People vs. Mariano

The governing principle is that criminal jurisdiction is determined exclusively by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The Court held that estafa committed by a civilian falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of civil courts, and the rule granting exclusive jurisdiction to the tribunal that first takes cognizance applies only when two courts possess concurrent jurisdiction by statutory grant. Absent such grant to the military commission, the civil court’s jurisdiction remains intact and is not extinguished by the prior adjudication of a distinct offense involving different accused.

On December 18, 1974, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an information charging Hermogenes Mariano, a civilian liaison officer, with estafa for allegedly misappropriating USAID/NEC excess property valued at P4,797.35 intended for the municipality of San Jose del Monte. The same property had previously been the subject of a malversation case against Municipal Mayor Constantino Nolasco, who was convicted and sentenced by a Military Commission. The trial court granted Mariano’s motion to quash the estafa information, reasoning that the military tribunal’s prior cognizance of the property divested the civil court of jurisdiction. The People elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via certiorari to resolve the jurisdictional conflict.

• Hermogenes Mariano, a civilian, served as a liaison officer appointed by the Municipal Mayor of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, to receive US excess property from USAID/NEC for municipal use.
• Between May 11 and June 8, 1971, Mariano allegedly received electric and power cables valued at P4,797.35. Instead of delivering the items to the Municipal Mayor, he purportedly misappropriated them despite repeated demands.
• The same property formed the basis of a malversation charge against Mayor Constantino Nolasco, who was subsequently convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by a Military Commission.
• On December 18, 1974, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mariano in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
• Mariano moved to quash the information, asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the Military Commission had already adjudicated the case involving the identical subject matter.
• The trial court granted the motion to quash, holding that the military tribunal’s prior cognizance of the property divested the civil court of jurisdiction. The People sought certiorari to correct the jurisdictional error.

• Petitioner maintained that the Court of First Instance possessed original jurisdiction over estafa under Section 44(f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as the prescribed penalty exceeds six months’ imprisonment.
• Petitioner argued that General Order No. 49 does not vest military tribunals with jurisdiction over estafa, thereby eliminating any basis for concurrent jurisdiction.
• Petitioner contended that malversation and estafa constitute distinct offenses, and the prior military conviction involved a different accused. Consequently, the first-to-file rule does not apply, and the civil court’s jurisdiction remains exclusive and undisturbed.

• Respondent Judge and accused asserted that the Military Commission had already taken cognizance of the case involving the same subject property, thereby divesting the civil court of jurisdiction under the principle of prior exclusive assumption of jurisdiction.
• Respondent argued that the trial court lacked authority to retry or re-examine matters already adjudicated by a competent military tribunal, warranting the quashal of the information.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the trial court correctly granted the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction based on the prior cognizance of the subject matter by a military tribunal.
• Substantive Issues: Whether civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over estafa committed by a civilian, and whether the prior adjudication of a distinct offense (malversation) involving different accused extinguishes the civil court’s jurisdiction over the estafa charge.

• Procedural: The Court ruled that the trial court gravely erred in quashing the information. Jurisdiction attaches at the time of filing and is governed by the statute then in force. The trial court properly acquired jurisdiction upon the filing of the information, and the subsequent invocation of a military tribunal’s prior cognizance does not retroactively strip it of that jurisdiction. The Order was set aside, and the trial court was directed to proceed.
• Substantive: The Court held that estafa falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of civil courts. Concurrent jurisdiction requires a statutory grant to both tribunals, which is absent here because General Order No. 49 does not enumerate estafa among offenses cognizable by military commissions. Malversation and estafa are legally distinct crimes with different elements and accused persons. Because the military commission lacked authority over estafa, the rule granting exclusive jurisdiction to the tribunal that first takes cognizance does not apply, and the civil court retains full authority to try the case.

• Jurisdiction Determined by Law at Commencement of Action — Jurisdiction is fixed by the statute in force at the time the action is filed and is not altered by subsequent changes in law or by the prior assumption of jurisdiction by another tribunal over a related but distinct offense. The Court applied this principle to affirm that the Court of First Instance acquired jurisdiction upon filing under the Judiciary Act of 1948, and that jurisdiction cannot be divested by the prior military adjudication of a different accused.
• Exclusive vs. Concurrent Jurisdiction — Concurrent jurisdiction exists only when two tribunals are expressly vested by law with authority to try the same offense. The first-to-file rule applies solely in such instances. The Court held that because military commissions lacked statutory authority over estafa, no concurrent jurisdiction existed, and civil courts retained exclusive jurisdiction over the civilian’s case.

• "the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action." — The Court invoked this settled rule to reject the trial court’s reliance on the military commission’s prior cognizance, emphasizing that jurisdictional authority is fixed at filing and cannot be displaced by subsequent jurisdictional claims over distinct offenses.
• "We do not have here a situation involving two tribunals vested with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime so as to apply the rule that the court or tribunal which first takes cognizance of the case acquires jurisdiction thereof exclusive of the other." — The Court clarified that the first-to-acquire-jurisdiction doctrine presupposes concurrent statutory authority, which is absent when one tribunal lacks legal power over the specific crime charged.

• Herrera v. Barretto — Cited to establish the foundational definition of jurisdiction as the authority to hear and determine a cause and the right to act in a case.
• People v. Fontanilla — Cited as controlling precedent for the principle that jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time the action commences.
• People v. Fernando — Cited to delineate the scope of the concurrent jurisdiction rule, reinforcing that the first-to-file principle applies only when both tribunals possess concurrent statutory authority.

• Judiciary Act of 1948, Sec. 44(f) — Confers original jurisdiction upon Courts of First Instance over criminal cases where the prescribed penalty exceeds six months’ imprisonment or a fine of two hundred pesos. The provision established the trial court’s jurisdictional basis.
• Revised Penal Code, Art. 315, par. 3(d) — Defines the penalty for estafa involving amounts over P200 but not exceeding P6,000, which falls within the jurisdictional threshold of the Court of First Instance.
• General Order No. 49 (Oct. 4, 1974) — Redefined the jurisdiction of military tribunals over specific offenses. The Court noted that estafa was not enumerated therein, thereby confirming the military commission’s lack of authority over the crime.

• Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, and Martin, JJ. — Concurred with the ponencia without additional opinion.