People vs. Monleon

An extrajudicial confession, when voluntarily executed and corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for parricide, even where the offender had no intent to kill and the victim's death resulted from internal complications caused by the physical violence inflicted; under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

Cosme Monleon and Concordia Bongo had been married for twenty-six years and resided in Barrio Lunas, Borbon, Cebu, where Monleon worked as a forty-five-year-old illiterate farmer. The prosecution was brought under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death, and the appeal raised questions concerning the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions, the corpus delicti rule, the res gestae doctrine, and the appreciation of mitigating circumstances.

Cosme Monleon and his wife, Concordia Bongo, had been married for twenty-six years and were residents of Barrio Lunas, Borbon, Cebu. Monleon was a forty-five-year-old illiterate farmer. On June 1, 1970, Monleon worked in the palihug — a form of bayanihan — at the farm of his brother-in-law, Tomas Rosello, where he drank copious amounts of tuba, the coconut wine. He arrived home at about seven o'clock that evening, drunk, and asked Concordia whether their ten-year-old son, Marciano, had fed the carabao. She assured him it had been fed, but when Monleon checked, he found the carabao had not been adequately fed and became furious.

As Monleon was about to whip Marciano, Concordia intervened, and a violent quarrel ensued. Monleon placed himself astride his wife's chest, squeezed her neck, pressed her head against a post, and kicked her in the abdomen. He shouted, "What do I care if there would be someone who would be buried tomorrow. You let your brothers and sisters stand up and I will also include them." One of the couple's six children, Felicisimo, pulled Monleon away and stopped the assault. The following morning, Concordia vomited blood and died at eleven o'clock. The cause of death was "acute abdomen," a pathologic condition within the belly requiring surgical intervention. Prosecution witnesses Clemencia Bongo-Monleon — Concordia's sister and wife of Monleon's elder brother — and Epifania Bongo testified to having witnessed the assault.

Sixteen days after Concordia's death, on June 18, Monleon thumbmarked a confession written in the Cebuano dialect and sworn to before the town mayor, in which he admitted assaulting his wife and expressed repentance. He also orally admitted to Lieutenant Perfecto Bongo of the Cebu City police department, a relative of Concordia, that he assaulted his wife because he was drunk and she was a nagger. On July 31, 1970, an NBI medico-legal officer exhumed Concordia's body and found bluish-black discolorations on the sphenoid temporal bones of her skull, on the atlas or cervical vertebra at the base of the neck, and on the first ribs — all due to internal hemorrhage caused by trauma or external violence. The doctor opined that the acute abdomen could have been caused by external violence.

Monleon denied using violence against his wife, testifying that they had merely a verbal quarrel. He claimed that Clemencia testified against him because of a boundary dispute over lands inherited by Clemencia and Concordia from their father, Victor Bongo. He said Lieutenant Bongo asked him to sign a "recibo" promising to take care of his children, and that persons threatened to kill him if he did not thumbmark his confession. The trial court convicted Monleon of parricide, crediting the prosecution witnesses and finding the confession voluntarily executed.

• Credibility of Prosecution Evidence: Petitioner's counsel de oficio argued that the trial court erred in giving credence to Monleon's confession, the affidavit of his son Marciano, and the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Clemencia Bongo-Monleon, Epifania Bongo, Perfecto Bongo, and NBI medico-legal officer Dr. Ceferino Cunanan.
• Discrepancies in Confession: Petitioner contended that discrepancies between the confession and the prosecution witnesses' version — regarding the time of Concordia's death and whether Monleon was present when she died, as well as inconsistencies in the dates of the confession's execution and swearing — destroyed the probative value of the confession.
• Admission of Marciano's Affidavit: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in admitting Marciano Monleon's affidavit (Exh. E), which was written in the Cebuano dialect and was not accompanied by a translation into English, Spanish, or the national language as required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
• Res Gestae Ruling: Petitioner maintained that the trial court erred in treating Concordia's alleged declarations to Clemencia's husband as part of the res gestae, noting it was incredible that Concordia, after being severely maltreated, would have the strength to walk three hundred meters to Clemencia's house on a hill.
• Rejection of Defense Testimonies: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in rejecting the testimonies of Monleon and his two children, Marciano and Felicisima, who corroborated his denial.
• Coercion of Confession: Petitioner asserted that persons threatened to kill him if he did not affix his thumbmark to the confession.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Solicitor General submitted that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed, the extrajudicial confession having been voluntarily executed and corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti established through the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the NBI medico-legal findings.
• Recommendation for Executive Clemency: The Solicitor General recommended executive clemency because the penalty of reclusion perpetua appeared excessive considering the degree of malice exhibited by Monleon, citing Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution.

• Admissibility of Confession: Whether Monleon's extrajudicial confession was admissible and sufficient, when corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti, to sustain the conviction.
• Effect of Discrepancies: Whether discrepancies between the confession and prosecution witness testimony negate the probative value of the confession.
• Admission of Marciano's Affidavit: Whether the trial court erred in admitting Marciano's affidavit written in Cebuano without an accompanying translation.
• Res Gestae: Whether Concordia's alleged declarations to Clemencia's husband were properly admitted as part of the res gestae.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and non-habitual intoxication should be appreciated.

• Admissibility of Confession: Yes. The confession was voluntarily executed and corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti, satisfying the requirements of Section 3, Rule 133 and Section 29, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
• Effect of Discrepancies: No. The discrepancies regarding the time of death and Monleon's presence at death do not destroy the probative value of the confession or negate his admission that he assaulted his wife; a court may reject portions of a confession found improbable or untrustworthy without discarding the whole.
• Admission of Marciano's Affidavit: No, the trial court erred. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that documents in an unofficial language be accompanied by a translation into English, Spanish, or the national language.
• Res Gestae: No, the trial court erred. A careful scrutiny of Clemencia's entire testimony revealed that Concordia's recounting of the assault occurred the following day, not an hour after the incident, and thus did not qualify as res gestae.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Yes. The extenuating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and intoxication, which was not habitual, were present, making the imposable penalty reclusion perpetua under Articles 63(3) and 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Admissibility of Confession: The corpus delicti — the fact that Concordia Bongo was the victim of a crime — was established by the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Clemencia Bongo-Monleon and Epifania Bongo, who witnessed the assault. Monleon's extrajudicial confession was therefore corroborated by independent evidence of the corpus delicti, satisfying Section 3, Rule 133 and Section 29, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The mayor and Lieutenant Bongo testified that Monleon was not forced to affix his thumbmark, and there was no evidence of torture or maltreatment. Monleon could have complained to the fiscal during the preliminary investigation that he was forced to execute the confession but did not do so. The trial court observed the demeanor of the witnesses and was convinced the confession was voluntarily executed.

• Effect of Discrepancies: The discrepancies cited by counsel de oficio — the time of death (eleven o'clock in the morning per prosecution witnesses versus one o'clock in the afternoon per the confession), whether Monleon was present at death, and the dates of thumbmarking and swearing — were found insufficient to destroy the confession's probative value or negate Monleon's admission that he assaulted his wife. A court may reject portions of a confession by reason of the improbability of facts or statements therein, or because of their falsity or untrustworthiness, without discarding the entire confession. The core admission — that Monleon physically assaulted Concordia — remained intact and was independently corroborated.

• Admission of Marciano's Affidavit: The trial court erred in admitting Marciano's affidavit over the objection of defense counsel. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a translation into English, Spanish, or the national language. The affidavit was written in the Cebuano dialect and was not accompanied by the required translation.

• Res Gestae: The trial court erred in regarding as part of the res gestae the statement supposedly made by Concordia to Clemencia's husband immediately after the incident. A careful scrutiny of Clemencia's entire testimony revealed that what she really meant was that Concordia, on the following day, June 2, recounted to her and to Epifania how she was maltreated by Monleon. In all probability, Clemencia, upon arriving at her house at around eight o'clock in the evening of June 1, apprised her husband that she had witnessed the assault. The defense's observation that it was incredible for Concordia, after being severely maltreated, to walk three hundred meters to Clemencia's house on a hill supported the conclusion that Clemencia was confused in her assertion.

• Mitigating Circumstances: The trial court did not appreciate any mitigating circumstances. The Solicitor General correctly identified the extenuating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong (Monleon, in his inebriated state, had no intent to kill; he was infuriated because his son did not feed the carabao and was provoked to castigate his wife because she prevented him from whipping the negligent son) and intoxication, which was not habitual. Under Articles 63(3) and 246 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable was reclusion perpetua. However, considering that Monleon had no intent to kill and that Concordia's death might have been hastened by lack of appropriate medical attendance or her weak constitution, the penalty appeared excessive. The case was analogous to People vs. Rabao, where a husband who punched his wife in the abdomen during a quarrel, causing her death, was convicted of parricide and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with commutation recommended to the Chief Executive.

• Corpus Delicti Rule — An extrajudicial confession, to support a conviction, must be corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti, which is the fact of the commission of the crime and not merely the occurrence of the death. The corpus delicti was established through the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Clemencia Bongo-Monleon and Epifania Bongo, who independently witnessed Monleon's assault on Concordia. The confession was thus admissible and sufficient, satisfying Section 3, Rule 133 and Section 29, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

• Article 4, Revised Penal Code — Criminal Liability for Felonious Acts — Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The maltreatment inflicted by Monleon on his wife was the proximate cause of her death, even though he had no intent to kill her and she did not die outright but from internal complications produced by the physical violence.

• Partial Rejection of Confession — A court may reject portions of a confession by reason of the improbability of the facts or statements therein or because of their falsity or untrustworthiness, without discarding the entire confession. Discrepancies between a confession and other evidence do not necessarily destroy the confession's probative value where the core admission remains corroborated.

• Mitigating Circumstances — Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong and Non-Habitual Intoxication — Where the offender, in an inebriated state, had no intent to kill and the victim's death resulted from complications of physical violence rather than from a lethal weapon or fatal blow, the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and intoxication (not habitual) are present, warranting a recommendation for executive clemency where the imposable penalty appears excessive.

• "The instant case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: that Monleon's felonious assault, though not intended to kill, was the proximate cause of death and thus incurred criminal liability for parricide.

• "Those discrepancies do not destroy the probative value of the confession nor negate Monleon's admission therein that he assaulted his wife. A court may reject portions of the confession by reason of the improbability of the facts or statements therein or because of their falsity or untrustworthiness." — This defines the doctrine of partial rejection of confessions, allowing courts to discard improbable portions while retaining the confession's core admission.

• "The trial court's error in regarding as part of the res gestae the statement supposedly made by Concordia to Clemencia's husband immediately after the incident and its error in admitting Monleon's affidavit are not sufficient to exculpate Monleon or engender any reasonable doubt as to his guilt." — This passage establishes that certain evidentiary errors by the trial court were harmless, as the remaining evidence — eyewitness testimony, the confession, and medico-legal findings — was independently sufficient to sustain the conviction.

• People vs. Layos, 60 Phil. 760 — Cited for the proposition that a court may reject portions of a confession by reason of the improbability of facts or statements therein.
• People vs. Piring, 63 Phil. 546 — Cited alongside Layos for the same proposition regarding partial rejection of confessions.
• People vs. Villanueva, 115 Phil. 858 — Cited alongside Layos and Piring for the partial rejection of confessions doctrine.
• People vs. Rabao, 67 Phil. 255 — Cited as directly analogous: a husband quarrelled with his wife, punched her in the abdomen, and she died; he was convicted of parricide and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with commutation recommended to the Chief Executive. This precedent supported the recommendation for executive clemency.
• People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658 — Cited in support of the recommendation for executive clemency in parricide cases where the penalty appeared excessive.
• U.S. vs. Guevara, 10 Phil. 37 — Cited in support of the executive clemency recommendation.
• People vs. Castañeda, 60 Phil. 604 — Cited in support of the executive clemency recommendation.
• People vs. Gungab, 64 Phil. 779 — Cited in support of the executive clemency recommendation.

• Article 4, Revised Penal Code — Provides that criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Applied to hold Monleon criminally liable for parricide despite his lack of intent to kill, his felonious assault being the proximate cause of Concordia's death.
• Article 5, Revised Penal Code — Authorizes the Court to bring to the attention of the Chief Executive cases where the penalty appears excessive. Applied to recommend executive clemency for Monleon.
• Article 63(3), Revised Penal Code — Provides the rule for imposing the lesser penalty when only one mitigating circumstance is present and no aggravating circumstance. Applied in conjunction with Article 246 to fix the imposable penalty at reclusion perpetua.
• Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death. Monleon was convicted under this article for killing his wife.
• Section 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Provides that an extrajudicial confession is insufficient to sustain a conviction unless corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti. Applied to uphold the conviction, the corpus delicti having been established by eyewitness testimony.
• Section 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Relates to the admissibility and sufficiency of confessions. Applied alongside Section 3, Rule 133.
• Section 34, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Provides that documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a translation into English, Spanish, or the national language. Applied to hold that the trial court erred in admitting Marciano's untranslated Cebuano affidavit.
• Section 14, Article IX, 1973 Constitution — Referenced by the Solicitor General in connection with the recommendation for executive clemency.
• Section 3(1), Article XVII, 1973 Constitution — Referenced in connection with furnishing a certified copy of the decision to the Chief Executive through the Secretary of Justice.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concurred.