People vs. Marlon Lacerna

A person charged under Section 4 of R.A. 6425 for "giving away" prohibited drugs may be convicted of "illegal possession" under Section 8 of the same Act, possession being a necessary element and necessarily included offense in the crimes of sale, delivery, or giving away of prohibited drugs. The phrase "give away" requires a transfer of ownership by way of gift or premium, not merely the physical handing over of an object between co-accused inside a vehicle.

Appellant Marlon Lacerna y Aranador and his co-accused Noriel Lacerna y Cordero were charged under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675, in relation to Section 21, Article IV thereof. The case arose in the context of a nationwide anti-drug enforcement effort involving mobile patrol units of the Western Police District tasked with manning checkpoints and monitoring strategic locations in Manila pursuant to orders from police command. Appellant and co-accused were cousins en route to North Harbor to board a vessel for Iloilo City, carrying luggage that included a plastic bag allegedly entrusted to them by their uncle.

On September 12, 1992, at about 2:00 p.m., Police Officer 3 Carlito P. Valenzuela of the Mobile Patrol Division of the Western Police District was manning a checkpoint and patrolling the sidestreets of Radial Road near Moriones Street, Manila, pursuant to orders from General Nazareno to monitor strategic places in the city. He and his companion, PO3 Angelito Camero, were cruising the area in their mobile patrol car when a taxicab passed by in heavy traffic. Appellant Marlon Lacerna was seated beside the driver while co-accused Noriel Lacerna occupied the left back seat. When PO3 Valenzuela looked at the occupants, they bowed their heads and slouched, refusing to meet his gaze. Feeling that something was amiss, the officers signalled the taxi to pull over.

PO3 Valenzuela asked permission to search the vehicle, and the occupants readily agreed. The officers examined two pieces of luggage: a knapsack and a dark blue plastic grocery bag. When asked about the contents of the plastic bag, co-accused Noriel answered that it contained his vomit. Skeptical, PO3 Valenzuela poked a hole in the bag and peered inside, finding several blocks wrapped in newspaper emitting the distinct smell of marijuana. He opened one block and saw dried marijuana leaves. Both Lacernas claimed the bag was a "padala" — sent by their uncle from Baguio City for shipment to Iloilo. The officers brought the accused and the plastic bag to the WPD Headquarters on UN Avenue, Manila. At about 9:00 p.m., the accused were turned over to PO3 Rafael Melencio for investigation, and the 18 blocks were turned over to Lt. de Soto, who counted them. The specimens were subsequently brought to the National Bureau of Investigation, where Forensic Chemist Aida A. Pascual examined the 18 blocks and confirmed they tested positive for marijuana.

Appellant set up the defense of denial. He testified that on September 11, 1992, his uncle Edwin Lacerna visited his brother's house in Caloocan City and requested him to bring personal belongings to Iloilo. The following morning, at about 10:00 a.m., appellant and Noriel met their uncle at the Grand Central Station in Monumento, where the uncle placed the plastic bag beside their other baggage. The bag was twisted and knotted on top, and they did not inspect its contents. Appellant's purpose in returning to Iloilo was to obtain requirements for his application to enter the Marines. Noriel had arrived in Manila only three days earlier to look for work and was staying with appellant. Appellant alleged that during the search, the police took the plastic bag to the back of the taxi where the accused could not see the checking. He further claimed that at WPD Headquarters, they were maltreated by a "Kabo" who forced them to admit ownership of the marijuana — Noriel was boxed on the chest, blindfolded, and strangled with a plastic bag for about 30 minutes. They refused to sign the Booking and Arrest Report but were made to impress their fingerprints on a white bond paper.

The trial court found appellant guilty of "giving away to another" marijuana under Section 4 of R.A. 6425, reasoning that appellant had handed the bundled 18 blocks to co-accused Noriel, who seated himself at the rear of the taxi with the marijuana. The trial court held that guilty knowledge was not required by the phrase "give away to another" and that appellant's claim of ignorance of the contents was belied by the pungent odor of marijuana. Co-accused Noriel was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence, the trial court finding that he did not "give away" the marijuana and noting his "probinsyano" traits as making it unlikely he dealt in prohibited drugs.

• Definition of "Giving Away": Appellant argued that the lower court erred in making a sweeping statement that the act of "giving away to another" does not require knowledge of the nature of the thing being passed, as contradistinguished from the term "deliver," where knowledge is required.
• Lack of Knowledge: Appellant maintained that the trial court erred in not giving credence to his assertion that he had no knowledge that the contents of the plastic bag given to him by his uncle were marijuana leaves.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in convicting him despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Illegal Search and Seizure: Appellant argued that the bricks of marijuana were inadmissible as they were obtained through illegal search and seizure, as he and his co-accused were not committing any crime at the time and were merely riding a taxicab to Pier 15, making the arrest and seizure violative of his constitutional right and the seized items "fruits of the poisonous tree."

• Validity of Warrantless Search: The Solicitor General countered that the search and seizure were consistent with the jurisprudential trend liberalizing warrantless search and seizure where culprits are riding moving vehicles, because a warrant cannot be secured in time to apprehend a mobile target.

• Warrantless Search and Seizure: Whether appellant's right against warrantless search and seizure was violated.
• Conviction for "Giving Away": Whether the trial court was correct in convicting appellant for "giving away to another" 18 blocks of marijuana under Section 4 of R.A. 6425.
• Conviction for Illegal Possession: Whether appellant may be held guilty of "illegal possession" of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of R.A. 6425.

• Warrantless Search and Seizure: No. The search was not justified by probable cause, as the occupants' suspicious reactions of hiding their faces and slouching did not constitute probable cause, and the marijuana was securely packed in an airtight bag with no distinctive odor detectable before the bag was opened. However, the search was valid because appellant freely and voluntarily consented to it, consent being a generally recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
• Conviction for "Giving Away": No. The act of physically handing a plastic bag from the front to the back seat of a taxicab between co-accused does not constitute "giving away" prohibited drugs under Section 4, which requires a transfer of ownership by way of gift or premium, a disposition other than a sale involving no consideration.
• Conviction for Illegal Possession: Yes. Appellant was convicted of illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8, possession being a necessary element necessarily included in the crime of "giving away" charged in the Information. All three elements of illegal possession were established: appellant possessed an item identified as a prohibited drug, such possession was unauthorized, and possession was freely and consciously undertaken.

• Warrantless Search and Seizure: The Court first examined the constitutional and statutory framework governing searches and seizures. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and Section 3(2) thereof renders evidence obtained in violation inadmissible. The Court identified five generally accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused. While searches of moving vehicles are allowed upon probable cause, and checkpoints are not per se illegal as long as inspection is merely visual, the Court found that probable cause was absent in this case. The radio communication from General Nazareno concerned possible robbery and holdup cases, not drug trafficking. The occupants' furtive gestures of hiding their faces and slouching did not amount to probable cause. The marijuana was securely packed in an airtight plastic bag twisted and tied at the top, and no distinctive odor was detectable until PO3 Valenzuela poked a hole in the bag — distinguishing this case from People vs. Claudio, where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag carried by the accused. Nonetheless, the search was validated by appellant's voluntary consent. PO3 Valenzuela expressly sought permission before searching, and appellant — described as "urbanized in mannerism and speech" — agreed, stating he had nothing to hide. The Court distinguished this from Aniag, Jr. vs. COMELEC, which outlawed searches based on mere implied acquiescence given under intimidating circumstances, finding instead that appellant's consent was intelligent, express, and voluntary. The seized marijuana was therefore admissible.

• Conviction for "Giving Away": The Court rejected the trial court's interpretation that the physical act of handing the plastic bag from the front to the back seat of the taxicab constituted "giving away" prohibited drugs. The phrase "give away" is commonly defined as "to make a present of; to donate, or to make a sacrifice," and as used in statutes, extends only to a disposition in ejusdem generis with a sale or gift — synonymous with "to furnish," embracing acts of selling and giving away with the intent of transferring ownership. As distinguished from "delivery," which is an incident of sale, "giving away" is a disposition other than a sale, involving no consideration, where the prohibited drug becomes an item presented as a gift or premium. Appellant handed the bag to Noriel merely because Noriel boarded the taxi first and there was more room in the back seat — not as a gift or premium. The Court cited People vs. Cuison, where it acquitted an accused because the act per se of handing over baggage at the airport could not be considered criminal. The Court further noted that adopting the trial court's reasoning would lead to absurd results: Noriel would be criminally liable when he handed the bag to PO3 Valenzuela for inspection, and Valenzuela would likewise be culpable when he turned the bag over to Lt. de Soto. Statutes should receive a sensible construction to avoid absurd conclusions.

• Conviction for Illegal Possession: The Court held that although appellant could not be convicted of "giving away" under Section 4, he could be convicted of "illegal possession" under Section 8, as possession is a necessary element of and necessarily included in the crimes of sale, delivery, or giving away of prohibited drugs. Citing People vs. Tabar, where the Court convicted an accused of illegal possession under Section 8 although he was charged with "selling" marijuana under Section 4, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity not covered by the sale. The elements of illegal possession are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug. The NBI forensic chemist's identification of the marijuana was conclusive, satisfying the first element. Appellant had no legal authorization, satisfying the second. As to the third element — conscious possession — the Court rejected the trial court's reasoning that appellant must have known the contents because of the pungent odor, noting that the bag was twisted and tied airtight and PO3 Valenzuela himself did not notice the smell until he punctured the bag. However, the Court applied the doctrine that in prosecutions of acts mala prohibita, criminal intent need not be proved; it is sufficient that the prohibited act was intentionally done. The intent to commit the crime is distinguished from the intent to perpetrate the act: a person may not have intended to commit a crime, but if he intended to commit the act and that act is by its nature the crime itself, he may be held liable. Appellant's possession of the plastic bag gave rise to a disputable presumption under Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that he was the owner of the bag and its contents. His bare denial that the bag was given to him by his uncle without knowledge of its contents was insufficient to overcome this presumption, as denial is a common and standard defense ploy in drug prosecutions, invariably viewed with disfavor unless substantiated by clear evidence. The trial court's rejection of appellant's denial was accorded the highest respect, appellant having failed to show that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued any evidence of substance.

• Consent Search as Exception to Warrant Requirement — A warrantless search is valid when the accused freely and voluntarily consents to it, consent being a generally recognized exception to the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. Consent must be intelligent, express, and voluntary, not merely passive conformity under intimidating or coercive circumstances. In this case, appellant's express declaration that he was "confident that they have not done anything wrong" and his allowing the search constituted intelligent and voluntary acquiescence that validated the warrantless search.

• Distinction Between "Giving Away" and "Delivery" of Prohibited Drugs — "Giving away" prohibited drugs under Section 4 of R.A. 6425 requires a transfer of ownership by way of gift or premium — a disposition other than a sale involving no consideration. It is distinguished from "delivery," which is an incident of sale. The mere physical act of handing a bag between co-accused inside a vehicle, without intent to transfer ownership, does not constitute "giving away."

• Possession as a Necessary Element Necessarily Included in Sale, Delivery, or Giving Away — Illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 is necessarily included in charges of sale, delivery, or giving away under Section 4, because possession is a condition sine qua non — the corpus delicti of illegal sale or delivery cannot be established without showing that the accused possessed the prohibited drug. An accused charged under Section 4 may therefore be convicted under Section 8.

• Elements of Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs — The three elements are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.

• Mala Prohibita: Intent to Commit the Act vs. Intent to Commit the Crime — In prosecutions of acts mala prohibita, criminal intent need not be proved; it is sufficient that the prohibited act was intentionally done. Intent to commit the crime is distinguished from intent to perpetrate the act: a person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime, but if he intended to commit the act, and that act is by its nature the crime itself, he may be held liable. However, the prosecution must still prove that possession was done "freely and consciously."

• Disputable Presumption of Ownership Under Section 3(j), Rule 131 — A person found in possession of a thing is presumed to be the owner thereof. This presumption is satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be overcome by other evidence; a bare, uncorroborated denial is insufficient to rebut it.

• "Intent to commit the crime is not necessary, but intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law must be shown." — This passage articulates the controlling distinction in mala prohibita prosecutions between criminal intent and intent to do the prohibited act, a doctrine central to the Court's finding that appellant's conscious possession of the bag sufficed for conviction under Section 8 even without proof he knew the contents were marijuana.

• "A search of the luggage inside the vehicle would require the existence of probable cause." — This passage defines the boundary of permissible checkpoint searches: visual inspection is allowed as a routine check, but opening luggage requires probable cause — unless the search is otherwise justified by a recognized exception such as consent.

• "As distinguished from 'delivery,' which is an incident of sale, 'giving away' is a disposition other than a sale. It is, therefore, an act short of a sale which involves no consideration. The prohibited drug becomes an item or merchandise presented as a gift or premium (giveaway), where ownership is transferred." — This passage provides the canonical definition of "giving away" under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, distinguishing it from delivery and requiring transfer of ownership without consideration.

• "It being established that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the Court will thus determine appellant's culpability under Section 8." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for convicting appellant of a necessarily included offense not expressly charged, grounding the modification of the conviction from Section 4 to Section 8.

• People vs. Cuison, 256 SCRA 325 (1996) — Followed for principles governing arrest, search, and seizure, and for the proposition that the act per se of handing over baggage cannot be considered criminal, supporting the reversal of the "giving away" conviction.
• People vs. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144 (1993) — Followed as controlling precedent for convicting an accused of illegal possession under Section 8 when charged with selling under Section 4, establishing that possession is necessarily included in the crime charged.
• People vs. Manzano, 227 SCRA 780 (1993) — Followed for identifying the elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, emphasizing that delivery implies prior possession and that possession is a condition sine qua non.
• Aniag, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 424 (1994) — Distinguished. The Court cited Aniag for the principle that implied acquiescence under intimidating circumstances does not constitute valid consent, but distinguished it because appellant's consent in this case was express, intelligent, and voluntary.
• People vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 (1988) — Distinguished. In Claudio, the distinctive odor of marijuana emanating from a plastic bag constituted probable cause; in this case, the bag was airtight and no odor was detectable until it was punctured, so probable cause was absent.
• People vs. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1991) — Cited by the trial court for the proposition that "giving away" is akin to "transporting" and is a malum prohibitum established by mere commission of the act; the Supreme Court implicitly rejected this analogy.
• People vs. Bayona, 61 Phil. 181 (1935) — Followed for the doctrine that in mala prohibita, the intent with which the defendant violated the statute is immaterial, and the prohibited act's completion suffices.
• U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909) — Followed for the distinction between intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act in mala prohibita prosecutions.

• Section 4, Article II, Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended — Penalizes any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit, or transport any prohibited drug, or act as a broker. The Court interpreted "give away" as requiring a transfer of ownership by gift or premium, and reversed the conviction under this provision.
• Section 8, Article II, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179 — Penalizes illegal possession or use of Indian hemp with imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. The Court convicted appellant under this provision as a necessarily included offense, applying the penalty in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
• Section 2(f), R.A. 6425, as amended — Defines "deliver" as a person's act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another personally or otherwise, with or without consideration. The Court distinguished this from "giving away," which requires transfer of ownership without consideration.
• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and requires a warrant upon probable cause. The Court found no probable cause but upheld the search on the ground of consent.
• Section 3(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Renders evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures inadmissible. The Court found no violation because the search was consented to.
• Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court — Provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or evidence without a search warrant. The Court cited this among the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
• Section 3(j), Rule 131, Rules of Court — Establishes the disputable presumption that a person in possession of a thing is the owner thereof. The Court applied this presumption to appellant's possession of the plastic bag, finding his bare denial insufficient to overcome it.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concurred.