People vs. Masinag Vda. de Ramos

An extrajudicial confession is admissible only against the confessant and not against a co-accused; for a conspirator’s admission to be received against a co-accused, there must be independent evidence, apart from the confession, establishing the existence of conspiracy. Furthermore, hearsay testimony that merely recites what another person told the witness has no probative value to prove a co-accused’s participation in a conspiracy. Conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt through evidence of an overt act in furtherance of the common criminal design.

On the morning of July 17, 1992, the bodies of spouses Romualdo Jael and Leonila Caringal were discovered inside their home in Lucena City. They had sustained multiple stab wounds, and various personal properties were missing. Several individuals were subsequently charged with Robbery with Double Homicide, including Decena Masinag Vda. de Ramos, who was alleged to have conspired with the principal offenders by furnishing information about the victims. The prosecution’s case relied principally on the statements of state witness Ariel Dador and the extrajudicial confession of accused Cesar Osabel.

• The Alleged Plan: In the evening of July 15, 1992, Cesar Osabel brought Ariel Dador and a man identified only as Purcino to the house of appellant Decena Masinag Vda. de Ramos in Isabang, Lucena City. Osabel and Masinag talked privately inside a room while Dador and Purcino waited outside. On the way home, Osabel told Dador and Purcino that he and Masinag had planned to rob the spouses Romualdo and Leonila Jael. Osabel said Masinag had informed him that the spouses were old, rich, and easy to rob because only their daughter resided with them.

• Execution of the Robbery and Killings: The following evening, July 16, 1992, at about 7:00 p.m., Dador, Osabel, and Purcino went to the Jaels’ residence. Osabel and Purcino entered the house; Dador remained outside about 30 meters away. Dador heard a woman inside shouting for help. After about two hours, Osabel and Purcino emerged carrying a karaoke machine and a rifle. Osabel’s hands were bloody. Osabel told Dador he had tied the victims’ hands with a television power cord and stabbed them repeatedly so they could not report the robbery.

• Disposal of the Loot: Dador was instructed to hire a tricycle, but upon his return Osabel and Purcino were gone. Dador later found them at Osabel’s house counting money taken from the victims. They gave Dador P300.00. When Dador accompanied them to Sta. Cruz, Manila to sell the karaoke machine, Dador received an additional P500.00. Osabel had the stolen rifle repaired in Gulang-Gulang, Lucena City.

• Discovery of the Bodies: On the morning of July 17, 1992, Simeon Tabor, a neighbor, noticed that the Jaels—who were known to be early risers—had not come out of their house. Tabor sent his son to fetch the victims’ son, SPO1 Lamberto Jael. Upon entering the house, they found bloodstains leading to the bathroom, where the lifeless bodies of the victims lay.

• Autopsy Findings: Dr. Vicente F. Martinez conducted the post-mortem examination. His findings indicated that Romualdo Jael died six to eight hours before the examination, while Leonila Jael died before midnight of July 16, 1992. The cause of death for both was massive shock secondary to massive hemorrhage and multiple stab wounds.

• Arrests and Confessions: Dador and Osabel were later arrested for the killing of another individual, Cesar M. Sante. During the investigation, Dador executed an extrajudicial confession admitting his role in the Jael robbery-killings and implicating appellant Masinag and Osabel. The confession was given with the assistance of Atty. Rey Oliver Alejandrino, a former Regional Director of the Human Rights Commission. Osabel also executed an extrajudicial confession implicating himself and appellant, likewise with the assistance of Atty. Alejandrino. At trial, Osabel repudiated his confession, claiming it was extracted through violence.

• Appellant’s Defense: Appellant Masinag denied any involvement in the robbery and killings. She knew the victims because their houses were about a kilometer apart. She and Osabel were acquaintances—he had courted her, but they never had a romantic relationship—and she claimed she had not seen him for six months before the incident. She did not know Dador or Guilling. She denied harboring any resentment against the victims and asserted she had no participation whatsoever in the conspiracy.

• Insufficiency of Evidence of Conspiracy: Appellant maintained that the trial court erred in finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of conspiring to commit robbery with homicide despite the complete absence of evidence of her actual participation. She argued that the testimony of state witness Dador regarding her role in the plan was hearsay, because he did not personally hear her say anything and merely repeated what Osabel told him. She further contended that Osabel’s extrajudicial confession could not be used against her, as it was inadmissible under the res inter alios acta rule and was later repudiated in court.

• Hearsay: Whether the testimony of state witness Ariel Dador concerning appellant’s participation in the robbery plan constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence.
• Admissibility of Co-Accused’s Extrajudicial Confession: Whether the extrajudicial confession of accused Cesar Osabel was admissible against appellant under the res inter alios acta rule or any recognized exception.
• Proof of Conspiracy: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant conspired with her co-accused to commit robbery with homicide, particularly whether any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was established.

• Hearsay: Dador’s testimony that appellant and Osabel planned the robbery was hearsay and devoid of probative weight. Dador admitted on cross-examination that he never spoke with appellant and was not present during the conversation between appellant and Osabel inside the room. His knowledge of the plan came solely from what Osabel told him on the way home. Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness may testify only to facts of his personal knowledge; testimony based on what another person said is hearsay and inadmissible.

• Admissibility of Co-Accused’s Extrajudicial Confession: Osabel’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against appellant. Pursuant to the res inter alios acta rule embodied in Section 25, Rule 130, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is therefore binding only upon the confessant. The exception for admissions of a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 requires independent evidence of conspiracy apart from the confession itself, and no such independent evidence was presented. Nor could the confession be used as corroborative evidence, as there was no other circumstantial or direct evidence to corroborate.

• Proof of Conspiracy: The prosecution failed to establish appellant’s guilt with moral certainty. Conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself. No overt act attributable to appellant was shown. Even assuming she had knowledge of or acquiesced in the plan, mere knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement—without active participation by performing an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy—is insufficient to hold an accused liable as a co-principal. The evidence did not demonstrate a joint purpose, concerted action, or community of interest directly linking appellant to the crimes. The constitutional presumption of innocence therefore mandated acquittal.

• Hearsay Rule (Section 36, Rule 130, Rules of Court) — A witness can testify only to facts of which he has personal knowledge, i.e., derived from his own perception. Testimony that merely recites what someone else told the witness, whether orally or in writing, is hearsay and inadmissible as evidence. In this case, Dador’s account of the plan was based entirely on Osabel’s statements and carried no evidentiary weight.

• Res Inter Alios Acta Rule (Section 25, Rule 130) — The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against a co-accused. The rationale is that a person ought not to be bound by the acts or declarations of strangers.

• Exception: Conspirator’s Admissions (Section 30, Rule 130) — For an admission made by a conspirator to be admissible against a co-accused, there must be independent evidence, aside from the extrajudicial confession, establishing the existence of conspiracy. This exception was not satisfied because no such independent evidence was adduced.

• Proof of Conspiracy — Conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action, and community of interest. However, except with respect to the mastermind, an overt act performed by the accused in furtherance of the conspiracy must be shown. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate, without active participation, does not constitute a party as a conspirator.

• “Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay.” — Articulates the personal knowledge requirement and the core definition of hearsay.

• “The res inter alios acta rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused.” — States the fundamental principle rendering Osabel’s confession inadmissible against appellant.

• “Conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself. … it must also be shown that appellant performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” — Encapsulates the high evidentiary standard for conspiracy and the requirement of an overt act.

• People v. Berroya, 347 Phil. 410 (1997) — Followed for the rule that a co-conspirator must have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy to be held liable as a co-principal.

• People v. Raquel, 333 Phil. 72 (1996) — Cited as authority for the res inter alios acta principle and the inadmissibility of an extrajudicial confession against a co-accused.

• Sanvicente v. People, G.R. No. 132081 (November 26, 2002) — Applied for the proposition that evidence based on what a witness was supposedly told is without evidentiary weight for being patently hearsay.

• People v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 138608 (September 24, 2002) — Relied upon for the doctrine that, save for the mastermind, proof of conspiracy requires an overt act in furtherance thereof.

• Section 25, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Res inter alios acta rule: the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Applied to exclude Osabel’s extrajudicial confession as evidence against appellant.

• Section 30, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Admissions by a conspirator are admissible against a co-accused only upon independent evidence of conspiracy. The Court held that this exception was inapplicable due to the absence of independent proof.

• Section 36, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Testimony confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. Applied in rejecting Dador’s testimony about the robbery plan.

Chief Justice Davide, Jr. (Chairman), and Justices Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna concurred.

None.