that the checks were funded and should be deposited on their due date.
• Dishonor and Demand: Solis deposited the checks at Premier Bank, but all were dishonored for the reason "account closed." Bank records showed the account was closed on July 11, 1996, and the checks were returned on October 4, 1996. Solis verbally informed Montaner and later sent a demand letter dated October 13, 1996, received by Montaner's husband. Montaner failed to pay or deposit the amount within three days from notice.
• Defense Version: Montaner denied issuing the checks to Solis, claiming she lent the blank but signed checks to Marlyn Galope out of pity so Galope could secure a loan. She claimed she told Galope the checks were not funded. She also denied knowledge of the notice of dishonor, claiming her husband received it but left for abroad in July 1996 and returned only in 1997.

• Lack of Intent to Defraud: Petitioner argued she merely entrusted the signed but blank checks to Marlyn Galope out of pity, asserting no certainty beyond reasonable doubt that she issued the checks to defraud Solis.
• Absence of Transaction: Petitioner maintained that no transaction ever transpired between her and Solis.
• Simple Imprudence: Admitting possible imprudence in parting with the blank signed checks, appellant insisted that simple imprudence does not equate to criminal liability.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The conviction was affirmed, the prosecution having established all elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee. Solis's categorical testimony proved the checks were issued in exchange for cash. The dishonor of the checks for "account closed" and the failure to pay within three days of notice gave rise to prima facie evidence of deceit. The defense that the blank signed checks were merely entrusted to a third party was rejected as contrary to ordinary common sense and human experience. Furthermore, the unsubstantiated denial held less evidentiary value than the affirmative testimony of credible witnesses, and the failure to produce the alleged third-party recipient as a corroborating witness was fatal to the defense.

• Prima facie evidence of deceit in estafa by bouncing checks — The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover the check within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor constitutes prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Applied to hold Montaner liable, as she failed to cover the checks within three days from receiving notice of dishonor.
• Evidentiary value of denial — Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence possessing far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Applied to disregard Montaner's claim that she merely lent the checks to a third party.
• Credibility of evidence vis-à-vis common experience — Evidence must be credible in itself—such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. Assertions repugnant to common knowledge and experience belong to the miraculous and are outside judicial cognizance. Applied to reject the claim that a person would voluntarily part with blank signed checks without any suspicion they could be used to defraud others.

• "Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself – such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. The Court has no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance."
• "Moreover, it is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters."

• Cajigas v. People, G.R. No. 156541, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 54 — Followed. Cited for the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
• People v. Garin, 476 Phil. 455 (2004); People v. Samus, 437 Phil. 645 (2002) — Followed. Cited for the principle that evidence must be credible in itself and conform to common knowledge and experience.
• Gomba v. People, G.R. No. 150536, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 396 — Followed. Cited for the doctrine that unsubstantiated denial is negative and self-serving evidence with less evidentiary value than affirmative testimony.

• Paragraph 2(d), Article 315, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes estafa by postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank. Applied to hold the appellant liable, with the failure to cover the check within three days from notice of dishonor serving as prima facie evidence of deceit.

Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chairperson), Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.