People vs. Mercado

Where the kidnapped victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, the offense constitutes the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, and the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed.

Accused-appellants SPO2 Elpidio Mercado and SPO1 Aurelio Acebron were both members of the Philippine National Police assigned to the Tanay, Rizal municipal station, sharing a government-provided apartment at Plaza Aldea, Tanay. Mercado also maintained a house in Sto. Tomas, Pasig, where his wife operated a store with video machines that neighborhood youths, including the victim Richard Buama and prosecution witnesses Florencio Villareal and Eric Ona, frequented. The crime was committed on February 9, 1994, after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659, which amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code to introduce the concept of a "special complex crime" of kidnapping with murder or homicide.

On the evening of February 9, 1994, accused-appellant Elpidio Mercado, a PNP officer assigned in Tanay, Rizal, drove to Sto. Tomas, Pasig, where he maintained a house and a store with video machines. He suspected Richard Buama, a 17-year-old minor, and Florencio Villareal, then 12 years old, of having broken into his store and stolen money. Mercado arrived in his red Chevrolet car accompanied by Eric Ona, a 21-year-old neighbor. They first encountered Florencio, who voluntarily went with them, and then found Richard and Rex Bugayong seated on a street gutter. Rex fled, but Mercado placed his arm around Richard's shoulders while poking a gun at his side. Richard pleaded, saying he would go with them if they would not hurt him. Mercado, Eric, and Florencio then boarded the car and drove to Tanay, Rizal, arriving at around 11 o'clock in the evening.

At the apartment in Tanay, which Mercado shared with co-accused Aurelio Acebron, Mercado slapped and boxed Richard outside before bringing him inside. Mercado then went upstairs and came down with Acebron. Mercado told Acebron he had brought a "present" and that they were going to kill two boys. Acebron replied that the small one should be spared because he resembled his son who would celebrate his birthday the next day. Richard, terrified, could not answer when Acebron asked about a girl's picture found in his wallet, which angered Acebron into boxing Richard in the stomach. Mercado then ordered his aide Jeff to get a rope; Jeff brought a rattan rope and tied Richard's hands while Mercado tied his feet. Richard was gagged and blindfolded with rags. Mercado asked Acebron to get a bolo, which Acebron did. Acebron and Jeff then loaded Richard into the luggage compartment of Mercado's car. Mercado and Acebron drove away, leaving Florencio and Eric in the apartment.

After two hours, Mercado and Acebron returned without Richard. Florencio saw Acebron washing bloodstains off the bolo. When Florencio asked where Richard was, Mercado replied, "Wala na. Pinatahimik ko na." ("Gone. I have already silenced him.") Eric asked the same question and received the answer, "Wala na, pinagpahinga ko na." ("He is gone. I have laid him to rest.") Mercado and Acebron then took Eric and Florencio to a beerhouse in Tanay, where the two accused bragged about the number of people they had killed — Acebron claiming Richard was his 17th victim and Mercado claiming Richard was his 25th. They warned the boys not to tell anyone or they and their families would be killed. Mercado then drove everyone home to Pasig, arriving at around 5:30 in the morning.

Florencio waited three days for news about Richard. On February 12, 1994, he told Richard's sister, Maria Buama, to look for Richard in Tanay. Richard's brother, SPO2 Virgilio Buama, a policeman, found Richard's body at the San Francisco Funeral Homes in Morong, Rizal, having been told the body was recovered near the boundary of Rizal and Laguna. Dr. Jesusa Nieves Vergara, Acting Chief of the Medico-Legal Division of the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted a postmortem examination and found that the cadaver had both hands tied with plastic cord and both feet tied with rattan, sustained nine injuries including abrasions, lacerations, and stab wounds on the head, neck, and left arm, and died of "intracranial hemorrhage as a result of skull fracture." At the PNP headquarters in Hilltop, Taytay, Florencio and Eric identified photographs of Mercado and Acebron from among more than 100 members of the Rizal PNP. Mercado's car was found parked at the Tanay Police Station with blood spots on the backseat.

Accused-appellants raised the defense of alibi, presenting the PNP logbook and formation sheets to show they reported for work at the Tanay police station on February 9, 1994, attended a conference at the Hilltop headquarters from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and attended the evening formation until 8:30 p.m. SPO4 Teofilo Paz Bias corroborated their account. However, Bias admitted that travel time between Tanay and Pasig could take less than hour, especially at nighttime. The trial court found the logbook unreliable, noting that it did not always reflect the actual whereabouts of PNP members and that members signed only once for the entire day. The trial court convicted both accused-appellants of kidnapping with murder and sentenced each to death.

• Constitutionality of the Death Penalty: Accused-appellants argued that Republic Act No. 7659 violated the 1987 Constitution because there were no compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for the enumerated crimes, it constituted cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment, it denied equality before the law by disproportionately affecting the poor, it repudiated international treaty obligations, and it was not a deterrent to crime.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Accused-appellants contended that the trial court erred in credencing the testimonies of Florencio Villareal and Eric Ona despite clashing material inconsistencies in their accounts of the events, which created reasonable doubt.
• Alibi and Physical Impossibility: Accused-appellants maintained that the PNP logbook and duty roster, corroborated by SPO1 Catapusan and SPO4 Bias, established they were on official duty in Tanay on February 9, 1994, from 8:00 a.m. to 8:30 p.m., making it physically impossible for Mercado to pick up the victim in Pasig at 9:00 p.m.
• Absence of Conspiracy: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy without any evidence or basis in fact and law to support a common resolution between them to commit the crime.
• Insufficiency of Evidence for Kidnapping with Homicide: Accused-appellants contended there was no evidence that homicide had been committed in furtherance of or as a consequence of the kidnapping, as no eyewitness testified to the actual killing.
• Alleged Haste of the Trial Court: Accused-appellants charged that the trial court rendered its decision with undue haste — one day after submission of their 32-page joint memorandum — resulting in fatal errors of conviction based on wrong appreciation of facts and speculations.

• Constitutionality of the Death Penalty: Whether Republic Act No. 7659, reimposing the death penalty, is constitutional.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's principal witnesses, Florencio Villareal and Eric Ona, undermine their credibility and create reasonable doubt.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the prosecution's circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for kidnapping with murder absent an eyewitness to the actual killing.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was established between accused-appellants Mercado and Acebron.
• Alibi: Whether the defense of alibi precludes the presence of accused-appellants at the scene of the crime.
• Criminal and Civil Liability: Whether accused-appellants are guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and whether the awards of civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages, and actual damages are proper.
• Haste of Trial Court: Whether the trial court's one-day turnaround in rendering judgment constitutes reversible error.

• Constitutionality of the Death Penalty: Yes. The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 was sustained in People vs. Echegaray, the death penalty not being cruel, unjust, excessive, or unusual punishment, and Congress having properly determined the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
• Credibility of Witnesses: No, the inconsistencies do not undermine credibility. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the veracity of testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. The combination of eighteen circumstances constituted an unbroken chain producing conviction beyond reasonable doubt, satisfying the requisites for circumstantial evidence under Rule 133, Section 4.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established by the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, from which a common design to kill the victim could be logically inferred.
• Alibi: No. Alibi was rejected because the physical impossibility of accused-appellants' presence at the scene was not established — Pasig was only an hour's drive from Tanay — and positive identification by the prosecution witnesses prevails over alibi and denial.
• Criminal and Civil Liability: Yes, accused-appellants are guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder under the last paragraph of Article 267 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The awards of civil indemnity and moral and exemplary damages were deleted because the Buama family, having only informally adopted the victim, were not his legal heirs; only P3,510.00 in actual damages supported by competent receipts was awarded.
• Haste of Trial Court: No. The speed of disposition did not constitute reversible error, the trial court's findings being based on the records and transcripts, and a judge being entitled to study a case before the deadline for promulgation.

• Constitutionality of the Death Penalty: The Court reaffirmed its 12-3 per curiam resolution in People vs. Echegaray, which held that the death penalty is not cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment; that the offenses enumerated in Republic Act No. 7659 satisfy the element of heinousness; that the law provides procedural and substantial safeguards; and that the Constitution does not require a statistically proven rise in crime before the death penalty may be reimposed. The claim of unequal application against the poor was rejected as the law makes no distinction among classes of persons. The argument based on international treaty obligations was rejected because the Philippines neither signed nor ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 6(2) of the Covenant explicitly recognizes capital punishment for the most serious crimes. The claim that the death penalty does not deter crime was rejected, retribution being a legitimate penological aim beyond deterrence.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Court applied the established rule that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is entitled to great weight and is conclusive absent any showing of arbitrariness or oversight of material facts. The twelve alleged inconsistencies between the testimonies of Florencio and Eric, and between their testimonies and their sworn statements, concerned only minor details and collateral matters — such as the exact time of pickup, the manner of entry into the car, the position of Richard's body, the description of the weapon, and the distance of the apartment from the beerhouse. These did not detract from the essential points: that accused-appellants beat the victim, took him away in Mercado's car, and returned admitting they had "silenced" or "laid him to rest." Slight contradictions even strengthen credibility by proving the testimonies were not rehearsed. Discrepancies between affidavits and open-court testimony were explained by the inherent incompleteness and inaccuracy of affidavits, which are taken ex parte and often prepared by investigators using their own language. The imputed motive of revenge — stemming from a January 23, 1994 incident when Mercado slapped Eric and hit Florencio — was rejected as a desperate attempt to discredit the witnesses, it being inconceivable that two young boys would falsely accuse bemedalled police officers of so heinous a crime.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Although no eyewitness testified to the actual killing, the Court applied Rule 133, Section 4, which allows conviction on circumstantial evidence when there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court enumerated eighteen circumstances — from the abduction at gunpoint, the beating at the apartment, the binding and gagging, the loading into the luggage compartment, the two-hour absence, the admissions of having "silenced" and "laid to rest" the victim, the washing of the bloodstained bolo, the bragging about body counts, to the discovery of the victim's body with limbs still bound and mouth gagged — which constituted an unbroken chain pointing to accused-appellants' culpability.

• Conspiracy: Direct proof of conspiracy is not essential; it may be shown by the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. The concatenation of facts — Mercado calling Acebron downstairs, announcing they would kill someone, both slapping and boxing the victim, Acebron getting the bolo on Mercado's order, Acebron helping load the victim into the car compartment, both driving away together and returning without the victim, both admitting the victim had been "silenced" or "laid to rest," and Acebron washing the bloodstained bolo — established a common design to kill Richard beyond reasonable doubt.

• Alibi: For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove both presence at another place and the physical impossibility of being at the scene of the crime. The trial court found the PNP logbook unreliable, as it did not always reflect actual whereabouts and members signed only once for the entire day. Even assuming accused-appellants were in Tanay, it was not physically impossible for them to be in Pasig, which was only an hour's drive away, especially at nighttime when traffic was light. Moreover, the evening formation ended at 8:30 p.m., and the abduction occurred at around 9:00 p.m. Above all, the positive identification of accused-appellants by Florencio and Eric, coupled with the absence of any plausible reason for the witnesses to testify falsely, rendered the alibi bereft of probative value.

• Criminal and Civil Liability: The crime was committed on February 9, 1994, after the amendment of the Revised Penal Code by Republic Act No. 7659 on December 31, 1993. Article 267, as amended, provides that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Relying on People vs. Ramos, the Court held that this amendment introduced the concept of a "special complex crime" of kidnapping with murder, eliminating the distinction between cases where the killing was purposely sought and those where it was an afterthought. It is sufficient that the victim is "killed or dies as a consequence of the detention"; the presence of circumstances qualifying the killing as murder is not required, although in this case treachery attended the killing as the victim's limbs were tied and his mouth gagged. As to civil liability, the Buama family had only informally adopted Richard and thus could not be considered his legal heirs under Articles 782 and 2206 of the Civil Code, which define "heirs" as the deceased's spouse, legitimate, and illegitimate ascendants and descendants. The awards of P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P100,000.00 moral and exemplary damages were therefore deleted. Of the P52,680.00 claimed as actual damages, only P3,510.00 was supported by competent receipts — P1,300.00 for a burial mass issued by the Immaculate Conception Parish Church and P2,210.00 for flowers issued by Lourdes Vergara herself — and was awarded accordingly.

• Haste of Trial Court: A review of the trial court's decision showed its findings were based on the records and transcripts of stenographic notes. A judge is not required to study a case only after all pleadings are filed; studying a case before the deadline is a mark of diligence. As long as the trial judge does not sacrifice orderly administration of justice for speed, he cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with due dispatch.

• Special Complex Crime of Kidnapping with Murder — Under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Article 48 nor treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime, with the maximum penalty of death imposed. The Court applied this by affirming the trial court's conviction of both accused-appellants for the single special complex crime, it being sufficient that the victim was "killed or dies as a consequence of the detention."

• Circumstantial Evidence Sufficiency Test — Conviction may rest on purely circumstantial evidence when: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found eighteen circumstances forming an unbroken chain establishing guilt.

• Credibility of Witnesses; Minor Inconsistencies — Inconsistencies referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the veracity and weight of testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants. Slight contradictions strengthen credibility by proving testimonies are not rehearsed and serve as safeguards against memorized perjury.

• Inferiority of Affidavits to Open-Court Testimony — Affidavits are generally considered inferior to testimony given in open court because they are taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, and are typically prepared by an investigator who may use his own language or misunderstand the affiant.

• Conspiracy; Proof by Conduct — Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy; it may be shown by the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, from which a common design may be logically inferred.

• Alibi; Requisites — For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime and (b) the physical impossibility of being at the scene of the crime. Alibi is inherently weak and easily fabricated and cannot prevail over positive identification.

• Heirs; Definition for Civil Indemnity — The term "heirs" is limited to the deceased's spouse, legitimate, and illegitimate ascendants and descendants under Articles 782 and 2206 of the Civil Code. A family that only informally adopted the victim cannot be considered his legal heirs and thus cannot recover civil indemnity and moral damages for his death.

• "Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659." — This passage, quoting People vs. Ramos, articulates the controlling rule on the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 and is the ratio decidendi for affirming the conviction and death penalty.

• "Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. They are thus safeguards against memorized perjury." — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine on minor inconsistencies in witness testimony, frequently cited in subsequent Philippine jurisprudence on credibility.

• "An affidavit, 'being taken ex-parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion, and sometimes from want of suggestion and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject.'" — This passage states the rationale for the doctrinal inferiority of affidavits to open-court testimony, explaining why discrepancies between sworn statements and trial testimony do not necessarily impair credibility.

• "Alibi is generally regarded with suspicion and is always received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it can be easily fabricated and concocted. For alibi to prosper as a defense, it must be convincing enough to preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident." — This is the standard formulation of the requisites for a successful alibi defense, applied here to reject the accused-appellants' claim of official duty in Tanay.

• People vs. Echegaray, 335 Phil. 343 (1997) — Controlling precedent on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659; the Court's 12-3 per curiam resolution upheld the death penalty as not cruel, degrading, or inhuman, and held that Congress properly determined compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Followed.
• Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, 297 SCRA 754 (1998) — Sustained the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8177 (death by lethal injection) against claims of cruel punishment and treaty violations. Followed.
• People vs. Ramos, 297 SCRA 618 (1998) — Established the doctrine on the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder under the last paragraph of Article 267 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, eliminating the distinction between purposeful and afterthought killings. Followed and applied directly to the facts.
• People vs. Fulinara, 317 Phil. 31 (1995) — Cited for the proposition that conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence even without an eyewitness to the actual killing, where the circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain. Followed.
• People vs. Mijano, 311 SCRA 81 (1999) — Cited for the rejection of the equal protection challenge to the death penalty, the law making no distinction among classes of persons. Followed.
• People vs. Paraiso, G.R. No. 127840, Nov. 29, 1999 — Cited for the rule that actual damages must be based on competent proof and the best evidence available; a list of burial expenses prepared by someone other than the witness testifying was disregarded as hearsay. Followed.
• Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Ybañez, 24 SCRA 989 (1968) — Cited for the proposition that moral damages for the death of a brother caused by quasi-delict were disallowed, supporting the deletion of damages to the Buama family as non-heirs. Followed.

• Article 267, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines kidnapping and serious illegal detention and provides that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty (death) shall be imposed. The Court applied this provision to convict accused-appellants of the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder.
• Article III, Section 19(1), 1987 Constitution — Provides that excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment inflicted, and that neither shall the death penalty be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it. The Court upheld Republic Act No. 7659 as a valid exercise of this constitutional authorization.
• Article III, Section 1, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees due process and equal protection of the laws; cited to reject the argument that the death penalty disproportionately affects the poor.
• Rule 133, Section 4, Rules of Court — Sets the requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction: more than one circumstance, proven facts, and a combination producing conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Applied to uphold the conviction absent an eyewitness to the killing.
• Articles 782 and 2206, Civil Code — Define "heirs" as the deceased's spouse, legitimate, and illegitimate ascendants and descendants; applied to deny the Buama family, as informal adopters, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Basis for awarding exemplary damages; the award was deleted because the claimants were not legal heirs.
• Section 25, Republic Act No. 7659 (amending Article 83, Revised Penal Code) — Requires that upon finality of a death penalty decision, the records be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency. The Court directed compliance in the dispositive portion.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred. Four members of the Court maintained their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is unconstitutional, but nevertheless submitted to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.