People vs. Mendoza

A dying declaration retains its probative force even if the declarant survives for several days after making it, provided the statement was uttered under a consciousness of impending death at the time. Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, as conclusively as the killing itself; it cannot be inferred merely from the fact that the victim was unarmed and sustained fatal wounds, absent a showing of the deliberate and conscious adoption of a mode of attack that rendered self-defense impossible.

On the evening of October 11, 1998, in Caloocan City, Prudencio Valdoz was repeatedly stabbed. An eyewitness identified Rolando Mendoza and Reynaldo Balverde as the assailants. Valdoz was taken to the East Avenue Medical Center where, believing he would die, he named both men to a co-worker and, the following day, gave a written statement to the police acknowledging that his wounds were fatal. He died on October 19, 1998 from septic shock caused by multiple stab wounds. Mendoza was charged with murder together with Balverde; only Mendoza was apprehended and stood trial.

• The Stabbing: Around 8:00 p.m. on October 11, 1998, Eduardo Mariquit was walking home on Sta. Rita Street, San Vicente Ferrer, Tala, Caloocan City, when he saw appellant Rolando Mendoza (alias “Patsy”) and Reynaldo Balverde (alias “Jingjing”) stabbing Prudencio Valdoz. Appellant used a kitchen knife, stabbing the victim twice on the side below the left armpit; Balverde used a butcher’s knife and stabbed the victim once. Valdoz staggered and collapsed. Balverde approached Mariquit and warned him, “Wala kang nakita, wala kang narinig.” The assailants then fled. Mariquit assisted Valdoz to his house about twelve meters away and later informed the victim’s brother, Manuel Valdoz.

• The Victim’s Declarations: Neighbor Estrellita Carmelo heard a commotion and found Valdoz wounded. She and others transported him first to Tala Hospital and then to East Avenue Medical Center. Inside the operating room, Valdoz, in great pain, called Carmelo close and told her, “Ate, baka mamatay ako sasabihin ko sa iyo kung sino an[g] sumaksak sa akin, tandaan mo lang huwag mong kalimutan,” and named appellant and Balverde. The following day, October 12, 1998, PO3 Alex Barroga of the Caloocan City Police interviewed Valdoz at the hospital. In the presence of relatives and Carmelo, and while gasping for breath, Valdoz gave an ante-mortem statement identifying the same two assailants, and answered “Opo” when asked, “Sa palagay mo, ikamamatay mo ang tinamong sugat sa pagsaksak sa iyo?” He signed the statement with Manuel Valdoz and Merle Valdoz as witnesses.

• Death and Autopsy: Valdoz died on October 19, 1998. Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra, Medico-Legal Officer, conducted an autopsy. Her Medico‑Legal Report No. M-1595-98, as corrected, disclosed four stab wounds on the trunk: one piercing the left dome of the diaphragm, another piercing the head of the pancreas and the small intestine and its mesentery, and two more piercing the loops and mesentery of the small intestine. All wounds were described as fatal. The cause of death was septic shock secondary to multiple wounds of the trunk, status post exploratory laparotomy.

• Defense Version: Appellant denied stabbing the victim. He claimed that after a brief altercation between the intoxicated victim and Balverde at a closed store, appellant intervened and urged the victim to go home. Appellant then saw Balverde follow the victim uphill; he called out, and the next thing he saw was Balverde and the victim engaged in a fistfight. Appellant tried to separate them. Because the lighting was poor, he could not see clearly; he only noticed the victim raise his left arm and utter “Hah” before walking away and falling to his knees. Only after lifting Valdoz did appellant realize that the victim’s shirt was soaked in blood. Appellant attempted to chase Balverde but lost him. He did not report the incident to the police. Appellant alleged that eyewitness Mariquit had a grudge because appellant had driven him away three weeks earlier without giving him anything to eat.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: Whether the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Eduardo Mariquit despite alleged inconsistencies and an asserted ill motive.

• Dying Declaration: Whether the victim’s ante-mortem statements were made under a consciousness of impending death and therefore admissible as dying declarations.

• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: The trial court’s assessment of credibility was accorded great respect and left undisturbed. Mariquit testified in a categorical, candid, and convincing manner, positively identifying appellant as a perpetrator. The alleged inconsistencies—concerning the order of events, the precise number of wounds, or the exact words of the co-accused—were minor and did not detract from the essential credibility of the testimony. The sworn statement, taken ex parte, could not override the clear and detailed declarations made in open court. The imputed ill motive was flimsy and insufficient to negate an otherwise credible positive identification. Findings of the trial court on witness credibility are entitled to the highest degree of respect absent any showing that it overlooked facts of substance.

• Dying Declaration: Both the oral declaration to Carmelo and the written statement to PO3 Barroga qualified as dying declarations under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Consciousness of impending death was shown by the victim’s own words—“baka mamatay ako”—and his affirmative answer when asked if his wounds would cause his death. Moreover, the nature and extent of the four fatal stab wounds necessarily engendered such consciousness. The fact that the victim lived for several more days did not destroy the declarations’ probative value, because the rule does not require that death follow immediately; it is sufficient that the statement was made under a settled belief of approaching death and that the declarant subsequently died from the injuries. The brother’s testimony about the victim’s later strength did not negate the declarant’s state of mind at the time the declarations were made.

• Treachery: Treachery was not established. Although an eyewitness saw the stabbing, the prosecution adduced no evidence on the manner in which the aggression began or on any deliberate and conscious adoption of a mode of attack that left the victim without an opportunity for self-defense or retaliation. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, as conclusively as the killing itself. Because the circumstances surrounding the commencement of the attack were not shown, the qualifying circumstance could not be appreciated, and the killing was classified only as homicide.

• Dying Declaration (Ante-mortem Statement) — Under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a dying declaration is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule upon proof of these requisites: (1) death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (3) the declaration relates to facts the victim was competent to testify to; and (4) the declaration is offered in a case where the declarant’s death is the subject of inquiry. Consciousness of impending death may be shown by the declarant’s express statements or inferred from the nature and extent of the wounds. The declarant need not die immediately or within a fixed period after making the statement; survival for a time thereafter does not impair admissibility, as long as the declaration was made under a settled belief of approaching death and death resulted from the injury.

• Treachery — Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, treachery is a qualifying circumstance requiring proof of two elements: (1) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation, and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of such means. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. Where the evidence fails to show how the aggression commenced or the particulars of the mode of attack, treachery cannot be appreciated and the crime is homicide only.

• Credibility of Witnesses — The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court overlooked facts or circumstances of substance that would affect the result. Minor inconsistencies in a witness’s narration do not impair credibility if the testimony is coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole. Affidavits taken ex parte are generally incomplete and less reliable than open court declarations; discrepancies between an affidavit and trial testimony do not automatically discredit a witness.

• “The reasons for the admissibility of a dying declaration as an exception to the hearsay rule are (a) necessity and (b) trustworthiness. Necessity, because death renders a declarant's taking the witness stand impossible, and it often happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime. Hence, the declaration is allowed to prevent a failure of justice. And trustworthiness, for in the language of Lord Baron Eyre, the declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and every hope of this world is gone, when every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth.” — The decision anchors the dying declaration exception on the twin justifications of necessity and trustworthiness.

• “The rule on dying declarations does not require that the person ‘should be at the time in the throes of death, or that he should die immediately, or within any specified time thereafter, in order to give the declaration probative force. Where a person has been fatally wounded, is in sore distress therefrom, and believes that he will not recover and is soon to die, his statement made in this belief relating to the cause of his injury is admissible, if it appears that he subsequently died from the direct effects of the wound, although he may have revived after making the statements or may have lived a considerable time thereafter, and may have again begun to hope for recovery.’” — A frequently cited passage clarifying that survival after a dying declaration does not defeat its admissibility.

• People v. Bautista, 278 SCRA 613 (1997) — Followed. Reiterated the principle that a declarant’s survival for some time after making a dying declaration does not affect its probative force, directly refuting appellant’s attempt to invalidate the victim’s statements.

• People v. Casingal, 337 SCRA 100 (2000); People v. Aquino, 322 SCRA 769 (2000) — Followed. Supplied the two elements of treachery, which were applied in finding the qualifying circumstance unsubstantiated.

• People v. Silva, 321 SCRA 647 (1999) — Followed. Emphasized that treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself, and that absent details of the mode of attack, treachery cannot be appreciated.

• Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Dying Declaration) — Applied in evaluating the admissibility of the victim’s ante-mortem statements. The requisites were satisfied because the victim twice identified his assailants under a consciousness of impending death caused by multiple fatal stab wounds, and the statements were offered in the prosecution for his death.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (Murder) — The provision was examined in relation to the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Because treachery was not proved, the crime could not be classified as murder.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code (Homicide) — Applied as the proper designation following the failure to prove any qualifying circumstance. The penalty of reclusion temporal was imposed in its medium period in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

Melo, Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concurred.