People vs. Melendrez

Recidivism may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in imposing the principal penalty for the crime committed, notwithstanding the imposition of an additional penalty for habitual delinquency under Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ricardo Melendrez y Nieto had been previously convicted by final judgment twice of theft and once of estafa, with his last conviction for estafa rendered on September 3, 1932. The Revised Penal Code had recently taken effect, supplanting the old Penal Code, and its enforcement had produced a difference of opinion among the members of the Supreme Court on whether recidivism could still be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance when the defendant was already subject to the additional penalty prescribed for habitual delinquency.

An information was filed charging Ricardo Melendrez y Nieto and Elias Martinez with robbery committed on or about June 15, 1933, in the municipality of Pasay, Province of Rizal, within two and one-half miles from the limits of the City of Manila. The two accused allegedly conspired and helped each other in willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously breaking open the door of a store located at No. 85 Cementina, Pasay — an inhabited house belonging to and occupied by Tin Bun Boc — and, once inside, taking personal properties without the owner's consent. The items stolen included money amounting to P30.26, a gold-plated Elgin watch with a gold-filled chain valued at P25.00, a solid gold Chinese signet ring valued at P13.50, a buntal hat valued at P4.50, packages of Camel and Chesterfield cigarettes, and three cans of Milkmaid, totaling P76.68 in damage and prejudice to the owner.

The information further alleged that Melendrez was a habitual delinquent, he having been previously convicted by final judgment of competent courts twice of theft and once of estafa, with his last conviction for estafa on September 3, 1932. At the time of trial, Elias Martinez had not yet been apprehended, so only Melendrez was arraigned. He pleaded guilty to the charge.

Upon the plea of guilty, the trial court found Melendrez guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to eight years and one day of prision mayor, and to serve an additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor for being a habitual delinquent. From this judgment, Melendrez appealed.

• Lack of instruction as mitigating circumstance: Appellant contended that his lack of instruction should be considered as a mitigating circumstance in the commission of the crime.

• Recidivism as aggravating circumstance: The fiscal argued that the aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account against the appellant in imposing the penalty.

• Lack of instruction: Whether lack of instruction may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in crimes of robbery.
• Plea of guilty: Whether the plea of guilty upon arraignment is a mitigating circumstance properly appreciated in favor of the appellant.
• Recidivism and habitual delinquency: Whether the aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account in imposing the principal penalty, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant is also sentenced to an additional penalty as a habitual delinquent.

• Lack of instruction: No. Lack of instruction cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance in crimes of robbery, and the records afforded no basis to judge the appellant's degree of instruction because no evidence was taken on that point, he having pleaded guilty.
• Plea of guilty: Yes. The plea of guilty upon arraignment is a mitigating circumstance that should be considered in the appellant's favor.
• Recidivism and habitual delinquency: Yes. The aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account in imposing the principal penalty in its corresponding degree, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant is also sentenced to an additional penalty as a habitual delinquent.

• Lack of instruction: The Court has repeatedly held in its various decisions that lack of instruction cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance in crimes of robbery. Independently of that settled rule, the records of the case afforded no basis on which to judge the degree of instruction of the appellant, inasmuch as no evidence was taken relative thereto — he having pleaded guilty upon arraignment. The contention was therefore rejected on both doctrinal and evidentiary grounds.
• Plea of guilty: The fact that the appellant pleaded guilty upon arraignment is a recognized mitigating circumstance under the Revised Penal Code. It was properly appreciated in his favor, offsetting the aggravating circumstance of recidivism in the application of the Indeterminate period rules.
• Recidivism and habitual delinquency: The fiscal's claim that recidivism should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance was in accordance with the Court's earlier ruling in People vs. Aguinaldo (47 Phil., 728) rendered under the old Penal Code. The enforcement of the Revised Penal Code had produced a difference of opinion among the members of the Court on this point. After reviewing all decisions affecting the matter, rendered both in banc and in division, the Court held that recidivism should be taken into account in imposing the principal penalty in its corresponding degree, notwithstanding the additional penalty for habitual delinquency. The facts alleged constituted robbery committed without the use of arms in an inhabited house, the value of the articles taken being less than P250. Under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty is prision correccional in its medium degree. Because there was a concurrence of one mitigating circumstance (plea of guilty) and one aggravating circumstance (recidivism), the penalty was imposed in its medium degree, yielding two years, eleven months, and eleven days.

• Recidivism and habitual delinquency are not mutually exclusive — Recidivism may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in imposing the principal penalty for the crime committed, even when the defendant is also sentenced to an additional penalty as a habitual delinquent under Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code. The additional penalty for habitual delinquency does not absorb or supersede the aggravating effect of recidivism on the principal penalty. The Court reached this holding after reviewing all prior decisions on the matter, both in banc and in division, resolving a conflict that arose upon the enforcement of the Revised Penal Code.
• Lack of instruction in robbery — Lack of instruction cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance in crimes of robbery. This rule had been repeatedly affirmed in the Court's various decisions and was reaffirmed in this case.

• "it is now held that the aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account in imposing the principal penalty in its corresponding degree, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant is also sentenced to suffer an additional penalty as a habitual delinquent." — This is the ratio decidendi of the case, resolving the conflict among members of the Court on whether recidivism remains appreciable when habitual delinquency is also present under the Revised Penal Code.
• "lack of instruction cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance in crimes of robbery" — This reaffirms a settled doctrinal rule excluding lack of instruction as a mitigating circumstance in robbery cases, a point the Court noted it had repeatedly held.

• People vs. Aguinaldo, 47 Phil., 728 — Cited as the controlling authority under the old Penal Code for the proposition that recidivism should be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance. The Court followed and reaffirmed this rule under the Revised Penal Code, resolving the conflict that had arisen after the new Code took effect.

• Article 299, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for robbery in an inhabited house committed without the use of arms where the value of the articles taken is less than P250. The Court applied this provision to determine that the prescribed penalty is prision correccional in its medium degree, which was then imposed in its medium degree due to the concurrence of one mitigating and one aggravating circumstance.
• Article 14, paragraph 9, Revised Penal Code — Defines a recidivist as one who, at the time of trial for one crime, has been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Code. Cited in the separate opinion of Abad Santos, J.
• Article 62, paragraph 5(c), Revised Penal Code — Defines habitual delinquency as being found guilty of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsification a third time or oftener within ten years from release or last conviction. Cited in the separate opinion of Abad Santos, J.

Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

• Abad Santos, J. — Concurred in part and dissented in part. He disagreed with the majority's holding that recidivism should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in imposing the principal penalty when the defendant is also a habitual delinquent. He reasoned that recidivism is an inherent element of habitual delinquency: a person found guilty for the second time of the crimes enumerated in Article 62 is a recidivist under Article 14, paragraph 9; if found guilty for the third time or oftener, he is deemed a habitual delinquent. Because the law already determines the effect to be given to a second, third, fourth, and fifth conviction, it would be beyond the purpose of the law to again take into consideration the legal effect of the previous, second conviction when imposing the penalty for the third or subsequent conviction. He agreed with the remainder of the decision.