People vs. Mercado

Theft is consummated at the place where the offender takes the personal property of another with intent to gain; the subsequent carrying of the stolen property to another province does not make theft a continuing crime and does not confer jurisdiction on the courts of the place where the property is later found.

The case concerns two theft charges over carabaos owned by Pedro A. Ladores and Leon Ladores. The legal backdrop is the territorial limitation on CFI criminal jurisdiction under section 6 of General Orders No. 58 and the definition of theft in article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

On or about June 21, 1936, the provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations in the CFI of Pampanga against Francisco Mercado for theft of large cattle. The first information alleged that in Candaba, Pampanga, Mercado, with intent of gain, took and carried away two male carabaos with certificates Nos. 7361553, dated at Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija, on October 29, 1929, and 6993322, dated at Gapan, Nueva Ecija, on June 3, 1933, both belonging to Pedro A. Ladores, each worth P60 and to his damage in the total amount of P120. The second information alleged that on the same date and place, Mercado took and carried away one male carabao with certificate No. 6696261, dated at Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija, on April 11, 1928, valued at P90, owned by Leon Ladores, without his knowledge and consent. Both informations alleged that the commission of the crime was commenced at Gapan, Nueva Ecija, and consummated or completed at Candaba, Pampanga.

The informations were filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga after the report of preliminary inquiries made, upon complaint, by the justice of the peace court of Candaba, Pampanga, where the case originated. Mercado waived his right to a preliminary investigation and asked that the two cases be remanded to the CFI for trial and final judgment.

The CFI found that, although the stolen animals were afterwards brought by Mercado to Candaba, Pampanga, where they were found in his possession, the crimes had taken place and had been committed in Gapan, Nueva Ecija.

• Continuing Crime and Jurisdiction: The prosecution, as appellant, argued that there are crimes considered continuing, such as those whose execution or consummation continues successively and uninterruptedly until stopped by a cause independent of the offender’s will; it invoked abduction cases like United States vs. Bernabe and estafa cases like United States vs. Cardell and United States vs. Santiago, and American authorities in Corpus Juris, Wharton, and Clark holding that a thief who carries stolen goods from one county to another may be convicted in either. On that basis, it contended that the CFI of Pampanga had jurisdiction because Mercado brought the carabaos to Candaba, Pampanga.

• Jurisdiction over Theft: Whether the CFI of Pampanga has jurisdiction to try and decide the two theft cases where the informations allege that Mercado stole the carabaos in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, and later brought them to Candaba, Pampanga, where they were found in his possession.
• Continuing Crime: Whether theft of large cattle is a continuing crime that may be prosecuted in the place where the stolen animals are later found or brought.

• Jurisdiction over Theft: No. The thefts were wholly committed in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, because under article 308 of the Revised Penal Code theft is consummated upon taking with intent to gain; the CFI of Pampanga therefore lacked jurisdiction.
• Continuing Crime: No. Theft is not a continuing crime merely because the stolen property is carried to another province; the common-law larceny rule and the abduction and estafa cases relied on by the prosecution do not apply.

• Jurisdiction over Theft: The SC began from the rule that one cannot be held to answer for a crime except in the jurisdiction where it was committed, based on section 6 of General Orders No. 58, which requires the complaint or information to allege that the crime was committed within the CFI’s jurisdiction. Citing United States vs. Cunanan, the SC noted that CFI criminal jurisdiction is limited to defined territory and cannot extend to offenses committed outside it. The informations alleged that the theft was commenced in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, and consummated or completed in Candaba, Pampanga. Under article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft requires (a) taking away of personal property, (b) property belonging to another, (c) intent to gain, (d) lack of consent of the owner, and (e) no violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. The SC held that the thefts were wholly committed in Gapan: when Mercado took the carabaos with intent to gain while they were in Gapan, all acts of execution necessary for consummation were performed. It was not necessary that he realize actual gain or remove the animals to Candaba to use or benefit from them. Thus the prosecution should have been commenced in Nueva Ecija, and the CFI of Pampanga had no jurisdiction.

• Continuing Crime: The SC rejected the prosecution’s continuing-crime theory. It distinguished United States vs. Bernabe, where the carrying away of the offended party occurred in Manila but the unchaste designs essential to abduction were not manifested until the offender and victim were in Rizal, so the offense was consummated only in Rizal. It also distinguished the estafa cases United States vs. Cardell and United States vs. Santiago, where the accused appropriated collections in Cebu and Iloilo but had expressly bound themselves to account for or deliver the collections in Manila, making the crimes triable there. The American larceny authorities cited by the prosecution did not apply because common-law larceny requires a taking and carrying away, while Philippine theft under article 308 does not make asportation beyond the taking an indispensable requisite. The SC also noted that the Texas rule allowing prosecution where stolen property is carried was based on an express statutory provision. Practical considerations likewise supported venue at the place of taking, since allowing prosecution wherever the thief carried the property would force the owner to follow the thief at expense and delay and would encourage thieves to carry stolen property as far as possible. Therefore the theft was not a continuing crime and Pampanga could not try it.

• Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases — Criminal jurisdiction is limited to the territory where the offense was committed; a complaint or information must allege that the crime was committed within the CFI’s jurisdiction. The SC applied this to hold that the CFI of Pampanga could not try thefts committed in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, even if the stolen carabaos were later found in Candaba, Pampanga.
• Theft under Article 308, Revised Penal Code — The elements are: (a) taking away of personal property; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is with intent to gain; (d) it is without the owner’s consent; and (e) there is no violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. The SC applied this to hold that Mercado’s taking of the carabaos in Gapan consummated theft there.
• Consummation of theft — Theft is consummated once the offender takes the personal property of another with intent to gain; actual gain or the carrying of the stolen property to another place is not required. The SC applied this to hold that removal of the carabaos to Candaba did not postpone consummation to Pampanga.
• Continuing crime — A continuing crime is one whose execution or consummation continues successively and uninterruptedly until stopped by a cause independent of the offender’s will. The SC held that theft is not such a crime merely because the stolen property is carried to another province; the abduction and estafa cases relied on by the prosecution were distinguishable.
• Intent to gain presumed — Intent to gain is presumed from all furtive taking of useful property belonging to another unless special circumstances reveal a different intent. The SC applied this because the informations alleged a taking without the owner’s consent and did not allege any other purpose.

• “In criminal proceedings, the rule is that one can not be held to answer for any crime committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was committed.” — The SC used this as the starting point for its territorial-jurisdiction analysis and held that the CFI of Pampanga could not try the thefts committed in Nueva Ecija.
• “we hold that the thefts charged in the two informations already referred to were wholly committed in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, and that for their consummation nothing else remained to be done from the moment that the appellee took away, with intent to gain, said animals while they were yet in said municipality and province.” — This is the ratio: the taking in Gapan completed the theft, so venue lay there.
• “It was not necessary that there had been real or actual gain on his party or that he had removed the stolen animals to the town of Candaba, in the Province of Pampanga, in order to make use of or derive some benefit from them.” — The SC rejected the idea that carrying the carabaos to Pampanga was needed for consummation or jurisdiction.
• “The intent to gain is the usual motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another, unless special circumstance reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.” — The SC used this presumption to conclude that Mercado took the carabaos with intent to gain from the moment of taking in Gapan.

• United States vs. Cunanan, 26 Phil., 3760 — Cited for the rule that CFI criminal jurisdiction is limited to defined territory and cannot extend to offenses committed outside it.
• United States vs. Bernabe, 23 Phil., 154 — Distinguished; abduction was consummated in Rizal because the unchaste designs essential to the offense were first manifested there, unlike theft which was complete upon taking.
• United States vs. Cardell, 23 Phil., 207 — Distinguished; estafa was triable in Manila because the accused bound himself to account for or deliver collections there.
• United States vs. Santiago, 27 Phil., 408 — Distinguished on the same estafa ground as Cardell.
• United States vs. Adiao, 38 Phil., 754 — Followed; theft was consummated when the accused performed all acts of execution necessary for the crime, even if he had not used or benefited from the stolen property.

• Section 6, General Orders No. 58 — Requires the complaint or information to allege that the crime was committed within the jurisdiction of the CFI; the SC applied it to hold that the theft cases should have been filed in Nueva Ecija. The decision also refers to section 6, No. 4.
• Article 308, Revised Penal Code — Defines theft as taking personal property of another with intent to gain, without violence against or intimidation of persons and without force upon things, and without the owner’s consent; the SC applied it to hold that theft was consummated in Gapan upon the taking.